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In Essay One, I estimate how demographic characteristics associate with habitual 
purchase of sweetened carbonated soft drinks (sCSDs), as different demographic groups respond 
to marketing variables controlled by the sCSD industry.  My method and assumptions cleave 
neither to conventional economic analysis nor to medical and nutrition literature interested in 
sugar and soft-drink consumption.  No assumption in my estimation process violates arguments 
in later essays.  Results identify household purchase behaviors for relatively fine demographic 
groupings, are not linear in income or education level, and further vary by gender of the head of 
household and by type of sCSD industry marketing tool.  The richness and detail of results 
appear to be unique, and capable of answering more questions than I ask in this work, validating 
the logic behind the uncommon methodology. 
In Essay Two, I review empirical and theoretical results from medical/nutritional science 
on added sugars, obesity, and health, as well as psychology, decision theory, behavioral 
economics, neuroeconomics, and social psychology literature.  Each explains mechanisms by 
which individuals may fail to maximize their own lifetime utility in their eating patterns.  I offer a 
descriptive model and a framework that accommodate evidence indicating that conventional 
economic assumptions do not hold for some class of individuals in their dietary habits relative to 
high-energy, low-nutrient foods.  The challenge to expand conventional rational-choice/demand 
theory may help economists better model actual consumer dietary behavior, or help economists 
Charles Rhodes – University of Connecticut, 2013 
embrace a partial inability to do so comprehensively.  Either result should impact how economists 
assess demand and discuss policy options. 
Essay Three explores types of market failure associated with sCSD consumption and 
options for correcting them.  Policy recommendations to correct the full set of market failures 
flow from my empirical results and from my review of and linkage to scientific evidence 
provided by neighboring disciplines.  Because policy proposals here, some extant some new, 
specifically address empirically verified mechanisms that seem to undermine utility-maximizing 
behavior, greater Pareto efficiency and better U.S. health outcomes should follow from careful 
adherence to this policy set – more than for any previously proposed policy set to reduce 
unhealthful food consumption that I have found. 
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Chapter 1 
Dissertation Overview &  
Sweetened Carbonated Soft Drinks in the U.S. 
 
1.1    Dissertation Overview 
In Essay One, “An Empirical Analysis of Household-Level Sweetened Carbonated Soft-
Drink Purchase Behavior By Socio-Demographic Sub-Group,”  I estimate with some precision 
the demographic characteristics associated with habitual purchase of sweetened carbonated soft 
drinks (sCSDs) as different demographic groups respond to marketing variables controlled by 
the sCSD industry. No assumption in my estimation process violates arguments in later essays.  
I expect to contribute to the literature because my method and assumptions are not 
conventional to empirical analysis in industrial organization or marketing literature, while I 
explore consumer economics ignored by medical and nutrition literature interested in sugar and 
soft-drink consumption. I offer results that identify household purchase behaviors for relatively 
fine demographic groupings, results that are not linear in income or education level, and that 
further vary by gender of the head of household and by type of sCSD industry marketing tool. 
The richness and detail of the results appear to be unique, and capable of answering more 
questions than I ask in this work, validating the logic behind the uncommon methodology. 
Separately from identifying who is purchasing a high volume of sCSDs and who is 
purchasing in association with price, sale, and advertising incentives, I seek to understand why 
heavy drinkers of sCSDs do this despite clear evidence from the medical community that poor 
health is likely to result from this practice in a variety of ways. How one answers this question 
greatly affects what one considers to be relevant economic analysis, as well as how one believes 
economic analysis should inform policy choices. 
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In Essay Two, “When Regular Soft-Drink Consumption Fails to Maximize Utility: A 
Dynamic Theoretical Model Flexible to Failures of Rationality,” I review empirical and 
theoretical results from medical/nutritional science on added sugars, obesity, and health, as well 
as psychology, decision theory, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, and social psychology 
literature. Each explains mechanisms by which individuals may fail to maximize their own 
lifetime utility in their eating patterns. I refer to this quasi-exogenous literature to inform and 
comment on consumer behavior as it relates to habitual consumption of unhealthful foods, of 
which sCSDs are the primary example in the U.S. 
Neoclassical theories of rational choice tend to be positive, and do not analyze the 
processes underlying decisions. Essay Two presents a descriptive model informed by 
experimental results and theory from neighboring disciplines. I pose that pertaining to cheap 
ubiquitous high-energy low-nutritive foods, neoclassical models overreach in the strictness of 
premises about individual decision processes. The behavioral economic platform in Essay Two 
focuses on biological and psychological decision processes. This broader analysis provides 
insight into specific failures of the rational utility maximizing model, and indicates policy 
recommendations to correct individual failures to maximize utility. 
I expect this essay to contribute to the literature by introducing a simple framework that 
draws on empirical evidence indicating that conventional economic assumptions do not hold for 
at least some class of individuals in their dietary habits relative to high-energy, low-nutrient food 
consumption. The challenge to expand conventional rational-choice/demand theory may help 
economists improve modeling of actual consumer dietary behavior, or to embrace a partial 
inability to do so comprehensively. The latter effect may impact how economists assess demand 
and discuss policy options, and perhaps affect the degree of confidence with which they do both. 
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Essay Three, “Habitual Soft-Drink Consumption: How Markets Fail, and How Policy 
Prescriptions Must Adapt,” explores types of market failure in the sCSD industry and options for 
correcting them. Essays One and Two identify consumer behaviors and market failures, focusing 
on those that tend to be overlooked by conventional economic and industrial organization 
analyses. Policy recommendations to correct the full set of market failures flow from my 
empirical results (Essay One), and my review of and linkage to scientific evidence from 
neighboring disciplines (Essays Two and Three). In other words, I am presenting a holistic 
scientific analysis of poor nutrition in America. 
I expect this essay to contribute to the literature by presenting a simple framework to 
explain why economists seem to overlook certain market failures, and by advocating a more 
robust set of policy options. Policy proposals offered here are designed to effectively improve 
U.S. health outcomes associated with sCSD overconsumption, based on mechanisms that have 
been theoretically and then empirically identified by relevant science from economics and 
neighboring disciplines. Policy proposals include some options extant in the literature, but also 
encompass new options, with both sets specifically addressing particular mechanisms that 
undermine Pareto efficiency in sCSD markets and more broadly. The policy set proposed here is 
designed to more fully correct sCSD market failures – including failures of the market 
environment and individual decision making to conform to neoclassical expectations – than 
would proposals currently advocated in any single literature. If implemented in toto and as 
described, the set of policy proposals offered here would positively impact U.S. health outcomes 
to a degree unachievable by any subset of policies currently proposed, and should improve U.S. 
diets beyond reduced sCSD consumption. 
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1.2    Cultural Context of the sCSD Product Category 
Figures relating the rapid expansion of overweight and obesity in the American population 
over recent decades have been cited so often that they may have begun to lose their power to 
alarm. But the numbers depicting epidemic rises in diet-related health problems when understood 
in their proper context cannot fail to alarm, once one admits that the term “epidemic,” while not 
microbially based, is appropriate. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
use the term epidemic in this context (cdc.gov website, accessed November 2011), and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) uses “Pandemic” for the situation globally (Swinburn et al. 2011). 
Defining obesity as having a body-mass index (BMI1) over 30, 2010 numbers from the CDC 
indicate that every state in the U.S. has an obesity rate over 20%, with 12 states having obesity 
prevalence of over 30% (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia, 
[http://www.cdc.gov2
Overweight and obese individuals are at increased risk for many diseases and health conditions, including 
the following: hypertension, dyslipidemia (for example, high LDL cholesterol, low HDL cholesterol, or 
high levels of triglycerides), Type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke, gallbladder disease, 
osteoarthritis, sleep apnea and respiratory problems, [and] some cancers (endometrial, breast, and colon). 
]). For reference, not a single state had obesity prevalence over 14% in 
1990. For adults over the age of 20 years, the CDC calculates the combined nationwide rate for 
those either overweight (34.4%) or obese (33.9%) by the BMI measure to be 68.3 percent. Only 
one-third of Americans remain at or below a broad scientific measure for “normal” weight.  
                                                 
1 Body Mass Index, or BMI, is calculated in standard American measure as: weight (lbs.) / [height (in.)]2} x 703; 
and in metric units as weight (kg) / [ [height (m)]2. Thus a 5-foot five-inch person weighing 150 lbs. has a BMI of 
24.96, on the cusp between “normal” (18.5-24.9), and “overweight” (25-29.9). Any BMI below 18.5 is considered 
“underweight.”  “BMI is calculated the same way for both adults and children,” 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html, or http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/overwt.html, accessed 19 
November 2011. 
2 All facts in this paragraph and the indented quote are from http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html, or 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/overwt.html, or 
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_BMI/index.html, accessed 19 November 2011. LDL is low-
density lipoprotein (the “bad” part of cholesterol), and HDL is high-density lipoprotein, who’s high ratio relative to 
LDL is considered a good marker in cholesterol evaluation. 
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American health is faltering, and the current trend is persistent and negative. Seventeen percent 
of U.S. children and adolescents are now obese, triple the rate from a generation ago,3
The economic costs of overweight and obesity are large and growing. One estimate by 
Columbia University, Oxford, and Harvard Public Health specialists is that costs for treatment of 
obesity-related diseases will rise in the US by $48-66 billion per year by 2030 (Wang et al. 
2011). For baseline reference, Finkelstein et al. (2009) estimate the 2008 cost of obesity-related 
diseases in the U.S. at $147 billion, so Wang et al.’s estimated increases on the order of one-third 
more. Finkelstein et al. estimate that in 2006 obese individuals spent about 42% more on health 
care, or $1429 per capita, versus normal weight people.  
 with 35% 
of American children now overweight or obese (Harris et al. 2009). 
 What do these grim numbers and ominous projections have to do with sweetened 
carbonated soft-drinks (again, sCSDs)? How can one food category, particularly one that 
averages 94% water,4 be attributed particular blame in the obesity epidemic?5
While marketed to the consumer brain for their flavor, effervescence, kick (caffeine), 
color, and overall enjoyability, most sugar-sweetened beverages enter the digestive track as 
nutrient-deficient simple sugars in a form and quantity the human body did not evolve to tolerate 
well (Wolf , Bray, and Popkin 2007). Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs), and particularly 
sCSDs, the largest category by consumption within SSBs, have a special place at the head of the 
line when the medical community attributes factors associated with overweight, obesity, and 
dietary-based illness. While there is more detail in Essay Two, it is useful to summarize here 
 
                                                 
3 http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/index.html, accessed 19 November 2011. 
4 NPLAN 2011; The National Policy & Legal Analysis Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity, p 15. 
5 “…(O)besity is a multifactorial condition…(.) (I)t is extremely difficult to identify, much less quantify the relative 
contributions of each factor in epidemiological studies” (Johnson et al. 2009, p 1016). 
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some of the reasons that sCSDs and SSBs are exceptional, as these reasons motivate both the 
focus and in part the methodology of my empirical work. 
The first reason is the sheer quantity of SSBs in the American diet. This quantity has 
been increasing for decades. The second reason is the class of biological effects (on body and 
mind) of the sugars in SSBs. Added sugars are sugars added to foods in processing, excluding 
naturally occurring sugars such as in oranges, onions, or milk. 
Soft drinks and other sugar-sweetened beverages are the primary source of added sugars in Americans’ 
diet. Excessive consumption of sugars has been linked with several metabolic abnormalities and adverse 
health conditions, as well as shortfalls of essential nutrients. 
  American Heart Association Scientific Statement (Johnson et al. 2009, p 1011) 
 
Marriott et al. (2010) confirm that sCSDs are “the main contributor of added sugars in the 
diet of all age/gender groups [from 4-8 years to 31 to 50 years] with a higher mean gram-
equivalent contribution of added sugars from soft drinks beginning in adolescence, peaking in 
adulthood, and evidencing lower contribution after age 50”6
A 2011 National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Data Brief reports that 
“approximately one-half of the population aged 2 and older consumes sugar drinks [SSBs] on 
any given day. …Among boys 2 -19 years, 70% consume sugar drinks on any given day” 
(Ogden et al. 2011, p 2). About half of this half of the population that consumes SSBs daily, or 
25%, consume at least 200 kcals per day, equivalent to more than one 12-oz can of sCSD per 
day. Just over half of all SSB calories are consumed at home (p 5). Five percent of Americans 
 (p 247). Even the eldest groups are 
not immune to the effects of SSBs in the diet, however: “today all ages consume far more sugar 
from SSBs and related beverages than any other time” [in human history and in recent decades] 
(Popkin 2010). “Market research data show that in the 1990s, soft drink consumption increased 
more quickly than consumption of any other food group” (French, Story, Jeffery 2001, p 312). 
                                                 
6 Females in the 51-to-70-years life stages group, and both genders in 71+ years consumed added sugars in “grain 
products” more than from sCSDs. 
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consume at least 567 kcals from SSBs daily, equivalent to more than four 12-oz cans of cola (p 
2). “…[T]he American Heart Association has recommended a consumption goal of no more than 
450 kilocalories (kcal) of sugar-sweetened beverages—or fewer than three 12-oz cans of 
carbonated cola—per week” (p 1, emphasis added). 
Reports based on the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 
surveys from 1988-1994 and from 1999-2000, the gold-standard food recall surveys on which 
US food consumption data is based, both found the number one contributor of energy intake to 
be soft drinks, at over 7% of total average daily caloric intake in the 1999-2000 period (Block 
2004; the NCHS data just cited is NHANES based). In a 2001 Journal of Nutrition article, Susan 
Krebs-Smith of the National Cancer Institute lists 42 food categories that together comprise more 
than 99.99 percent of added sugars in the American diet. Carbonated soft drinks are first at 
33.2% (one-third), followed by fruit drinks at another 9.8%. Including fruit drinks, the six food 
categories after sCSDs (fruit drinks, candy, cakes, ice cream/ice milk, ready-to-eat cereals and 
cereal bars, and sugar/honey) together comprise the second third of total added sugars (to 
66.1%), leaving the remaining 35 categories to round out the final third. In their American Heart 
Association Scientific Statement, Johnson et al. (2009) list regular soft drinks as accounting for 
33% of all added sugars in the American diet, with fruit drinks another 9.7%. The Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans, 2010 groups soda, energy drinks, and sports drinks together as 36% of 
added sugars in the American diet, followed by sugar-sweetened fruit drinks, again at 10%.  
Consumption of sCSDs peaked in 1997, but this is almost entirely offset now by the rise 
in very-near-category sports drinks and energy drinks and other SSBs, with the balance offset by 
bottled water. Sports drinks and energy drinks are sCSDs in all but name, with a slight ingredient 
twist that often includes no reduction in sugar content (Popkin 2010; Harris 2011). “Over the 
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past 30 years, total calorie intake has increased by an average of 150 to 300 calories per day, and 
approximately 50% of this increase comes from liquid calories (primarily sugar-sweetened 
beverages). At the same time there has been no apparent change in physical activity” (Johnson et 
al. 2009, p 1016). Nielsen and Popkin (2004) confirm that dietary calories from SSB 
consumption tripled from 1977 to 2001. To make the 150-300 kcal/d increase tractable, consider 
that to burn off the 140 kcal/d in a 12-ounce soda, an 85-kg man (187.4 lbs.) would have to get 
out of his chair and walk for 50 minutes (Bleich et al. 2009). If physical activity is flat, as has 
been found, the effect of adding non-nutritive calories is predictable.  
McCrory et al. (2002) confirm the fact that Americans are becoming obese in larger 
numbers and earlier in life due to increased caloric intake and not due to a decrease in physical 
activity. This characterizes a classic energy imbalance. When this energy imbalance is positive, it 
must lead to weight gain (although not in a simplistic or linear fashion, as has been commonly 
applied by economists and others concerned with the sCSD-weight correlation, Hall et al. 2011). 
SSBs contribute directly to obesity in children, adolescents, and adults (Malik et al. 2004, 2010; 
for children only, Ludwig, Peterson, Gortmaker 2001). As SSBs account for half the average 
American calorie increase over recent decades, their contribution is larger than for any other 
food. Portion sizes and number of servings of SSBs have increased over time, replacing more 
nutrient-rich dietary choices including milk with nutrient poor beverage substitutes (Nielsen and 
Popkin 2004). Duffey and Popkin (2006) find that when they separated foods and beverages into 
similar clusters by nutrient profile and health effects, being in the unhealthy food cluster 
predicted being in the unhealthy beverage cluster, and vice versa. High SSB purchase may be a 
useful marker for poorer overall diet. 
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While some mechanisms by which SSBs contribute to obesity are debated, others are 
well-established, as will be detailed in Essay Two. But there is no confusion about whether SSBs 
contribute to obesity. Johnson et al. (2010) make clear that the jury is back: Vartanian et al. 
(2007) conducted a meta-analysis of 88 cross-sectional and prospective studies, and found that 
higher sCSD intake was associated with not only greater (average daily) energy intake, but with 
higher body weight, lower intake of other nutrients, and poorer indicators of health.7
a reduction in liquid calories had a stronger effect than did a reduction in solid calorie intake on weight 
loss. Of the individual beverages, only intake of sugar-sweetened beverages was significantly associated 
with weight change. A reduction in SSB intake of 1 serving/[day] was associated with a weight loss of 0.49 
kg (95% C.I.: 0.11, 0.82; P=0.006) at 6 [months] and of 0.65 kg (95% C.I.: 0.22, 1.09; P=0.003) at 18 
[months] (p 1299). 
 Following 
their 18-month prospective study of 810 adults (not then obese), Chen et al. (2009) found that: 
 
 The SSB contribution to health problems goes beyond the particular and unrivaled effect 
of SSB calories on daily caloric imbalance and obesity over time. The liquid sugars in SSBs 
increase the risk of diabetes and cardiovascular disease independently of their contribution to 
obesity. Harvard School of Public Health’s Frank Hu (2010) explains that while “(u)ntil recently, 
the role of [refined] carbohydrates in cardiovascular disease risk has received scant attention” (p 
1541), a prospective study over 12 years with over 50,000 participants indicates that refined 
carbohydrates are likely to cause even more atherosclerosis and heart disease than saturated fat 
would “in a predominantly sedentary and overweight population” (p 1542).  
Essay Two presents scientifically established metabolic effects of sugar consumption on 
weight, health, and effects that may mimic addictive properties that could influence decision 
                                                 
7 Malik et al. (2010) note that the type of study may affect the degree of association between SSB consumption and 
obesity [citations deleted, emphasis added, p 1358]: 
…[D]ifferences in study design, methodologies, and data quality have made it difficult to observe a consistent effect. 
Cross-sectional studies are not optimal because of the high potential for intractable confounding and reverse causation. 
Experimental studies are not well suited to capture long-term patterns because compliance tends to wane with increasing 
duration, but they do provide important insight into potential underlying biological mechanisms. Prospective cohort 
studies tend to provide the most robust evidence despite a large degree of diversity between studies in terms of outcome 
measurements, size, and duration of follow-up. Therefore, greater emphasis should be placed on larger studied of longer 
duration that are better powered to detect an effect. In this literature [SSBs and obesity], the longest and largest studies 
show stronger and more consistent associations compared with smaller and shorter studies. 
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making. Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012) describe the abuse potential for sugar explicitly: 
“sugar acts on the brain to encourage subsequent intake” (p 28). Princeton psychology 
researchers Avena, Rada, and Hoebel (2009), in a larger discussion of the neurobiology of sugar 
and fat binge eating, review literature on similar dopamine pathways between drug addicts and 
“carbohydrate cravers” and conclude: “Collectively, these clinical studies support the view that 
overeating can affect behavior and brain systems in a manner that resembles aspects of 
addiction” (p 625). The American Heart Association’s recommended daily limit for added sugars 
in the diet is less than the gram-equivalent sugar in a 12-ounce can of cola (144 kcal/day) for an 
average adult woman (100 kcal/day), and a half teaspoon less than the recommended limit for an 
adult male (150 kcal/day; Stanhope et al. 2011). So it is worth considering whether a 12- or 20- 
or 36- or 48-oz “can/bottle/cup” of sCSD is “overeating” in the sense of binge eating.8
Ogden et al. (2011) find every age group of males from adolescence to the age of 60 
derive more than 150 kcals/day from SSBs (the average, including 2−5 years, is 178 kcals/d, 
peaking at 273 kcal/d for 12−19-year olds). Females significantly differ from males in all but the 
2−5-year group, and are over the adult 100 kcal/day recommendation from SSB calories alone in 
age groups from adolescence to at least the age of 40, averaging over 100 kcals/d across all 
groups, including 2−5 years. To reiterate: on average Americans above the age of 5 and below 
the age of 60 (perhaps 40 for females
 
9
                                                 
8 Avena, Rada, and Hoebel use the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.) to define binge 
eating, as repeatedly eating a larger amount than normal in less than 2 hours, along with combinations of other 
aspects, including: eating when not physically hungry, eating much more rapidly than normal, and eating alone 
because one is embarrassed. Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) use a more general definition: “eating that results 
from disinhibition of dietary restraints” whether or not within a pattern of bulimia as clinically defined (p 86). 
) are exceeding their entire daily added sugar limit as 
recommended by the AHA from sugar-sweetened beverages alone. Specifically this excessive 
9 The lack of greater age definition makes the cutoff unclear. For females in the 20-39-year group, the average is 138 
kcal/d, for the 40-59 group it is 86 kcal/d, and above 60 it is 42 kcal/d. There is a steep drop off, that by interpolation 
probably doesn’t fall below 100 kcal/d until at least the age of 50. But there is no way to be sure from the Ogden et 
al. (2011) data configuration. 
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amount counts no other added sugar calories from any source, in any processed food, including 
ready-to-eat cereals, breads, and other items not even classified as sweets, as well as of course, 
not counting non-SSB sweets. By established medical and nutrition standards, the average 
number of SSB ounces per day per American is an overconsumption of discretionary calories 
defined as allowable across all sources.10
This information raises questions relevant to the mechanisms of consumer choice that 
economists rely upon. Regular soft-drink consumption may affect lifetime utility in more than 
one way. As desirable consumables for which one might expect that in the roughest sense 
demand increases with income (thus having at least one aspect of a normal good, like demand for 
cars), sCSDs simultaneously have at least some commonly known negative health(/side) effects 
(like pork lard for cooking, an empirically demonstrated inferior good). All consumers may not 
know about obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and cancer risk, but the association of sCSDs with 
some of these effects and at least dental caries is a reasonable assumption as to the knowledge 
base of nearly every sCSD consumer. To argue the opposite would be absurd given even the 
minimal nutritional knowledge one absorbs being raised in the U.S.  
 
                                                 
10 Current sCSD average consumption rates estimated by the U.S. government and the medical community suggest 
that as few as 15% and perhaps 25% or more of the U.S. population is driven over recommended daily limits of 
added sugar by sugared beverage consumption alone, with specific demographic groups tending even further beyond 
recommended limits predominantly due to sweetened beverage consumption (range calculated from information in 
Johnson et al. 2009; Marriot et al. 2010 [esp. Table 7, from which Table 23 (the only table in Essay Two) is partially 
constructed]; and Chapter 3 in USDA’s Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010]). “On the basis of the 2005 US 
Dietary Guidelines, intake of added sugars greatly exceeds discretionary calorie allowances, regardless of energy 
needs” (Johnson et al. 2009), meaning people consume too many added sugars daily, regardless of how many 
overall calories comprise the baseline recommended amount for the man, woman, or child. Thus use of the term 
“overconsumption” follows. Overconsumption of added sugars (artificially added, not naturally occurring) spans 
nearly every demographic category, with sCSDs the single largest contributor. Further, sCSDs (along with fruit-
ades/fruit drinks) as a portion of calories rise substantially for consumers who take 20 to 35 percent or more of their 
total calories from added sugars (Marriot et al. 2010, Johnson et al. 2009). Recommended daily limits for added 
sugars are easily reached if one consumes a single 12-oz can of classic Coke (144 kcals), and are almost certainly 
exceeded with a 20-oz bottle (240 kcals). Two things are noteworthy here. First, for the standard caloric product 
versions, Pepsi has more sugar than Coke per serving. Second, these numbers mean that a single product unit per 
day (12 or 20 ounces) represents at least the entire daily overage for added sugars for an individual, as estimated for 
actual American diets using dietary recall surveys, the current academic standard. Exact figures appear again in 
Essay Two. 
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If the “bad” aspects are known and people drink less as income rises, sCSDs are no 
longer normal but inferior goods – a testable hypothesis discussed in the results section (Chapter 
5). 
Of interest to the economist must be whether decisions stay rational and the individual 
utility maximization assumption is satisfied when current consumption of a good may be 
counterbalanced over time by undesirable aspects of this good, and when near the time that the 
choice to consume is made the consumable may affect the brain chemistry used to evaluate 
expected utility. If either effect occurs, the assumptions of rational choice and utility 
maximization may find too little footing to be used as definitive premises for quantitative 
analysis. Essay Two explores evidence relevant to these concerns, and offers theoretical models 
flexible to the assumption of rational utility maximization in the regular choice to consume high-
added-sugar foodstuffs. 
Essay Three continues this effort in an attempt to match policy prospects with 
mechanisms by which markets or individual utility maximization might fail. Essay Three 
explores evidence that the formation of dietary habits may not follow processes the economist 
would consider to be consistently rational, and that the breaking or re-training of dietary habits is 
far from trivial. Essay Three considers empirical evidence that the comprehensive marketing 
environment in conjunction with cultural factors that have developed in recent decades have 
increased sCSD consumption by mechanisms that tend to be ignored by economists due to 
economists’ own default assumption set. A core argument is that the current soft-drink culture is 
deeply engrained in the market environment and consumer psychology, and that only by 
influencing the market environment and consumer psychology can this health-degrading culture 
begin to be reversed. 
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Essay One 
An Empirical Analysis of  
Household-Level Sweetened Carbonated Soft-Drink Purchase Behavior  
By Socio-Demographic Sub-Group  
 
Chapter 2 
Introduction and Motivation 
 
2.1    Overview 
In this essay I use data from actual household purchases and industry advertising over 
three recent years, and conduct multivariate regression to identify how specific demographic 
groups vary in their purchase response to marketing of sweetened carbonated soft drinks 
(sCSDs) at the product category level. My empirical design appreciates findings, insights, and 
arguments made in Essay Two. 
Empirical results reveal patterns of household purchase response to sCSD-industry price, 
sale, and advertising signals (marketing variables) that vary significantly by identifiable 
demographic characteristics. Along with household income, racial classification, and household 
size (or number of children), the sex, highest level of education, and age of the household head 
all tend to expose significant differences in purchase response to sCSD marketing variables. By 
interacting income and education with other demographic variables, I identify where effects 
associated with certain demographic characteristics predict larger or smaller purchase responses, 
and to a degree how robust these effects are.  
Isolating the effects of either price, or sale, or advertising on household purchase, 
“highest education level of high school or less” for the household head tends to be the most 
robust predictor of higher sCSD purchase, followed by “household income at or below the 
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poverty level for a family of four.” There is more variability by racial groups, a fact to which this 
work draws considerable attention. It is clear that households headed by Asian males are 
inordinately responsive to marketing variable incentives, and purchase according to textbook 
predictions for a normal good, in a way that no other sex-specific racially identified head-of-
household type does. In contrast to Asian-male-headed households, most groups confirm 
purchase behavior roughly consistent with sCSDs being an inferior good. Male-headed 
households tend to be more purchase responsive to marketing variables than female-headed 
households, with and without children present in the home. Reacting to price and advertising (but 
not to sale), lower-middle and lower income households with children purchase more sCSD as 
the number of children in the home rises, whereas middle-income and higher-income households 
buy less sCSD as the number of children in the home rises. This indicates an income-based 
difference in how much sCSD parents allow their children to drink, with parents on the lower 
spectrum becoming more tolerant as they have more children in the home. 
After controlling for other effects, very few of the estimated and predicted purchase 
patterns are linear in effect from a low to high level within a variable – income, education level, 
age, or number of children. This suggests a complexity of behavior that belies predictions from 
the broadest forms of modeling, and justifies the attempt to identify effects at more refined levels 
of demographic identification than are typically selected for estimation and analysis. 
The empirical results from estimation and prediction in this work identify high-purchase-
response demographic sub-groups. As such these results may be used to identify or confirm the 
effectiveness of sCSD marketing strategies for commercial exploitation by the industry, or used 
by policy makers concerned with the overconsumption of sCSDs.  
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2.2    Research Objectives for Empirical Essay 
The empirical work uses sCSD purchase data at the household level from early 2006 to 
the end of 2008 across 16 major metropolitan areas and their environs, together sampling around 
1/3 of the U.S. population. This includes grocery or general merchandiser purchase of containers 
brought home, and not restaurant, movie house, or vending machine purchase data. Soft-drink 
industry television advertising exposure for weeks matching purchase data are also used (both 
data sets collected and processed by The Nielsen Company). Representing each household in 
each data week generates around 2.6 million household-level observations. 
The scope of the effect of sCSD consumption on American health, the diversity of the 
U.S. population, and existing evidence from a range of academic literatures present many 
questions that may be addressed using three years of marketing data for and household purchase 
of sCSDs – particularly when demographic information is available for all households in a 
demographically-weighted sample. 
Research already confirms that people vary widely in their nutrition knowledge, beliefs, 
and choices (Variyam and Golan 2002; Guthrie and Variyam 2007; Neff et al. 2009; Powell and 
Chaloupka 2010). Differences in sex, age, income, education, and ethnicity partly account for 
this variety. Analysis is limited to characteristics we can observe or infer. But even within these 
limitations, consumers are combinations of characteristics. Researchers may regress on categoric 
variables such as age or income, but ultimately individuals exist in multiple dimensions, and the 
higher-income young may not behave as the higher-income old, in ways that can significantly 
differ from linear estimation results based on age or income alone. Demographic variables alone 
may never explain a large portion of household differences in tastes (Zhen et al. 2009). 
Estimations based on broad averages may poorly identify associations of high variability. 
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While some behavioral trends may be roughly identified by broad isolated characteristics, 
combinations of observable characteristics are more likely to identify trends at an interesting 
level. Of course sCSD purchase rises with household size. Similarly, people expect sCSD 
demand to vary by income level, education level, and racial group, and probably by the sex of 
the head of household. But why should any difference in purchase across changing household 
income be strongly similar across racial groups, or across levels of education? Might it not be the 
case that a college education would affect one’s response to a price or advertising change 
differently if they were earning $20k/yr. versus $100k/yr. – whether for a luxury car, frozen 
chicken, or for sCSDs? By interacting demographic variables to identify specific demographic 
sub-groups, my objective is to determine if purchase responses to sCSD industry marketing 
variables – price, sale/price promotion, and advertising – differ significantly in ways that are not 
captured by aggregate variables.    
Studies with few demographic categories find that higher levels of family income or of 
formal education are associated with higher diet quality, and less added sugar intake (Thompson 
et al. 2009, Zoellner et al. 2011). Formally, in this empirical essay: I seek to analyze 
demographic variables in more disaggregate units, to determine which sets of household-level 
demographic characteristics are associated with the strongest sCSD-purchase response to sCSD 
industry marketing variables. Thus I examine consumer behavior in more detail, while also 
implicitly checking for the relative robustness of effects already identified in the literature across 
characteristics. For example if lower-educated households buy more sCSDs relative to higher-
educated households, is it true that lower-educated Hispanic households buy more sCSDs than 
higher-educated Hispanic households when they are on sale? If so is the difference greater or less 
than the difference for Asian households? 
17 
 
The same work can address numerous other questions. When deriving estimates for finer 
levels of demographic characteristics interacted across income or education levels, are responses 
linear – which would validate a categoric variable approach – or non-linear? Non-linear 
responses would suggest that marketing strategies or policy proposals based on broad categoric 
data may prove inefficient. There is an existing literature associating demographic characteristics 
with high added-sugar consumption or high sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) or sCSD 
consumption, but from my search, the entire literature derives from single- or two-day dietary 
recall surveys. Compared to these results, does behavior identified by a three-year panel confirm, 
dispute, or add useful gradients to current findings?  
There is more than one valid perspective on whether sCSDs are normal economic goods, 
or inferior economic goods. They are highly palatable, and their consumption has doubled with 
rising incomes in the U.S. since the 1960s. Use is high enough that many people clearly do not 
treat sCSDs as a rare treat, despite strong suggestions that they should from repeated iterations of 
the USDA’s Dietary Guidelines (and food pyramid). This suggests sCSDs are a normal good. 
However, medical/nutrition literature using dietary recall data for added sugars generally 
(Thompson et al. 2009) and for SSBs (Zoellner et al. 2011) finds that consumption falls in rising 
income, suggesting that sCSDs are an inferior good. What will this analysis based on actual 
purchase history suggest about the basic nature of sCSDs as an economic good? 
None of the prior studies interact education and income to control for education effects 
within income effects (and vice-versa), and only Thompson et al. interact either with racial 
group. If there are ethnically-based differences in purchase of sCSDs, the difference in purchase 
associated with rising education or income may well not be identical between racial groups, and 
Thompson et al. find differences from their nutrition survey data. By interacting purchase 
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reactions to various marketing variables within education-racial-group or income-racial-group 
bands, the robustness of education or income effects to sub-cultural tastes may be implicitly 
checked. Delineated by demographic characteristic, are the same people that nutritionists, 
psychologists, and behavioral economists (including decision theorists) suggest would be poor 
food decision makers the same ones that respond least to price incentives, and most to sale and 
advertising incentives for sCSD purchase? 
I also explore all of the above for difference in the sex of heads of household, including 
in the presence of children. Do poorer or less educated parents buy more sCSDs than better-
educated or higher-income parents? Are either group more reactive to sCSD advertising on 
television or to price promotions? Does racial grouping affect these reactions? Which household 
characteristics are associated with the highest reaction to all marketing variables when children 
are present in the household? Which the least? Which households will tax-based policies likely 
affect most, which will education-based policies affect most, which will advertising restrictions 
affect most? 
Broadly: will this deeper analysis, derived from panel data and household responses to 
industry marketing confirm, refute, or expand existing understanding in meaningful ways? 
 
2.3    Literature Review: sCSD Markets and Consumers 
Given the multiple objectives across this dissertation, literature review is broken into 
pieces at appropriate places for each essay, with the “Cultural Context” section (1.2) serving as 
background for all three essays. The following sub-sections address: market facts, market 
structure, and marketing facts relevant to the sCSD industry and its dominant place in the SSB 
category; and relevant literature of others who have correlated sCSD or SSB consumption with 
demographic factors. 
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2.3.1    CSD Industrial Organization and Marketing 
Industry structure of the sCSD or SSB industry is not a focal point of this work. 
Arguments can be made that the evolution of the American market that culminated in tripling of 
consumption of SSBs from 1970 to 2001 may not have occurred under an industry structure not 
dominated by one or two industry leaders of exceptional profitability, and power (market, 
economic, and political). But this is speculative, and does not affect other findings here. Some 
indications of industry structure and power are here in order to establish a general background 
before examining sCSD purchases by demographic type at the household level, and to partially 
sketch circumstances relevant to policy proposals in Essay Three.  
The Coca-Cola Company, founded some 125 years ago in 1886 and now based in 
Atlanta, is the most successful soft-drink company. It began when an Atlanta pharmacist 
combined a caffeinated kola nut from Africa with coca leaves from South America, putting 
together a spiced sugar-sweetened water-based “tonic.” Coca-Cola calculates that across its 
beverage line, worldwide customers now consume 1.8 billon servings per day – nearly one for 
every 3 people on the planet. These servings of more than 3,500 products are brought to over 200 
countries by over 146,000 employees, in a profitable manner, indicated by 49 consecutive years 
of stock dividend share increases. Beyond standard corporate webpage features, the Coca-Cola 
website has a tab linking to the company’s 2010/2011 Sustainability Report, and a “Heritage” 
tab. They well know their products and how to market them and their brand.1
During World War II, Coca-Cola worked closely with the US Department of War to provide free Cokes to 
army soldiers. As a result of a lobbying campaign, they were allowed to break sugar rationing rules and to 
create Coke plants in European countries with the support of the government, ultimately becoming 
synonymous globally with SSBs (Malik et al. 2010, p 1355). 
 
PepsiCo, building from the 1898 formulation of Pepsi Cola, is based in New York state, 
and is the only clear rival to Coca-Cola for market share in the sCSD industry. PepsiCo has 
                                                 
1 http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ourcompany/index.html, accessed 9 May 12. 
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diversified much further into snack and other food market divisions, having developed or 
acquired hundreds of brands, many easily recognizable in U.S. stores, and perhaps not associated 
with PepsiCo (Quaker Oats, Lay’s, Aunt Jemima, etc.). 
Some estimates attribute these two companies with controlling roughly three-quarters of 
the world beverage market (Sharma et al. 2010).  
The Coca-Cola Company (40%) and PepsiCo (33%) dominate the flavoring syrup and 
concentrate manufacturing industry (North American Industry Classification System: 311930, 
comprised of 151 companies in the U.S.), for use in fountain drinks, manufactured soft drinks, 
and powdered concentrates. These two manufacturers alone define an industry Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index, or HHI, of over 2500, designating it a highly concentrated industry (>2500).  
The soft-drink manufacturing industry (NAICS: 312111, comprised of 1,209 companies 
in the U.S. that blend flavorings and water, then package and distribute soft drinks) is dominated 
by the Coca-Cola Company (28.6%), PepsiCo (26.8%), and Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. 
(8.6%). These three manufacturers alone manifest an HHI of over 1610, defining a moderately 
concentrated industry (1500-2500). While less concentrated than the flavoring syrup and 
concentrate industry, this number may seem counterintuitively low. This HHI covers all six soft-
drink categories as defined by the Federal Trade Commission. These categories are: sCSDs (43% 
by industry revenue), fruit beverages (15.2% by revenue), bottled waters (12.6%, including 
spring, with flavoring, and vitamin and mineral enhanced), functional beverages (11.3%, 
including energy drinks, and ready-to-drink teas and coffees), sports drinks (8.7%, including 
liquid and powdered formulas), and an “other” category (7.2%, including ices, dairy-based 
drinks, and soy-based drinks) (NPLAN 2011). If one removes waters, “other,” and teas and 
coffees (but not energy drinks), the HHI for soft-drink manufacturing begins to edge higher. 
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Coca-Cola and Pepsi are dominant in multiple soft-drink categories, including bottled water. 
Negative consumption trends in sCSDs give way to profitability for other soft-drink categories, 
often among brands owned by the majors that dominate sCSD market share. While estimation in 
this essay is restricted to sCSDs due to data limitations, it is important to discuss policy options 
for the SSB category, to avoid companies adapting brand strategies that would allow them to 
keep consumer SSB sugar consumption high while cutting sCSD market share within the SSB 
category.2
The three primary soft drink manufacturers have historically employed differing 
relationships with independent bottlers and distributers. A 1999 Wall Street Journal article 
indicates an antitrust lawsuit filed by an exclusive distributor of Coca-Cola against the Coca-Cola 
Company for discriminatory pricing between distributors. Exclusive distribution rights had been 
challenged by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) two decades earlier, but the bid failed 
(Deogun 1999). Eventually the Coca-Cola Company had enough of this and: “In February 2010, 
bought out the remaining interests in Coca-Cola enterprises, the main contracted bottler, giving 
the Coca-Cola Company control over 90% of the North American volume” (NPLAN 2011, p 12).  
 Market share of sCSDs has been yielding to other SSBs such as energy and sports 
drinks for at least a decade, since around 1997. 
A 1999 FTC report indicates “rapid structural change that transformed” the sCSD 
industry in the 1980s and early 1990s. The FTC had challenged large horizontal integrations of 
franchises and bottlers, but not vertical acquisitions. Beyond the FTC merger enforcement 
activities, the Department of Justice (DoJ) leveled price-fixing cases in the mid-to late 1980s 
“against CSD bottlers affiliated with each of the leading concentrate firms” (Saltzman, Levy, and 
Hilke 1999, p vii). The report found that: 
                                                 
2 This statement is defended by medical/nutrition knowledge and market conditions explored in Essays Two and 
Three. 
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Horizontal franchise acquisitions by Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola bottlers led to higher CSD prices and lower 
per capita CSD volumes, as hypothesized. … Vertical integration was associated with lower CSD prices for 
alternative measures of the degree of vertical integration (as hypothesized)… lower[ing] CSD prices by 4.3%. 
… The results for third bottler acquisitions varies with the local market shares of the franchises being 
acquired. On average, large franchise acquisitions were associated with lower CSD prices (1.2%) and higher 
per capita CSD volumes (14%) [suggesting price-elastic consumer demand]. [The reverse was true for small 
franchise acquisitions.] (p viii).  
 
The same report notes that DoJ investigations and indictments led to “guilty pleas or convictions 
for price fixing between and among CSD bottlers” (p 2). 
 The sCSD/SSB industries are rich fields for the study of market power issues, both for 
price and industry structure, but also for the effects of persuasive advertising for an industry able 
to get its products into basically any public forum that might allow commercial food sales. The 
extent to which the SSB market shapes the food marketing and food consumption environments 
that Americans face is a topic in Essays Two and Three. Public opinion tends to turn against SSB 
manufacturers when discussing marketing to children (Harris et al. 2011; NPLAN 2011). 
Manufacturers of sCSDs are the largest marketer of any food product to children, and the number 
one advertiser  to children in schools, with over 60% of total spending (NPLAN 2011, p 23, 25, 
figures based on FTC 2008). 
 
2.3.2    Associations Between Demographic Factors, SSB Consumption, and Health Literacy 
Literature strongly supports the efficacy of examining purchase patterns over a multi-year 
panel to identify how demographic sub-groups respond to marketing of unhealthful foods. I find 
no evidence that anyone has done this using purchase data rather than dietary recall for sCSDs. 
Socio-demographic factors are associated with differences in dietary choice. Deshmukh-
Taskar et al. (2007) find that food group consumption varies by socioeconomic, demographic, 
and lifestyle factors in a 1,266-person sample of young adults. Stevens-Garmon, Huang, and Lin 
(2007, using Nielsen HomeScan data) show that the direction of ethnic influence is not always 
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(2007, using Nielsen HomeScan data) show that the direction of ethnic influence is not always 
predictable, as African Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans all buy more fresh 
organic produce than Caucasian Americans. Remember from Marriott et al. (2010) that high 
added-sugar intake is associated with lower intake of many micronutrients. Kant and Graubard 
(2007) use NHANES data in conjunction with serum blood tests, finding that ethnicity and 
education level are stronger independent predictors of micronutrient intake than income level, 
and that after controlling for income and education levels, ethnic differences persist as 
independent predictors. This suggests that ethnic grouping could explain more variance in 
household sCSD purchase than differences in household income or head-of-household education 
level, a testable hypothesis here. Kranz and Siega-Riz (2002) find that ethnicity, income, and 
level of the female head of household’s education are among the determinants of added sugar 
intake for 2-to-5-year-old preschool children. This links purchaser decisions to added sugar 
intake, and suggests that policies that effectively reduce the head of household’s purchase may 
help reduce sugar intake for non-shoppers in the household. 
Soederberg Miller et al. (2011), define health literacy as “the ability to obtain, process, 
and use health information in managing one’s health” (p 803). Health literacy for many 
Americans remains consistently low over time, despite generations of rising average incomes 
and educations (Kumanyika 2009, responding to Popkin, Siega-Riz, Haines 1996). Beydoun and 
Wang (2008) measure nutrition knowledge and beliefs about the importance of nutrition. They 
find significant correlation  between higher diet quality and higher education or higher income at 
high levels of nutrition knowledge and beliefs, but not at low levels of nutrition knowledge and 
nutrition beliefs. (See 6.7.3 for more detail on the authors cited in this paragraph.) This suggests 
that demographic variables here (education and income level, racial group, age, or presence of 
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children in the household) cannot fully identify household characteristics associated with sCSD 
purchase, because nutrition knowledge and beliefs within sample households are not data in this 
quantitative analysis. To the degree that sCSD purchase behavior does not closely proxy 
nutrition knowledge and beliefs, there will be an implicit grouping of potentially identifiable 
knowledge and belief levels within levels of demographic variables in the empirical work of this 
study. This is a data-driven limitation. 
Beydoun and Wang use cross-sectional data, and do not use race as a factor, so the 
implementation of panel data on purchase for a particularly unhealthful food (sCSDs) in this 
study has the potential to satisfy or fail to satisfy predictions that follow from Beydoun and 
Wang’s results that associate lower diet quality with lower education or lower income. We 
would expect from Beydoun and Wang’s results a higher sCSD purchase response to Advertising 
(at least, possibly also less negative response to rising Price) for lower-education and lower-
income groups. 
Zoellner et al. (2011), claim to be the first to account for demographic differences in a 
sample population while also examining the association between health literacy skills, healthy 
eating, and SSB consumption. They find that a one-point rise in health literacy score (Newest 
Vital Sign, 0 to 6) is associated with intake of 34 fewer SSB calories per day. The non-
significant positive associations they find between education and income categoric variables and 
Healthy Eating Index (HEI) score (where health literacy is significant) importantly indicate that 
increasing education or income alone are inadequate to predict a healthy eating profile. They 
conclude that a measure of health literacy is a better predictor of HEI scores and SSB 
consumption than education or income, and consequently caution against using income and 
education status as proxies for health literacy. My quantitative work does not use any direct 
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measure of health understanding, and by necessity proxies household application of nutrition 
knowledge by the HHH education variable, another data-driven limitation. 
However, Zoellner et al.’s results are compromised by the fact that they only regress 
education and income as categoric variables. It is my precise hypothesis that there is non-
linearity across income and education levels, and across these levels within ethnic groups that I 
test. If proven, this non-linearity would compromise the statistical significance of a linear 
regression fit.3
To the extent that my analysis will overestimate the influence of education or income 
level on sCSD purchase owing to a failure to identify health literacy across household types, a 
specific policy prescription must follow, both from Zoellner et al., and from those who identify 
low functional nutrition knowledge in the U.S. generally (including Kumanyika). Raising the 
general level of nutrition knowledge and knowledge of the specific medical consequences of 
consuming too much added sugar too frequently can only serve the general public and societal 
goals for improving health. The assumption that those with the highest levels of income and/or 
 Their caution is well taken and I cannot claim that regressing on levels of income 
or education would lead to statistically significant associations with level of health literacy. But 
from their results, a useful conclusion emerges that speaks to my hypothesis that sCSDs are so 
unhealthful that heavy household purchase naturally proxies for poor nutrition knowledge. There 
are significant inverse relationships between HEI scores and SSB kcals/day for health literacy 
scores, age (by year), and sex, as well as a significant inverse relation between the categoric 
variable education and SSB consumption. So while not tying my household-purchase data with 
nutrition knowledge is a limitation, it is one mitigated by the overlap of relevant results with 
those found when health literacy scores are accounted when associating demographic traits with 
diet quality. 
                                                 
3 Results indicate latent non-linearity of fit does compromise the statistical significance of a linear regression fit. 
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education will automatically use better critical skills in their nutrition choices finds modest 
support at a broad categoric level, but application of this assumption as a premise to the 
household level is not unambiguously supported by the literature. Assuming that those with the 
highest income or education levels make better food choices ignores the larger problem of eating 
habits across more than two-thirds of Americans, habits that at very least “need improvement” 
(Finke and Huston 2003, p 151, citing the HEI rating for the American average level of nutrition 
knowledge, as defined by the USDA’s Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion). 
I have found one study that presages some of my methodology and research goals. 
Thompson et al. (2009), use many similar categories for demographic variables, across a 
nationally representative population, and with interaction of demographic terms, from a 29,000-
person National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to assess “interrelationships of” added sugar 
intake, socioeconomic status, and race/ethnicity in U.S. adults. They claim theirs is the first study 
to associate demographic factors with added sugar intake as a means to “formulate effective 
nutrition intervention programs” (p 1377). (The variant work with a marketing orientation here 
appears to be the second.) The NHIS is a cross-sectional study conducted annually by the 
National Center for Health Statistics, and consists of a clustered, randomized sample of U.S. 
households. Thompson et al., regress age, income and education levels, and ethnic/racial groups, 
along with an interaction of education level with racial groups and by U.S. region, on a 
transformed dependent variable representing dietary intake of added sugars. Separate regressions 
are run for men and women. For Age, there are 3 groups, 18-39, 40-59, and 60+ years; for Race, 
non-Hispanic Whites, African Americans, and Asians, as well as Hispanics, and American 
Indian/Alaskan Natives; for education level, less than high school, high school, some college, 
and college or greater; for (family-size adjusted) income less than 200% of the poverty level, 
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200-299%, 300-399%, 400-499%, and 500%+. Interaction is only reported for education and 
race/ethnicity variables. 
Thompson et al., find significant inverse associations between sugar intake and education 
level or income levels for men and for women. Race/ethnicity groups significantly differ, with 
Asian Americans the lowest consumers, and African Americans the highest, with African-
American men followed closely by White and American-Indian/Alaskan-Native men in high 
sugar consumption. For race interacted with education level, Thompson et al., find significant 
drops in sugar intake with rising education level for Whites, African Americans, Hispanic men, 
and American-Indian/Alaskan-Native men. The relation for Hispanic and American-
Indian/Alaskan Native women was “not clearly delineated,” and no relation could be discerned 
for Asian Americans.  
The order of sugar intake by ethnic group does not change between males and females, 
the education and income effects are linear, and the interacted education-ethnic effects are linear 
for all groups except non-Hispanic Asians and Hispanic women. “Groups with low income and 
education are particularly vulnerable to diets high in added sugars. However, there are 
differences within race/ethnicity groups that suggest that interventions aimed at reducing the 
intake of added sugars should be tailored to each group” (p 1382). Thompson et al. note that 
while strong independent relationships exist between demographic factors and added sugar 
intake, environmental factors, including “greater advertising” may also affect outcomes. Their 
results fulfill the prediction of Beydoun and Wang that low income and low education will be 
associated with lower diet quality, in the form of higher added sugar intake. 
These are strong results that suggest comparisons and research questions for the 
contribution to the literature provided by the quantitative work here. 
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2.4    Expected Contribution to the Literature 
From my review of the literature to date, this is the first work that estimates how rising 
education level for a fixed level of household income will variously affect purchase quantity 
depending on the ethnicity of the household, and does the same fixing education level across 
rising income level, while remaining flexible to non-linearity of effects across levels of education 
or income. For example, for female-headed households, the drop in sCSD purchase associated 
with higher education level is much stronger for Hispanic households than for White, African-
American, or Asian female-headed households (while Hispanic female-headed households are 
highest in purchase at the lowest education level when income level is also low). The drop is 
even larger for male-headed Hispanic households, and the drop is non-linear in rising education 
at different income levels for more than one of the racial groups. 
My method of estimating correlations between sCSD consumption at the household level 
and specific demographic characteristics differ from the two primary related literature sets in 
important ways, in part by linking the two in what from my review appears to be a unique way.  
I differ first from the general Industrial Organization and Marketing literatures by not 
using a structural model to estimate demand for brands within the industry, or to infer pricing 
and competitive strategies reflected in market shares within the industry. This choice was largely 
motivated by insights into medical effects of SSB overconsumption, which for sugared 
beverages are aside from minor differences in sugar content, independent of the brands 
consumed. Also, drawing from fields related to economics that are not beholden to neoclassical 
assumptions, Essays Two and Three here challenge whether structural models are even 
appropriate for the sCSD industry and consumption as it currently exists in the U.S. Use of a 
reduced-form specification avoids the assumption implicit in neoclassical estimations that 
29 
 
consumers rationally maximize utility in their choices.4
But I maintain interest in how price, incidents of discounting at point of purchase (“sale” 
events), and advertising – all now at the sCSD industry level – influence household purchasing 
across clearly delineated demographic characteristics. Consumer response to marketing variables 
remains a primary focus of estimation, leaving this work in the Industrial Organization and 
Marketing class, at least as much as other consumer economic works are.  
 Every aspect of the empirical design I 
employ in this essay is flexible to challenges to the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory 
that I explore in Essays Two and Three. The estimation strategy here is a demonstration of how 
to examine consumer behavior without assuming rational behavior and utility maximization for 
all sCSD consumers.  
Company or marketing research certainly identifies brand demand and consumer 
responses to marketing incentives down to fine demographic characteristics, as any large-market 
profit maximizer should. The primary contribution here then is that while ignoring the brand 
reactions that Marketing literature prizes, results here identify an otherwise rarely specified level 
of detail in describing which demographic sub-groups respond to what degree to sCSD industry 
marketing incentives (the price, sale, and advertising just mentioned). Marketing data may often 
be too detailed or too private to allow policymakers to identify groups apparently at risk for 
health problems associated with the U.S. population’s primary source of added sugar intake. This 
                                                 
4 A prevailing method of economic estimation in Industrial Organization and in Marketing employs a structural 
model, estimating demand. Structural models of demand offer the advantage of allowing post-estimation calculation 
of price-elasticities of demand by product, and the posing of market counterfactuals for analysis. A reduced-form or 
“ad-hoc” model is estimated without relying on the assumptions that fail if transitivity and/or consistency of 
revealed preferences are violated. Quantities purchased are still regressed on price, but a reduced-form model is 
appropriate for estimation that is not reliant on assumptions of economic theory that consumer choices are rational, 
i.e., consistent and utility maximizing. Neither does a reduced-form model preclude such behavior. This method 
respects the possibility that there are reasonable conditions under which regular consumption of sCSDs may not be 
rational (as economists use the term). Quantitative results are unaffected by how we infer whether rational or 
irrational economic decisions predominantly characterize the decision to consume sCSDs regularly. The reasons for 
this choice are explored in detail in Essays Two and Three. 
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work identifies these groups, as well as which sCSD industry marketing techniques seem to 
provoke purchase changes to what degree. 
I differ second from the literature based on dietary-recall-data studies, such as those 
discussed in the previous section, not only by identifying high-sCSD-consumption demographic 
sub-groups in greater detail, but also while relating consumer behavior to sCSD industry price 
sale and advertising incentives.  
Dietary survey recall data has the advantage of being at the individual rather than at the 
household level. However, one thing all of the dietary-recall-data studies have in common is that 
when they aggregate or categorize results to examine demographic factors, they use fewer 
categories than I regress for income, education, or ethnic group variables, and rarely interact 
characteristics to achieve tighter grouping. My method is designed to contribute to the literature 
in part by offering a greater level of precision in the association of effects than others have, and 
in part by using panel data for actual purchases rather than single-day, or two-day (over a ten-day 
period) dietary recall survey data. My work is confined to sCSDs, but as Essay Two (Chapter 6) 
will demonstrate, the case is now for the contrarian to prove that regular sCSD (SSB) 
consumption is not among the single most unhealthful dietary choices that some portion of the 
population makes daily. Regular consumption of sCSDs does not prove low nutrition knowledge, 
but there is little question that there is a strong association (Beydoun and Wang). 
By focusing on sCSDs, I study the “worst” of the added sugar products by volume and by 
single-product health effect (as supported by section 6.7). Data for relevant SSBs would have 
been preferable, but sCSDs are the clear leader in the category, by two- or three-to-one.  
NHANES dietary recall survey methods are frequently cited for self-underreporting of 
food consumption (Huston and Finke 2003). I use three years of actual household purchase data 
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rather than single- or two-day dietary recall, as every other study does. This removes one type of 
bias (dietary recall reporting), while perhaps introducing others (non-random sample, adjusted to 
reflect a random sample by Nielsen methodology5
By using more categories and more interaction of demographic variables, it is possible to 
identify associations between demographic variables and sCSD purchase finer than what 
Thompson et al. analyze. By interacting each group with sCSD industry-level marketing 
variables, it is possible to identify certain “environmental” factors contributing to sugar 
overconsumption that Thompson et al. cannot account for, but refer to as important.  
). Nielsen HomeScan has its own 
underreporting issues that rise with large families and female heads of household (Zhen et al. 
2009).  
Thus the analysis here may confirm or refute the findings of Thompson et al. (and 
Beydoun and Wang, and others) as they apply to the #1 source of added sugars in the U.S. diet. 
This analysis can further explore the robustness of demographic associations with one type of 
sugar intake in at least two ways. It first can identify whether the demographic associations noted 
in the medical/nutrition literature hold when regressed using panel data on actual purchase versus 
cross-sectional self-reporting, and second can identify associations at more refined demographic 
levels than are typically reported. Further, it can identify whether effects are generally linear 
across categoric variables. It can also identify the degree to which these demographic 
associations with sCSD intake are associated with specific marketing tools (price, sale, or 
advertising), checking for robustness of household purchase responses to the marketing variables 
across income, education, and racial groups. From specific demographic sub-group responses to 
marketing variables (and the robustness of these), we may infer policy strategies specific to the 
                                                 
5 Einav, Leibtag, Nevo, 2010 indicate this is not likely to be a problem. 
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marketing of sCSDs that most seems to affect, to use the phrasing of Thompson et al. (p 1382), 
those groups “particularly vulnerable to diets high in added sugars.”  
The empirical method here is unique not only because it exploits a large panel data set to 
generate results to an almost bewildering (or annoying) level of detail, but because this proof-of-
method attempt in fact yields an extremely rich set of results from which multiple specific 
hypotheses may be tested. The resulting wealth of coefficients ripe for accurate predictions of 
consumer behavior verify the non-linearity of behavior within and across categoric variables and 
validate this cumbersome approach. 
While results here present a narrow set of configurations for household-realistic 
combinations of demographic characteristics, perhaps dozens more may be easily constructed, 
each informative as to how purchase differs by relevant real-world demographic dimensions.  
Broadly, results here do add a level of robustness to the findings of Kant and Graubard 
that education level and (to a lesser extent) ethnicity are stronger predictors of high added sugar 
and low micronutrient intake than household income level; to the findings of Stevens-Garmon, 
Huang and Lin that ethnic influence is not always predictable for food consumption; and to the 
findings of Kranz and Siega-Riz that ethnicity, income, and level of female head-of-household 
education help determine household sugar intake (including for children). Results here follow 
some patterns identified by Thompson et al. that rising education level and rising income level 
are associated with lower added sugar intake, but the results here are much weaker for the 
income level association. As with Thompson et al., results here show significant difference by 
racial group, and by racial group interacted with education level, and particularly high sCSD 
(Thompson et al. use overall dietary sugar) consumption for a low-education, low-income 
combination. This study specifically overcomes the linear education and income effects that 
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Thompson et al. find, as well as dispensing with their restriction that holds the rank order by 
racial group fixed for both males and females (here as heads of household).  The greater number 
of variables and the demonstration of non-linear effects when categoric variables are 
disaggregated to levels greatly expand the quantitative detail relevant to policy that Thompson et 
al. themselves originally expanded to help policymakers target those groups overconsuming 
added sugars (here restricted to one product type). Targeting can be more specific using this 
method, and reactions by demographic sub-groups to specific policy vectors may be more 
precisely anticipated. 
 
2.5    Overview of Research Design and Results 
I conduct multivariate regression on demographic and marketing variables, the dependent 
variable being quantity of sCSDs purchased by a household in a week. Because non-purchase in 
a week may result from not being in the market for sCSD purchase in a week (the household 
never considers purchase that week), or from a rejection of the marketing variable profile that 
week (the household considers purchase, but does not locate a satisfactory product, price, etc.), 
there is a sample selection problem when regressing marketing variables on household purchase.  
One can address the sample selection problem using a two-step Heckman (also known as 
a “Heckit”) model. Within this model, dynamic elements are used in the probit stage, so the 
effects are appreciated in the model here, but transfer (through the inverse Mills ratio) to the 
ordinary-least-squares regression without introducing autocorrelation error. Interacting 
demographic characteristics identifies demographic sub-groups. These sub-groups are 
themselves interacted with marketing variables. The result is a coefficient for each sub-group’s 
purchase reaction to each sCSD-industry marketing variable. 
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The two-step process yields a set of coefficients that must be properly adjusted to yield 
correct marginal effects. These marginal effects are combined to analyze specific purchase 
behaviors, and combined into household-realistic characteristic profiles that predict purchase 
behaviors specific to levels of income and education, racial group, and sex of the head(s) of 
household, among other characteristics.  
Results suggest that nutrition education policies will benefit all demographic groups, but 
that some are in more dire need than others. Combining the empirical results here with findings 
discussed in Essays Two and Three supports a range of policy options. Advertising restrictions 
should be considered. Tax-per-ounce policies may be effective in alerting consumers to the fact 
that the USDA is interested in discouraging consumption of sCSDs (SSBs), and any device that 
raises consumer awareness that the product is unhealthful when consumed daily in common 
container sizes is likely to affect purchase more than  simple taxation on any scale currently 
proposed. Per-ounce soft-drink taxes are unlikely to significantly dissuade purchase for 
committed buyers, who by numerous household-realistic profiles already demonstrate habitual 
sCSD purchase, even when the outlay appears to be four times the percentage of the household 
budget of higher-income households. I propose based on empirical results and established peer-
reviewed findings from other fields that sCSD marketing environments be modified, and that 
sCSD-industry advertising budgets (across all media) be scaled and matched into a fund that is 
pre-designated for use to generate and air carefully designed public-service announcements that 
educate the public to the dangers of products and diets high in added sugars, and help educate the 
public to conscientiously change unhealthful dietary habits. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology and Model Specification 
 
3.1    Selecting Into the Market for sCSDs – A Heckman Sample Selection Approach 
In the introduction (1.2), I summarized reasons that the regular consumption of sCSDs 
may not reflect rational economic behavior upon which a structural model of demand depends. 
Reduced-form modeling (RFM) offers the implicit advantage of letting the data speak for 
themselves, without being encumbered by layers of assumptions about economic behavior or 
about functional form (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008; Della Vigna et al. 2009; Dahl and Della 
Vigna 2009; Basker 2005; Chen and Shapiro 2006). 
The research here attempts to distinguish different demographic groups’ purchase 
responses to marketing-mix variables for sCSDs. The dependent variable is total ounces 
purchased by a household in a time period. A purchase response to marketing variables requires 
involvement in the specific market in which a decision is made to purchase or not. “The market” 
is then more than a physical space, or an area where buyers and sellers transact, exchanging 
goods for money – such as a Designated Marketing Area (DMA), which may be understood to 
be a city and its environs.1
                                                 
1 Defined more precisely in the Data section, as “the spatial range of metropolitan commercial television broadcast 
markets, …[that] thus extend across urban households to suburban and some rural households.” The Nielsen 
company defines DMAs and generated the data sets employed in this study. 
 Rather, “being in” or “selecting into” the market means at some level 
a household member actively considers purchase. “The market” is a solution to an equation 
consisting of sellers, their evident marketing tools (e.g., price, sale, advertising, product 
characteristics), and buyers, within a venue (the local Designated Marketing Area) that exists in a 
specific time frame. Here each observation period, one week, is counted as a new market in 
which potential buyers may transact with sellers if both choose. 
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Typically for shelf-stable products, whose quality by definition does not degrade over 
weeks or even months, consumers may purchase a large amount in one period, and consume 
from their stockpile over subsequent periods. Purchase data would reflect this with a large 
number of “zero-purchase” weeks, and much larger than serving-size consumption at purchase 
incidents. The final data configuration here reflects exactly this, presenting a large number of 
“zero” observations for household purchase by week. This presents one mode of the classic 
limited dependent variable problem for econometric modeling. 
In distinguishing among the extant regression models appropriate for a limited dependent 
variable that is continuous and non-negative, data may be censored or truncated.  Panel data with 
continuous information on household purchasers ensures that there are observations for 
demographic explanatory variables even when the dependent variable is zero for a period. This 
defines a censored dependent variable. Truncation occurs when both dependent and explanatory 
variables are not observed when a latent explanatory variable is above (below) a threshold. 
Truncation is a specialized case of censoring, involving more information loss (Cameron and 
Trivedi 529). For the marketing variables in this research – Price, Sale, and Advertising – the 
definition of truncation is partially met. Explanatory and dependent variable information is 
missing for zero-purchase weeks, but the continuing presence of demographic information about 
potential consumers assures that some explanatory variables do exist. Thus the dependent 
variable will have aspects of being censored and of being truncated. Given a limited dependent 
variable, a researcher must assess whether the data and research question match existing models, 
and if so, whether the limitations associated with any one model are tolerable given the data, 
research question, and alternative models.  
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To model participation in the sCSD market, one may code a purchase occasion as a “1,” 
and non-purchase as a “0.” But then a coded non-purchase “0” represents a household in a 
metropolitan area in a week, a household that may or may not be participating in the market. One 
type of 0 occurs for market participants – who by the definition of market participant, consider 
buying – but who have chosen not to buy. Perhaps they found no lemon-lime flavor or price 
discounts this week, or judged that there was enough at home already, so bought nothing. A 
second and distinct type of 0 occurs for those who never considered buying sCSDs in the 
observed week: non-participants in the market. This group’s “0s” reflect their lack of economic 
presence/being/existence in the market transaction set of agents-forum-time. Because the 0s are 
of two types – market participants with true-zero responses to the current marketing mix, and 
non-market participants who are not reacting to the marketing mix in their observed behavior – 
there is in examining only the observable 0s, a failure to identify the market participants who 
choose a no-purchase response to this period’s marketing mix of variables. Market participation, 
even when the result of considering a sCSD purchase is to not purchase at that time, should be 
coded “1,” when the data are capable of presenting only a “0.” This is the crux of the selection 
bias problem – we see only “0s” when we do not see purchase, without knowing whether the 
zeros are responses to marketing mix variables by participants in the market, or zeros 
characterizing lack of participation in the market. 
In his 1979 Econometrica article, James Heckman proposed a model to correct for bias in 
the selection of a data sample. The sample selection bias considered in the current research is not 
a bias in the selection of households, but a bias in the identification of household participation in 
the market for observed periods of zero-purchase. Restated, the need here is to correct for a self-
selection bias, determined by individual choice to participate in the market, not a need to correct 
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for a selection bias stemming from Nielsen’s method of sampling.2
Econometrically, with yi* as the latent variable for market participation, 
 Heckman modeling to correct 
for self-selection bias is an accepted method for the data type used here (Zhen et al. 2009). 
ix  the 
explanatory variable set,β  a vector of coefficients, and an additive error term iu , the attempt is 
to model: 
iii uxy += β'
* .    (1) 
To approximate this, we use actual observations yi, such that: 
yi = 1 when yi* = 1, 
and    yi = 0 when yi* = 0. 
But we never observe: 
yi = 0 when yi* = 1. 
Observing this would fully identify consumer consideration and rejection of marketing 
variables, as opposed to consumer disengagement from the market in a given zero-purchase 
week. But there is not and will not be data to comprehensively identify who among our Nielsen 
households considered purchasing sCSDs in a sampled week. In other words, the true number of 
non-purchases that reflect consideration and rejection of marketing variables observable by a 
potential consumer in a week cannot be unambiguously distinguished from non-purchases 
resulting from a household’s complete inattention to the potentially observable marketing 
variables for the week.  
Without the ability to exactly identify which households are responding to marketing 
variables in their (non-)purchase, there is an implicit misspecification in modeling purchase as a 
                                                 
2 For there to be sample selection bias in the selection of households, Nielsen must be contracting households that do 
not cumulatively define a representative cross-section of U.S. households. This conclusion is not supported by the 
literature (Einav, Leibtag, Nevo 2010), especially as Nielsen provides its own demographic sampling correction 
information, which is employed here, and is described in the Data section. 
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direct response to marketing variables. This misspecification defines an econometric need to 
discriminate market participants from non-market participants. The Heckman two-step model 
establishes two equations, a selection equation assessing the probability of market participation in 
a given observation period, and an outcome equation gauging the quantitative result of 
participation. In this application, the first equation assesses the probability that a household 
selects into the market in a given observation period (modeling purchase decisions), and the 
second equation gauges the purchase quantity resulting from participation (modeling expenditure 
decisions). The dependent variable in the selection equation is a probit probability variable, 1 if 
purchase occurred and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in the expenditure equation is ounces 
purchased by a household in a period, contingent on participation in the market. In the selection 
equation, purchase is equated with market participation, so the dependent variable does not fully 
reveal the latent probability of market participation (as distinct from non-participation, which also 
generates a 0 observation). 
In modeling the decision to purchase or not separately from the expenditure decision, 
there is an attempt to identify factors influencing market participation, while the error term 
captures the influence of unobservables. By Heckman’s design, using parameter estimates and 
variance from the selection model to inform estimation of the expenditure decision attempts to 
correct for the latency of the dependent variable in the expenditure equation. As participation in 
the market is only observed when there is positive purchase, there are no zero-purchase 
observations directly used in estimation of the second-stage, the expenditure equation. 
Formally, using an asterisk (*) to denote latency of market participation, and 
remembering that there can be no negative probability or negative purchase, the dependent 
variables for the selection equation, 1y , and the outcome equation, 2y , are: 
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So 2y , quantity purchased, is observed only when 0
*
1 >y , meaning the decision to purchase has 
been made. The probability of observing *2y is the probability that 0
*
1 >y  times the conditional 
probability of *2y given that 0
*
1 >y : f*(
*
2y | 0
*
1 >y ) x Pr[ 0
*
1 >y ].3 0
*
1 =y When , 2y  is not 
meaningful; that is, without purchase, quantity purchased is not relevant. Linear modeling of the 
latent dependent variables *1y  and 
*
2y , on respective parameterized explanatory variable sets (
iiX β
' ), and with additive errors 1ε  and 2ε , appears so: 
 (selection / market participation) 11
'
1
*
1 εβ += Xy ,   and    (4) 
   (outcome / expenditure) 22
'
2
*
2 εβ += Xy .    (5) 
From here, we can begin construction of the conditional expectation for 2y , using only positive 
values of 1y  (where 1y >0  11
'
1 εβ +X >0) : 
]0|[]0,,|[ 11
'
122
'
2
*
1212 >++=> εβεβ XXEyXXyE . (6) 
This reduces to: 
].|[]0,,|[ 1
'
1122
'
2
*
1212 βεεβ XEXyXXyE −>+=>  (7) 
X1 and X2 can be identical, but this may lead to identification issues, as discussed further in sub-
section 3.2 below. 1ε  and 2ε  may or may not be correlated.
4
                                                 
3 Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 548. 
 The error terms are expected to be 
4 When the errors are not correlated, by assumption or by demonstration, this becomes a Tobit model  ( *2
*
1 yy = ), 
and there is no selection bias problem. Because the zero value is a theoretically random censoring point and the 
censoring point could take other values, the model can also be called a Tobit model with stochastic threshold. The 
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correlated here, as the portion of unidentified latent market participation will affect both 
equations, as will any other unobservable characteristic that effects both the decision to purchase 
and quantity of purchase. Existence of correlation between the two error terms itself confirms 
that selection into the market occurs in part from unobservables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 
552). As long as this correlation holds, selection bias is a problem, and ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression will give us the first term on the right-hand side in (7), but will not yield 
consistent estimates, due to the unresolved expectation following it (a nonlinearity, and a likely 
source of heteroskedastic error). Our interest in obtaining ]|[ 1
'
112 βεε XE −>  must focus on 
error terms 1ε  and 2ε . 
Given the latency of *1y  and 
*
2y , it will not be possible to derive a precise relationship 
between 1ε  and 2ε  without some assumptions about the distribution of 1ε , 2ε , or both. If we 
assume that the error in the expenditure equation is a multiple of the error in the market 
participation equation, plus some noise statistically independent from the participation equation, 
the relationship between 1ε  and 2ε  can be characterized as a linear model (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005, p 551)5
     
: 
ξδεε += 12 .    (8) 
Now the independence of ξ  and 1ε  can be used to generate the following result after 
substituting the right-hand side of (8) for 2ε  in equation (7): 
]|)[(]0,,|[ 1
'
1112
'
2
*
1212 βεξδεβ XEXyXXyE −>++=>  
                                                                                                                                                             
bivariate sample selection model here may also be called a model with a probit selection equation, or a type 2 Tobit 
model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 547-8). Here the model is referred to throughout the paper as a Heckman 
model, as no assumption is made that the error terms in the two equations are not correlated, and this terminology 
distinguishes the model here from the specialized case known as the Tobit. The model presented here is also known 
as the “Heckit” method, or “Heckit model,” the name being a play on the combination of Heckman and probit. 
5 Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 550, note that this is a weaker distributional assumption than the joint normality of 
1ε  and 2ε , which is required for the maximum likelihood estimator of the Heckman. 
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For the particular case of left-truncation at zero for standard normal distributions, which 
describes the outcome equation, as it is regressed on only positive purchase observations after 
the probit estimation, probit results can be employed as follows to solve for all but the δ  term in 
(9): 
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where φ  is the standard normal density, Φ  is the standard normal cumulative density function, 
and 
)(
)()(
z
zz
Φ
=
φλ .6 )(zλ is commonly known as the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). In equation (10), 
the undesignated sigma serves as the δ  from equation (9), so δ  may now be employed to 
signify the coefficient on the IMR. Because δ  is estimable as the covariance between the errors 
of the probit and outcome equations, this δ  may be depicted interchangeably below with “ 12σ ” 
as in equation (12). Using the condensed proof in (10), the IMR, and δ  as the covariant-error 
coefficient, equation (9) reduces to:  
                                                 
6 Equation (10) can only be solved using: 1) the theoretical expectations for a left-truncated moment of a standard 
normal z, (z ~ N[0,1]), that [ ] [ ])(1/)(| ccczzE Φ−=> φ ; and 2) employing the symmetry of the standardized 
normal density function around zero to transition from the second to the third line (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 
540-541; citing in the definition of )(zλ , T. Amemiya, Advanced Econometrics, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1985). 
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Similar methods involving theoretical expectations for a left-truncated moment of a standard 
normal z can be used to solve for the left-truncated variance7
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In equation (11), equation (7) has morphed into something practical. Heckman two-step 
estimation treats the sample selection bias problem as an omitted variable problem, the omitted 
variable being the )( 1
'
1βδλ X  term from equation (11), or )( 1
'
112 βλσ X  from equation (12).8
The first step in estimation is running the probit model for the selection equation. From 
equation (4) above, the standard normal assumption on the error term yields a probit model: 
  
)(]|0Pr[ 1
'
11
*
1 βXXy Φ=> .      (13) 
The observation-level likelihood estimator for the probit equation, with vectorized x and over n 
observations, is: 
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Probit estimation yields 1βˆ , and then the observation-level IMR: )ˆ(
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recovered the IMR to be used as the missing variable, the outcome/expenditure equation is 
regressed only on positive purchase observations, and with Heckman’s adjustments, can be run 
as an OLS regression. In the following equation (15), the subscript i and the vectorized x 
designate an observation-level estimation equation for the OLS equation: 
iiii vy ++= )ˆ( 1
'
1122
'
22 βλσβ xx .   (15) 
                                                 
7 Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 540-541, 549. 
8 The two-step model offers some advantages to the maximum likelihood estimation of Heckman when data are 
problematic and for large datasets (StataCorp. 2007. Stata Statistical Software: Release 10. College Station, TX: 
StataCorp LP, p 560). 
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The Heckman two-step estimator, with equation (14) informing equation (15), is an efficient 
estimator of 2β .
9
2βˆ  Even with the resulting  and ivˆ , we still need estimates of 12σ  and 
2
2σ  to 
calculate our mean and variance, from theory equations (11) and (12). 12σˆ  is the estimated 
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio from the probit-equation results.10
2
2σ
 This is the last piece 
necessary to calculate , to obtain the Heckman-adjusted standard deviations for the outcome 
equation coefficients: 
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where )ˆ(ˆ 1
'
1 βλλ ii x= . Correlation of the probit-side and OLS-side errors can be confirmed by 
testing whether 12σˆ , or 212 ˆ/ˆ σσρ = , are 0. If they are, there was no selection bias problem, and 
OLS estimates would be consistent without employing Heckman’s method. 
  
3.2    Identification Considerations Associated with the Heckman Two-step Estimator 
“Exclusion restrictions” are variables that exist only on the probit side of the model, 
intended to explain selection into the market without necessarily explaining quantity purchase 
once commitment to purchase is certain. Exclusion restrictions help to more robustly identify the 
model, without relying solely on the nonlinearity of the functional form (Cameron and Trivedi 
2009, p 546, 543).  
It is easy to imagine that a highly shelf-stable product like canned or bottled sCSDs may 
be stocked in the homes of consumers, and that stock levels may affect likelihood of purchase. 
Attempting to construct a household-stock-level variable from recent purchase behavior would 
create an autocorrelation problem in OLS regression. As demographic variables of interest are 
                                                 
9 Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p 550. 
10 Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p 550. 
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time-invariant, standard solutions to an autocorrelation problem (primarily, differencing between 
time periods) is not appealing. But with the two-equation framework, calculated levels of 
household stock can be entered on the probit side, and then are regressed only on probability, not 
on current quantity purchased. As the household stock variable does not present in both 
equations, it is not factored into the inverse Mills ratio, which channels information between the 
two equations.  
Frequency of purchase (number of weeks per year) is likely to be correlated with 
probability of market participation, with no necessary connection to quantity of purchase, and 
thus serves as a second exclusionary restriction, further identifying the model of estimation. 
 
3.3    Parameter Interpretation and Inference 
Bringing the IMR into the outcome equation (OLS regression) as an “omitted” regressor 
affects coefficient estimates for OLS-equation explanatory variables, as well as effecting the 
OLS error term. The relation between coefficients and standard deviations is still useful for 
inference, but coefficients directly from the OLS estimation reflect outcomes that are not fully 
corrected for selection bias. Marginal effects of variables common to the probit and OLS 
equations of estimation, characterizing those with selection bias, must be further adjusted. 
Marginal effects of explanatory variables are the derivative of the expected value of the 
dependent variable in the OLS equation with respect to components of xi. Given the entrance of 
probit estimates into the OLS equation through the IMR, marginal effects need to be calculated 
that include the effects (including heteroskedasticity) from the IMR.11
                                                 
11 Breen, p 42-3. And “It is quite possible that the magnitude, sign, and statistical significance of the effect might all 
be different from those of the estimate 
 
β , a point that appears frequently overlooked in empirical studies” (Greene 
2003, p 783). 
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Marginal effects for the specific explanatory variables that are common to both the OLS 
and probit equations are calculated as follows. In equation (17) below, k2β  is the OLS 
coefficient, from which the related effects of kx  in the probit model (selection equation) must be 
subtracted, to avoid overstating the true impact of kx  on y.12
k2β
 For any variable that exists on the 
OLS side only, is the marginal effect. k1β  in (17) is the probit coefficient for the k
th 
explanatory variable, and 12σ  is the covariance between the error vectors from the probit and 
OLS equations (reported as “sigma” under “Probit y” results tables). The IMR, now vectorized, 
represents the standard normal density function evaluated at a particular value of an explanatory 
variable and its parameter, corresponding to the probability represented by the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function evaluated for the same explanatory variable and parameter: 
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= . This notation for λ  removes right-hand-side fractions from the 
marginal effects calculation for any variable common to both equations. Thus the final marginal 
effect for any single such common variable, kxy ∂∂ / , must be calculated as follows: 
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Every active  consumer rejection of sCSD marketing variables cannot be observed, but if 
they were, this would expand the number of identified market participation incidents. Thus the 
probability of participation is to some unknown extent estimated too low. If we expect that most 
people who consider buying a sCSD in fact do, then we may expect this underestimation to be 
small. Regardless of our expectation, the undercounting of market participation does factor into 
the secondary OLS estimation and the subsequent calculation of marginal effects. Those 
                                                 
12 Breen, p 42-3. This process is consistent with Saha, Capps, and Byrne 1997, and Byrne Capps, and Saha 1996. 
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explanatory variables that correlate more strongly with purchase will have slightly inflated 
coefficients. This occurs because some of the non-purchase observations (zeros) correctly belong 
to the market response set, rather than to the non-participation set in which they are counted. 
Similarly, explanatory variables that correlate more strongly with non-purchase will have slightly 
deflated coefficients, as a portion of the non-purchase observations (zeros) correctly belong to a 
market response set, rather than to the non-participation set in which they are counted (too many 
zeros are factored in). The magnitude of these effects will be proportional to the extent that the 
“true-zero participation responses” exist and are neither observed nor econometrically identified 
by the specific application here of Heckman’s method. 
 
3.4    Actual Estimation Models 
 Multiple models, all Heckman-type, based on equation (11) above, which resolves to 
equations 19 and 20 below, are presented in Chapter 5: Empirical Results. This section 
summarizes the models of estimation, and lays out the variable types used in each. 
Once again, the general set of research questions and hypotheses are aspects of the 
motivating question: How are different demographic characteristics associated with purchase 
responses to sCSD marketing variables? So the explanatory variable set for the reduced-form 
model will interact demographic characteristics with marketing variables. The model will also 
use seasonal binaries, and the necessary “exclusion restriction” variables discussed in section 3.2 
above. Chapters 4 and 5 will explain aspects of the data, but for now, it is helpful to know that 
for estimation observations are at the household level for one week. The corresponding 
subscripts “i” (household) and “t” (time period = one week) will now together replace the “i” for 
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individual observations, as used above from equation (14) on. So with the notation change, 
equation (15) reads: 
itititit vy ++= )ˆ( 1
'
1122
'
22 βλσβ xx  ,   (18) 
with “2” still designating the second (expenditure/OLS) equation, and “1” the first 
(selection/probit) equation. 
In every model that follows, demographic and marketing variables exist in both 
equations, with seasonal binaries in the expenditure equation (Summer, Fall, and Winter, against 
the Spring base group), and exclusion restriction variables in the selection equation (Weeks in 
the year a household buys 2 liters or more, and the moving average of household stock of sCSDs 
based on recent purchases). The single exception to this is the variable for purchase on 
Discount/Sale, which cannot be regressed properly on the probit side, for reasons to be explained 
below. Notationally, if '2itx  is decomposed into demographic (
'~
itx ) and non-demographic (
'
itx
 ) 
component vectors, and the lambda term in (18) is folded in with the non-demographic 
component vectors, we do not need numeric designation for the two equations, and can simplify 
notation from (18) as we decompose the explanatory variable set: 
itititit vy +++= γβα
''
0
~ xx  ,    (19) 
where 0α  is the intercept, belonging to neither β   nor γ , the unscripted coefficient vectors for 
their respective explanatory variable sets. Interaction of the demographic explanatory variable set 
with each of the three marketing variables (that exist individually in the non-demographic 
variable vector) involves a simple replication of the demographic component vector for each 
marketing variable – i.e., the second right-hand-side term in (19) appears in the third, fourth, and 
fifth terms: 
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ititititititit vAdvSalePy ++++++= γββββα
'''''
0
~*~*~*~ xxxxx  . (20) 
The expenditure equation in each of the following models of estimation can be conceived as (19) 
or (20). In simpler models (with no interaction of terms), the demographic and marketing 
variables (except Sale) are identical in the Probit and OLS  halves. But identification of purchase 
responses to the three marketing variables for particular demographic characteristics is possible 
through interaction of demographic and marketing terms. In all the models, interaction between 
the demographic variables and each of the marketing variables – Price, Sale, Advertising – is 
introduced only in the expenditure/outcome equation.13
The models fall into three classes, based on the resolution of the demographic variables 
involved. Capital letters designate model types for clarity, but model names are not acronyms. 
The BASIC model uses demographic variables at a category  level, that is, for a category such as 
household Income, which is a categoric variable spanning all (16) distinct levels defined in the 
original data set. The exception is that racial groups (the White, African-American, Asian, and 
Other Race groups in the Race categoric variable, plus Hispanic
  
14
                                                 
13 The purpose of the demographic-marketing variable interaction is to identify quantity response, where the probit 
equation only attempts to identify selection into the market. Also, as will be addressed below, any variable with 
“Sale” in it cannot be properly estimated on the probit side, details in section 4.4. 
) exist distinctly from the Race 
category, in order to have meaning. The BROAD model breaks each demographic category into 
distinct levels within the category, with each level being a separate group, and a separate 
regressor. The BASIC and BROAD models are regressed in the style of equations (19) and (20) 
[no marketing-variable interactions (19), versus with interactions (20)]. The REFINED model 
uses the levels of the BROAD model, such that each demographic variable can be conceived as 
the interaction of two demographic category levels from the BROAD model (say, second level of 
14 “Race” when capitalized refers to the variable, which is the four groups. “Racial groups” capitalized or not, refer 
to the set of five groups, adding Hispanic to the original set, with the understanding that when reference groups are 
chosen, “Race” uses White, while “Hispanic” implicitly uses non-Hispanic. 
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Income with a specific number of children in the home), to identify consumer reactions at a 
much more refined level than either of the two previous model levels. Each demographic 
variable is then a sub-group comprised of elements of the two groups from which it is derived. 
All the demographic variables so defined in the REFINED model are also interacted with the 
marketing variables, per (20). Some readers may benefit by turning now or during the model 
descriptions in 3.4.1 – 3.4.3 to Figure 1 (located after sub-section 3.4.3), which describes 
demographic variables in each level of the model. 
 
   3.4.1    The BASIC Model 
 This model is an exercise in the fundamental modeling approach. It can confirm basic a 
priori hypotheses about signs and significance of estimated coefficients for broadly-defined 
(categoric) explanatory variables, and may expose coefficients that do not match hypotheses, 
highlighting variables to be more carefully examined in the BROAD and REFINED models, 
with their more disaggregated demographic variables. Even for the BASIC model, a small 
number of reference(/base) group choices need to be made to avoid the dummy variable trap (see 
Figure 1, last column). In all versions of the BASIC model, the reference demographic group is 
White, non-Hispanic, with no children. Reference groups become more refined in subsequent 
models, but assumptions are held as consistently as is feasible across the models. 
In the BASIC model, each demographic category is undifferentiated, so coefficients are 
interpretable as increments to be applied across the levels that comprise a category, such as Fem 
Educ, which denotes the highest education level attained by a female head of household. In 
interpreting estimation results, these increments are econometrically constrained to be monotonic 
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in direction and size, whether levels within the category – Grade School, 15
 
 Less than High 
School, High School, Some College, College, Post-College – are monotonic increments or not. 
For example a coefficient of 9.18 for the category Fem Educ mandates the interpretation that 
Less than High School households purchase 9.18 x 2 ounces on average in a week, while College 
households buy 9.18 x 5 ounces per week.  
   3.4.2    The BROAD Model 
Disaggregating a categoric variable into discrete levels permits one to identify non-
monotonic changes in direction and size of purchase response. If for example a particular 
category level (e.g., Some College in Fem Educ) varies significantly in size or direction from 
being two marginal effect (reported coefficient) units from Less than High School. Exploring this 
possibility is the mission of the BROAD model. This exercise largely confirms that marginal 
effects do vary in a non-linear fashion both in direction and in size. The BASIC model is naive in 
its restriction that effects of categoric variables remain linear for sCSD consumption. The 
BROAD model requires more reference-group choices, to avoid the dummy-variable trap. In all 
versions of the BROAD model, the reference group is White, non-Hispanic, upper tranche of 
Income, Post-College Education (Female or Male head of household), Household Size of one, 
with no children, and (Female or Male head of household) Age between 50 and 65 years. The 
value of “breaking out” from a categoric variable into levels to measure non-linear impacts will 
become evident in the Data and Results chapters. 
 
                                                 
15 Category levels for Education as they exist in the BROAD and REFINED models, fold the “Grade School” into 
the “Less than High School” level, to avoid needless complexity that is unlikely to offer illuminating identification, 
and that would be based on a very low number of actual observations for household heads whose highest level of 
educational attainment is grade school. More sophisticated models thus employ five, not six, levels of Education. 
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   3.4.3    The REFINED Model 
In the BROAD model, there are however no coefficients that directly inform how, say, 
Whites of different Income levels vary in their purchase responses, although this is an interest of 
this research. Discussing any racial group as a unitary group masks large differences in quantity 
purchased per week and response to marketing variables associated with Education or Income 
groups that a racial group spans. Each variable in the REFINED model exists as a combination 
of two demographic characteristics, with or without an interaction with a marketing mix variable. 
So a demographic-demographic combination (sub-group) exists at a level for each of two 
combined categories or groups. For example Female Educ Less HS is a group, that when 
interacted with levels of Income, generate six sub-groups. Similarly, x1PvInc is a group (defined 
in Figure 1), that when interacted with Female Educ levels, generates five sub-groups. Because 
demographic variables exist as specific demographic sub-groups of one trait combined across the 
possible variants (levels) of another demographic trait, these interacted variables can identify 
sub-group consumer responses to a level of accuracy unachievable in the BASIC or BROAD 
models. 
For example within the categories Income and # of Kids are households at the second 
defined level of income that include one child. So this unique sub-group exists at the second 
level of six in Income and the second level of five in # of Kids. Sets of interacted variables 
comprise the following seven combined categories, where HH designates “household,” and  
HHH designates “head of household”:  
• Income x (Male/Fem HHH) Education 
• Income x Race (/Hispanic) 
• Income x HH Size 
• Income x # of Kids in HH 
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• Income x (Male/Fem HHH) Age 
• (Male/Fem HHH) Educ x Race (/Hispanic) 
• (Male/Fem HHH) Educ x # of Kids in HH. 
The high number of coefficients resulting from this specification allow the identification 
of marginal effects specific to precise demographic sub-groups, and comparison of results in 
multiple configurations (e.g., across levels of Income and separately across number of children), 
for deeper insight into real-world behavior. Income or Education effects (which are generally 
expected to conflict) can be checked for their robustness across Race, Number of Children, or 
Age. 
Within each of the bulleted combined categories, a reference sub-group is dropped to 
avoid the dummy variable trap, so every variable in any category combination is estimated as the 
marginal effect versus the reference sub-group. This allows for comparison of a set of marginal 
effects that all reflect to the same reference group (a set spans all combinations of the two 
demographic groups that are interacted in sub-groups from the BROAD model). Comparison of 
sets occasionally establishes a level of consistency enabling some comparison of results across 
different demographic-demographic category combinations – a method that introduces another 
level of analysis for marginal effects on marketing-variable interaction variables. 
However, because the combination of two categories establishes a second-tier dummy-
variable trap, beyond dropping the reference sub-group, one level of one of the categories cannot 
be combined with all of the levels of the other category in the combination. Summary statistics, 
and previous iterations of estimation informed the choices of which category levels should 
simply be listed as variables in the equation of estimation, rather than including them in the 
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combined category sets.16
 
 Little inference is done on these variables, which are included in the 
estimation because dropping them entirely would resign their effects into the reference groups, 
rather than controlling for their effects. Base group choices for the REFINED model are 
combinations of the same base group assumptions made for the BROAD model. 
Figure 1 (set).    Demographic Variables By Type, for the BASIC, BROAD, and REFINED 
Models 
   
BASIC:  9 Demographic Variables (7 variables for Fem or Male HHHs, 9 if both are 
HHHs) 
Variable Type Range Base Group Assumption 
Income categoric 16 levels: under $5k – $100k+  
F HHH Educ categoric 6 levels: Grade School – Post-Collg  
M HHH Educ categoric 6 levels: Grade School – Post-Collg  
Race binary (4) White, Afr-Amer, Asian, Other White 
    Hispanic binary  Not Hispanic 
HH Size categoric 1 – 9  
# of Kids categoric 0 – 7  
F HHH Age  categoric 9 levels: <25y – 65+  
M HHH Age  categoric 9 levels: <25y – 65+  
To add marketing variable interaction, each of above also times Price, Sale, and/or Advertising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Because Income and Education are the primary interacted categories, the category level drops are taken from the 
other five categories: No Male HHH, No Female HHH, Other Race, 4 Kids or more, Female Age greater than 65, 
Male Age greater than 65, and HH Size 5 or more. The un-combined category levels listed here, from the second-
tier dummy variable trap, were not interacted with marketing variables. 
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(Figure 1, continued) 
BROAD:  38 Demographic Variables (7 variables for Fem or Male HHHs, 9 if both are 
HHHs) 
Variable Type Range Base Group Assumption 
HalfPov4Inc binary 
Household income level, 
relative to average poverty level 
for a family of 4, 2006 -2008, 
approximated by the 16 Nielsen 
levels for household income. 
 
 
5xPov4Inc 
1xPov4Inc binary 
2xPov4Inc binary 
3xPov4Inc binary 
4xPov4Inc binary 
5xPov4Inc binary 
Fem Less HS binary  
 
Head of household’s last level 
of education. HHH is Female, 
or Male, or both. Less High 
School includes Grade School, 
for 6 levels. 
 
 
Fem Post Collg 
Fem HS binary 
Fem Some Collg binary 
Fem Collg binary 
Fem Post Collg binary 
Male Less HS binary  
 
Male Post Collg 
Male HS binary 
Male Some Collg binary 
Male Collg binary 
Male Post Collg binary 
Race binary (4) White, Afr-Amer, Asian, Other White 
    Hispanic binary  Not Hispanic 
HH size 1 binary   
 
HH size 1 
HH size 2 binary  
HH size 3 binary  
HH size 4 binary  
HH size 5+ binary  
No Kids binary   
 
No Kids 
One Kids binary  
Two Kids binary  
Three Kids binary  
4 Kids+ binary  
Fem Age <30 binary   
 
Fem Age 50-65 
Fem Age 30-40 binary  
Fem Age 40-50 binary  
Fem Age 50-65 binary  
Fem Age 65+ binary  
Male Age <30 binary   
 
Male Age 50-65 
Male Age 30-40 binary  
Male Age 40-50 binary  
Male Age 50-65 binary  
Male Age 65+ binary  
To add marketing variable interaction, each of above also times Price, Sale, and/or Advertising. 
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(Figure 1, continued) 
REFINED:  256 Demographic Variables (7 variables for Fem or Male HHHs, 11 if both are 
HHHs) 
Variable Type Range Base Group Assumption 
HalfPov4Inc x Fem Less HS binary (178 variables) 
 
Each level of 
Income interacted 
with each other 
demographic 
variable level 
from BROAD. 
 
 
5xPov4Inc x Fem Post Collg 
5xPov4Inc x Male Post Collg 
5xPov4Inc x White 
5xPov4Inc x HH size 1 
5xPov4Inc x No Kids 
5xPov4Inc x Fm Age 50-65 
5xPov4Inc x Male Age 50-65 
1xPov4Inc     x Fem Less HS binary 
2xPov4Inc     x Fem Less HS binary 
3xPov4Inc     x Fem Less HS binary 
4xPov4Inc     x Fem Less HS binary 
5xPov4Inc     x Fem Less HS binary 
HalfPov4Inc x Fem HS binary 
1xPov4Inc     x Fem HS binary 
⁞ binaries 
4xPov4Inc     x Male Age 50-65 binary 
5xPov4Inc     x Male Age 50-65 binary 
Fem Less HS x No Kids binary (78 variables) 
 
Each level of Fem 
Educ and Male 
Educ interacted 
with # of Kids in 
HH 
 
 
 
 
Fem Post Collg x No Kids 
Male Post Collg x No Kids 
Fem Less HS x 1 Kids binary 
Fem Less HS x 2 Kids binary 
Fem Less HS x 3 Kids binary 
Fem HS         x No Kids binary 
Fem HS         x 1 Kids binary 
⁞ binaries 
Male Post Collg x 2 Kids binary 
Male Post Collg x 3 Kids binary 
Fem Less HS x White binary Each level of 
Fem/Male Educ 
interacted with 
Race and with 
Hispanic=yes 
 
 
Fem Post Collg x White 
Male Post Collg x White 
Fem HS          x White binary 
⁞ binaries 
Male Collg     x Hispanic binary 
Male Post Collg x Hispanic binary 
To add marketing variable interaction, each of above also times Price, Sale, and/or Advertising. 
To avoid a second-level dummy variable trap, one group from each demographic set must also be dropped from 
the interacted variable sets. Candidate groups were indicated by data configuration or results from earlier 
estimations. These groups are regressed without interaction with either Income or Education variables, and 
without interaction with marketing variables, but had to be regressed to avoid folding their effects into 
reference-group assumptions: No Male HHH Head, No Female HHH Head, Other Race, HH Size 5+, 4 Kids+, 
Fem Age 65+, Male Age 65+. Certain Other Race interactions were possible to introduce into the demographic 
interactions without challenging the second-level dummy variable restriction. Separate inference has so far not 
been done on these, as this group is narrow. 
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Chapter 4 
Data and Empirical Implementation 
  
4.1    Data Source and Scope 
Data are from AC Nielson, weekly HomeScan, spanning three years from February 2006 
through to December 2008 (152 weekly “Process Periods”), and 16 Designated Marketing Areas 
(DMAs): Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Hartford & New Haven, Houston, 
Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami – Ft. Lauderdale, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco – 
Oakland – San Jose, Seattle – Tacoma, Springfield – Holyoke (MA), and Washington D.C. 
DMAs are defined by the spatial range of metropolitan commercial television broadcast markets 
to the county level, and thus extend across urban households to suburban and some rural 
households. This data set combines specific purchase information, recorded after purchase by 
household members, with the demographic information of the participating household. Because 
some households end HomeScan participation and others enter in a given year, the number of 
households (HHs) in each annual panel varies: 17,278 households in 2006; 17,883 in 2007; 
17,772 in 2008; for an average 17,628 households in an annual panel.17
Also from Nielsen are sCSD (television) advertising data corresponding to Nielson 
DMAs. The television advertising industry has defined standard units known as “gross rating 
 After data management 
procedures that included totaling daily purchases to the weekly level, there were 459,392 non-
zero purchase observations within the sweetened carbonated soft-drink product category, across 
all HHs over the three years. 
                                                 
17 The dataset is resolute to the household level, but not to individual-level data. It is not possible to identify who in 
a household or how many in a household are drinking the sCSDs purchased. If one member in a larger household 
dominates demand for sCSDs, demand is averaged, despite the individual demand being the true driver, and at 
consumption levels above the household average. There is similarly no information about the health, body mass 
index, or nutrition education of household members, any of which could prove helpful in pursuing questions of 
interest. 
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points” (GRPs) that measure a target audience’s viewing exposure to specific advertising within 
a broadcast market.18
Raw data from Nielsen offers a “projection-factor weighting” number for each household 
in each year. This number is computed using a proprietary Nielsen methodology to weight each 
HH so that the dimensions of particular demographic characteristics can be treated as 
proportionally representing true population frequencies within the DMA. For example, given the 
relatively few sampled HHs with household heads under 30 years of age, the Projection Factor 
associated with such a household would be higher than for a household with a head between 50 
and 65 years, but the same Projection Factor assigned to the HH would also be weighted to 
reflect Income, Race, and other demographic characteristics, in order to make the HH 
representative of households similar to others in the DMA by any of a range of measures. 
Nielsen-assigned Projection Factors at the HH level are used to weight the data in this study, so 
that inference on estimation results applies to populations, rather than merely to Nielsen sample-
household behaviors. Assuming that Nielsen’s Projection Factor methodology is sound, the 
particular 16-DMA sample here implies that for this study there was effective sampling from 
roughly one-third of the U.S. population. With proper econometric application, estimation results 
should prove statistically robust. 
 Nielsen advertising data categorizes the DMA-level GRPs to a certain level 
of demographic granularity. For example the entire data set includes age-specific GRPs for 
children. For variable construction here, this enables calibration of mean advertising exposure to 
the age-specific number of individuals in a household. 
Wider than the category of sCSDs alone, about half (48%) of all sugar-sweetened 
beverages (SSBs) are purchased in supermarkets and general merchandise stores, about 20% in 
                                                 
18 More specifically, the GRP number is a total derived from multiplying the percentage of households that are 
projected to have seen a telecast of an advertisement (or class of advertisements) times the frequency of telecasts, 
and summing across the full range of telecast frequencies defined by Nielsen. 
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restaurants, and about 12% each in convenience stores and vending machines. SSB consumption 
occurs about 52% at home, and 48% away from home  (Ogden et al. 2011; NPLAN 2011). 
Only store purchases with containers brought home are in the Nielsen data set. Thus 
findings here represent a lower limit for the purchase effects of marketing variables, and relevant 
to the policy debate, a lower limit to the health effects from sCSD consumption. There is nothing 
specific to this data set or empirical methodology that allows inference as to the linear or 
nonlinear application of these marketing variable responses to away-from-home purchase 
decisions and use. The degree of overlap between results from this purchase-based analysis and 
results from National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) recall-based analysis 
may inform the extent to which it is appropriate to generalize the marginal effects identified in 
this work to include away-from-home consumption. From only the results here, inferring the 
influence of marketing variables on away-from-home consumption behavior by demographic 
sub-group would necessarily be speculative, and therefore will not be undertaken.  
Nielsen HomeScan has underreporting issues that rise with large families and female 
heads of household (Zhen et al. 2009). But these may be small compared to the other standard 
food consumption methodology. NHANES dietary recall survey methods are frequently cited for 
self-underreporting of food consumption (Huston and Finke 2003). 
 
4.2    Scale of Analysis for Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
The research questions of interest in this paper focus on the extent to which different 
demographically identified groups respond to price, “sale”/discounting, and advertising (the 
marketing-mix variables) for sCSDs as a product category. Weekly HH purchase total of any 
sCSD, in ounces, is the dependent variable of final estimation in all models.  
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Based on information and conclusions presented in Essay Two on health effects 
associated with habitual sCSD consumption, the interest of estimation here is not to identify 
brand-specific reactions to price sale or advertising. The biological effects of sCSD consumption 
are not brand-specific. Whether one consumes the 240 calories in a 20-ounce bottle – or 23% of 
the daily carbohydrates recommended for a 2000-calorie diet – from Coca-Cola Classic or a 
generic cola brand, or any other from a panoply of sCSD brand choices, is irrelevant to one’s 
stomach or liver. So this analysis is structured to use household observations to identify the 
effects of marketing variables at the product-category level. 
Defining marketing-mix explanatory variables to address consumer response at the 
product-category level leads to different definitions than variables defined to estimate demand at 
the product level (food > product category > brand > product). Variables defined for structural 
demand estimation would tend to rely on product-specific prices sales and advertising. The three 
marketing variables defined below are not product specific, but each yields a coefficient that can 
be interpreted in ounces per week, once multiplied by some selected value of the product 
category variable – here average value of the continuous marketing variable across the final data 
configuration. 
Demographic variables will be defined when describing their statistical characteristics in 
Chapter 5, and will pertain to either the household head(s), or the entire household. 
 
4.3    Marketing Mix – Price Index  
The Price variable here is an index, in dollars per ounce. It is constructed in multiple 
steps – designed to insulate against any potential endogeneity between the Price Index and HH 
quantity purchased. Household purchases in ounces are first matched with purchase price and 
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divided to give prices per ounce paid by the household in a given week. This term enters as one 
of the two element types of the Price Index, for weeks in which purchase is made. Purchase 
prices in ounces are then sorted to the brand level in a DMA, so each brand has a unique price-
per-ounce for any DMA-week combination. Total ounces purchased by a household in a week 
are adjusted using the Projection Factor, to better approximate true population purchase at the 
brand level across the entire dataset. Totaling these for any process period yields a projection-
factor-adjusted sample-wide total purchase in ounces. Sorting this by brand generates brand-level 
numerators to be paired with a sample-wide total purchase denominator to yield a vector of 
“U.S.”− market shares by brand. Brand prices in a DMA-week are then weighted by the “U.S.”− 
brand-market shares, then averaged, yielding the second element type of the Price Index. So 
actual prices per ounce from household purchase are the Price Index entries in weeks in which 
purchase occurs, while the average DMA-week Price Index just described is retained as the price 
the household faces for weeks in which no purchase was made. All Price Index values are 
adjusted for inflation across the three-year data span, using a Consumer-Price-Index monthly 
adjustment factor from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Multiplying the brand-price-per-ounce in a DMA-week times the “U.S.”-market share 
decouples the levels of price and quantity in the resulting brand-share-weighted average sCSD 
price for a DMA-week combination, while retaining the plausibility of both the average price 
and the average market share for the product-category. Price is determined exogenously for the 
category, not for the individual brands purchased by the HH; and brand-price is weighted into the 
Price Index by “national” market share, not the particular HH’s or DMA’s cross-sectional 
purchase. Price determinations are made by individual manufacturers and retailers, not the sCSD 
product category. Endogeneity would occur only if all soft-drink manufacturers and retailers 
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were coordinating DMA-wide prices simultaneously with household-level purchasing decisions. 
So by construction the non-purchase-week price observations in the Price Index are resistant to 
endogeneity that can result from simultaneous price-quantity solution observed in household 
purchase. 
While the construction of the Price Index is consistent with targeting consumer response 
to the entire product-category, the coefficients of estimation on the price variable may depict less 
quantity response than they would if prices were constrained to the specific products an 
individual HH routinely considers purchasing, but these cannot be completely identified. We 
may expect price-response coefficients to be of lower magnitude than if the coefficients 
corresponded to prices on household-selected products rather than on the full product category. 
This would be an effective damping of the signal conveying price-reactivity in household 
purchasing, because category prices are regressed on what ultimately must be household 
purchases of a limited number of actual products whose specific prices do not exist as unique 
regressors.  
For purchase weeks where the price-per-ounce represents the actual prices paid (first 
element type), there is a small chance of price-quantity endogeneity entering the Price Index, 
despite the other controls. An appropriate test for price endogeneity was conducted after 
estimation (and confirmed that price-endogeneity cannot be biasing results in this model – full 
description in Chapter 5).  
Being based on Nielsen-sample household purchases in a DMA-week, the Price Index 
may not represent the entire choice set of the price-product options that individual shoppers may 
conceivably face in the supermarket aisle or refrigerator case. Simply put, if a particular product 
is not bought in a DMA in a week, its price is unknown, and cannot be factored into the index. 
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This data-driven difference must generate results different from what they would be if the goal 
were to model consumer demand given a specific choice set constructed from the actual and 
entire bank of shelf-available sCSD choices and known prices. Given the relatively large market 
shares for dominant brands (and store brands as a group), this difference may be academic, but as 
only one data structure is used here, there is no way to know to a certainty.  
It is important to remember that because the Price Index here is built from actual 
purchases rather than the actual choice set, it is likely to favor by inclusion more price-
competitive products, products on sale, and possibly more heavily advertised products than the 
entire population might buy, particularly if brands not well-represented in the national market 
share constructed here proved to be consistently significant and higher in DMA-market share 
than they appear to be here. Compared to constructions built from fully-known shelf availability, 
prices, and documented promotions, the estimated mean prices for the sCSD category here may 
well be lower, the estimated mean percentage of the category on sale may be higher, and the 
effect of advertising may be higher than if these variables could be regressed on a full-
information price-product set. 
 
4.4    Marketing Mix – Discount/Sale  
The Disc/Sale variable is not an index, it simply identifies any type of HomeScan-coded 
“Sale” or price promotion from the many types that Nielsen defines. If the HH noted that the 
item was discounted in price, (without specifically identifying a coupon application exclusively), 
the variable is non-zero. Among the marketing variables, the Disc/Sale variable has a unique 
problem because it is binary in nature. In this dataset, there are values in the Price Index and 
Advertising Index when there is no purchase observation for a HH-week, but there is no 
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identification of whether an item was on sale if it was not purchased. There is purchase without 
Disc/Sale, but every time Disc/Sale exists as a positive binary, there must have been a purchase. 
This creates two problems with probit estimation on a 0–1 dependent variable. First, because 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between Sale and purchase, a linear combination of other 
explanatory variables of selection to purchase may be expected to total to Sale – the classic 
perfect multicollinearity problem, which can push standard errors higher. Particularly for the 
Sale variable, the standard error approaches infinity. Second, because there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between Sale and purchase, there is no variability between the Sale explanatory 
variable and a “1” for the probit dependent variable.19
Leaving aside this econometric problem, there is an economic argument to be considered 
as well in leaving Disc/Sale out of probit-side estimation. The probit estimation step attempts to 
identify who is “in the market” versus who is not. Recognizing that we are not talking about 
durable goods, but a product that is very widely available and a very small portion of budgetary 
 So putting any Sale variable or 
demographic-marketing interaction variable involving Sale on the probit side only creates 
specific estimates with no standard deviations. (In practical estimation, econometric software 
returns a string of missing values for the row, where other variable estimates have standard 
errors, z-scores, p-values, and 95%-Confidence Intervals). This failure of variability in turn 
artificially deflates the IMR, thus upsetting the correct Heckman adjustment of the OLS equation 
– the correct Heckman adjustment being the point of employing the probit “selection” equation 
in the first place. 
                                                 
19 If this is still not clear, understand that of the four possible configurations for household purchase observations in 
the sCSD market, data limitations determine that only three are observed: “on Sale”=1 when “quantity 
purchased”=1; or “quantity purchased”=1 with “on Sale”=0; or “quantity purchased”=0, therefore “on Sale”=0. 
There are no observations for which “on Sale”=1 and “quantity purchased”=0 – a situation which must exist for 
households in the sCSD market in a given week. Without this fourth observation type, there can be no variability in 
the Sale-Purchase relationship in the probit equation. 
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expenditure to begin with – so that price promotions will effectively save a buyer a few cents or 
at most a very few dollars – one can see that the motivation to buy a small consumable item on 
sale necessarily follows the decision to buy at all. An item being on sale may affect the timing of 
purchase, but does not affect whether one is considering purchase. This is because if the 
information that something is on sale can impact the decision-making process, then one is 
already considering or amenable to purchase, and is therefore already in the market. Buying 
something on Sale cannot be a determinant of market participation, because it follows from 
market participation. So exclusion of the Disc/Sale variable in probit estimation is reasonable on 
strictly logical grounds, given that this dataset does not identify price promotions without there 
having been purchase. Disc/Sale may well affect quantity purchased, and is thus regressed and 
interacted with demographic variables in the OLS equation exactly as the Price and Advertising 
variables are. 
 
4.5    Marketing Mix – Advertising Index 
The Advertising variable (generally designated “Adv” or “Advert” in Results tables) is 
also an index, and its units are in GRPs at a household level, specific to a particular DMA in a 
given week. The specific advertising data configuration used here is GRP exposures for a DMA-
week combination, across types of television broadcast (cable, network, syndicated, and spot 
television placements), for each of five age categories: 2–5 years, 6–11 years, 12–17 years, 18–
24 years, and 25+ years; thus presenting 20 GRP numbers for each DMA-week. I calibrate 
household-specific GRP exposure to the number and age of HH members by adding the GRP 
exposure types into a HH weekly total according to demographic data listings for age and 
number of each household member. Thus the advertising observation for a specific household in 
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a week is that household’s estimated exposure to television advertising of any sCSD, with GRP 
exposure based on the number and age of that HH’s members, and on the original DMA-week 
GRP exposure indexes compiled from Nielsen.  
As with the Price Index, some factors may influence our expectation of magnitudes of 
estimated variables associated with the Advertising Index. Also as with the Price Index, the 
construction of the Advertising Index is consistent with targeting consumer response to the entire 
product-category, so the coefficients of estimation on Advertising variables may depict less 
quantity response than they would if advertising were examined for the specific products an 
individual HH routinely considers purchasing. Identifying these is outside the scope of analysis 
of consumer responses to product-category-level marketing variables. Paralleling the potential 
effect associated with the Price Index, there could be an effective damping of the signal 
conveying advertising-reactivity in household purchasing, because category-level advertising is 
regressed on what ultimately must be household purchases of a limited number of actual 
products whose specific advertising GRPs do not exist as unique regressors. On the other hand, 
advertising triggers for any product in the sCSD category may trigger purchase desire for a 
household’s preferred brand(s), given a known spillover effect from sCSD advertising (Zheng 
and Kaiser 2008). There may thus be an additive rather than a dampening effect in the 
Advertising Index which is implausible for the Price Index. 
We may also begin with expectations that household response to weekly changes in 
sCSD advertising may be low, because they are minor incremental changes to well-established 
taste and brand perceptions. In other words, consumption changes based on weekly advertising 
changes may naturally be of a much smaller dimension in effect on purchase behavior than the 
bank of name recognition and associative desire that marketing experts call the “brand equity” 
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retained in consumer perception. Many of the name-brand sCSDs have built brand equity over 
decades, even well over a century for Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and Dr. Pepper – with 7-Up a relative 
youngster, given its introduction in 1929. Any study of brand equity must be external to the 
reduced-from estimation here on product-category-level marketing variables. But this cannot 
discount the fact that regular U.S. consumers of sCSDs have been influenced over a lifetime by 
sCSD advertisements, so the marginal weekly advertising exposures documented in these data 
may be unlikely to affect significant shifts in what may be habitual purchase behavior. This may 
result in low marginal effects from Advertising and Advertising-interacted variables relative to 
other marketing variables.  
From an opposing perspective, the coefficients on the Advertising Index and its 
interaction terms may be artificially inflated, if manufacturers analyzing their markets over 
decades choose to advertise at historical times of peak purchase, as the drive to increase market 
share might suggest doing. This would result in high correlation between Advertising and 
purchase quantity that is purely correlative with, and in no statistically identifiable way 
determinative of, relatively higher purchase. 
 
4.6    Balancing the Panel by Including Non-purchase Observations for Households 
A dataset consisting of only purchase observations cannot directly represent the choice 
not to purchase as a valid response to a price promotion or increased advertising. So regressing 
on only positive observations with no other modeling correction would mis-specify a model 
seeking to answer these research questions. It is therefore necessary to balance the panel with 
demographic information fully listed for every week in which households are in the panel, 
including weeks without purchase. The integrity of the Nielsen data-gathering process ensures 
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that these filled-in zeros are actual purchase observations for the household for the week. As the 
Price and Advertising Indices are constructed so that they have non-zero values in non-purchase 
weeks for every household, the “fill-in” expands the ability of the existing dataset to characterize 
real-world behavior. With every house existing in the Nielsen panel during a year now having an 
observation – zero or positive purchase – every week, the number of observations rises to 
2,666,124. With the filled-in zeros, non-purchase observations represent 82.8% of all 
observations. The post fill-in data configuration reveals in a way that is less obvious before the 
fill in, that given the extremely shelf-stable nature of the product, HHs do appear to purchase at 
supermarkets usually to replace consumed HH stocks of sCSDs. 
 The filled-in zero-purchase observations create cell space in the data for implementation 
of the “household stocking variable” to be used as an exclusion restriction variable (section 3.2). 
Based on tabulated numbers for HH-average annual frequency of purchase (10.16, st. dev. 
0.046), and frequency of purchases greater than 67 ounces (7.77, st. dev. 9.17, in Table 1, section 
5.1), out of thirteen fixed stocking intervals constructed, the six-week degrading stock variable 
fit best. The “MovgAvgHHstock6” variable begins with the week’s purchase in ounces, and 
subtracts one-sixth of the volume for each subsequent week, overlapping with addition and stock 
subtraction for any new purchase. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Results 
 
5.1    Descriptive Statistics and Pre-Regression Data Analysis 
5.1.1    Descriptive Statistics and Selected Race-/Hispanic-Specific Means 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables, with 
many demographic variables here covering an entire demographic category. Category-spanning 
variables used in the BASIC model will be decomposed into category levels for more complex 
versions of the model later. Across all observations, including zero-purchase weeks for 
households, the weekly HH-average purchase total (the dependent variable) is 47.8 ounces, the 
equivalent of two now standard-sized 20-ounce bottles, plus a 1960’s standard-serving-sized 8-
ounce bottle. The coefficient of variation (CV = standard deviation/mean) of 342% indicates the 
extreme variation in purchase quantity when over 80% of observations are zero purchase. So it is 
useful to see how the purchase statistics change when only positive purchase observations are 
considered, the next line in the table. Counting only the HH weekly observations for which 
purchase occurs, the average rises over five times to 277.4 ounces, the equivalent of four two-
liter bottles, again plus a 1960’s standard-serving-sized 8-ounce bottle. For this amount, the CV 
has dropped to 109%, depicting high variance but far less than for the zero-purchase-inclusive 
average. The mean number of weeks in a year that HHs purchase more than a two-liter bottle (a 
six-pack of 12-ounce cans is more fluid than a two-liter bottle; variable depicted 
“WksHHTotOzGrtr67,” the first exclusionary restriction, in probit estimation results) is 7.77, 
with a CV of 118%, again depicting large variance in HH behavior. These basic statistics support 
the observation that sCSDs are routinely purchased in quantities greater than for immediate 
consumption, stocked, and consumed over a period of time.  
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The Price and Advertising variables are each indexes, constructed across all sCSDs to a 
weekly level within each DMA. The mean price in $/oz across all DMAs for all weeks is 2.2 
cents per ounce, with a CV of 11%. The following line, with a CV of 44%, reflects prices 
adjusted for inflation using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index tables. For this 
second mean price-per-ounce, the maximum value is forcibly determined by excluding prices per 
ounce above $0.50, as this is over twenty times the mean and many standard deviations away, 
suggesting errors in data entry by participating households.  
The CV for average HH advertising exposure in GRPs is 74%, indicating far less variance 
than for the purchase and purchase frequency variables above. The minimum and maximum show 
a wide range in weekly sCSD-advert GRPs from the most to least saturated markets. 
The portion of purchases that Nielsen HomeScan participants indicated were on sale in 
some form is 30.5%, which indicates something about the timing of purchases, or as can be 
inferred by the mean of weeks-per-year-greater-than-67-ounces, the timing of household re-
stocking purchases. Again, a CV of 151% indicates high variability in sale purchase – a single 
standard deviation defines purchase-on-sale frequency from 0 to 75 percent. On average under a 
promotional price discount (sale) households purchase 328.5 ounces, with a relatively miniscule 
standard deviation. As might be expected, mean purchase on sale is some 50 ounces more than 
the 277.4-ounce mean for positive purchases broadly, or about 2/3 of a two-liter bottle. 
Moving to the demographic variables, the sixteen Nielsen categories for household 
income range from “Under $5000” to “$100,000 & Over.” The mean HH Income of 20.8 in this 
dataset indicates around $50,000 per year, although the standard deviation indicates little 
population concentration around this mean. Note that one standard deviation pushes up to the 
$70,000 range, or pushes down to the $25,000 range.  
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Education levels and Age levels are for the household head. It is important to understand 
that there may be a single head of household (HHH, male or female), or two heads of household 
(both male and female). All HHH-identified Nielsen variables apply to a single sex. For either 
sex of HHH, there are six levels within the category that can define the highest level of education 
completed, and a null option indicating there is no HHH of that sex in the home. The higher 
mean education level for Female versus Male HHHs falls between High School graduate and 
Some College, as it also does for Male HHHs. The variance suggested by adding or subtracting a 
standard deviation indicates little concentration around the mean, and greater variation in the 
Male education level. 
Under Nielsen’s “Race” variable there are four groups, and the portion of each in the 
sample is reported by the mean here: White 76.1%, African American 13.4%, Asian 4.6%, Other 
Race 5.9%. Whether a HHH identifies as Hispanic is identified with a binary question separate 
from the Race question. It is therefore possible to be non-Hispanic, or White-, AfrAm-, or Asian-
Hispanic, and all of these combinations exist in the data. The only way to not be one of these is 
to identify as Other Race and select Hispanic versus non-Hispanic.1
                                                 
1 For the BASIC model data configuration, which should cleave closely to the data configurations for subsequent 
models: White-Hispanic - 87,012 observations (divide by 152, for roughly 572 households); African-American-
Hispanic – 10,496 observations (divide by 152, for roughly 69 households); Asian-Hispanic – 7,820 observations 
(divide by 152, for roughly 51 households);  Other-Race-Hispanic – 99,420 (divide by 152, for roughly 654 
households). There are 204,748 observations for self-identified Hispanic households in the demographic record, 
roughly 1,347 of the yearly average number of sample households in the 17,500-range. This number of households 
matches the combined total of households from the four-choice Race-identification numbers just listed. The “Other-
Race-Hispanic” number as a fraction of all Hispanic households also matches the correlation coefficient between 
Hispanic and Other Race of 0.523 in Table 5 below, confirming that just over 50% of self-identified Hispanics 
choose the Other Race option in the Race category, to self-identify their “Race” as unique from White, African-
American, or Asian. 
 Other Race would also 
include any other group not self-identifying as White or Asian, including Hawaiians and other 
indigenous peoples of the Americas or elsewhere. So there is no pre-determination of strongly 
correlated behavior between the Other Race group and the group identifying as Hispanic versus 
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non-Hispanic. Of the sampled households, 7.7% self-identify as Hispanic, but these are 
necessarily all distributed across the four Race categories. 
 Mean household size is 2.4, but again, the standard deviation suggests little clustering 
around the mean. 26.9% of households have one or more children. When children are in the 
home, the HH purchase average including zero-purchase weeks is 50% higher than the overall 
HH purchase average mean, but across only positive purchases, the mean with children is only 
10% higher (not shown here). The HHH average Age for females (~45 years) is higher than for 
males (~40 years), but the dispersion is again high, and higher for male HHHs. 
 The mean values for the seasons represent their proportion in the data, and reflect that the 
first weeks of January 2006 are not in the dataset. 
 It will prove useful in analysis of model results to have benchmark comparisons of 
Income, Education level, and HH Size averages across racial groups, and the lower portion of 
Table 1 offers these.2
                                                 
2 All of these demographic numbers specifically correspond to the Nielsen sample, and are calculated before 
application of Nielsen’s Projection Factor, which is used to generalize purchase behavior to the larger populations of 
the sampled DMAs. From a previous note:  “Racial groups” capitalized or not, refer to the set of five groups, adding 
Hispanic to the original “Race” variable set, with the implicit understanding that when reference groups are chosen, 
“Race” uses White, while “Hispanic” implicitly uses non-Hispanic. 
 The average income for White HHs is close to the whole-sample average, 
with almost the same standard deviation. African-American and Other Race averages are lower, 
with African American HH incomes being a bit more dispersed. Hispanic average HH incomes 
are greater than White HHs, and Asian average HH incomes are much higher than for all other 
groups, with the least dispersion. This higher income corresponds with outstandingly higher level 
of Education, averaged across Male and Female HHHs, for Asian HHs. Again self-identified 
Hispanic HHs top White HHs, which also place lower than Other Race HHs in average HHH 
Education level. African-American households have the lowest average Education level (High 
School), just greater than one entire level (of the 6) below the Asian average (of almost halfway 
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between Some College, and College). Whites maintain the smallest average HH Sizes at between 
2.25 and 2.5, with an increase in size and dispersion for African American average HH Sizes, 
also under 2.5. For other non-White groups, there is an increase in average household size 
relative to White HHs, all of these being closer to 3 than to 2 or 2.5. On average, Hispanics 
maintain the largest HHs.  
 
5.1.2    Mean Purchase By Demographic Variables Decomposed to Category Levels 
 For the demographic variables that were category-wide in Table 1, Table 2 decomposes 
the category variables, as well as Race, Hispanic, and a few additional variables at the end of the 
table, for reference. For each level of these variables, statistics for mean weekly HH purchase in 
ounces (zero-purchase weeks included) are listed. Bold numbers indicate the highest mean 
within the category cluster. Income levels are relative to the federally-defined poverty level for a 
family of four (Pov4Inc, or PvInc), which is in the $20,600 range from 2006-2008.3
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services website, accessed 5/19/2011: 
 Income is 
decomposed into the following levels: from zero to half the Pov4Inc, half the Pov4Inc to 
Pov4Inc, from Pov4Inc to twice Pov4Inc, etcetera, through to 5 times the Pov4Inc and higher. 
The highest income category in Nielsen’s raw data is “$100,000 and above.” This notation 
referencing the poverty level for a U.S. family of four over the data period will be applied in 
future tables and results, sometimes with variants of shorter notation, such as: “3xPovInc” or 
“HfPvInc” or even “2xInc.” Because the highest mean weekly purchase by one of these groups 
is for 3xPov4Inc, it is immediately clear that consumption is unlikely to increase or decrease in a 
linear fashion across all the income levels. This is something to consider when examining 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/figures-
fed-reg.shtml . 2006: $20,000; 2007: $20,650; 2008: $21,200. 
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regression results for the BASIC model, which assumes a linear relationship for single-increment 
changes in category level. 
 Defining five levels of education for HHHs of either sex, we see that across both sexes 
there is a strict fall in weekly purchase for each discrete category-level rise in education for the 
HHH, from over 72-oz/wk. down to half that amount, under 37-oz/wk. The span by Education 
level is larger for Female HHHs. 
 At 34.5 ounces/wk, Asian stands out as the lowest average weekly purchase by Race, 
with Whites above African Americans, and Other Race highest at 53.6 ounces. Self-identified 
Hispanics, while existing across these four groups, do as discussed make up around 50% of 
Other Race, and fall in just behind Other Race, at 52.4 ounces/wk. 
 Ounces purchased per week (still including zero-purchase weeks) do strictly rise in 
Household Size and in Number of Children, but not by equal increments – per capita purchase 
actually falls as the number of people in the home (by either measure) rises. 
 For either sex of HHH, the age level with the highest weekly purchase is 40-50 years. 
This fact corresponds well to HHH-Age breakdowns by HH Size and presence of children (see 
Tables A-1a – A-1d in the Appendix).  
 For reference, mean weekly ounces purchased for only Male HHH (“No Fem Hd”) and 
only Female HHH (“No Male Hd”) are included. Male-only HHH homes average about 10% 
more than Female-only HHH homes, at about a 12-ounce can less than the 47.8-ounce general 
HH average (including zero purchase weeks) from the first line of Table 1 above. This is 
consistent with the fact that, except for the lowest level of Female Education, households with 
Male heads (or both) buy more on average than households with Female heads (or both) at every 
level of Education and Age. The Male- and Female-only averages are less than the general HH 
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average because they tend to have smaller household sizes. (In Tables A-1a. and A-1c. , “No 
Female Head” [Male only HHH] has the most observations of any “Age group” at HHsize=1, 
and sixth-most of 10 for HHsize=2, and is quite small after that. “No Male Head” [Female only 
HHH] has the most observations of any “Age group” in any breakdown in Table A-1 by far at 
HHsize=1, and the third-most of 10 in the next-smallest HHsizes=2 and =3.) 
 As expected, controlling for no other factors, the highest mean weekly purchase is in 
Summer, followed by Autumn, Spring, then Winter – basically dropping with average seasonal 
temperature for the U.S. 
Table 3 lists mean weekly HH ounces purchased for the same variable set as Table 2, this 
time for positive purchase weeks only (zero-purchase weeks not included). Most category-level 
means rise by four or five times the Table 2 means, and again, bold numbers indicate the highest 
mean within category clusters. Of interest, the highest means within a few key categories shift. 
The highest purchase in the income category shifts up one sub-group to 4xPov4Inc. There is 
evidence from Tables 2 and 3 that while not uniform in direction, sCSD purchase rises with HH 
Income. So initial evidence suggests a weak expectation for a positive income effect, reflecting 
sCSDs are a normal good. I will proceed to interpret results beginning from this perspective. 
Also in Table 3, the Male Education level with the highest purchase shifts from Less than 
High-School to High School. But the striking result is the move of the Asian HH mean from the 
lowest mean when zero-purchase weeks are included, to the highest mean when zero-purchase 
weeks are excluded. When Asian households do buy they buy in relatively large quantities – 
perhaps for holidays, with little consumption between, perhaps at membership clubs with 
outstanding stockpiling behavior. Hispanic HHs drop from the second highest mean with zero-
purchase, to second-lowest without zero-purchase, so seem to be buying less in bulk and storing 
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less. This would be consistent with lower access to membership stores and larger supermarkets 
(possibly from relatively lower automobile ownership), and inadequate home storage space –  all 
characteristic of urban-center, less mobile populations, possibly with lower income. That 
African-American HHs have the lowest average when zero-purchase observations are excluded 
may support this hypothesis. 
 
5.1.3    Frequency Distributions for Demographic Variables 
 Table 4, presented as a set of smaller tables for easier viewing, gives the frequency 
distribution for the demographic categories, by category level, as used in the BROAD and 
interacted in the REFINED models. Fewer than 4% of the sample HHs are in the lowest income 
category, 3xPov4Inc has the largest frequency at 27%, and 15.6% are in the open-ended highest-
income level. One-third of households have two members, with just under 20% in HHs of 3 
members. Three-quarters of Nielsen HomeScan HHs in this dataset self-categorize as White, 
under 13.4% as African American, 6% as Other Race, and 4.6% Asian. The 7.7% who self-
identify as Hispanic are distributed across these categories, favoring the Other Race (as noted in 
footnote 1). 
For the sex-of-HHH-delineated Education and Age levels, frequencies cannot total 1, 
because HHs exist with one and with more than one household head. Just under 20% of all 
sampled HHs have No Male Head (so no Male Education or Age levels), and just under 10% 
have No Female Head (so no Female Education or Age levels). The two lowest levels of 
education in the raw dataset are combined to “Less than High School,” leaving five levels of 
Education. “Some College” is the most frequent highest level of Education completed by HHHs 
for either sex. For both sexes Post College runs roughly double the percentage of Less than High 
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School, but both are under 10%, while all frequencies between these highest and lowest 
Education levels are above 20%. The mode for both sex of HHH Age levels is 50-65 years, 
owing in part to a larger span than the 40-50 level. At the lowest and highest levels, fewer than 
4% of Female HHHs and fewer than 2% of Male HHHs are under 30, while just over 10% of 
Male and Female HHHs are 65 or older. 
 
5.1.4    Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variable, Marketing Variables, and Categoric 
Variables in BASIC Model 
To understand relations between variables defined in the data matrix before controlling 
for the influence of other variables in regression, close examination of the correlation of 
marketing and demographic variables to each other and to weekly HH ounces purchased will 
prove useful. The following discussion is based on correlation coefficients generated after 
variables were projection-factor weighted, so the marketing variable correlations are more likely 
to reflect true population characteristics of the 16 DMAs represented, rather than particular traits 
of the Nielsen sample population. This does not affect correlation values for demographic-
demographic variable comparisons. 
Table 5 displays the correlation matrix for the dependent and explanatory variables in the 
BASIC model. Most of the correlation coefficients in the table, positive and negative, are in the 
hundredths in magnitude, so are little correlated. All others are specifically addressed here as part 
of the overall analysis. Only two correlation coefficients are above 0.7 (MaleEdu-MaleAge at 
0.772, and HHsize-KidsThereAll [presence of any children] at 0.722) , and another two above 
0.5 (FemEdu-FemAge, at 0.546, and OtherRace-Hispanic, at 0.523). Other correlations do not 
meet rule-of-thumb standards for inferring notable correlation. Nonetheless, many inferences on 
the simple direction of correlation confirm insights from the Race-specific means in the lower 
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part of Table 1 above. Also, although the coefficients are low or very low, Price is negatively 
correlated with quantity purchased (-0.034), while Sale and Advertising are positively correlated 
with quantity purchased (0.404 and 0.02), all as expected. Sale and Advertising are negatively 
correlated with price, but very weakly (-0.022 and -0.043). So proceeding with prudent 
observation of direction of correlation may offer insights that could inform data relations 
preceding regression analysis. 
Household Income and level of Male HHH Education are both weakly correlated with 
purchase quantity, although opposite their expected directions (-0.0051 for Inc, 0.026 for 
MaleEdu). Regression results will confirm whether or not these seemingly confounding effects 
are strong enough to persist, or will disappear when controlling for other factors. Household Size 
and Presence of Children are weakly correlated with purchase quantity (0.113 and 0.079), but 
positively as expected. The again weak but unexpectedly positive correlation between HH In-
come and Price noted in the last paragraph may reflect households with higher incomes buying 
more name-brand soft-drinks than their lower-income counterparts. This explanation may hold 
for Male HHH Education level and Male HHH Age. Name-brand preference could similarly help 
explain the relatively strong positive correlation between Asian households and weekly Price 
(0.121), as Asian households have the strongest correlation of any racial category to Income 
(0.096), and the correlation is positive. Correlations with weekly Price for Household Size         
(-0.043), Presence of Children (-0.034), Female Age (-0.0211), and the White (-0.052) and Afri-
can-American (-0.035) racial groups are all negative, generally as predicted by economic theory. 
The correlations of the demographic variables with Sale are mostly positive, as expected, 
with some negative correlations in racial categories (AfrAm -0.002; Asian -0.01) of small 
magnitude. The exception in Sale is the small negative correlation associated with rising Income 
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(-0.002), and rising Female HHH level of Education (-0.002). As both of these were negative in 
weekly ounces purchased, and are also negative in weekly Advertising exposure, it suggests that 
high Female HHH level of Education and high Income are correlated with lower purchase 
generally, and low or negative response to marketing variable incentives. The exception is the 
negative Price correlation in rising Female Education, as discussed above. 
Beyond the negative correlation with weekly Advertising for Income and Female HHH 
level of Education, data suggest that Male HHH level of Education (-0.026), Asian race (-0.012), 
Household Size (-0.03), Presence of Children (-0.034), and Male HHH Age (-0.002) are all 
negatively correlated with weekly Advertising, although the absolute value of  every correlation 
coefficient in the column is smaller in magnitude than 0.034. Picking out the positive correlation 
coefficients between demographic categories and weekly Advertising, the data offer limited 
evidence that African Americans (0.005), Other Race (0.013), Hispanics (0.033), and HHs with 
lower income (-0.026) and lower Education level of the HHH (FemEdu -0.015, MaleEdu -0.017) 
are receiving more advertising exposure for sCSD products than their counterparts. The positive 
correlation coefficient on Female HHH Age (0.011) may reflect larger families in rising Age to a 
larger degree than for Male HHHs (-0.0019), so concluding that Female HHHs are targeted with 
more advertising is more tenuous than for these other categories.  
Higher Education is positively correlated with higher Income (FemEdu 0.243, MaleEdu 
0.419), but not strongly, and higher Age is correlated with higher Income for Male HHHs (0.26), 
but not for Female HHHs (-0.043). For Race and Hispanic category binaries, White (-0.012), 
African American (-0.041), and Other Race (-0.003) are negatively correlated with HH Income, 
and Asian (0.096) and Hispanic (0.02) HHs positively correlated. 
Female and Male HHH level of Education are negatively correlated (-0.145), suggesting 
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that HHs with two high levels of education or two low levels of education are more exceptional 
than HHs where levels differ. HHH Age and Education level are positively correlated, more 
positively for Male HHHs (0.772) than Female HHHs (0.546).    
 Only White HHs are weakly but negatively correlated with both HH Size (-0.074) and 
Presence of Children (-0.087), implying White HHs tend to be smaller. All other Race groups 
and Hispanic are weakly but positively correlated with Presence of Children (AfrAm 0.028, 
Asian 0.058, Other 0.067) although African-Americans are also negatively correlated with HH 
Size (-0.003), implying African-Americans without children are more likely to live in smaller 
HHs than other non-White racial groups. Hispanics have larger correlation to Presence of 
Children (0.102) and HH Size (0.119) than the base Race category groups. Hispanic and Other 
Race are correlated (0.523), as explained in the description of the Race binaries. As expected, 
HH Size and Presence of Children are obviously correlated (0.722), but not to a high degree (i.e., 
less than 0.8), supporting inclusion of both variable types for the REFINED model. (A 
correlation matrix checking for multicollinearity between sub-groups in these two categories 
before including both in the REFINED model revealed no multicollinearity of a magnitude likely 
to skew regression results.) 
The ten correlation coefficients between HHH Age and Race binaries indicate that White 
HHs tend to have older HHHs (FemAge 0.055 MaleAge 0.108), there are relatively fewer HHs 
with older Male African-American heads (FemAge 0.002 MaleAge -0.137), and relatively fewer 
HHs with older heads who are Female Asian (FemAge -0.05 MaleAge -0.024) or Female 
Hispanic (FemAge -0.053 MaleAge 0.011). It also appears that Other Race HHs tend to be 
younger in profile on average (FemAge -0.058 MaleAge -0.018). This could reflect the nature of 
how families accrete into the Nielsen survey system. 
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5.1.5    Graphic Relations Between Marketing Variables 
The focus of this work is to identify what types of households respond most or least to 
marketing variables. There is not an attempt to identify when certain groups react differently by 
week, season, or event, or whether manufacturer marketing strategies are maximizing profits. 
Nonetheless, general insight into the behavior over time of category-level marketing variables 
may prove interesting, in part because category-level variables may appear to mask the strategies 
of specific companies in the industry, or it may show common strategies across the big 
competitors. If there are common strategies among big competitors, we would expect sharper 
more dynamic movement. Given a common scale for graphing, if strategies are masked by 
industry-wide movement, we would expect flatter lines, with little deviation from the mean 
values presented in Table 1 above.  
Analyzing marketing data at the product-category level does not facilitate identification 
of whether there is a category leader, i.e. whether a particular firm or firms drive the industry or 
singularly push the dynamics of marketing variable change over time. Some small insight into 
sCSD industry dynamics may be culled from graphing category-level marketing variables 
against each other. Fierce price competition might dampen peaks and valleys in an industry-
average price plot as any company’s price rise would be offset by another’s price drop. I will 
assess here whether average prices do go down when percentage volume sold on sale increases 
(perhaps the -0.0216 coefficient between the two in Table 5 is not fully informative?), whether 
price rises closely match advertising increases, and whether changes in percentage on sale and 
mean GRP exposure (advertising) seem correlated in magnitude over time. Total purchase in a 
pan-DMA-week is also plotted for reference with marketing variables. 
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In Graph 1: Average Price and Percent Sold On Sale, the mean inflation-adjusted 
average price across all DMAs for a given data week (weeks 1 – 152) is plotted against the left-
axis measure (mean Adj'd Avg P by DMA-week), while the mean percentage purchased on 
Discount/Sale (including zero-observation weeks) is plotted against the right-axis measure (mean 
DiscSale). As may be expected despite the fact that this is product-category-level analysis and 
not the behavior of individual firms, there is a strong direct negative correlation between average 
price and volume purchased on sale, confirmed by the many shaped spaces in the graph defined 
by price rising and falling exactly as percentage purchased on sale falls then rises.  (The -0.0216 
from the correlation matrix does not appear to tell the whole story.) Because the very highest 
percentage-on-sale peaks are not directly at the same time as the lowest average prices per week 
(and least percentage on sale similarly is not simultaneous to the highest price peaks), there 
appears to be true price shocking in the market, rather than relatively higher prices appearing as a 
function only of lower quantities on sale. 
In Graph 2: Average Price and Average Advertising Exposure, the mean inflation-
adjusted average price across all DMAs for a given data week is again plotted against the left-
axis measure (mean Adj'd Avg P by DMA-week), and the mean HH exposure to sCSD 
advertisements in GRPs (HHgrpPP) is plotted against the right-axis measure. As might not be 
expected from industry-wide data, there appears to be pulsing in advertising frequency. This is 
consistent with optimal marketing behavior (Doganoglu and Klapper 2006), but need not 
necessarily indicate collusion. The Coca-Cola company spends 12% of all soft-drink advertising, 
by a broad measure that includes bottled waters and pre-packaged teas and coffees, followed by 
Pepsi at 7% (NPLAN 2011, p 45). Restricted to the sCSD category alone, these two giants may 
create an industry pulsing effect just from their own advertising cycles.  
83 
Relative to the first quarter of 2006, the Turin Winter Olympic Games (February 10-26, 
2006) demonstrates high exposure. There are obvious but not consistent pulses concentrated in 
summers. After a pulsing drop through the spring of 2008, the summer pulsing strategies 
converge into a steady build through the summer into the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games 
(August 8-24, 2008), after which they fall off relatively precipitously, perhaps in response to the 
beginning of the Great Recession. Notably, there is little graphical evidence that advertising is 
high during or immediately preceding most price pulses – at least averaged over the product 
category. So this does not appear to be a profit-strategy common to the industry. 
Because the x-axes are identical between Graphs 1 & 2, the average price line establishes 
a comparative baseline common to the two graphs. One can compare the non-Price dash lines 
between the two, to assess whether Sale and Advertising seem to move conjointly at the industry 
level. There is no easily determined pattern that is parallel, either in synchronization, or with one 
of these variables leading at a cognizable interval. There is a slight downward trend in both 
advertising exposure and percent purchase on sale from the highs of early 2006 to the flats of 
2007, to levels in late 2008 that tend to be below 2006 and 2007 averages. 
If price swings in 16-DMA-wide average price of over 10% within a year can be 
considered dynamic for a relatively low-cost food item, then there is dynamic pricing. It is easy 
to count about seven peaks in percentage on sale per year, which corresponds fairly well to the 
number of times a year that the average household tends to buy more than two liters of sCSD 
(remember also from Table 1 that 30.5% of all purchases are made on price-promoted sCSDs). 
Again, note that cumulative-average industry behavior may deviate in appearance from 
rational strategy for a single firm – although it may mimic that of a profit-maximizing firm if 
there is little aggressive competition or tacit collusion in price, sale, or advertising. 
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In Graph 3: Average Price & Oz By Week -- All Purchases, the mean inflation-
adjusted average price across all DMAs for a given data week is again plotted against the left-
axis measure (mean Adj'd Avg P by DMA-week), and the average Projection-Factor-adjusted 
pan-DMA-total-by-week is plotted against the right-axis measure (Avg total in Oz). There is a 
general tendency for total purchase quantity to move opposite a peak or crevice in pan-DMA-
week price – a healthy overall price-responsiveness somewhat confounded only in the high-
demand middle quarters of 2008. 
Because the x-axis and quarterly and annual reference lines are identical across the three 
graphs, the price-quantity comparison of Graph 3 can translate to sale-quantity, and advertising-
quantity comparisons. Quantity purchased is obviously highest in summer, followed closely by 
autumn months. Quantity purchased often peaks when price dips. Comparing peaks in total 
average purchase with the peaks in percentage on sale reveals some simultaneity (especially in 
the second and third quarters of 2006, fourth of 2007, and second of 2008), but inconsistent co-
movement in direction and magnitude. For example, there is a notable increase in purchase in the 
middle quarters of 2008 that seems poorly reflected in percentage bought on sale, relative to 
2006 and 2007. Exceptionally high percentage purchased on sale at the end of 2006 also did not 
correspond with relatively high purchase volume.  
Peaks in advertising occasionally seem to lead total purchase peaks by a week or two, but 
there is no graphically appreciable strong correlation between average weekly HH GRPs and 
total quantity purchased. As examples, a strong cumulative advertising pulse in the first quarter 
of 2007 seems to have no or negative effect on total sale quantities in following weeks, while the 
relative jump in total sales in the middle quarters of 2008 does not seem provoked by spikes in 
average HH GRP on the order of the 2000-and-above HH GRP levels seen in spring and summer 
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2006, spring 2007, or spring of 2008. As a population, consumers do not appear to have 
immediate Pavlovian response to marginal sCSD industry-wide advertising pulses. Regression 
results attempt to identify whether specific demographic sub-groups are particularly purchase-
responsive to sCSD advert absorption in the same week. 
 
5.2    Execution of Estimation – Methods, Inference, and Econometric Testing Common to 
All Models 
 All models use the same purchase, demographic, and advertising datasets, but results can 
and do vary as we would expect them to, as the level of resolution of demographic variables is 
increased from the BASIC to the BROAD to the REFINED model.  
 
5.2.1    Notes on Probit Results, Common to All Models  
Probit equation results are described briefly in 5.3.1 (BASIC Results) and 5.4.1. 
(BROAD Results) below. Every model with the same probit-equation variables has the same or 
quite similar (generally to the thousandths place, or better) probit coefficients. For the few 
variables identical to the lower-level models, the probit-equation coefficients from the REFINED 
model hold signs and magnitudes that are similar, such that no model differs greatly in its non-
demographic variable probit coefficients. The single exception to this rule is that the Advertising 
coefficient estimates for the probit in BASIC models are negative, while positive for the more 
sophisticated BROAD and REFINED models. 
One common coefficient is the reported rho value ( 212 ˆ/ˆ σσρ = , notation as in eqn. [16]), 
which is significantly non-zero in all versions of the model. This result determines that selection 
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and outcome equations do have correlated (non-independent) error distributions.4
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at every model level estimated here that the selection model is appropriate, that is, a simple OLS, 
Tobit, or Two-Part model would be mis-specified if applied to this data configuration. In all the 
models, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR= , where z is the probit regressor set) is 
significant at below the 1% level, suggesting that the appropriate correction factor for the OLS 
equation is transferred through the two-step estimation process.  
 
5.2.2    Notes on Heteroskedasticity, Common to All Models 
All OLS-side equations are estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust OLS variance 
estimators. From testing on previous versions of the models used here, heteroskedasticity of error 
is expected (across households, and across DMAs), so robust estimators are applied proactively.5
 
 
5.2.3    Notes on Endogeneity, Common to All Models 
As noted in section 4.3, despite a construction that makes unlikely the simultaneous 
solution of price and quantity at the same level of decision-making, a small chance of price being 
an endogenous regressor makes hypothesis testing prudent. The standard Hausman test for 
endogeneity tests two variants of a model, but on the assumption that one of the estimators (the 
                                                 
4 “The errors [between the probit and OLS equations] covary despite proper [Heckman two-step/Heckit] model 
specification. In essence then, both equations are affected (in part) by the same random perturbations (or random 
perturbations tend to covary)” (Breen: 35, citing p. 383 in: Berk, R.A., and Ray, S.C. (1982) “Selection biases in 
sociological data.” Social Science Research 11:352-398).  
5 Double checking, by testing for heteroskedasticity of errors after a heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimator is 
applied is not accommodated by STATA 10. Using notation from Chapter 3, and a definition of W to be 
)ˆ( 1
'
1122
'
2 βλσβ ii xx +  from equation (15), the variance correction estimator employed is described here as it is by 
STATA (STATA 10, Reference A-H: 562-3):  
11
12 )')('()'(ˆ
−− += WWQRWWWWV σ .  Note that )'()''(ˆ 2 DWZVDWDZWQ pρ= . In Q, D represents 
the square diagonal matrix of dimension N = # of observations, with )]()[( 1'11'11'1 kkkkkk βλββλ xxx +  (from equation 
(17)) as the diagonal elements; Z is the data matrix of probit equation covariates (“
kk 1
'
1 βx ” in the above notation); 
and Vp is the variance-covariance estimate from probit estimation of the selection equation. 
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OLS without an instrumental variable) is consistent and fully efficient. But the sample-selection 
model is used precisely because without it, OLS estimation is inconsistent and biased (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005: 546, Breen: 36). So the standard Hausman test of endogeneity [estimator: 
V(b0) – V(b1)] is econometrically inappropriate for any of these models. Use of the “seemingly 
unrelated estimation” command in STATA allows estimation of b0 against b1 in a way that is 
always defined. It estimates V(b0 – b1) by V(b0) – cov(b0, b1) – cov(b1, b0) + V(b1), instead of the 
questionable standard Hausman (STATA 10, Reference Q-Z: 352-354). 
Because the price-quantity configurations are theoretically identical across the five 
models, I use the third of the five model variants, the BROAD model without marketing 
interaction variables. If this model displays price endogeneity, all of the models will; if not, none 
of them will. I generate a lagged Price Index, and regress separately to generate the “consistent” 
(i.e., non-endogenous) b0 to compare against the previous regression results b1 (note that no 
independent OLS regression is conducted here). The test is whether b0 and b1 are the same. With 
41 degrees of freedom, the chi-square statistic is 29.84. The exact level of significance (p-value) 
on the assertion that the test statistic is in the critical region above the critical value for a  χ2 
distribution with 41 degrees of freedom (roughly 52) is 0.902, so we cannot reject the equality of 
the common coefficients across b0 and b1. To be certain, I also add to this test a test of whether 
the means of the two Price Indexes (lagged and not) are different. With 41 degrees of freedom, 
the chi-square statistic is 30.28. The exact level of significance (p-value) on the assertion that the 
test statistic is in the critical region above the critical value for a  χ2 distribution with 41 degrees 
of freedom (roughly 52) is 0.911, so we again cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of 
common coefficients across b0 and b1 and particularly across the differing Price Indexes. 
Therefore b1 (the default vector of coefficient estimates across any model reported here) does not 
88 
display price-quantity endogeneity, consistent with the particular construction of the Price Index 
to avoid it. Lagging the Price vector in anticipation of endogeneity would be redundant. 
 
5.2.4    Notes on Hypothesis Testing, Common to All Models 
5.2.4.a    Marginal Effects (MEs) and “mfx adjustment” 
Hypothesis testing is done on second-stage OLS coefficient estimates after two-step 
Heckman estimation, with marginal effects (MEs) interpreted only after a further stage of 
adjustment that conforms to equation (17) in section 3.3 above (Breen 1996; Byrne, Capps, Saha 
1996; Saha Capps, Byrne 1997). I will refer to this as “mfx adjustment.” As explained in the text 
supporting equation (17), direct inference on OLS variables common to the probit equation is 
inappropriate to describe the behavior of those who have selected into the market.6
                                                 
6 Saha, Capps, and Byrne: “It is proposed that the marginal effect expressions are incomplete in almost all 
consumption demand studies that use the Heckman approach” p 181.  “As is well-documented in the theoretical 
literature but rarely applied in the applied literature, the calculation of these marginal effects must be adjusted to 
account for sample selection bias” (Vance, p 1418). Vance offers an example in his paper where failure to apply the 
mfx adjustment led to “misleading inferences …[being] drawn with respect to the precision of the estimated 
coefficients” in other authors’ peer-reviewed published work.  
 Practical 
application of this correction involves construction of the elements of equation (17) from 
estimation results, in a formula that yields a result to which the delta method may be applied “to 
compute the [standard error] of a non-linear function for which it is too complex to analytically 
compute the variance.” The delta method uses a Taylor series to linearly approximate a non-
linear function, then this linear-approximate result is used to compute variance for inference on 
the relevant estimate, whose distribution is the function of multiple parameters (Vance, p 1416, 
including quote). The difference between the mfx adjustment numbers used for inference and the 
original OLS coefficient estimates are ultimately not predictable in linear fashion. This mfx 
adjustment process of defining linear approximate solutions for multiple parameter distributions 
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yields marginal effects that are often 20-35% smaller than the original OLS-side coefficient 
estimates (selection into the market is a restriction), but some of which fall by more than 90%, 
and a few of which rise in size. Signs of the marginal effects rarely flip from original OLS-side 
coefficient estimate signs, but this does occur with numbers relatively close to 0 in magnitude.7
The final “coefficient estimates” vector for inference is thus a combination first of 
coefficient estimates taken directly from OLS estimation, for variables unique to the OLS 
equation, and second of products of the mfx adjustment process (adjusted MEs), for variables 
existing in the OLS and probit equations. Within this vector, the “coefficient estimates/MEs” on 
demographic variables (including demographic-demographic interaction variables), on the 
constant, and the seasonal binaries are directly interpretable in ounces purchased. Remembering 
that the OLS-side estimation is for positive-quantity observations only, these are quantities when 
the HH buys sCSDs, not weekly quantities (for all but a very few HHs). Within the same vector, 
all estimates/MEs that are – or are interacted with – the continuous marketing-mix variables 
(Price, Advertising) must be multiplied by some value for the continuous variable to be 
interpreted in ounces. For all inference, the data-wide average value of each continuous 
marketing-mix variable is used to calculate marketing-mix variable MEs in ounce-equivalents. 
 
Standard errors for the mfx-adjusted ME estimates generated from the delta method 
application are almost uniformly too similar to the original variance-covariance matrix values 
associated with OLS-side output to significantly affect the results of hypothesis testing, such as 
for simple z-scores and critical p-values.8
                                                 
7 Rare exceptions include 3xPov4Inc & FemAge65+ in the BROAD model with marketing, and 2xPvIncxFmPCollg 
& 1xPvIncxSmCollg in REFINED. 
 OLS standard errors are used for hypothesis testing. 
8 Standard errors (even heteroskedasticity-robust ones) may vary from OLS results because an estimate of the IMR 
is used, so the estimate brings its own standard error into an already heteroskedastic model. As with the coefficients 
versus marginal effects on variables common to both equations of estimation, whether the variance is higher or 
lower is not predictable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005: 550; Vance: 38). Greene states that there are also unknown 
parameters of the IMR, in addition to its heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2003: 785). While checking for differences 
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Despite the need to correct for marginal effects to conduct proper inference on the 
households that select into the market, the non-mfx-adjusted OLS-side coefficient estimates still 
represent the marginal effects of variables on the population as a whole. So we must expect at the 
least that estimated coefficients for the marketing-mix variables remain of expected signs 
(negative on Price, positive on Sale and Advertising) for the unadjusted OLS-side coefficient 
estimates. Along with the constant, seasonal dummies, and the two exclusion-restriction 
variables, the OLS-side marketing-mix variables are of the expected sign in all five levels of the 
model, confirming to an extent the choice of specification of models, variables, and estimators. 
All nine of these variables are significant at the 1% level in all five versions of the model, with 
the exception of DiscSale in REFINED, which is significant at the 10% level.9
 
 
5.2.4.b    Projection-Factor Weighting of the Data, and Average Continuous Variable 
Values 
Inference and prediction on continuous (marketing and marketing-variable-interacted) 
variables requires that the final OLS/mfx-adjusted estimates be multiplied by some value of the 
continuous variable. In every interpretation and prediction, averages for the continuous 
marketing variables across the final data configuration are used. These averages are presented in 
                                                                                                                                                             
between the adjusted and unadjusted standard errors is driven by statistical theory (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005: 550), 
in practice here, the effective mathematical differences between the adjusted and unadjusted standard errors proved 
almost uniformly negligible in their ultimate effect on z-scores or p-values, as differences are routinely under 2% of 
the absolute value of the standard error. To be clear, z-scores and p-values may differ between OLS estimates and 
mfx-adjusted ME values for identical variables, but the standard error value strongly tends to be identical to within 
2%, regardless of the estimate or corresponding mfx-adjusted value. For the REFINED model, delta-method-
generated standard errors are identical to the OLS-side standard errors for all un-interacted variables (i.e., all the 
variables for which such calculation is appropriate). So using the OLS variance-covariance matrix on the mfx-
adjusted vector is extremely unlikely to change significance calculations for any single un-interacted variable, and 
because much relevant inference is done on combinations of estimates/MEs, any possible effect is diminished 
further. References exist that directly assert that STATA automatically does the standard error correction properly, 
meaning that any further delta-method correction would yield very similar results 
(https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/selection.pdf, accessed 26 August, 2011).  
9 This higher variance may be expected for a binary variable that has had much of its variation explained (controlled 
for) through its interaction with some 250+ specific demographic sub-groups. 
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table results with marketing-variable interactions, under the “X” column in various results tables. 
The numbers are not averages in the original metrics of the variables, as the data had to be 
weighted by application of the Projection Factor. The highest Projection Factor in this dataset is 
16,632, so every variable in every observation for every HH is scaled to a fraction of that HH’s 
Projection Factor, i.e., divided by 16,632. This makes the averages for any variable seem of 
questionably small magnitude – but the values are exactly proportionate to the data scale used for 
estimation. For all of the binary variables, the mfx-adjusted estimate results need no further 
correction to be in ounces/purchase. 
In section 4.4, specific properties of the Disc/Sale binary are discussed, and how they 
affect estimation strategy. While the HH purchase reaction to Disc/Sale is a function of the 
continuous probability distribution describing the portion of the sCSD category that is on sale in 
a data week, the variable is binary at the estimation level, so regression occurs on Disc/Sale as a 
binary. Disc/Sale and its interaction products evaluate in interpretation and prediction either as 
existing (=1), or not (=0). As they are not points on a continuum, they are not multiplied by the 
Disc/Sale pan-data average for interpretation as the Price and Advertising variables are.  
 
5.2.4.c    Failures of Statistical Significance at the 10% Level for Variables in a 2.6-Million-
Observation Dataset 
With the high number of observations common to every level of the model applied here, 
it may seem strange that the number of variables that are not significant at p-value 0.000 
increases as models increase in sophistication. There are multiple sources for this dispersion, and 
not every one of these sources jeopardizes the inference of economic significance due to failure 
to meet an arbitrarily defined level of statistical significance. 
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First, the variability within the data that define a random explanatory variable in a sample 
defines the concentration or dispersion of the values for that variable. There is a fixed amount of 
variability in the Price Index, for example (every HH that does not purchase in a DMA-week 
faces the same price for that DMA-week combination; variability in Advertising data is even 
less). So when the Price Index is interacted with dozens, or hundreds of demographic-
demographic (binary) variables, the fixed variability within the sample is used to define 
dispersion for all the related variables. This simple preponderance of variables drawing on a 
fixed amount of statistical dispersion, as applied to smaller and smaller sub-groups, may push 
higher standard errors on individual estimates. This becomes clear by the time inference is done 
on the REFINED model. P-values for the same sub-group in one of the four estimate sets (un-
interacted, and interacted with each of the three marketing variables) is 0.000, while for another 
it is above 0.5. It is not a compelling argument that a sub-group acts very similarly within itself 
in one dimension (resulting in the very low p-value), and with extremely divergent behavior 
within itself in a similar dimension (resulting in a very high p-value). There appears in cases to 
be more a lack of information sufficient to identify small variance from the mean, than may be 
warranted by the actual unobserved variance from the mean. The common expression for this 
among econometricians is “asking too much identifying information from the [limited amount in 
the] data.” This is observed in the higher number of p-values greater than 0.10 in all marketing-
variable-interacted variable sets in the REFINED model, but particularly in Advertising-
interacted variables versus Price- or even Disc/Sale-interacted variables.  
The underlying motivation of this research is to fully exploit the natural variability in 
such a large and reliable dataset to more accurately identify consumer behavior to the level of 
demographic sub-groups. This successful attempt, because it is successful, has challenged the 
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bounds of the identifying information inherent to the variability in the data. As final prediction is 
done on combinations of individual mfx-adjusted estimates, the ultimate effect of many 
individually less-than-reasonably-significant values does not to an uncomfortable extent 
undermine the quality, force, or statistical significance of the final-level (total effect) inferences 
made here.   
The second reason that many variables display high standard errors despite the number of 
observations is that individual variables may not affect the dependent variable to a significant 
degree. Often here, this does not seem to be a compelling cause, given significant effects 
documented for elements of the variable in other levels of the model, or even in other estimate 
clusters in the same model (four total, from equation (20)). This is a critical realization, because 
it discounts the most common explanation for low absolute values for z-scores. 
Third, the effect of the variable may not differ much from the effect on the dependent 
variable of the reference group with which that variable is affiliated. This is possible, but if true 
might commonly manifest in variables whose statistical significance diminishes as variables get 
closer in definition to the reference group. This does not appear as failure of significance often 
occurring in sub-groups close in definition to the reference sub-groups in the REFINED model, 
but there is limited evidence that this happens in the coarser BROAD model, especially for 
Female Age and # of Kids, but possibly in racial grouping as well. 
Fourth, there may be bi- or multi-modal behavior within the defined variable’s 
demographic group or demographic sub-group. A few examples may clarify. In the BASIC 
model, it seems unlikely that each Nielsen-defined increment in Income should have identical 
marginal responsiveness to the marketing mix for sCSDs. While any level may display unique 
behavior, richer HHs may behave more alike, poorer HHs may behave more alike, and each of 
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these groups may behave unlike the other. In the BROAD and REFINED models, for HHs 
having a fixed number of children, say one or three children, one parenting style may be quite 
permissive of high consumption of sugar, while another parenting style may be quite restrictive 
with respect to sugar consumption. There may be enough of each type to have its own separate 
mean, but no way to econometrically identify parenting style given the data here (particularly if 
level of Education is not determinative of parenting style). The two styles are lumped into a 
single class based solely on the number of children in the home. While their separate modes may 
be and are folded into a single mean, this is at the expense of a high standard error, because the 
bi-modal behavior within the defined demographic group forces high variance from the single 
mean.  
While the research design here is to sharpen our ability to see which specific 
demographic characteristics are associated with which purchase responses, the econometric 
efficacy of this approach remains limited by the available data. High standard errors can reflect 
this limitation more than they reflect a failure of the affected variable to represent an 
econometrically useful level of demographic specificity within the demographic variable set to 
which it belongs. 
 
5.2.5    Notes on Exclusion Restriction Variables, Common to All Models 
The particular mean of 7.77 for the exclusion restriction variable “WksHHTotOzGrtr67” 
in Table 1 supports the choice of six weeks as an appropriate stock draw-down period for the 
second exclusion restriction variable, “MovgAvgHHStock6” (described in section 4.6).10
                                                 
10 Six (weeks)  times 7.77 is 46.62, a reasonable approximate to the number of weeks in a year. This is by far the 
closest number of full weeks (data process periods) that fit within a 48- or 52-week year (the two types in the three-
year data span) without going over.  
 While 
a linear approximation of complicated household behaviors, when regressed on probability of 
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purchase, this constructed variable proved to be a statistically significant predictor of probability 
of purchase (p-value 0.000) in every version of the model to which it applied, as just noted. 
 
5.2.6    Notes on “Goodness of Fit” Metrics, Common to All Models 
 Two-step Heckman estimation results offer no standard metrics commonly used to judge 
whether one model fits the data better than another. No R2 is appropriate, because the missing 
variable adjustments from the probit stage upset classic OLS R2 calculation. No Akaike 
information criterion or Bayesian information criterion scores can be calculated, as the two-step 
Heckman does not use maximum-likelihood estimation in the second stage, so no maximum 
likelihood can be reported. It will become evident, that in examining results from progressively 
complex versions of the model, the constant, almost all the seasonal dummies, and with 
exceptions the un-interacted-marketing-mix variables all shrink in magnitude as model 
complexity increases. This suggests that more variation is explained by more refined 
demographic variables (and their interaction with marketing-mix variables), so that less 
variability must be explained by “catch-all” constants, binaries, and to an extent un-interacted 
continuous marketing-mix variables. So without conventional explicit goodness-of-fit measures, 
empirical evidence exists that the most complex models here fit best. 
 
5.3    BASIC Model – Estimation Results and Prediction 
5.3.1    BASIC without marketing variable interaction – probit and OLS results 
Reference group choices on the demographic variables must be made for every model, 
and must not conflict for probit and OLS equations. The BASIC models use White, non-
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Hispanic, No Children for reference group demographic variables, and Spring (Ssn1) as the 
reference group for seasons. 
The probit stage of estimation yields coefficient estimates for explanatory variables that 
are used only indirectly in final results, but the coefficients of estimation (hereafter: coefficient 
estimates, or coefficients, for brevity) do have signs indicating whether a variable is associated 
with greater or lesser probability of purchase, which is meant to proxy for selection in the 
market. Particularly for an item such as sCSDs that are so easily stockpiled in the home, we 
expect that quantity of purchase may be high for infrequent purchasers, which might reverse the 
signs on the same variable’s coefficients between the probit and OLS steps in estimation. This in 
fact occurs.  
Table 6 presents estimation results for the BASIC model without marketing variable 
interaction of the demographic variables, including in the bottom half of the table, results from 
the probit step in estimation. All probit variables are significant at the 1% level, except for 
Female & Male Education, which are both significant at the 5% level. The probit regression 
coefficient for the constant is negative, as one would expect, fitting a regression line with 
roughly 83% of all observations being zero purchases. Probit results are identical for the BASIC 
model with marketing variable interactions, except for the inter-equation variables listed after the 
probit constant in result tables. 
The probit equation coefficient on the Price index is positive (27.629) and significant 
(pval=0), as occurs in every level of the selection model discussed in this paper. For proper 
interpretation of continuous variables, the Price and Advertising (-0.00013) estimates should be 
calculated at particular values, and as for OLS estimate interpretation the means are used (Price 
mean=0.007407, Advert mean=374.631). The corrected probit-side estimates for inference for 
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Price and Advertising are then 0.205 and -0.049 respectively – and now of magnitudes consistent 
with all the other probit estimates, between zero and one. 
In previous iterations, estimate results where the probit coefficient on Price is negative, 
always simultaneously have a positive Price coefficient estimate on the OLS side, which implies 
a positive price reaction in quantity purchased for the general population – a poor result, not 
faced here. As discussed in the last subsection, all the OLS Price coefficients before mfx 
adjustment are negative as theory suggests. It is useful to recall that the probit equation is to 
determine which variables are most likely to be correlated with participation in a sCSD DMA-
week market. If we assume that almost all branded products cost more per ounce than private 
labels, and understand that of the top 95% of purchases by brand across a sugared and diet sCSD 
dataset, only 15.11% are private label, then it is clear that consumers display preference for 
higher cost brands as a percentage of all purchase. For example, the Coca-Cola brand is a 
premium brand, costing more than private label and many lesser-known brands, and Coca-Cola 
(for Classic and/or Diet) holds a market share in this data set larger than any other name brand, 
and larger than the sum of all private label brands (see Table A-2 in the Appendix, truncated for 
length to 75% of purchases by brand). A positive association between Price and selection into the 
market should not be surprising. 
The corrected probit-side Advertising estimate is negative and significant (-0.049, 
pval=0) in both BASIC models. This is not expected, but the BASIC is an estimation built on 
demographically coarse averages, so some counterintuitive results can occur. Negative 
Advertising estimates on the probit side do not persist in the more sophisticated BROAD and 
REFINED models, so pose little threat to the integrity of the modeling structure. 
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The household Income coefficient (-0.054) is negative, although it is positive in the OLS 
and marginal effects in BASIC models. This may be an initial sign that sCSDs are an inferior 
good. Education is negative for Female and Male HHHs (-0.005 for both), and for all Race 
groups against the White reference group (AfrAm & Asian -0.2, Other Race -0.193). Hispanic   
(-0.163) is negative against the non-Hispanic reference group. This is not necessarily intuitive, 
given that Hispanics have a relatively high mean weekly purchase across the full observation set 
(Table 2), so are likely to select into the market with relatively high frequency. This is a point of 
query to keep in mind as we proceed to more refined models. The probit estimate on the 
probability of selection into the market for HH Size is counterintuitvely negative (-0.057), but 
that for presence of children (Kids there All, 0.105) is positive. Both Female & Male Age probit 
estimates are negative in rising age group (-0.07, and -0.016 respectively). 
The exclusionary restriction variables, Weeks in the year that  HH total ounces Purchased 
are Greater than 67 ounces (0.161), and Moving Average HH Stock (coef.=-0.0003), are of the 
expected signs, and significant at the 1% level, suggesting functional adequacy. 
The unadjusted OLS coefficients at the top of Table 6 precede mfx adjustment. While 
most inference follows from the mfx-adjusted presentation of the same variable set (Table 7), the 
model structure is supported by the marketing variables all being of the correct direction, and 
significant at p-value=0. If they were not, the model would be suggesting that the population as a 
whole is not reacting as expected to marketing variables. However, the p-values are the same for 
coefficients and Heckman-adjusted MEs, so do note before leaving Table 6 that all coefficients 
are significant at the 1% level (as we would expect, asking at this stage for very little identifying 
information from many observations on very broadly defined variables). The single exception is 
for the p-value=0.067 for positive number of children in the home (Kids there All). This is still 
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better than the 10% level, but may indicate bi-modal or multi-modal behavior for HHs with 
children, as described in 5.2.4.c. 
 
5.3.2    BASIC without marketing variable interaction – marginal effects 
Table 7 presents the marginal effects [δy/δxk from eqn. (17)] of this first BASIC model, 
that without marketing variables presents purchase responses to sCSD marketing by the most 
generalized demographic groups. These MEs tend to be smaller than the OLS coefficient 
estimates for the corresponding variables in Table 6. This is mathematically implied by equation 
(17), and the application of equation (17) is precisely to correct for overestimation of marginal 
effects (sub-section 5.2.4a, above). The exception is on the Discount/Sale variable. Because it is 
not present in the probit equation it does not change.  
Generally, the MEs are interpretable as HH total ounces for a given week in which sCSD 
purchase occurs. Continuous-variable corrections using the pan-data average values involves 
multiplying the first column value by the (unrounded) second column value for the marketing-
mix variables. This correction yields the following ME values in ounces per purchase for a data 
week: Price -1106.018 becomes -8.192, and Advertising 0.0198 becomes 7.424. These 
continuous-variable MEs will be discussed below for these corrected values, not the ME values 
in the first numeric column of Table 7. 
The marginal effect of Price (-1106.018 * 0.0074=-8.19) is negative, while Sale (58.835) 
and Advertising (0.05 * 374.63 = 7.42) are positive, as expected. The other non-demographic 
variables – the constant (84.1), seasons (Ssn2 46.7, Ssn3 45.9, Ssn4 45.7), and the exclusionary 
restriction variables – are all of the expected signs and plausible magnitudes. So all of the 
variables that may quickly define whether the most basic model seems to be performing to 
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expectations are of the expected sign and highly significant. At 84.1 ounces, the constant is 2 
liters, plus ¾ of an extra 20-oz bottle, per week. 
The Price ME is -8.19 ounces per penny increase per ounce. This is a much smaller 
quantity response, given a data-wide mean price of 2.2 cents per ounce, than a unilateral own-
price elasticity for the top brand names greater in absolute value than 2.8 would seem to 
suggest.11
Income is the first demographic variable, and is positive as expected, at 3.028. Through 
the 24 income levels in the Nielsen Income category, this means that the highest-income group 
would purchase 72 ounces more than the lowest-income group, equivalent to a six-pack of 12-
ounce cans. 
 But this low quantity response is anticipated by the particular construction of the Price 
vector, which is an average over all purchased products in a DMA in a week, not a price on the 
particular product(s) purchased in the week by the observed HH. Because this construction does 
not change by HH characteristic or across models, the differences between Price response 
coefficient estimates for particular demographic MEs to sCSD category-level changes can 
readily be compared. The same holds for the Sale and Advertising coefficient estimates (relative 
to the coefficients on the demographic variables and seasons).  
In level of Female and Male Education, the effect is negative, with the magnitude for 
each increment higher for Female (-5.959) than Male (-4.762). Thus, if the effect is 
monotonically negative, we would expect the fall in mean purchase from Grade School to Post-
College education to be around 30 ounces, but for the same span across Male Education, the fall 
would be around 24 ounces. We may look to more sophisticated models with the question of 
whether the negative effect of Education on purchase seems consistently weaker for Males than 
Females. If so, this could indicate a higher tendency for the level of formal education to affect 
                                                 
11 Cotterill, Putsis, Rabinowitz, and Druckute, p 235-6, in Tremblay and Tremblay 2007. 
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applied nutrition education in Female HHHs versus Male HHHs. The magnitude of each jump in 
level is larger for Education than for Income, but there are more levels in Income. Which of 
these is likely to persist in the larger effect, and for which other demographic characteristics, 
must again be determined by more sophisticated models to follow. 
Relative to the “White” reference group, African-Americans (-15.755) buy 1¼ fewer 12-
ouce cans per purchase, while Asians (37.188) purchase not quite two and Other Race (19.562) 
not quite one 20-ounce bottle(s) more than Whites when they buy. Hispanics (-20.359) purchase 
roughly a 20-ounce bottle per purchase less than reference-group non-Hispanic HHs. From the 
Race-specific means at the bottom of Table 1, Hispanic HHs in this dataset have higher average 
Income, and higher average Education than Whites African-Americans and Other Race, either of 
which could drive lower purchase.  
It will prove useful to remember that any actual HH is a cross-section of demographic 
traits. For example, any HH whose purchase pattern exactly follows the reference group, but that 
has an attribute that differs from the reference group and that is associated with a higher purchase 
in ounces per week, must have an offsetting lower purchase correlation for a differing attribute, 
so that the effect balances to the reference-group mean. If the HH differs from the purchase 
pattern of the reference group, then the differing MEs will explain by how much. To 
demonstrate, we know from Tables 1 & 5 that Hispanic homes have larger HH sizes and more 
Kids in HH than other race-based groups. So if one of these characteristics has a large ME 
(HHsize), there must be an offsetting smaller/negative ME (Hispanic, Kids in HH) to 
compensate, unless the specific HH is truly exceptional in its purchase behavior (which cannot 
be identified in this construction). Adding Hispanic (-20.4), HHsize (+25.8), and Kids in HH     
(-2.5) results in a number much closer to the reference mean than the original MEs seem to 
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suggest – particularly for low numbers of children, after which the linearity of the HHsize ME 
begins to force less plausible differences (given the known purchase means from Tables 1, 2 & 
3).  So while estimation identifies the direction, magnitude, and significance of certain attributes 
in their correlation with purchase, it is not particularly helpful to imagine any single attribute in 
isolation, as it cannot exit isolated from other attributes identifying actual HHs. This limitation is 
relaxed in more complicated versions of the model by combining all relevant characteristics into 
specific household types for prediction of purchase effects by type. 
For each additional HH member, this BASIC model estimates just over two 12-ounce 
cans more of purchase (25.764). The presence of children in the home is associated with a 
negative impact on purchase quantity (-2.554), such that on a strict continuum a HH with five 
children would buy one can less per purchase than a HH with no children. Without considering 
the counteracting effect between the HH-Size and #-of-Kids-in-HH variables, the children 
variable is counterintuitive. While statistically significant, this latter effect if judged in isolation 
seems suspect, and is also one to verify or overturn with evidence in more flexible specifications. 
Age-bracket increments in Female HHH Age (3.004) are slightly larger than the 
increments for Male HHH Age (2.798), both positive, and at around 3 ounces per purchase 
roughly the magnitude in increment as for Income. A ten-year rise in Fem/Male Age (roughly 
two increments) translates to about a half a 12-ounce can. Comparing these MEs to means from 
Tables 2 and 3, these MEs seem to be artificially pulled toward zero by a rise from young to 
middle age for HHHs, driven by increasing family size, followed by a drop in ounces per week 
for HHHs aging from middle age to elderly (consult also Tables A-1a and A-1c for HH Size by 
Age). Again as for Income, the purchase incidence averages by Age category level do not 
suggest monotonic increase, so more refined models may escape the econometric stricture of the 
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BASIC model and display some negative and some positive coefficient estimates for Female/ 
Male Age that may more closely parallel expectations set by the weekly means in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
5.3.3    BASIC with marketing variable interaction – marginal effects 
Table 8 lists probit results, and OLS coefficient estimates from the BASIC model 
including interactions of each of the demographic variables with each of the three marketing 
variables. The last three columns are the marginal effects of each variable of estimation from the 
combined effects of the two equations, the p-values for these MEs, and the average values at 
which continuous marketing variables are calculated (see 5.2.4.b regarding Disc/Sale). The 
marketing variables interacted with demographic variables do not exist in the probit equation, so 
the OLS coefficient is the ME. The OLS coefficient is multiplied times the data-wide average 
value for the appropriate continuous marketing variable, so each ME in the third-to-last column 
for marketing variable interaction terms is in ounces, just as for the MEs for the demographic 
variables above it in the column.12
A caveat is in order, as vocabulary for “marginal effect” overlaps here. Each Table 8 
“δy/δx” column value is a  δy/δxk [as in eqn. (17)], and therefore a marginal effect in that it is 
properly mfx adjusted. But each table value is not the combined marginal effect (CME) of a 
dependent variable constructed from every explanatory variable that comprises an aspect of a 
particular marketing variable or of a demographic characteristic (example below). In contrast to 
results from the BASIC model without marketing-variable interaction variables, the CMEs for 
the marketing or demographic variables are no longer immediately inferable from a single value 
 
                                                 
12 Process descriptions are intentionally repeated at each model level to accommodate readers who are focused only 
on certain sub-section results. 
104 
in the table.13
As an example of a marketing variable CME, adding every variable from Table 8, 
column δy/δx, that has “Adv x …” to “Wkly Advert” yields a positive CME for the advertising 
effect, although not every Advertising-interacted δy/δxk is positive. In fact, combining “Wkly 
Advert” with any single Advertising-interacted term for a group-specific Advertising reaction 
reveals that all of the demographic characteristics are net positive in purchase response to 
Advertising (numeric results demonstrated below). 
 The combined marginal effects must be totaled from table values with components 
common to a particular marketing variable or demographic characteristic. The total effect (TE) 
of a demographic characteristic adds the constant and the un-interacted marketing variable MEs 
to the relevant demographic variable’s CME. However, because no characteristic exists in 
isolation from the other characteristics regressed here, ideally TEs should be constructed in a 
configuration that represents a possible household with a value for every relevant demographic 
dimension described by this model configuration. TEs for marketing variables are totals of the 
un-interacted ME for the variable, along with all MEs resulting from interaction with that 
marketing variable. 
While the unadjusted OLS coefficient on Price (-179.84 * 0.0074 = -1.33) is negative as 
expected across the population in or out of the weekly sCSD market, the BASIC with marketing 
interaction model is the only model version with a positive CME for the un-interacted Price 
variable (826.47 * 0.0074 = 6.12), and for every individual price reaction (“P x …” + “Wkly 
Price DMA”), and for the cumulative price reaction, or TE, ([Σ“P x …”] + “Wkly P DMA”) of 
the in-the-market portion of the population {([Σ“P x …”] * 0.0074) + 6.12 = 5.60}. Thus four 
versions of the model have negative cumulative Price reaction CMEs for mfx-adjusted marginal 
                                                 
13 Of course the values in Table 7 may be seen as CMEs, as without the marketing interaction variables, the CME 
reduces to the reported MEs – the two are equivalent where there is no marketing variable interaction. The same 
relation will hold for Table 11, compared to the CMEs in Table 13. 
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effects, and there is this single exception. This suggests that the Heckman model specification is 
fairly robust, and either somewhat sensitive when more aggregated variable definitions are used, 
or that in BASIC with marketing it is possible that a positive price reaction may result from a 
favoring of brand products, similar to the discussion for probit results for Table 6 in 5.3.1. Any 
such positive price reaction is not identified by more complex versions of the model. The former 
explanation seems more plausible. 
The cumulative positive Price ME after mfx-adjustment is not large, and when examined 
carefully does not demonstrate an assessment of non-economic behavior for the in-market 
sample. The reference groups White, non-Hispanic, and No Kids are particularly and 
exceptionally negative in their price reactions, as evidenced by three of the four positive 
reactions (Asian 1.6 + Hispanic 2.2 + Kids There All 0.46 account for 4.22 of the 5.60 net 
positive Price effect) in the table. These reactions versus reference groups explain 75% of the 
positive net Price ME, leaving the positive ME for Female Education (which may or may not be 
explained by a preference for name brands among higher-educated Female HHHs, per the 
argument for a positive price effect described in 4.3.1). So any confounding result is quite small, 
and may prove particular. The residual 1.4-ounce positive cumulative Price reaction is small 
relative to the incremental magnitudes of coefficient estimates for Income, Education, and most 
racial categories. So if this single version of the model is not accurate by a small amount in one 
dimension (and that based on an index as much as on personal choice), confidence in the 
modeling approach may be maintained. 
For “Disc/Sale” the unadjusted OLS coefficient and the mfx-adjusted ME are identical 
(81.46). Combining the “Disc/Sale” ME with any of the “Sale x …” interaction terms (“Sale x 
…” + “Disc/Sale”) yields uniformly net positive sale-response MEs, and the cumulative Sale 
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ME, or TE, is positive as well ([Σ“Sale x …”] + 81.46= 170.9), rising from the un-interacted 
Disc/Sale ME, as may be expected. The unadjusted OLS coefficient on Advertising is also 
positive as expected (0.05 * 374.631 = 18.75). The two-ME combination on marketing effects 
and demographic characteristics (“Adv x …” + “Wkly Advert”) shows all positive reactions to 
“Wkly Advert,” and the cumulative Advertising effect, or TE, {([Σ“Adv x …”] * 374.631) + 
18.75 = 13.47} is positive as well. But this TE is less than the un-interacted Advertising ME, due 
largely to the relatively strong negative “Adv x Hispanic” and “Adv x Kids there All” MEs, each 
relatively less reactive to Advertising than is its reference group. 
The other non-demographic variables – the constant (69.4), seasons (Ssn2 32.9, Ssn3 
26.7, Ssn4 20.6), and the exclusionary restriction variables – are all of the expected signs and 
plausible magnitudes, with p-values of 0.000. So all of the variables that may quickly define 
whether the most basic model seems to be performing to expectations are of the expected sign 
and highly significant. At 69.5 ounces, the constant is about 2 ounces over 2 liters, and 15 ounces 
less than the constant in the version without marketing-variable interaction, meaning more 
variability in the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables than in the first 
model. 
 
5.3.4    BASIC with marketing variable interaction – combined marginal effects (CMEs) 
The marginal effect of any demographic group’s specific reaction to a marketing variable 
is a combination of that variable’s marginal effect from column δy/δxk, and of the ME (in 
ounces) for the marketing variable with which it interacts. These two-variable combination MEs 
will be referred to as CME in (marketing variable). For example, the CME in Price of 
Household Income (HH Inc) will involve its ME, and the ME for the HH-Inc Price-interacted 
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term. I evaluate all Price- and Advertising-interaction terms at their respective (projection-factor-
adjusted) averages, provided in the “X” column in results tables for models including marketing 
variable interaction. Thus:   
CME in Price for HH Inc = δy/δx of HH Inc + (δy/δx of P x HH Inc* X of Wkly P DMA)  
CME in Advert for HH Inc = δy/δx of HH Inc + (δy/δx of Adv x HH Inc * X of Wkly Advert) 
CME in Sale for HH Inc = δy/δx of HH Inc + (δy/δx of Sale x HH Inc). (21) 
It is important to remember that variable CMEs in a marketing variable (e.g. CME in Price for 
HH Inc) are marginal, not total effects. Many CMEs in Advertising in the following table are 
negative, but the TEs in Advertising (variable ME + “Adv x …” + “Wkly Advert”) are all 
positive, as just described. 
The first column of figures in Table 9 presents the ME for each variable from Table 8, 
for reference. The second column of figures are the combined marginal effects in Price for each 
of the demographic categories in the BASIC model with marketing variable interactions, the 
fourth column for CMEs in Advertising, and the sixth for CMEs in Sale. Each of these CMEs 
more fully identifies the volatility unique to that demographic trait’s marginal reactivity to 
marketing variable changes than is possible in the BASIC model without marketing variable 
interactions with demographic category variables. The effects from Tables 7 and 9 are estimated 
using identical data, with all of the basic variables identically defined, so the Table 7 MEs are 
also provided for reference in the last column.  
Differencing the list of MEs in the first column, or the CMEs in Price, Advertising, or 
Sale, from the list of MEs in the last column shows that there is no common move in direction or 
size of change. Identifying the response to marketing mix variables separately by each variable 
and re-combining the effects to a marketing-variable-specific CME therefore does reveal 
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dynamic reactions to marketing mix variables specific to each demographic characteristic that 
are not completely identified in the model without marketing-variable interactions. One thing to 
notice is that the direction of the CME in Sale matches the ME from Table 7 for every variable, 
while signs on Price and Advertising CMEs may differ (Price in 3 of 11, Advertising in 2 of 11). 
This demonstrates that the magnitude of the Sale effect may dominate the Price and Advertising 
effects.14
The numeric columns after the CMEs in Price and the CMEs in Advertising show the 
difference for each variable between the CME from the previous column and the CME if one 
standard deviation is added to the average at which the first CME is calculated (a “shock” 
increase in Price or in Advertising). A binary Sale is either present or not, and there is neither an 
average at which it is evaluated nor a standard deviation for an “either/or” state. Statistical 
significance for CMEs is now the joint significance of the variable’s ME and the variable’s 
 In general the direction and degree of difference between the MEs from the BASIC 
without marketing interactions and the ME for a variable in the first column – which is 
calculated having isolated particular marketing variable reactions, without the marketing variable 
reactions being reported in the first ME – say something about marketing-variable 
responsiveness for the characteristic. For example, Asian moves most, almost 50 ounces 
including a reversal of sign (37.2 to -12.3, ca. -130%), whereas Male Age changes by around      
-10% (2.8 to 2.5). HH Size moves less than 10% (25.8 to 27.1), but when the information in the 
columns between is understood (next paragraph), it becomes clear that this is because the 
expected Price and Advertising reactions are of nearly equal size, and there is little dynamic 
response to Sale in rising HH size. 
                                                 
14 Indeed in the parallel Table 14, for the BROAD model, only 3 signs differ between the MEs for the Broad without 
marketing variable interaction, versus five for Price and five for Advertising. This result supports the possibility that 
the magnitude of the Sale effect may dominate in determining direction of the ME when all effects are combined, as 
they are in models without marketing variable interaction with demographic variables. 
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reactivity (ME) to the marketing variable. A Wald test on the MEs that together comprise a 
combined marginal effect may prove statistically significant where the OLS-side table p-value 
for the component variables may be greater than 0.10. Joint significance tests for each “CME in a 
marketing variable” finds that every one is significant at the 1% level, with the exceptions 
presented in the following two paragraphs. 
Male Edu is above the 10% level in Price and Advertising, and above 5% in Sale (Price 
0.928, Adv 0.173, Sale 0.057). Male Edu is far from conventional measures of acceptable 
statistical significance for one or both of two reasons. First, its mean is perhaps coincidentally 
too close to the intercept in effect not to be overwhelmed by its standard deviation in calculation 
of statistical significance by the student’s t test. Second, it may well be multi-modal (see sub-
section 5.2.4.c), meaning there are distinct areas of clustering within the larger distributions 
generating the data (not only for lower- versus higher-educated Males but for these groups across 
Age, # of Kids, and HH size, which are all not broken into specific control groups in this model). 
Any such distinct distributions (cluster areas) are agglomerated into this category and forcibly 
characterized by a single mean, so we would expect dispersion to raise the standard deviation 
enough that relative to the near-zero mean, it must force a high p-value. Thus the effect that Male 
Edu has on the dependent variable is small, and may be real, but the dispersion within the 
category does not allow standard characterization of that effect to be statistically significant. To 
re-state, the implicit robustness checks offered by models covering the same elements as in the 
Male Edu variable attest that it is statistically significant, despite the values here.   
No other exception is above 5% significance. African American has a p-value of 0.01 for 
the CME in Sale. Asian has a p-value of 0.047 for CME in Price, and of 0.042 for CME in 
Advertising. Other Race has a p-value of 0.022 for CME in Price, and of 0.014 for CME in Sale. 
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At this level of aggregation bi-modal behavior (see sub-section 5.2.4.c) within these groups is 
plausible. Later, more sophisticated models indicate that bi-modal behavior exists in these 
groups. 
The CME in Price of moving from one HH Income category to the next (3.96) falls as 
expected from the corresponding ME for HH Income (4.3), indicating that HHs with higher 
incomes are more Price sensitive than lower-income HHs. Higher-income HHs have lower 
CMEs in Advertising, by the same measure (3.9 versus 4.3), meaning they are less responsive 
than lower-income HHs. Adding a standard deviation to the average values at which the CMEs 
are evaluated has a small effect in the expected direction for Price (-0.2), but not for Advertising 
(-0.4). This suggests that higher-income HHs buy less in increasing Price, while lower-income 
households are responding more positively to Advertising.15
The CME in Price of moving from one Female Education category to the next (-8.7) rises 
from the corresponding ME (-9.3), indicating that HHs with higher-educated Female HHHs are 
less Price responsive than their lower-educated counterparts. But as the CME in Sale rises (-7.6 
versus -9.3)  in rising Female Education, buying on Sale seems preferred in higher Female 
Education, despite the relative Price insensitivity versus lower-educated Female HHHs. The 
effect of Advertising seems stronger for lower-educated Female HHHs, by the negative CME    
 More sophisticated models that 
offer MEs by income level and interaction with Advertising may serve to check whether lower 
income HHs are consistently responding more strongly to Advertising. The CME in Sale of 
moving from one HH Income category to the next (3.6) is lower than the HH Income ME (4.3), 
so in general higher-Income HHs buy fewer ounces when they buy on Sale than lower-income 
HHs. 
                                                 
15 The same result could also follow from lower-income households absorbing much more sCSD advertising with 
the same conversion rate to purchase as higher Income HHs. 
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(-9.39 versus -9.33), and because the effect falls in rising Advertising, by the (-0.06) to a plus-
one-standard-deviation shock to Advertising. 
The CME in Price for Male Education (0.07) is a fall from the Male Educ ME of 0.333, 
opposite the effect for Female Education. For Male HHHs rising Education translates to more 
Price responsiveness in this specification. And a standard deviation shock to the Price average   
(-0.15) confirms this. The CME in Sale is negative (to -1.9 from 0.33), indicating that Male 
HHHs with lower education buy relatively more when the sCSD is on Sale. The CME in 
Advertising is negative (to -1.06 from 0.33), so as with Income and Female HHH Education, 
lower-income HHs buy more in rising Advertising than higher-income HHs. The effect is 
strengthened by a standard-deviation shock (-1.47), indicating that Advertising effectiveness 
demonstrated by correlation with more ounces purchased by lower-educated Male HHHs is 
linear or even rising (there is no clear diminishing return to Advertising to lower- versus higher-
income HHs in this dimension). The same is true for Female HHHs, to a lesser degree.  
To re-iterate, by these results in BASIC, lower-income and lower-educated HHs respond 
more to Advertising than their higher-income and higher-educated counterparts, and are more 
responsive to Sale in lower Education for Male HHHs, but not Female HHHs. In rising Male 
Education and in rising Income, Price responsiveness rises, while it falls in rising Female 
Education. With placement denoting higher responsiveness to the marketing variable, here is a 
simple grid: 
 
 
         . 
 Income Fem Educ Male Educ 
Lower Adv, Sale Price, Adv Adv, Sale 
Higher Price Sale Price 
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Nothing stands out as breaking from common-sense economic rationale – and the fact that each 
group and its Hi-Lo opposite is responsive to either Price or Sale is a reasonable sign that the 
correlations for these key variables here are in some sense sensible. 
The Race CMEs are relative to the White base group. The MEs of African-American 
HHs (Afr-Amer) (-30.4), Asian HHs (-12.3), and Other Race (8.8) HHs are much more negative 
than their MEs in the previous specification (Afr-Amer -15.8, Asn 37.2 [reverses sign], OthR 
19.6), meaning these three racial groups’ buy fewer ounces relative to White HH reference group 
average purchase when the three marketing variable effects are isolated and controlled for. Afr-
Amer HH purchase falls very slightly in Price ME, (to -30.6), and drops (-0.16) when a standard 
deviation is added to the mean at which Price is evaluated. So the Afr-Amer HH is responsive to 
Price in the expected direction, a fraction more than White HHs are at mean Price. The CME in 
Price for Asian HHHs rises some 15% versus the base group (to -10.7 from -12.3), and the 
difference from a Price shock is also positive (0.96), so Asian HHs are consistently less Price 
sensitive than White HHs, or by comparison given the same reference group, than are Afr-Amer 
HHs, or Other Race HHs. The CME in Price for Other Race HHs falls versus the ME (to 7.9 
from 8.9), as does the response to a positive Price shock (-0.59), so Other Race HHs are more 
Price responsive than White HHs.  
Comparing their first-column MEs to their Sale response, Afr-Amer HHs rise relative to 
White HHs by over 20 ounces (-8.36), Asians by 90 ounces (82.9, the largest response by more 
than double of any in the table), and Other Race by 2 ounces (10.8). Asian HHs and Other Race 
HHs also have the expected increase in response to Advertising (Asn to -10.5 from -12.3, 
OtherRace to 11.2 from 8.9, the largest positive response to Advertising in the table), and 
relatively strong positive responses to a standard-deviation shock to Advertising (1.9 and 2.4), 
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relative to the White HH reference group. Afr-Amer HHs fall very slightly in Advertising CME 
(-30.66), with a negative difference to an Advertising shock (-0.3), so are less responsive to 
Advertising than the White Reference group – despite averaging lower in Income and Education, 
which based on the simple grid above (and Table 1, bottom) might seem unexpected.  
The large, even extreme given the magnitudes, marketing variable responsiveness of 
Asian and Afr-Amer HHs relative to White HHs is rooted in response to Sale. The positive 
response to Sale explains and overwhelms Asian HHs positive response in Price CME. Opposite 
the Asian and Afr-Amer HH MEs that change a lot in difference from the White reference group, 
the difference from the White reference group for Other Race (to 8.9 from 19.6) actually shrinks. 
Still, Other Race is the only variable in this table that has expected responses to every marketing 
variable interaction and to a standard deviation addition to continuous marketing variables. So 
amplitude of the specific marketing-variable reactions is clearly a factor in the magnitude of net 
effect, with Other Race magnitudes cumulatively smaller than Asian and Afr-Amer in Sale.  
Leaving the Race variables but staying within “racial group” variables, the CME for 
Hispanic (versus non-Hispanic) HHs decreases in size relative to the ME from Table 7 (to -11.6 
from -20.4), and exactly opposite of Other Race, does not react relative to its base group in the 
expected direction for any of the marketing variable interactions or standard deviation shocks 
(from -11.6, in Price a rise to -9.5 [1.3], in Adv a large fall to -16.9 [-5.5], in Sale a fall to -13.9). 
It is not yet clear whether strongly habitual purchase of sCSDs would be reflected in high 
responsiveness (HHs very attentive to changes) or low responsiveness (HHs buy regardless of 
marketing signal changes) to large marketing variable changes. 
Comparing the ME to the CME in Price for perhaps the least definitive category, HH 
Size, there is a drop in ounces, as economic theory predicts (from 27 to 24.7), and the correct 
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sign for a positive shock in Price (-1.4). Kids in HH now reverses sign from the last model’s ME 
(of -2.5) to 10.9, but rises in CME in Price, with a further rise to a positive Price shock. In 
practice, when there are Kids in HH, it raises the HH size, and the changes in HH size are larger 
than the Kids in HH changes, so the net reaction is of economically sensible signs (falling 
purchase in rising Price).  
The same is not true for CME in Advertising. HH size rises to 28.5 as expected, but the 
fall in Kids in HH in Advertising is larger. For a positive shock to Advertising, again the 
unexpected negative for Kids in HH (-2.4) is not reversed by the positive in HH Size (1.5)  as it 
was for a Price shock. Again unexpectedly, the quantity response to Sale is negative for both, 
falling slightly to 26.6 (from 27) for HH Size, meaning smaller HHs buy more on Sale, while 
Kids in HH falls from 10.9 to -13.1, a reversal and very large drop in quantity in rising number 
of children in a HH. A result that HHs with more Kids buy less on Sale than HHs with fewer 
Kids seems counterintuitive to economic logic. There are two responses to this. First, we must 
check to see if this type of result is robust to more sophisticated models reported later.  Second, 
we may consider if HHs with more Kids are buying more frequently or more consistently than 
HHs without Kids, in which case we might infer a habitual buying behavior that is resistant to 
the influence of changes in marketing variables. Like the Hispanic variable, Kids in HH displays 
no expected response in any marketing variable CME, or to increase in standard deviation on 
either the Price and Advertising marketing variables. 
Sex of HHHs are identified by the Education and the Age variables. Rising Female Age 
moves opposite rising Female Education in CME for Price (falling from 9.4 to 8.2, and 
remaining negative in a positive price shock, at -0.65), and in CME for Sale, falling from 9.4 to 
8.3, meaning younger Female HHHs favor price promotions over older Female HHHs. This 
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result maintains the parallel wherein a group favors either lower Price or more Sale, but not both. 
Younger Female HHHs are more responsive to Advertising (8.2 from 9.4) just as lower-educated 
Female HHHs are, and as for Education, the negative Advertising response in rising Age (-1.3) 
holds for a positive shock to Advertising.  
Along with Male Education, Male Age is the least responsive in ounces of purchase to 
marketing variable changes of any variable in the table. The CME in Price falls to 2.45 from 2.5 
ounces, and the fall is supported by the -0.03-ounce response to a positive Price shock. The CME 
in Advertising is also of expected sign, but rises from 2.5 to 2.6, with a 0.1-ounce response to a 
positive shock. As for Female HHHs, younger Male HHHs are more responsive to Sale, as the 
1.68 CME is less than the 2.5 ME, although the gap is narrower for Male HHs. Another simple 
grid may help summarize: 
 
 
   .                                                                                      
It is only the larger negative response in HH size overwhelming the positive in Price in # of Kids 
that pushes Price into “Higher,” but the result then remains consistent with the hypothesis that 
Price and Sale responsiveness in ounces may contrast for levels within a variable, consistent with 
the theory that consumers seek lower (average) price for readily available non-credence goods. 
As a general test of either the model or the applicability of economic theory to these 
variable groups, 7 of 11 responses to adding a standard deviation change in Price are of the 
expected sign, with 4 of 11 of the expected sign in Sale, and 4 of 11 in Advertising. This totals 
15 of 33, or just under half of the responses from the BASIC model with marketing being of 
expected sign. This type of analysis is predicated on two assumptions. First, that the base groups 
are not coincidentally the most responsive to marketing variables – which is not at all clear here, 
 
HH Size Kids In HH Female Age Male Age 
Lower Sale Adv, Sale Adv, Sale Sale 
Higher Price, Adv (Price) Price Adv, Price 
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but the reference group assumptions are held as close as possible through the model levels, so 
this compromise may not much impede inter-model comparison. The second assumption is that 
for this product category and the magnitude of these variables in the HH budget, the effects of 
marketing-variable standard-deviation shocks would remain linear, and therefore unexpected 
signs do not indicate expected curvature (diminishing returns) when the sign is unexpected in the 
quantity response to a shock. This assumption is consistent with the strictures on ME for 
coefficient estimates in the BASIC model. For a rise in variable by type, the response to 
marketing variable interaction is most consistent with economic expectation for Race (7/9), then 
HH Size and Education (2/3 over Male & Female), Income (1/3) , and Hispanic and Kids in HH 
(0), with no expectation for rising Age (because this is the least likely to be linear in response, 
given the rise then fall in HH size through Age levels). 
 
5.3.5    Prediction – Introduction to Combined Marginal Effects (CME) Tables, Common to 
All Marketing-Variable-Interaction Models 
For the BASIC, BROAD, and REFINED models, estimation correlates sCSD purchase 
behavior according to seven demographic categories: Income, sex of HHH (for Educ level and 
Age), Education, Race/Hispanic, HH Size, # of Kids, and Age. If any four of these are held 
constant, a single table allows comparison of the other three, and different HHH sexes can be 
compared using similar tables. This structure is held as close to parallel as possible across the 
three model levels to identify demographically correlated differences in purchase response and to 
show the advantages of more sophisticated constructions. The result is Combined Marginal 
Effects tables of mean predictions. The predictions, Ŷ0 for each cell in a CME table, are linear 
combinations of combined marginal effects, each calculated from mfx-adjusted estimate results 
that are aggregated to include marketing-variable interaction effects for each variable. Thus:  
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xx XXXYEY βββα ˆ...ˆˆˆ]|[ˆ 221100 ++++== X ,   (22) 
where X is a vector of CMEs that together are required to fully characterize the 
demographic dimensions that define a HH, plus the intercept.16
Each model level will present at least one set of three CME tables, meant to identify 
purchase response by Income level, Education level, racial group, and sex of HHH for realistic 
profiles of representative homes. In the first table the four elements held fixed are: (1) HH 
Size=4, (2) # of Kids =2, (3) which defines the presence of Female & Male HHHs (sex of HHH 
assignment=both), (4) both HHHs assumed to be Age 40-50 years. In the second table the four 
elements held fixed are: (1) HH Size=3, (2) # of Kids =2, (3) Female ONLY HHH, (4) assumed 
to be Age 40-50 years. The third table is identical to the second, but the sex of the HHH is Male 
ONLY, not Female. Age level 40-50 years for the HHH in Tables 2 & 3 represents the HHH Age 
for either sex of maximum average weekly purchase, with or without non-purchase weeks 
included. Each set of three CME tables depicts purchase reactions to a particular marketing 
variable: Price, Sale, or Advertising. 
 Each Xx is the CME 
corresponding to a specific demographic group or sub-group, consistent in construction with 
equation (21). As every demographic group or sub-group is a dummy variable, the actual linear 
combination devolves to Xx’s each evaluated at Xx=1 (with all of the Xx=0 terms omitted), 
including Xx’s reaction to a marketing variable. If the marketing variable is continuous, it is 
calculated at its pan-data average.  
                                                 
16 The constant is not required here, and is only required in calculation of Total Effect (TE) for a variable, a 
calculation that would also include the MEs on the un-interacted marketing variables. The constant is included in 
every cell of every CME prediction table here simply to bring the ounce totals closer to the weekly levels expected 
from Table 3. The constant is quite high in BASIC models, and shrinks as the models increase in complexity, so 
including the constant also keeps relative cells from being different to the point of seeming unrelated if they are 
compared across model levels. Technically the cells in prediction tables are marginal total effects (MTEs) plus a 
constant, but the distinction between CMEs that are combinations of CMEs plus a constant and MTEs that are 
combinations of CMEs plus a constant does not seem worth introducing “MTE” in the main text. As the primary 
interest from regression is marginal effects for variables, no total effects will be constructed unless requested by a 
reader, who with these results, could easily calculate TEs for him- or herself. 
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The fixed elements in the table can be varied. For example the number of children in the 
household could be changed across two of three variable categories, differing by Income or 
Education levels, and/or by racial group. A very wide array of results can be defined by 
prediction tables in this manner. As the emphasis on the income and education effects by racial 
group is a key focus here, the Price, Sale, and Advertising table sets associated with these are 
presented here. 
In every model, each CME is a combination of two mfx-adjusted variable MEs, one for 
the variable and one for the variable interacted with the marketing variable of focus. As an 
example, in the BASIC model’s single table where HHsize=4, 8 of these (2-ME) CMEs are 
combined with the constant, for nine terms in the final cell-level CME (built from 17 mfx-
adjusted estimates). The level of the model determines the number of elements in each predicted 
value in a CME table cell. Based on degree of overlap with reference sub-group assumptions, 
most cells are combinations of 6 to 9 terms, each term itself being a CME. For either single-sex 
of HHH table, CMEs for the other sex’s Education and Age are dropped, HHsize=3, and all else 
is the same. There are fewer terms combined for cells whose elements overlap with the reference 
group helping to define the intercept (constant). Thus for “White” as a column, there is no Race 
element in the prediction calculation. By adopting the reference group for season “spring” for all 
9 tables across the three model levels, I avoid adding an extra term to the prediction calculation. 
Any of the assumptions are flexible, but would generate a completely separate set of three tables. 
Predicting for a different season would simply require adding that season’s estimate to the 
existing prediction calculation.  
To focus on how lower and higher Education effect HH purchase over the span of 
Income levels and vice-versa, each table is divided into four quadrants. The upper left and upper 
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right span Income levels for fixed levels of Education – here High School Educ and College 
Educ. The lower left and lower right quadrants span Education levels for fixed levels of Income 
– here 1xPvInc and 4xPvInc. The non-Hispanic Race groups (not including Other Race, because 
while it is regressed to control for its effect, Other Race is not clearly defined and is therefore of 
marginal interest in final analysis for this study), and Hispanic are columns across left and right 
halves of every table, so racial-group-specific analysis can be conducted. Cells may also be 
totaled or averaged in any dimension (row, column, or quadrant) to make inferences. Because 
each cell is a combination of between six and nine 2-variable CMEs in Price, and there were very 
few 2-variable CMEs in Price with p-values above 0.01 to begin with, those cells deemed by 
individual standard errors in the mfx-adjusted output table to be most likely to fail a significance 
test were tested. All such candidate cells proved to be significant at the one percent level, so all 
cells in all tables have pval=0.000.  
  
5.3.6    Prediction – BASIC with Marketing Variables, Combined Marginal Effects Tables 
 Table 10a presents household-realistic predictions of purchase response by demographic 
group and that group’s reaction to a rise in Price (CMEs in Price) relative to a reference sub-
group. Every cell holds fixed HHsize=4, # of Kids=2, Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the 
constant is added. The reference group for season, “spring” is assumed. The first observation 
pertaining to this table of predicted values is that the purchase quantities (for a week, but not 
every week, just purchase weeks) are all in a plausible range, given the averages listed in Table 
3. They may be seen as trending slightly lower than expected, but simply changing the season to 
summer would bring almost every number in the table within the span of the averages in Table 3 
(214 – 335 ounces). Table 10a is not a bad first approximation of household purchase behavior, 
given its limitations. In Table 3 the span from the lowest to the highest average purchase in 
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ounces for a demographic group is 121 ounces. Prediction from estimation should provide a 
more dynamic range, by accounting for dynamic reactions to marketing variables unique to 
demographic sub-groups, assuming they do in fact differ. The span for the HHsize=4 BASIC 
prediction (Table 10a) is 148, wider than 121, as expected, yet still fairly narrow. This may be 
due to the strictures of variable definition, but this notion can only be confirmed by results from 
later models. The spans for Price CMEs for the same HHsize=4 combination will be compared 
for the BROAD and REFINED prediction tables. 
 Between cells in a row and for many cells in columns, given the strictures of BASIC 
model variable definition, values generally change by small regimented amounts. The change in 
amount by row is the same for every racial group. There is no objective way to match the levels 
for the BROAD and REFINED models to the BASIC for Income. To generate values 
comparable across the three tables, specific choices must be made. I choose to use the average 
Nielsen increment for each of the 24 defined levels, and apply some common sense, such as 
calculating at the third of the first four levels, rather than at the second, and trying to appreciate 
the weighting of the original Nielsen 2-digit income codes for odd-level breaks.17
                                                 
17 Nielsen’s levels begin at 03 (under $5000) and end at 27 ($100,000+). Income levels clearly defined in BROAD 
and REFINED need to be constructed for the BASIC. With “Inc” representing the Income CME (4.311, from Table 
9): HfPvInc=Inc*1.5 (at $7.5k, to Nielsen level ‘06’); 1xPvInc=Inc*4 (at $15–20k to Nielsen level ‘11’); 
2xPvInc=Inc*7 (at $35k to Nielsen level ‘16 to 17’); 3xPvInc=Inc*13 (at $65k to Nielsen level  ‘21’); 
4xPvInc=Inc*17 (at $85k to Nielsen level ‘26’); 5xPvInc=Inc*23 (at $115k to Nielsen level ‘27’, but at the low 
end).  
 A single 
increment is $5000, constrained to be a uniform incremental rise for each $5000-increase in HH 
income. This explodes the values a bit toward the bottom half of the upper quadrants of tables 
10a,b, & c (the 10-ounce difference from HfPvInc to 1xPvInc becomes a 24-ounce difference 
from 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc). Lower-income HHs are constrained to be buying less than upper-
income HHs from the extension of the 3.96-ounce purchase increase correlated with each rise in 
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Income level. If other versions of the model confirm that the poorest HHs buy less, this might 
imply that sCSDs are seen as a minor luxury (treat), and/or that sCSDs are not being used as a 
cheap calorie source.18
 The Education adjustment is much more straightforward, simply adding “Grade School” 
into the Less High School level so it counts as two increments solves the mismatch between 
BASIC and the later models. Similarly, the Age levels are only slightly expanded in the BASIC 
from later models, and are listed in Table A-1d for reference. As Age is fixed at the same level in 
all cells of all three tables for levels extant in the data, no real adjustment applies. But the 
increment on Age would begin to seem unrealistic in the higher Age brackets if prediction for the 
BASIC model was done in a table spanning Age (with the highest Age group buying over 60 
ounces at purchase, driven just by their age, roughly 20-ounces more per purchase than the 
mean-highest-purchase Age group (40-50 years). 
 
The definition of Income results in a predicted income effect on purchase as positive 3.96 
ounces per purchase for every $5000 bump in Income, with no curvature or satiety. Based on this 
definition, the income effect (increased purchase in rising Income, with an 85-ounce-span from 
lowest to highest Income at fixed Education level, as evident in upper quadrants) dominates the 
education effect (falling purchase in rising Education, 40-ounce-span from lowest to highest 
Education level at fixed Income level, as seen in lower quadrants) in absolute value, a result not 
confirmed in BROAD and REFINED models. 
Another aspect of analysis can be taken by averaging all the values for fixed HS Ed 
across all Income levels (upper-left quadrant, avg=249, st.err.=32.53) and for fixed College Ed 
                                                 
18 As could be strictly rational for those so poor that they are chronically calorie deficient. But I imagine this level of 
chronic calorie deficiency is more extreme than a Nielsen HomeScan participant HH is likely to be enduring. 
Remember from the motivation section, the calorie richness of sCSDs does nothing to promote satiety. Sweetened 
CSDs do not alleviate hunger much better than plain water. 
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across all Income levels (upper-right quadrant, avg=228, st.err.= 32.53). Between these two, 
there is an average fall of 20 ounces per purchase. Comparing them to 1xPvInc (lower-left 
quadrant, avg=199, st.err.=18.69) and 4xPvInc (lower-right quadrant, avg=247, st.err.=18.69) 
across all Education levels, we find an average rise of 48 ounces per purchase at the higher fixed 
Income level. Purchase rises over 25% in the Income difference, versus falling 15-20% in the 
education difference – again the income effect dominates the education effect. The difference 
between the highest-purchase racial group (White) and the lowest (Afr-Amer) is 31 ounces, but 
this amount is less than the span across either Income levels (76 oz), or Education levels (40 oz), 
meaning that differing racial group is a smaller determinant of purchase than either of these other 
factors, as originally hypothesized. Later models will confirm or overturn this finding. 
Each racial group has a single adjustment that applies uniformly to all the cells in its 
column(s). The constraint that every level change in Income or Education is identical in 
purchase-ounce effect dictates that increments are the same for every racial group, so the 
difference between any two columns is fixed for every cell, regardless of which row – e.g., Asian 
HHs moving from 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc increase by 21.3 ounces, as do White, Afr-Amer, and 
Hispanic HHs.  
Racial groups can be ranked from highest to lowest purchase either by average quantity 
purchase response across the table for each of the four half-columns for each racial group, or 
totaling all 22 cells for each racial group. White (total=5382, avg=244) is the largest, followed 
by Asian (5221, 237), then Hispanic (5057, 229), and finally Afr-Amer (4709, 213). For the 
BASIC model, the quantity purchase differences between racial groups are fixed across all 4 
quadrant averages, for all three Price-CME tables: White-Asian has a 7-ounce average 
difference, White-Hispanic has a 15-ounce average difference, White-Afr-Amer has a 31-ounce 
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average difference. The racial group averages and rankings cannot change for Female or Male 
only HHHs in the BASIC specification. Regardless of racial group, there are uniform responses 
to variable level changes. Intuitively, uniform changes within each racial group to changes in 
Income, Education, and sex of HHH seem overly restrictive, but this notion can also be 
confirmed by results from later models.  
Comparing the HHsize=3, two Kids, for Female or Male ONLY HHH, the linearity of 
changes constrains sex of HHH comparison, if they indeed differ. All cell-by-cell differences 
comparing descriptive cells between Tables 10b and 10c are less than 20 ounces. The linear 
increments seem particularly restrictive for Education level increments in Male only HHH, at      
-1.4 ounces. Differences for fixed Education level HS versus College across Income levels are 
only 3 ounces, within same-racial-group columns. The education effect appears to be extremely 
weak for Male HHHs, only 6 ounces total difference across education levels, whereas across all 
Income levels, the total effect is 86 ounces – over ten times the education effect. While the table 
results are statistically significant they strain credibility of the inference, given economic 
intuition and results from BROAD and REFINED. The Female only HHH education response 
seems it must be more dynamic than the Male only education response, but the plausibility of the 
inference is again tempered by the binding linearity of purchase-ounce changes across variable 
levels. If this prediction set is accurate, Male HHHs (with two Kids) buy less than Female HHHs 
(with two Kids) in HS Ed, but buy more than Female HHHs when either has College Ed – results 
at odds with earlier versions of estimation results for more sophisticated models. 
As may be anticipated given the linear restrictions of the BASIC variable definitions, 
Tables 10b & 10c together are not very dynamic in range, with one cell below 140, and one 
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above 270 (both in the Female HHH table). This narrow span will be compared later to results in 
more flexible specifications. 
 
5.4    BROAD Model Results – Estimation Results and Prediction   
5.4.1    BROAD without marketing variable interaction – probit and OLS results 
Reference group choices on the demographic variables must be made for every model, 
and must not conflict for probit and OLS equations. The BROAD models use the top levels of 
Income and Education (5xPov4Inc, Fem Post Collg, Male Post Collg), White and non-Hispanic, 
HHsize=1 and No Kids, and Female and Male Age 50-65 years as reference group demographic 
variables, and Spring (Ssn1) as the reference group for seasons. 
The probit stage of estimation yields coefficient estimates for explanatory variables that 
are used only indirectly in final results, but the coefficients of estimation do have signs indicating 
whether a variable is associated with greater or lesser probability of purchase. These probabilities 
proxy for selection in the market. Particularly for an item so easily stockpiled in the home, such 
as sCSDs, we expect that quantity of purchase may be high for infrequent purchasers, which 
might reverse the signs on the same variable’s coefficients between the probit and OLS steps in 
estimation. This in fact occurs.  
Table 11 presents estimation results for the BROAD model without marketing variable 
interaction of the demographic variables, including in the bottom half of the table, results from 
the probit step in estimation. All probit variables are significant at the 1% level, an even more 
significant variable set than that for the BASIC without marketing variable interaction probit, 
suggesting better identification of demographic (sub-)groups sharing relatively common 
behavior. The probit regression coefficient for the constant is negative, as one would expect, 
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fitting a regression line with roughly 83% of all observations being zero purchases. Probit results 
are identical in the BROAD model with marketing variable interaction, except for the inter-
equation variables listed after the probit constant in result tables. 
The probit equation coefficient on the Price index is positive (45.988) and significant 
(pval=0), as occurs in every level of the selection model discussed in this paper. For proper 
interpretation of continuous variables, the Price and Advertising (0.000013) estimates should be 
calculated at particular values, and as for OLS estimate interpretation the means are used (Price 
mean=0.007407, Advert mean=374.631). The corrected probit-side estimates for inference for 
Price and Advertising are then 0.341 and 0.005 respectively – and now of magnitudes consistent 
with all the other probit estimates, between zero and one. Discussion of the positive probit 
coefficient on Price is in sub-section 5.3.1. The probit and OLS coefficients on Advertising are 
positive as expected in the BROAD models. 
In demographic variables we see a nearly element-by-element reversal of coefficient sign 
between the probit and the OLS coefficients, with all of the marketing variables, and with all of 
the OLS demographic variables in Income, Education, and racial group following expectations 
from either theory or from the category level averages from Tables 2 & 3, with the exception of 
Hispanic. 
The exclusionary restriction variables, Weeks in the year that  HH total ounces Purchased 
are Greater than 67 ounces (0.178), and Moving Average HH Stock (coeff.= -0.0004), are of the 
expected signs, and significant at the 1% level, so meet minimum requirements for functional 
adequacy. Each is larger in magnitude in the expected direction than for the BASIC model.19
                                                 
19 An identical increase occurs in REFINED (to 0.181 and -0.00043 versus the BROAD’s -0.00039) relative to 
BROAD, a further indication of better specification at each model level. 
  
126 
The unadjusted OLS coefficients in the first numeric column at the top of Table 11 
precede mfx adjustment. While most inference follows from the mfx-adjusted presentation of the 
same variable set (Table 12, replicated for convenience as the bold numeric column in Table 11), 
the model structure is supported by the marketing variables all being of the correct direction, and 
significant at p-value=0. If they were not, the model would be suggesting that the population as a 
whole is not reacting as expected to marketing variables. 
 
5.4.2    BROAD without marketing variable interaction – marginal effects 
Table 12 presents the marginal effects [δy/δxk from eqn. (17)] of this first BROAD 
model, that without marketing variables presents purchase responses to sCSD marketing by 
demographic group levels. These MEs tend to be smaller than the OLS coefficient estimates for 
the corresponding variables in Table 11. This is mathematically implied by equation (17), and 
the application of equation (17) is precisely to correct for overestimation of marginal effects 
(sub-section 5.2.4a, above). There is an exception for the Discount/Sale variable, as it is not 
present in the probit equation, so does not change. Generally, the MEs are interpretable as HH 
total ounces for a given week in which purchases of sCSDs occur. Continuous-variable 
corrections using the pan-data average values involves multiplying the first column value by the 
(unrounded) second column value for the marketing-mix variables. This correction yields the 
following ME values in ounces per purchase for a data week: Price -1313.277 becomes -9.727, 
and Advertising 0.011 becomes 3.958. These continuous-variable MEs will be discussed below 
for these corrected values, not the ME values in the first numeric column of Table 12. 
The marginal effect of Price is negative, and of Sale and Advertising positive, as 
expected. The other non-demographic variables – the constant, seasons, and the exclusionary 
restriction variables – are all of the expected signs and plausible magnitudes. So all of the 
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variables that may quickly define whether the model seems to be performing to expectations are 
of the expected sign and highly significant. At 65.4 ounces, the constant is just under 2 liters, 
roughly 20 fewer ounces than for the BASIC without marketing variable interaction, indicating 
that the level breakout of demographic variables identifies more observable variation. 
The Price ME is -9.73 ounces per penny increase per ounce. Discussion of the 
magnitudes of un-interacted marketing variable MEs is in sub-section 5.3.2.  
 All Income level MEs are negative relative to the highest-income-level reference group, 
as expected for purchase rising in income, or a “positive effect.” The effect is not linear however, 
with 4xPov4Inc (-11.388) deviating least from 5xPov4Inc (effect in constant) purchase behavior, 
but 2xPov4Inc (-33.765) rather than HalfPov4Inc (-23.124) deviating most from 5xPov4Inc 
purchase behavior. This effect is one demonstration justifying the level breakout from the 
BASIC categoric variable configuration. 
 There is a strict purchase-quantity drop in rising Education level for both Female and 
Male HHHs, with the smallest drop at Post College (in the constant). Male Less HS and HS 
differ by a single ounce, however, indicating that purchase behavior is nearly identical before 
Some College. In contrast to the BASIC models, we now see that the span in ounces across 
Education levels (62 for Female, 45.5 for Male) is much larger than the span across Income 
levels (22.5), indicating that the education effect dominates the income effect. 
 In racial group only, the BROAD without marketing variable interaction holds the exact 
same variable configuration as the BASIC model without marketing variable interaction, and the 
estimation results match in purchase rank from highest to lowest: Asian (40.7), Other Race 
(17.6), White, Afr Amer (-19), Hispanic(-21). Both differ from BASIC with interactions (White, 
Asian, Hispanic, Afr Amer). Of course the exact estimates do not match in the BASIC and 
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BROAD models for racial group variables, because the configuration of other controlling 
variables has changed. 
 HH Size rises in fairly linear fashion compared to variable level sets other than 
Education, jumping 53 ounces from HHsize=1 to HHsize=2, then by 24 ounces, then 33 ounces, 
then to 44 ounces for HHsize=5+. The offsetting drop in purchase quantity relative to the No 
Kids base group is not linear, peaking at Three Kids (-41). As an experiment consider a sole 
HHH with some number of children, such that HHsize=2 implies One Kid, and so on. Then 
roughly in ounces for the combined HH Size and # of Kids MEs only, HHsize2=50 (53.7 – 4), 
HHsize3=57.5, HHsize4=60, HHsize5+=110. Per capita purchase actually falls sharply, with 
smaller per capita purchase at HHsize5+ than at HHsize2. 
 Female Age levels do not display coefficients in concordance with the prediction from 
Table 3 that 50-65 has the highest purchase, else all these would be negative. But it is plausible 
that quantity purchase rises in Age (with average HH size by Age level), then falls above 65 
years. Male Age indicates a strong preference among young Male HHHs that fades in Age, with 
the 50-65 level folded into the constant for an equivalent “0” value neatly fitting the pattern of 
falling purchase in rising Male Age level. 
 “No Fem HHH” means only Male HHH, that is, relative to any HH with a Female HHH. 
Excepting the oddly high Fem Less HS 91-ounce ME, the general pattern of Male versus Female 
Education and Age implies that to be consistent, No Fem HHH (95.8) should be noticeably but 
not greatly larger than No Male HHH (81.1), and it is. 
 As for all the models, with spring as the base group, ounces at purchase fall with average 
temperature for the season (summer 32, fall 26, winter 19). As for all the models, the 
exclusionary restriction variables are of expected sign (annual # of HH weekly purchases > 67 
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ounces 0.178, and moving-average HH stock over 6 weeks from purchase -0.0004) and 
significant at pval=0. 
 
5.4.3    BROAD with marketing variable interaction – marginal effects 
Table 13 lists probit results and OLS coefficient estimates from the BROAD model 
including interactions of each of the demographic variables with each of the three marketing 
variables. The last three columns are the marginal effects of each variable of estimation from the 
combined effects of the two equations, the p-values for these MEs, and the average values at 
which marketing variables are calculated (see 5.2.4.b regarding Disc/Sale). For the marketing 
interaction variables, the OLS coefficient is the ME, so the continuous Price and Advertising 
variables are multiplied times the data-wide average value for the relevant marketing variable. 
From this perspective, each ME in the third-to-last column for marketing variable interaction 
terms is in ounces, like the MEs for the demographic variables above it in the column. 
While the unadjusted OLS coefficient on Price (-1160.794* 0.0074 = -8.60) is negative as 
expected across the population in or out of the weekly sCSD market, the un-interacted mfx-
adjusted Price variable, which is never used alone for interpretation, is positive (103.811* 0.0074 
= 0.769), although in ounces not much over zero. The cumulative ME of all Price and Price-
interacted variables is negative {([Σ“Price x …”] * 0. 0074) + 0.0769 = -68.533}, and much 
smaller than 0.769, meaning the CME for the individual variable price reactions (“P x …” + 
“Wkly P DMA”) tend to be negative. But there are exceptions that are net positive: Male Less 
HS & HS (base: PostCollege); all the racial groupings (bases: White, non-Hispanic); One Two & 
Three Kids (base: No Kids); all Female & Male Age levels (Base: 50-65 years) except Male 
Ages <30 & 40-50 years. In realistic combinations of variables, the HHsize CMEs between -6.2 
and -11.3 ounces would offset most possible combinations that include these positive price 
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effects. The largest positive single-variable CME is FemAge<30yrs, but the positive would be 
offset by larger negative values for all levels of Female Education except Some College. 
Younger Hispanic Female HHHs with children may not have negative Price reactions, but there 
are few realistic combinations that would be positive in total effect in Price. 
For “Disc/Sale” the unadjusted OLS coefficient and the mfx-adjusted ME are identical 
(73.2* 1 = 73.2). Combining the “DiscSale” ME with any of the “Sale x …” interaction terms 
(“Sale x …” + “Disc/Sale”) yields uniformly net positive sale-response MEs. At lower Income 
levels, in Male Education levels, Hispanic, HH Sizes, and One & Two Kids there are clusters of 
“Sale x …” MEs that are negative relative to their reference groups, but the “Disc/Sale” ME pulls 
them all net positive in combined ME. The cumulative Sale ME is positive as well ([Σ“Sale x 
…”] + 73.2 = 3.91). If one carefully combined a Hispanic HH of 4 members, lowest Income, 
lowest Male HHH Education, with two Kids, a negative total effect in Sale might be achievable – 
and believable if we surmise limited access to large supermarkets or shopper-club/big-box stores. 
The unadjusted OLS coefficient on Advertising is also positive as expected (0.022 * 
374.631 = 8.14), and the un-interacted mfx-adjusted Advertising variable, which is never used 
alone for interpretation, is positive (0.022 * 374.631 = 8.27 [larger than OLS; equations appear 
identical only due to rounding]). The two-ME combination on marketing effects and 
demographic characteristics (“Adv x …” + “Wkly Advert”) are all positive reactions to “Wkly 
Advert.” Relative to their reference groups, at all levels of Income, lowest Female Educ, all Male 
Educ, Hispanic, HH Sizes 2 & 4, One & 3 Kids, Fem Age 65+, and Male Age levels except 65+, 
there are “Adv x …” MEs that are negative, but the “Wkly Advert” ME pulls them all net 
positive in combined ME. The cumulative Advertising effect {([Σ“Adv x …”] * 374.631) + 8.14 
= -15.44} reverses from the un-interacted ME to negative – a function of all of the base-group-
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relative reactions. The largest of these is for Male Age <30 at -7.13, followed by Hispanic at -
4.43, and HfPvInc at -3.85, 1xPvInc at -3.05, and Male College Educ at -3.04. Peculiarities of the 
BASIC prediction tables notwithstanding, these groups closely parallel those I guessed to be 
high-consumption groups, before conducting this analysis. When controlling for HH Size and 
other factors, it may be that these groups share a purchase behavior that is resistant to 
Advertising in some way? Or perhaps the chosen base groups respond most to advertising? From 
Graphs 1 & 2 we may recall that Advertising, Prices, and percent of sCSD category on Sale do 
not appear to display clear correlation, so these groups’ counter-intuitive response to Advertising 
does not seem motivated by the pursuit of better price or discount (assuming that together they 
dominate the mean versus the base group levels). If we assume that the now around $500 million 
spent year after year in the sCSD category on advertising generally has the intended effect of 
stimulating purchase,20
The other non-demographic variables – the constant (59.8), seasons (Ssn2 28.9, Ssn3 
21.4, Ssn4 13.6), and the exclusionary restriction variables – are all of the expected signs and 
plausible magnitudes, with p-values of 0.000. So all of the variables that may quickly define 
whether the BROAD model seems to be performing to expectations are of the expected sign and 
highly significant. At 59.8 ounces, the constant is 8 ounces less than 2 liters, below the constant 
in all previous specifications, just as the seasonal dummies drop in size with each model, 
 then perhaps these particular groups are watching fewer television ads 
for sCSDs than their reference-group counterpart HHs, and are getting less than the projected 
exposure. 
                                                 
20 Harris et al. (2011) report $948 billion in SSB and energy drink advertising in 2010, up 5% from 2008. Three-
quarters is spent on television advertising, with Coca-Cola leading the pack at $300 million, followed by Pepsi at 
$250 million, across all of their SSB products. Similarly, NPLAN 2011 finds $1.4 billion in total advertising 
expenditures in the SSB industry (2010), and sCSDs have 45% of industry revenue. 
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meaning more variability in the dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables 
than in earlier models. 
 Before moving to the discussion of combined marginal effects, let us consider some 
differences based on sex of HHH, because the No Male HHH Hd and No Female HHH Hd 
variables are not interacted with marketing variables, so have no CMEs. Evidence from the 
BASIC and BROAD models generally indicate that Male HHHs purchase more than Female 
HHHs. Simply totaling all of the Male-HHH-specific MEs yields a higher total than totaling all 
of the Female-HHH-specific MEs in any of the four BASIC or BROAD models. Lower-educated 
Female HHHs do out-purchase lower-educated Male HHHs, but higher-educated Male HHHs 
still buy more than higher-educated Female HHHs, and do so consistently in the BROAD Age 
MEs, but not the BASIC Age MEs. The “No(Sex)HHH” variables lay it out explicitly. 
Remember a HH may have a Male and Female HHH, so these variables identify HHs expressly 
with one sex of HH head. Returning to Table 13, HHs with No Male head (56.8) average 9.5-
ounce smaller purchase than HHs with No Female head (65.2). These values are 30 ounces less 
for Male Only HHHs and 25 less for Female Only HHHs than in the BROAD model with no 
marketing variable interaction variables (No M HHH 81.1, No F HHH 95.8), supporting the 
methodological choice that discretely breaking out the marketing variable interactions would 
identify more variation in specific groups, leaving less for broad “catch-all” variables to explain. 
Through a wide-angle lens, the sex of HHH effect favoring higher purchase for Male HHHs 
tends to persist for quadrant totals in the sex-of-HHH-specific prediction tables at all model 
levels, despite MEs across most models demonstrating the exceptionally high purchase quantities 
for Female HHHs with low Education levels.  
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5.4.4    BROAD with marketing variable interaction – combined marginal effects 
The marginal effect of any demographic group’s specific reaction to a marketing variable 
is a combination of that variable’s marginal effect from column δy/δxk, and of the ME (in 
ounces) for the marketing variable with which it interacts. For example, the CME in Price of 
Household Income (HH Inc) will involve its ME, and the ME for the Price-interacted term. I 
evaluate all Price- and Advertising-interaction terms at their respective (projection-factor-
adjusted) averages, provided in the “X” column in results tables for models including marketing 
variable interaction (see equation (21)).21
The first column of figures in Table 14 presents the ME for each variable from Table 13, 
for reference. The second column of figures are the combined marginal effects in Price for each 
of the demographic categories in the BROAD model with marketing variable interactions, the 
fourth column for CMEs in Advertising, and the sixth for CMEs in Sale. Each of these CMEs 
more fully identifies the volatility unique to that demographic trait’s marginal reactivity to 
marketing variable changes than is possible in the BROAD model without marketing variable 
interactions with demographic category variables. The effects from Tables 12 and 14 are 
estimated using identical data, with all of the basic variables identically defined, so the Table 12 
MEs are also provided for reference in the last column.  
 
Differencing the list of MEs in the first column, or the CMEs in Price, Advertising, or 
Sale, from the list of MEs in the last column shows that there is no common move in direction or 
size of change. Identifying the response to marketing mix variables separately by each variable 
and re-combining the effects to a marketing-variable-specific CME therefore does reveal 
dynamic reactions to marketing mix variables specific to each demographic characteristic that 
                                                 
21 Process descriptions are intentionally repeated at each model level to accommodate readers who are focused only 
on certain sub-section results. 
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are not completely identified in the model without marketing-variable interactions. One thing to 
notice is that the direction of the CME in Sale matches the ME from Table 7 for all but 3 of the 
33 variables, while signs on Price and Advertising CMEs differ more (Price in 5 of 33, 
Advertising in 5 of 33). This demonstrates that the magnitude of the Sale effect may have the 
potential to dominate the Price and Advertising effects in the model without identified 
(separated) interaction effects. In general the direction and degree of difference between the MEs 
from the BROAD without marketing interactions and the ME for a variable in the first column – 
which is calculated having isolated particular marketing variable reactions, without those being 
reported in the first ME –say something about marketing-variable responsiveness for the 
characteristic. For example, HalfPovInc (46, with sign reversal), Asian (-30), and Fem & Male 
HHH Ages <30 (Fem -34, with sign reversal; Male 28)  move most, whereas Hispanic, some 
Education levels, and HHs with Kids move very little in this differencing. 
The numeric columns after the CMEs in Price and the CMEs in Advertising show the 
difference for each variable between the CME from the previous column and the CME if one 
standard deviation is added to the average at which the first CME is calculated (a “shock” 
increase in Price or in Advertising). A binary Sale is either present or not, and there is neither an 
average at which it is evaluated nor a standard deviation for an “either/or” state. Statistical 
significance for CMEs is now the joint significance of the variable’s ME and the variable’s 
reactivity (ME) to the marketing variable. A Wald test on the MEs that together comprise a 
combined marginal effect may prove statistically significant where the OLS-side table p-value 
for the component variables may be greater than 0.10. Joint significance tests for each “CME in a 
marketing variable” finds that every one is significant at the 1% level, with the exceptions 
presented in the following four paragraphs. There are 21 of these exceptions out of 99 CMEs in 
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marketing variables, of which 11 (over 6 of the 33 groups) are above the 10% level. Statistical 
significance poses little problem for inference. 
All of the Income levels have some 2-variable CMEs with p-values greater than 1%, but 
only 3xPov4Inc fails by the 10% conventional measure for at least two such CMEs, perhaps due 
to a confluence of behavior with the 5xPov4Inc reference group. 1xPov4Inc has p-values for 
CMEs in Price and Advertising of 0.019 and 0.017; and 2xPov4Inc has a CME in Sale of 0.381. 
3xPov4Inc has p-values for CMEs in Price, Advertising, and Sale of 0.622, 0.46, and 0.013. 
In racial groups, Asian has p-values for CMEs in Price and Advertising of 0.070 and 
0.045, perhaps suggesting bi-modality within the group that may be exposed in the REFINED 
model. Other Race may be acting like the White base group, as it has p-values for CMEs in Price 
and Advertising of 0.761, and 0.210. 
One Kids has p-values for CMEs in Price of 0.666 and in Advertising of 0.358, while 
Three Kids has p-values for CMEs in Price of 0.761 and in Advertising of 0.210. 
The Female Age levels 40-50 & 65+ are not statistically significant at the 10% level, 
most plausibly due to largely similar behavior to the 50-65-years base group. Female Age 40-50 
has p-values for CMEs in Price, Advertising, and Sale of 0.509, 0.974, and 0.086. Female Age 
65+ has p-values for CMEs in Price and Advertising of 0.818, and 0.136. 
At this level of aggregation bi-modal behavior within some of these groups is plausible, 
while every level in the BROAD model now has a reference group compared to which it may be 
similar in purchase behavior. 
The marketing-variable CMEs for the BROAD model with marketing variables display 
strict rises or falls across levels within a demographic category only in Female & Male 
Education (not in Sale for Male Educ), and HH Size, but even in these, the increments vary 
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considerably. This result strongly undermines the implicit validity of structure for the broadly 
defined variables in the BASIC model, which assumes strict rise or fall within incremental 
categories. This may suggest further advantages in identifying true correlates of behavior by 
exploring a further level of refinement in the definition of the demographic subgroups, as in the 
REFINED specification. 
The CMEs in Price for Income levels are relative to the 5xPov4Inc reference group. The 
CMEs in Price for HfPov4Inc (17.3), 3xPov4Inc (1.5, or by significance, “0”), and 4xPov4Inc 
(6.3) are above the Income reference group value, and 1xPov4Inc (-8), 2xPov4Inc (-10.2) are 
less than the Income reference group value, but all five do fall from the first-column ME to the 
CME in Price, as theory predicts they should, assuming the richest group (the reference group) is 
less Price sensitive. Except for the lowest Income level, variations from the reference group for 
Income are within one 12-ounce can per purchase. All Income levels display expected purchase 
reactions to a one-standard-deviation addition in the Price Index. For the CMEs in Advertising 
however, the most responsive group seems to be the richest, as all others fall from the first-
column ME to the CMEs in Advertising, supported further as all fall with a positive shock to 
Advertising. Oddly, the unexpectedly negative reactions to a shock in Advertising are nearly 
linear, with the strongest at the lowest income level, and the weakest at the highest. This result is 
noteworthy first in contrast to the non-linearity of the CMEs for Income levels, and second 
because this result directly conflicts with implications from the BASIC model (5.3.4) that 
suggest “that higher-income HHs buy less in increasing Price, while lower-income households 
are responding more positively to Advertising.” If lower-income HHs are absorbing much more 
Advertising than higher-income HHs, they may be displaying a saturation effect, and if they are 
responding more strongly to Advertising shocks, it seems the response may not be in the 
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direction sCSD advertisers intend. Positive responses to Sale (CME in Sale minus first-column 
ME) occur only for 2x- & 4xPov4Inc, relative to the base group. This result shows that higher-
Income HHs (4x- & 5xPov4Inc) are most responsive to Sale, again bringing into question results 
from the BASIC model. 
This is not to say that lower-income HHs are not responsive to marketing variables as a 
whole. Any variable that reverses sign from the last numeric column in Table 14 to any of the 
CMEs in Price, Advertising, or Sale columns has shifted by more than its own magnitude, and 
therefore represents a highly responsive group to marketing variables. (This is independent of the 
analysis conducted on marketing variable shocks.) In fact HalfPov4Inc has the largest span in 
ounces for a reversal of sign of any value in the table, from -23 to 17 for CME in Price, and 
1xPov4Inc has a rare 25-ounce rise in CME in Price versus its Table 12 ME. We must conclude 
that the lowest Income levels are highly responsive to Price changes, although less than the 
reference group in Advertising and Sale. 3x- & 4xPov4Inc also reverse signs for CME in Price 
versus their Table 12 MEs, also indicating a highly responsive group to Price variable changes. 
To be sure, as a category, the Income levels change from ME (the last numeric column) to CME 
in Price Advertising and Sale in larger amounts than any other category in the table, meaning 
that Income level is on average the best characteristic for identifying responsiveness to 
marketing variable changes when these are regressed separately.  
From Tables 2 and 3, the span in mean purchase from highest to lowest Education levels 
is larger for Female Educ than Male Educ, with Post College being the lowest value for both, and 
the same relation holds for the MEs and the CMEs in all three marketing variables. CME 
differences from the Post-College reference group by Education level are much more dynamic 
than for Income level differences from their reference group. For CME in Price for instance, the 
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difference from Female Less HS (87.4) to Fem College (36) is 51, nearly twice the difference 
from HalfPov4Inc (17.3) to 2xPov4Inc (-10.1). Roughly similar ratios hold for Advertising and 
Sale, and the span in Male Educ is always larger than the span for CME in a marketing variable 
for Income levels. This suggests that the size of the education effect dominates the size of the 
income effect, in direct contrast to BASIC model (with marketing interaction) results. This 
inference is strengthened by recognizing the robustness of the results. As with the same 
Education variable sets from Tables 12, 2, & 3, there is a strict fall in rising Education level 
across both sexes of HHHs in every CME in a marketing variable (except that the Sale effect is 
larger for Male HS than for Male Less HS, and both are above Some College22
The strength of the Education effect does not imply exceptional responsiveness (large 
changes in ounces) to marketing variables in comparison to the reference groups, but for Female 
Education the CMEs in Price and Sale are consistently in the expected direction (the only set for 
which this holds), and the fall in ounces for the CME in Price is further supported by negative 
responses to a positive Price shock for all Fem Educ levels. Price reactivity is highest for the two 
lower Female Education levels (-4.9, -3.5) versus the higher ones (-1.6, -2.8), where for Male 
HHHs the opposite holds (-0.1 and 0.2, versus -0.7 and -0.6). This may imply that Female HHHs 
with lower Education care more about price. Whether this is driven by lower incomes associated 
with the lower Education levels is a hypothesis implicitly identified in REFINED.
). 
23
                                                 
22 This result identifies the effect responsible for the overlap between Male Less HS and Male HS in Tables 3 and 
12. 
 Only Fem 
Less HS responds positively in Advertising and is also positive to a shock in Advertising. So 
oddly, Fem Less HS and Fem Post College respond most to Advertising, while all other levels 
23 Price interactions with variables fixed in Education level but spanning Income levels in REFINED do confirm 
more price responsiveness (higher ME average magnitudes) in Education levels of Some College and less, versus 
College and Post College (Table 20b). 
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are negative in Advertising. There is clearly no linear progression in reaction to a positive shock 
in Advertising for either the Female or Male Educ set. 
Compared to Post College, Male Education levels are less consistent than Female 
Education levels, in part because Male HS is less responsive than its base group in every CME in 
Price, Advertising, or Sale and the two shocks, the only group besides Hispanic, One Kids, and 
FemaleAge65+ for which this holds. The other Male Educ levels fall in CME in Price, supported 
by negative responses to a positive shock in Price, but all the Male Educ levels also fall in 
Advertising, with negative responses to a positive shock in Advertising. All Male Educ levels 
fall in Sale, meaning Post College defines the largest response to Sale – so the lower Male Educ 
levels react opposite the responses for Female Educ, and in Sale act more like the lower Income 
levels than the higher Income levels. 
Comparing just the MEs from the first column or Table 12 with the CMEs in Price for 
similar terminal Education levels for Female and Male HHHs, Female HHHs buy more than 
Male HHHs at lower Education levels, but less at higher Education levels. The same holds for all 
but College for CMEs in Advertising, and Female HHHs buy more at every Educ level for CME 
in Sale. 
There is a 36-ounce (40%) drop in ME level from Fem HS (82.1) to Fem Some College 
(46.5) that replicates a bit smaller in the CME in Price, Advertising, or Sale columns, but a drop 
of corresponding magnitude (20-ounce, or 33%) occurs for Male HHHs only between Some 
College (60.5) and College (40.1). This suggests that there is a discrete level at which nutrition 
awareness of sCSDs may find application, but a level higher for Male HHHs than for Female 
HHHs, and clearly not a linear function in either sex of HHH’s Educational level. This may be 
associated with Kids in HH, but that cannot be checked without interacting demographic 
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variables, or perhaps creative cross-tabulation of elements in the dataset. In the REFINED model 
this sex-of-HHH-specific result can be checked by racial group.  
Across Education levels, Female HHHs react en bloc as expected to a positive shock in 
Sale whereas Male HHHs en bloc do not, and the expected negative reactions to a plus-one-
standard-deviation Price shock are uniformly higher for Female HHHs. We may conclude from 
these results that Female HHHs are more responsive to marketing variables than Male HHHs for 
sCSDs, which generally have a low impact on HH budget. This may confirm that Female HHHs 
are more likely to manage HH budgets carefully, rather than confirming a sex-of-HHH-specific 
allegiance to sCSD marketing choices. Results leave no question that HH reactivity to marketing 
variables does vary by sex of HHH. 
Focusing on first-column MEs, racial groups peak in difference at -37. This magnitude is 
at the low end of deviations in Education-level CMEs (40), indicating that the education effect 
likely trumps any effect deriving from racial grouping, just as the education effect trumps the 
income effect. The CME in Price for Afr-Amer HHs (-36) is less than the White reference group, 
while Asian (9.8) and Other Race (1.1) HHs purchase on average more than White HHs. These 
racial group results closely parallel Table 3 averages, with the exception of the Other Race rank 
amongst the 5 groups – here above Whites, there below – suggesting Other Race HHs are more 
reactive to marketing mix variables than White HHs.  The difference between Afr-Amer HHs and 
the White reference group doubles (with no sign reversal) from ME (-19) to CME (-37), which 
parallels a 49-ounce sign reversal from Table 7 ME (37.2) to ME (-12.3) in Table 9, so this result 
confirms that Afr-Amer HHs are very responsive to marketing variable changes. Comparing the 
first-column MEs to CME in Price, Afr-Amer HHs (-37 to -36), Asian HHs (9.3 to 9.8), and 
Other Race HHs (0.9 to 1.1) all rise, although by very low amounts in ounces. Afr-Amer (0.5) 
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Asian (0.3) and Other Race (0.1) HHs are all less responsive to a Price shock than the White base 
group (and are therefore “unexpectedly” positive). 
But as may be expected from the “quick grids” in 5.3.4, groups relatively unresponsive in 
Price are highly responsive for CME in Sale, and here also in Advertising and positive shock to 
Advertising. The sizes of these reactions in ounces overwhelm the small positive responses in 
Price. Compared to its own ME measured against the White base group, in Sale, Afr-Amer HHs 
rise over 25 ounces per purchase, Asian HHs a full 2-liters per purchase, and Other Race 12 
ounces per purchase (starting from a single ounce difference from the base group). The Afr-
Amer HHH response (1.7) to an Advertising shock is half again that of Asian HHHs (1.1), but 
Other Race (3.4) is double the Afr-Amer response. For the moment leaving aside Hispanic 
versus non-Hispanic HHs, all three non-White Race groups have higher purchase responses than 
Whites to a shock/increase in sCSD industry Advertising, and Afr-Amer and Asian HHs are even 
more responsive to price-promotions/labeled discounts. This is the strongest identification of 
effect in the Table by HH characteristic, as Female HHH Education is the only other variable set 
in Table 14 to have nearly as uniform a purchase response for CMEs in Price, Advertising, or 
Sale and to positive shocks. The magnitudes for Race CMEs are smaller than for Fem Educ in 
Price, but larger in Sale and on par (but all in the expected direction) in Advertising. Non-White, 
non-Hispanic HHs respond more positively to Advertising and Sale and to a shock to 
Advertising in CME results. 
Hispanic HHs are uniformly weaker in response to marketing variables than non-
Hispanic HHs. Compared to the first-column ME, each of the marketing variable CMEs and 
associated positive shocks push the Hispanic ounce response in the direction opposite what 
economic theory generally predicts. Versus the first-column ME (-19.9), negative response in 
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CME in Advertising (-24.3) is larger than the positive response for the CME in Price (-16.6), 
which is larger than the negative response in Sale (-21.7). Hispanic HHs begin 20 ounces lower 
in purchase than non-Hispanic HHs, which is likely offset to an extent by larger HH sizes 
(bottom of Table 1, and large magnitudes here). The CME for Hispanic (versus non-Hispanic) 
HHs contracts in size relative to the ME from Table 12 but by a negligible amount (to -19.9 from 
-20.1) – as with Table 9, Hispanic versus non-Hispanic HHHs are relatively non-reactive to 
marketing variables, meaning this contrast does not follow the same form as the White/non-
White reactions to marketing variable shocks seen in Race variables.  
By higher responsiveness to the marketing variable set relative to its reference group, 
here is another simple grid, for Income, Education, and racial group (split responses are in 
parentheses, and designated by the greater number of level responses within the set): 
 
 
 
. 
While MEs for HH Size do run higher in magnitude versus the HHsize=1 reference group 
(76.5 – 162) than Education levels do from their reference group (41 – 96), there is the implicit 
ability in HH size to control for per capita effects, which average in the 33-ounce range, less than 
any Education level difference from its reference group value. Policy recommendations focused 
simply on HH size would seem particularly unfocused and perhaps unhelpful. In this 
specification by CMEs, Education level therefore seems to be the dominant policy-relevant 
explanatory variable group.  
 Income Fem Educ Male Educ 
(non-White) 
Race Hispanic 
In Group Price Price, Sale (Price) Adv, Sale  
Base Group Adv, (Sale) Adv Adv, Sale Price Price, Adv, Sale 
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The CMEs in Price show all HH sizes buying less in rising Price, and HHsizes2-5+ also 
respond as expected to a standard deviation Price shock in a gently but not strictly linear fashion. 
HHsize=3 & HHsize =5+ also react positively versus the HHsize=1 base group for CME in 
Advertising, and as expected to an Advertising shock. No other reactions are as expected, which 
includes all purchase responses to Sale, reflecting that HHsize=1 is most responsive to Sale. This 
result is counterintuitive if one expects larger HHs to manage budgets by looking more to price 
discounts, but is not counterintuitive if one expects that demand will be less flexible for larger 
HHs, so keeping HH stocks within certain benchmark amounts may mean more frequent 
purchase, and quantities of purchase on Sale will be lower.   
Comparing MEs to Table 12 MEs, Kids in HH as a group respond more dynamically than 
HH Size when specifically controlling for marketing variable changes.  Kids-in-HH MEs for 
Table 14 tend to be closer to zero, having controlled for marketing variable effects (smaller by -2 
to -11 ounces, with 4Kids+ expanding slightly), in contrast to the expansion in purchase (of a 
fairly uniform 23 ounces per level) associated with similar comparisons for HH Size. This 
confirms what was only suspected for Table 9 results, that Kids in HH is fundamentally a 
different type of characteristic identifying demographic differences in HH purchase response 
than is HH Size. Compared to the first-column MEs or the Table 12 MEs, CMEs in Price, 
Advertising, and Sale do not move uniformly or in pattern for # of Kids. CMEs in Price 
compared to first-column MEs are higher than the No Kids reference group for One and Three 
Kids (-2 to -1.3, and -35.9 to -35.7), but lower for 2 and 4 Kids+ (-9 to -9.5, and -32 to -33.9). 
Similarly referring to the first-column MEs, the CMEs in Advertising are higher than for No 
Kids (of expected sign) for 2 and 4Kids+, but lower for One and Three Kids. The 4 Kids+ 
response to Advertising is the largest positive response to an Advertising shock of any group in 
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the column, over 25% larger than the next nearest value. But not all #-of-Kids levels are positive 
in Advertising, so generalizing from this strong effect is not prudent. Three Kids and 4 Kids+ 
have higher CMEs in Sale versus their first-column MEs, while One and 2 Kids are strongly 
negative versus the base group response to Sale. This supports the hypothesis that HHs with 
more children will seek price discounts more than HHs with fewer children. I have no hypothesis 
for why there seem to be strong behavioral breaks in sCSD purchase and reversals of behavior as 
additional children are added to HH averages, or why this is not mirrored in HH size results. The 
robustness of these effects can be checked using REFINED model results. 
Comparing first-column ME to CME in Price, no Female Age levels are negative (e.g., 
Age65+ -2.5 to -0.9), meaning that Fem Age 50-65 are the most Price responsive group. All the 
other Fem Age levels are positive to a positive Price shock as well. The two lowest Fem Age 
levels are positive in Advertising and to a shock in Advertising, while the other levels fall 
relative to 50-65. Only the 40-50 Fem Age group has a positive CME versus ME in Sale. So the 
50-65 reference group is by far the most responsive to all three marketing variables, except for 
Fem Age <30 and 30-40 being positive in Advertising, which seem consistent with the BASIC 
table quick grid for lower Education and lower Income.  Again, the Female Age levels 40-50 & 
65+ are not statistically significant at the 10% level, most plausibly due to largely similar 
behavior to the 50-65-years base group. 
In contrast to Female HHH behaviors broken down by Age level, Male HHHs all respond 
as expected for CME in Price and to a standard-deviation Price shock, and all but Male Age 40-
50 rise in purchase for CME in Sale. Only Males 65+ react positively in Advertising, and to a 
shock in Advertising. This means that the 50-65 reference group is much less responsive for 
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Male HHHs compared to Female HHHs. Male Age is another example in addition to Female 
Education of a set that is both more Price and more Sale sensitive than its reference group. 
Exactly opposite the purchase behavior for Female HHHs Age <30 who purchase much 
less than their 50-65 reference group and far less than the Female 30-40 group, Male HHHs Age 
<30 have MEs about 30 ounces higher than their first-column ME for every CME in Table 14 
than does the 30-40 group. There is also a large fall from Male Age 40-50 to 65+. While the MEs 
between the highest and lowest Female Age values     (-32.9 and 0.5) span about 32 ounces, Male 
Age <30 is 56.8 ounces versus 65+’s -14.8 ounces, a span more than double that for Female Age. 
If HHsize is adjusted to per capita, Male Age represents the largest span for any set in the table. 
Half this span is accounted for by the gap between <30 and 30-40. Controlling for other factors 
using regression has greatly altered the rank of Male Age <30 for Age level in ounces purchased 
from its last place in Table 3. Male Age <30 are by far the highest purchasers in their set – and 
Price and Sale sensitive, but have the largest negative response in the table to a positive shock in 
Advertising (-7.5). The motivation for this high purchase seems independent of weekly 
Advertising changes at the sCSD category level. This introduces the prospect that there is 
acculturation and habit beyond the influence of weekly Advertising campaigns.  The question 
then becomes is this perhaps counterintuitive result found for other high-consumption groups, or 
is high Advertising influence found for relatively lowest consumption groups? These are exactly 
the type of questions to bring to the BROAD and REFINED prediction tables. 
It is unlikely that all three marketing variables are each linear in effect. If all three were 
linear in effect, adding together the three differences between each CME in a row to its’ first-
column ME might roughly add to the difference between the Table 14 ME and the Table 12 ME. 
This approximation does not occur for either variables where all the reactions follow standard 
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economic predictions (Fem Less HS, Male Age 65+, 4 Kids+) or for those like Hispanic and 
Male HS that react “as expected” in none of the CMEs. The ME-CME difference is based on 
identifying and accumulating group-specific reactions to marginal changes in each of the three 
marketing variable values, and as may be expected for reactions that cannot all be linear, 
standard deviation shocks to these variables do not total or approximate the ME-CME effect. The 
sole function of the CMEs is to identify direction and to a lesser extent magnitude of each 
demographic variable level’s reactivity relative to its reference group. Attempting to find some 
common link between groups that either react as expected to all or none of the shocks to identify 
common HH types that may be resistant to marketing variable changes in their purchase behavior 
– because they buy very rarely or because they are so habitual in purchase that marketing 
variable changes do not matter to them – does not yield any ready conclusions.  
 As for the BASIC model, and respecting that such a metric is dependent on the reference-
group choices, we can measure how many marketing variable shocks were of the expected sign. 
At the very least the measure applies fairly equally to the BASIC and BROAD models, although 
the BROAD has more reference group assumptions. In Table 9, 7 of 11 reactions to Price shocks, 
and 4 of 11 reactions to Advertising shocks and to Sale were of the expected sign. Reaction to 
standard deviation shocks are about the same percentages for the demographic category level 
break-outs of Table 14: 22 of 33 reactions (2/3) as expected for a Price shock, again about one-
third for an Advertising shock, or 11 of 33, and 15 of 33 (about ½, an improvement over Table 9) 
for existence of Sale. 
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5.4.5    Prediction – BROAD with Marketing Variables, Combined Marginal Effects Tables 
Table 15a presents household-realistic predictions of purchase response by demographic 
group and that group’s reaction to a rise in Price (CMEs in Price) relative to a reference sub-
group. Every cell holds fixed HHsize=4, # of Kids=2, Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the 
constant is added. The reference group for season, “spring” is assumed. Changing the season to 
summer would raise every number in the table by 28.9 ounces. The first observation pertaining 
to this table of predicted values is that the purchase quantities (for a week, but not every week, 
just purchase weeks) are all in a plausible range, given the averages listed in Table 3. For levels 
within the demographic categories, average purchase in ounces including positive purchase 
weeks span only 121 ounces in Table 3. Prediction from estimation should provide a more 
dynamic range, by accounting for dynamic reactions to marketing variables unique to 
demographic groups, assuming they do in fact differ. The span for the HHsize=4 BASIC 
prediction for CMEs in Price (Table 10a) was 148, wider than 121, as expected, yet still fairly 
narrow. Here in 15a, the BROAD model prediction table for CMEs in Price, the span is 222, 
much more flexible than the BASIC prediction range for the same HH profile. The spans for 
HHsize=4 will be compared for the REFINED prediction tables for CME in Price as well. 
For the BROAD CMEs in Price here, for HHsize=4 we see the first incidence of HH 
purchases for a group in a week predicted above 350 ounces, the nearest “50-ounce-even” level 
above the highest weekly average for any level in Table 3, of 335.7 ounces (HH size 5+). All 
such high values are marked in all prediction tables. The eight shaded cells here indicate high 
predicted purchase for the lowest Income level, but more strongly predict high purchase for the 
lowest Education level commonly shared by the HHHs for fixed Income levels 1xPvInc and 
4xPvInc. 
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By breaking demographic categories into levels, some of the strictures of the BASIC 
model have been relaxed here. Between cells in a row, values that in Table 10a generally 
changed by small regimented amounts, are now more flexible. The change in amount by row 
across columns identifying racial group remains fixed.  
By the particular definition of Income results and level changes in Tables 10a,b,&c, the 
span from the lowest to highest level of Income was a fixed 85.2 ounces across all four racial 
groups, achieved in strictly rising increments. The result was to conclude that the income effect 
dominated the education effect (comparing purchase predictions for a low and high level of each 
across all the levels of the other). Here increments of purchase in ounces between category levels 
remain constrained across racial groups (say from 2xPvInc to 3xPvInc, or from HS to Som 
Collg), but are no longer constrained to be uniform in size or direction of category level. Now 
the lowest and highest values do not necessarily occur at the first and last levels defining a 
category. For example in the first column, the lowest amount at purchase is 327, for 2xPvInc, 
and the highest is at HfPvInc (354).  The education effect is strictly negative in rising Education 
level, whereas any income effect is less robust, falling in purchase from HfPvInc through  
1xPvInc to 2xPvInc, then rising from 2xPvInc to 4xPvInc, then falling again from 4xPvInc to 
5xPvInc. Still, there is a clear rise for corresponding cell values between the 1xPvInc (lower-left 
quadrant), and the 4xPvInc (lower-right quadrant). So the BROAD model prediction tables are 
able to convey some subtlety in overall effects. 
Another aspect of analysis can be taken by averaging all the values for fixed HS Ed 
across all Income levels (upper-left quadrant, avg=327, st.err.=20.1) and for fixed College Ed 
across all Income levels (upper-right quadrant, avg=261, st.err.=20.1). Between these two 
averages, there is a fall of 66 ounces per purchase. Comparing them to 1xPvInc (lower-left 
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quadrant, avg=273, st.err.=60.91) and 4xPvInc (lower-right quadrant, avg=288, st.err.=60.91) 
across all Education levels, we find a rise in average of 15 ounces per purchase, with much 
higher variation. Purchase rises 5-7% in the Income difference, versus falling 45-52% in the 
Education difference – again the education effect dominates the income effect. 
The difference between the highest-purchase racial group average (Asian) and the lowest 
(Afr-Amer) is 46 ounces, so the Afr-Amer HH average is 15.3% below the average across all 
Asian cells in Table 15a. This amount is larger than the span across Income levels in any racial 
group (27 oz), but much smaller than the span across Education levels in any racial group (162 
oz), meaning that differing racial group may prove a smaller determinant of purchase than 
Education level, but likely more than Income level. In contrast to the BASIC prediction table 
results, here the Education-Income relationship has reversed, and racial grouping has risen in 
prominence as a determinant versus BASIC model results. REFINED results will add even more 
information to answer the fundamental question of which characteristic is most strongly 
correlated with difference in sCSD purchase. 
Each racial group has a single adjustment that applies uniformly to all the cells in its 
column(s), across all quadrants, and all three tables. The constraint that every level change in 
Income or Education is identical in purchase-ounce effect dictates that increments are the same 
for every racial group, so the difference between any two columns is fixed for every cell, 
regardless of which row. For example, predicted quantities drop by 6.3 ounces from 4xPvInc to 
5xPvInc for Asian HHs, but also for White, Afr-Amer, and Hispanic HHs.  
Predicted purchases by racial group can be ranked using a common metric, such as 
average quantity purchase response across the table for each of the four half-columns for each 
racial group, or a total for all 22 cells for each racial group. Asian (total=6789, avg=308) is the 
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largest, followed by White (6574, 298), then Hispanic (6208, 282), and finally Afr-Amer (5779, 
262). As held for the BASIC model, the quantity purchase differences between racial groups is 
fixed across all 4 quadrant averages. Nonetheless, the first two largest purchasers have switched 
rank from the BASIC prediction averages. For all three BROAD model CME in Price tables: 
Asian-White has a 10-ounce average difference, Asian -Hispanic has a 26-ounce average 
difference, Asian -Afr Amer has a 46-ounce average difference. The racial group averages and 
rankings cannot change for Female or Male only HHHs in the BROAD specification, as they 
could not in the BASIC. Regardless of racial group, there are uniform responses to variable level 
changes. Intuitively, uniform changes within each racial group to changes in Income, Education, 
and sex of HHH seem overly restrictive, but these constraints are relaxed in the REFINED model. 
Comparing the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Female or Male ONLY HHH, the linearity of 
changes constrains sex of HHH comparison somewhat, but differences emerge that were not 
evident in the BASIC prediction tables. Cell-by-cell differences between Tables 15b and 15c do 
now range in places to more than 20 ounces. For Female HHHs in same-racial-group columns, 
differences for fixed Education level HS versus College across Income levels are around 40 
ounces, whereas for Male HHHs the differences are closer to 26 ounces. The full education 
effect from lowest to highest level appears to be weaker for Male HHHs (74.7 oz) than for 
Female HHHs (87.4 oz). The difference in effect between HHsize=3 Male only versus Female 
only HHHs for fixed Income level (1x- or 4xPvInc) across education levels is lowest for the 
lowest education level (less HS, 11.4) rises in HS (12.7), peaks at Some College (39.6), and falls 
to the 25-range for College and Post College (27, 24.1). So Female HHH purchasing is most 
similar to Male HHH in lower Education levels, and less similar in higher, but the function is 
non-linear, peaking in the defined “middle” level of Some College.  
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Female and Male HHHs differ in purchase (again across same-racial-group columns in 
left-right adjacent quadrants) between 1x- and 4xPvInc by a fixed 14.3 ounces. By this set of 
prediction tables, Male HHHs (with two Kids) buy more than Female HHHs (with two Kids) in 
every comparative quadrant, and the sex of HHH effect is robust to all racial group differences. 
As with the BASIC prediction tables, all cells are significant at the 1% level. Cells 
deemed by individual standard errors in the mfx-adjusted output table to be most likely to fail a 
significance test were tested. All candidates proved to be significant at the one percent level, so 
all cells in all tables have pval=0.000. 
Tables 15b & 15c together are less dynamic in range (Female Only range=147, Male 
Only range=136) than Table 15a (range=222), but each is more dynamic than even the HHsize=4 
Table 10a for the BASIC model. The more flexible specification is identifying more dynamic 
purchase patterns – and this is only for CME in Price. Tables 9 for BASIC and 14 for BROAD 
indicate there may be more variability for CME in Sale. (REFINED prediction tables exist for all 
three marketing-variable CME sets.) 
The requirement to fully drop entire levels within demographic groups to avoid the 
dummy variable trap in the BROAD model is frustrating, as it buries the identification of how 
base groups react to marketing variable changes. By interacting demographic variables to create 
more refined variables, the REFINED model can shrink the reference groups, and identify even 
more variation in specific sub-group behavior. 
 
5.5    REFINED Model Results – Estimation Results and Prediction  
Reference group choices on the demographic variables must be made for every model, 
and must not conflict for probit and OLS equations. The REFINED models use the highest 
Income and Education levels (5xPovInc, Fem Post Collg Educ, Male Post Collg Educ), White, 
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Non-Hispanic, HHsize=1, NoKids, FemAge50-65, and MaleAge50-65 for reference group 
demographic variables, and Spring (Ssn1) as the reference group for seasons. These are 
consistent with but more refined than reference-group selections for the BASIC and BROAD 
models. Interacting each of the other demographic characteristics with Income, and # of Kids and 
racial group (including Hispanic) with both Male and Female Education, defines eleven sets of 
demographic-demographic variables, each with its own reference (sub-)group.24
In addition to the first-level dummy variable drops just described, as explained in the 
modeling section, the interaction of demographic categories necessitates a second level of 
variable drop to avoid the dummy-variable trap. Certain category levels were regressed 
separately, rather than being interacted with demographic or marketing variables, and rather than 
being dropped entirely, in which case their effects would have been absorbed into the intercept 
with other reference-group effects. Now that we are more familiar with the data, these may be 
named without causing confusion, and the choices should appear to be reasonable given results 
to this point: No Man HH Head, No Fem HH Head, Other Race, HH size 5Plus, _4KidsPlus, 
Female Age 65+, Male Age 65+. Thus one group for each category to be interacted with Income 
 The eleven 
reference/base groups are:  5xPovIncxFmPostCollgEd, 5xPovIncxMalePostCollgEd, 
5xPovIncxWhite, 5xPovIncxHHsize=1, 5xPovIncxNoKids, 5xPovIncxFemAge50-65, 
5xPovIncxMaleAge50-65, FmPostCollgEdxNoKids, MalePostCollgEdxNoKids, 
FmPostCollgEdxWhite, MalePostCollgEdxWhite. These are delineated in Figure 1 at the end of 
Chapter 3. 
                                                 
24 There would be twelve base groups if “non-Hispanic” were included, and three more “sets” if Hispanic were 
referred to “non-Hispanic” directly. But this is done implicitly, clustering Hispanic with the Race variables in the 
“racial groups” set, so only eleven sets of variables are counted. Hispanic does not refer to the White reference 
group. The “non-Hispanic” condition is not imposed on the Race variables. Examining results, this does not appear 
to make the Hispanic demographic- or marketing-variable-interacted results particularly vulnerable to statistical 
insignificance compared to the other racial groups. 
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and with Male/Female Education has been dropped, with the binary Hispanic category requiring 
no further drop, and with the No Female/Male HH Head group applying to any sex-of-HHH-
specific category.25
The REFINED model is a demonstration of what is possible using demographic-
demographic-variable and demographic-demographic-plus-marketing-variable interactions. No 
version of REFINED is run without marketing-variable interactions on the demographic-
demographic variables. Exhaustive use of the method and full description of results would prove 
pedantic to most readers, but it should be clear that the current methodology can be applied in 
order to model and contrast purchase behavior of fairly specific demographic sub-groups that are 
still large enough to evoke interest. This degree of resolution and cross-comparativity enhances 
the capacity to identify robust purchase patterns across specific sub-groups. 
 
An example of checking for the robustness of an inferred effect is checking whether any 
rise in purchase associated with a rise in Income is robust to the level of Education of the HHH. 
While the individual marginal effects for sub-groups may seem to bounce up and down relative to 
the reference group, average effects across part of the category may be compared, because all are 
calculated relative to the same reference group.  
One form of the familiar Wald hypothesis test combines coefficients and tests whether 
they together are less than or greater than a scalar. Thus, to gauge whether quantity purchase is 
                                                 
25 Because each demographic-demographic combination defines a unique binary that exists separately from its 
constituent components, as many Other-Race demographic-demographic combinations as possible were included in 
estimation (7 of the 256 variables), to include this as a potential avenue for analysis. There was no econometric 
conflict when also regressing Other Race as a second-level dummy trap variable (i.e. without demographic-
demographic and marketing variable interaction), but p-values on three of the 7 Other-Race demographic-
demographic variables seem high compared to neighboring values. (In the Income-Race set, neighboring values are 
adjacent Income levels within Other Race or the same Income level for other racial groups. For the Education-Race 
set of only two Other Race variables, neighboring values are the Post College demographic-demographic variables 
in other racial groups). Perhaps the high p-values are the result of asking for very similar sets of identifying 
information – one for the interacted Other Race variables, one for the “dropped” Other Race group – from a single 
dataset (per explanation in 5.2.4.c). 
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rising in Fem Educ within a fixed level of the Income category (say, level 3), the average of the 
lowest two CMEs  (Less than High School, High School) can be compared to an average of the 
highest two CMEs (College, Post-College), paralleling the algebraic form of a Wald test. I name 
this a “2x2” comparison, and I refer to “2x2” values. 
The exact same method may be replicated across any interactive dimension. Thus 
quantity purchase may be falling as Education rises in the Income x Male Educ combination, and 
may be falling or rising in increasing Education when the Income x Male Educ combination is 
interacted with the Price index. In interpreting patterns across levels within categories, phrases 
such as “rises in Income,” “falls in Education,” and “is flat in Income,” are meant in the 
context of a 2x2 comparison. For example, “for each Fem Educ level, purchase quantity rises in 
Income” explains the comparison where the average of the lowest two Income-levels at a given 
level of Fem Educ is a lower average than the average of the highest two Income-levels for the 
same given level of Fem Educ. Thus one may or may not observe the average ME falling as level 
of Fem Educ rises, while still observing that within each level of Fem Educ, quantity purchased 
does rise between the lowest and highest (two combined) Income groups. 
 Table A-3 in the Appendix is a full tabular reporting of the REFINED model probit and 
OLS results, and parallels Tables 8 and 13 in form. As with these previous tables, mfx-adjusted 
marginal effects (δy/δx) for inference are listed in bold for demographic-demographic variables 
in the third column from the right. The relevant p-values, and again, the average values at which 
continuous marketing variables must be evaluated for inference are listed in the second and last 
columns from the right. The continuous variable averages must be the same for all levels of the 
model, as they refer to data elements unaffected by definition of demographic binary variables. 
In addition, contained in the δy/δx column, after the demographic-demographic combination 
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variables, and after the second-stage dummy-variable-drop regressors, are estimates of 
interactions of marketing variables with each of the demographic-demographic combination 
variables. The reader can see the effect in ounces for the prediction stage of interacting Sale, or 
the Price or Advertising data-wide average value with each demographic-demographic variable. 
Table A-3 is in the Appendix due to its length, and relevant sub-portions are extracted and 
presented or built upon in new tables when discussing inference in this main text. 
 In the table, individual MEs are too numerous (256) to discuss individually, and vary 
greatly as each represents two demographic traits that can each react differently. So I conduct 
2x2 comparisons through the eleven different pairings (each of the other six traits interacted with 
Income, and with # of Kids and Race interacted with both sex of HHH’s individual Education 
levels). For each pairing, I compare totals and averages for one demographic variable trait held 
fixed across the range of the other demographic variable trait in the pair, and the reverse (in 
5.5.2). This will become clear as we proceed. A table will present the comparison figures for 
each pairing for the CME with a marketing-variable interaction (Price: Tables 17a-k; Sale: 
Tables 18a-k; Advertising: Tables 19a-k). Some discussion of patterns in the pairings of 
demographic-demographic variables with marketing variables is presented (in 5.5.1) before the 
2x2 comparisons (in 5.5.2), and before moving to the REFINED model prediction tables (in 
5.5.3). 
Before continuing to the 2x2 comparisons, discussion of the basic model markers will 
confirm the integrity of the REFINED model as it did for the BASIC and BROAD models, and 
issues of significance on MEs and CMEs will be discussed. The marginal effect of mfx-adjusted 
un-interacted marketing variables is as expected: Price negative, Sale and Advertising positive 
(see below for values). The other non-demographic variables – the constant (49.8), seasons 
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(Ssn2=summer 26.7, Ssn3=autumn 18.5, Ssn4=winter 9.7), and the exclusionary restriction 
variables (probit only, not in ounces: Weeks-in-the-year HH Total Oz >67, 0.18; 6-Week-
Average Moving HH Stock of sCSDs, -0.0004) – are all of the expected signs and plausible 
magnitudes, with p-values of 0.000. In fact, the REFINED model has the largest coefficients on 
exclusionary restrictions of any model, the smallest OLS constant (49.8 oz or 2/3 of a 2-liter 
bottle, versus a high of 84 oz in BASIC without marketing variable interaction, and a previous 
low of 59.8 oz in the BROAD w/mktg), and the smallest coefficients on the seasonal binaries, 
which have shrunk with each increase in model sophistication. From the spring reference group, 
each warmer season rises roughly 9 ounces or ½ a 20-ounce bottle, peaking in summer at 26.8 oz 
at purchase over the spring average. So all of the variables that may quickly define whether this 
model seems to be performing to expectations are of the expected sign and highly significant, 
and are appropriately of larger or smaller size in the expected direction than in any previous 
specification. The interaction of demographic characteristics to define sub-groups explains more 
of the variation previously described by “catch-all” constants and binaries. At 49.8 ounces, the 
constant is about a 20-oz bottle per purchase less than a 67.7-ounce, or 2-liter, bottle. 
As in the BASIC and BROAD models, the probit stage of estimation yields coefficient 
estimates for explanatory variables that are used only indirectly in final results, but the 
coefficients of estimation do have signs indicating whether a variable is associated with greater 
or lesser probability of purchase, which is meant to proxy for selection in the market. Particularly 
for an item such as sCSDs that are so easily stockpiled in the home, we expect that quantity of 
purchase may be high for infrequent purchasers, which might reverse the signs on the same 
variable’s coefficients between the probit and OLS steps in estimation. This in fact occurs. 
Consistent with previous models, the coefficient on probit Price is positive (and when evaluated 
157 
at the Price Index mean is 0.409), the coefficient on probit Advertising is positive (and when 
evaluated at the Advertising Index mean is 0.027), and the probit constant is negative. 
The unadjusted OLS coefficient on Price (-1590.242* 0.0074 = -11.78) is negative as 
expected across the population in or out of the weekly sCSD market. The un-interacted Price 
mfx-adjusted ME is also negative (-82.33116* 0.0074 = -0.61), but given the number of 
interaction terms and their draw on the stock of identifying variability in the data, the ME is no 
longer significant at the 10% level (and the un-interacted Sale ME just barely makes the cut). 
Beyond the mention of sign here, there is no inference on these marketing variable MEs in 
isolation. The cumulative ME of all Price and Price-interacted variables is negative {([Σ“Price x 
…”] * 0. 0074) + (-0.61) = -315.289}, much smaller than -0.61, meaning the CME for the 
individual variable price reactions (“P x …” + “Wkly P DMA”) tend to be negative. But there 
are numerous exceptions that are each net positive in comparison to their reference group. These 
are presented with a discussion of significance levels below, along with discussion of 
significance levels for Disc/Sale and Advertising interaction results.  
For “Disc/Sale” the unadjusted OLS coefficient and the mfx-adjusted ME are identical, 
and positive as expected (12.424). Combining the “DiscSale” ME with any of the “Sale x …” 
interaction terms (“Sale x …” + “Disc/Sale”) yields negative and positive sale-response MEs – 
each relative to a reference sub-group. The cumulative Sale ME is positive as well ([Σ“Sale x 
…”] + 12.424 = 665.952). 
The unadjusted OLS coefficient on Advertising is also positive as expected (0.015 * 
374.631 = 5.75), and the un-interacted mfx-adjusted Advertising variable, which is never used 
alone for interpretation, is positive (0.0174 * 374.631 = 6.51). The two-ME combination on 
marketing effects and demographic characteristics (“Adv x …” + “Wkly Advert”) again yields 
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negative and positive sale-response MEs – each relative to a reference sub-group.  The 
cumulative Advertising effect {([Σ“Adv x …”] * 374.631) + 6.51 = -114.788} flips from the un-
interacted ME to negative – a function of all of the base-group-relative reactions, as occurred in 
the BROAD model with marketing variable interactions. 
 In Table A-3, the variables that were dropped from the demographic-demographic 
variable constructs (with the exception of partial inclusion of Other Race as noted in footnote 25) 
and regressed separately are listed under the un-interacted demographic-demographic variable 
set and before Price-interactions. “No Man HHH” is for HHs without Male HHHs, i.e. Female 
only. The marginal total effect for this group controlling for all other factors in the table is 41.1, 
less than half of the 84.1 ounces at purchase for Male only HHHs (“No Fem HHH”), clearly 
indicating that Male HHHs are associated with much higher average purchase in single-sex HHH 
households. Both these correlations are significant at p-value=0.000. Having four or more 
children in the HH is associated with an extra 11 ounces per purchase controlling for all other 
variable effects. But with a p-value of 0.582 we may expect there are bi- or multi-modal 
“parenting styles” within the group. (This p-value if strictly interpreted forces the mfx-adjusted 
ME to be interpreted as “zero ounces,” or no effect on household purchase. See next subsection 
for discussion of this phenomenon for most REFINED model MEs.) The top Age groups for 
Male and Female, regressed away from the primary demographic-demographic variable sets, 
shows the oldest Age level for Female HHHs purchasing about twice (19.8) the amount the 
oldest Age level for Male HHHs do (9.3) at each purchase, both significant at the 10% level, 
although there may be some bi-modal behavior in Male HHHs for this level. Other Race 
regressed separately is positive (46.81) and significant at the 1% level, adding to a HH total at 
purchase a bit more than Female only HHH did. HH Size 5+ is strongly positive as may be 
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expected from previous results – at 146 ounces, larger than any other two of these category-level 
characteristics – with p-value=0.000. 
 As with the other basic markers of the model, there is nothing exceptional or 
counterintuitive in these isolated demographic-category-level variables (regressed to avoid a 
dummy-variable trap) that would bring into question the REFINED model or its application. 
 
5.5.1    Significance Issues for Single-Variable MEs, Including Marketing-Variable 
Interactions 
In sub-section 5.2.4.c four reasons were listed why variables that in previous models were 
statistically significant in their effect on the dependent variable might not be significant at the 
10% level. Now that there are 256 demographic-demographic variables before marketing-
variable interaction, certain patterns suggest which of the four reasons listed might be 
determining failure to meet a 10% standard for statistical significance. These will be analyzed 
also for marketing-variable interaction variable sets, as both element types construct CMEs on 
which inference is conducted, directly in sub-section 5.5.2, and for higher aggregation of these 
CMEs in sub-section 5.5.3. 
 
5.5.1.a    Significance Issues for Demographic-Demographic Variable MEs 
If one compares the p-values on MEs for demographic category level variables in the 
BROAD models without and with marketing variable interaction p-values on demographic level 
MEs (in Tables 11 and 13), no variable fails to be significant at the 10% level in both models.26
                                                 
26 There is a single exception for Fem Age 65+, but as the entire level is regressed separately in REFINED, without 
demographic-demographic interactions or marketing-variable interactions to avoid the second-level dummy-variable 
trap, this exception does not affect the substance of the argument in the main text. 
 
This indicates that each demographic category level is to some provable degree different from its 
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reference group, but more importantly proves there is adequate information to identify this 
difference, and each has a unique effect on the dependent variable. This almost eliminates the 
first two reasons in 5.2.4.c that there may be significance levels above an arbitrary standard, 0.10 
here. There is the lingering concern that if the demographic-demographic variable describes a 
sub-group with so few HHs representing it in the data (say, Female HHHs with Less than HS 
Education and 5xPvInc Income level), the sub-group may not have enough observations to rise 
to the level of statistical significance. But this point is moot, because using the Projection Factor 
has already applied identifying information across known characteristics to weight results to the 
DMA population level. Inference is on the population sampled by Nielsen, not on the sample, 
which alone might have few of certain types of HHs. This does eliminate the first two reasons in 
5.2.4.c that there may be significance problems with the demographic-demographic variables. 
Remembering that each demographic-demographic variable in the REFINED model is a 
combination of two significant demographic category-level variables from the BROAD models, 
this leaves few primary reasons that a combination of two significant variables may not be 
statistically significant at least the 10% level or better. Either the sub-group is too similar in 
purchase behavior to its reference sub-group, a sub-group is bi- or multi-modal in its behavior 
(see 5.2.4.c), or some of both reasons simultaneously. Every one of the 256 demographic-
demographic variable MEs in Table A-3 with a p-value over 0.1 will be listed as a candidate in 
one of these three groups, to demonstrate that there is a reasonable explanation for each which 
diverges from the conclusion that the variable does not affect the dependent variable. 
This is not a whimsical exercise. Demonstrating that the “poor” significance levels do not 
diminish the variables’ explanatory power for the dependent variable by offering reasonable 
alternative explanations is intended to remove some of the onus to prove that every 2-variable 
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CME is statistically significant, or that strict statistical significance is an adequate measure of 
relevance for every level of inference conducted here. This is useful because careful inference 
(including “2x2 comparisons”) is conducted on not only the sign but the magnitude of the CMEs 
on the understanding that the values being discussed do not fail to explain variations in HH total 
ounces purchased (the final dependent variable of estimation). I argue here that this inference 
offers insights into actual sub-group behavior in the market, or for similar sub-groups, such as 
low-Income versus high-Income. (Once again, for the prediction tables, the combination of many 
CMEs and the constant in each cell render the issue of significance moot, as the cells least likely 
to have significant p-values based on ME significance levels are all pval=0.000.) 
In Table A-3, p-values for the (mfx-adjusted) marginal effects of demographic-
demographic combination variables are in the second-to-last column. MEs with significance 
levels above 0.1 may be close in characteristic space to the reference group, indicating that their 
behavior may be too similar to be identified as significantly different (statistically). But as being 
in the reference group affects purchase behavior – which we know, because other groups 
significantly differ from the reference group – being very similar to the reference group also 
affects purchase behavior. Candidates for failing a standard significance measure for being too 
similar in behavior to its reference group are (variable (p-val):: proximal reference sub-group):  
*  5xPvIncFmCollgEd (0.331):: 5xPovIncxFmPostCollgEd; 
*  2xPvIncFmPostCollgEd (0.749):: 5xPovIncxFmPostCollgEd; 
*  HfPvIncMPostCollgEd (0.229), 1xPvIncMPostCollgEd (0.183), 3xPvIncMPostCollgEd (0.196):: 
5xPovIncxMalePostCollgEd; 
*  4xPvIncWhite (0.292):: 5xPovIncxWhite; 
*  3xPvIncHspnc (0.175), 5xPvIncHspnc (0.198):: (non-Hispanic) 
*  4xPvIncNoKids (0.201):: 5xPovIncxNoKids; 
*  4xPvIncOneKids (0.157):: 5xPvIncNoKids, possibly also bi-modal by parenting style, especially in 
upper-Income HHs; 
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*  3xPvIncFmAge50L65 (0.602):: 5xPovIncxFmAge50-65; 
*  5xPvIncMAge30L40 (0.243):: 5xPovIncxMaleAge50-65; 
*  2xPvIncMAge50L65 (0.137):: 5xPovIncxMaleAge50-65; 
*  FmSmColgEdWhite (0.184):: FmPostCollgEdxWhite; 
*  FmPostColgEdOthRace (0.111):: FmPostCollgEdxWhite; 
*  MColgEdWhite (0.37):: MalePostCollgEdxWhite; 
*  MPostColgEdAfrAm (0.345):: MalePostCollgEdxWhite; 
*  MPostColgEdOthRace (0.383):: MalePostCollgEdxWhite; 
*  MPostColgEdHspnc (0.491):: (non-Hispanic, possibly MalePostCollgEdxWhite). 
Each of these assertions could be tested by carefully constructing and graphing 
distributions from the original data, and visually or parametrically comparing them. This would 
be time and labor intensive. Because the sub-groups are “sliced much thinner” than the category 
levels, this might be the only way to hypothesis test assertions that an insignificant ME 
represents a group too close in behavior to the reference group. The two could be combined and 
regression re-run, but this could become extremely complicated with one pattern upsetting 
another amongst the 256 variables with 12 base-group assumptions (including non-Hispanic).  
To address assertions of bi-modal (or more) behavior within a sub-group, one shortcut is 
to scan descriptive statistics Tables 2 & 3 for standard errors on demographic category level 
means that seem relatively large compared to other levels in the category. These represent a rate 
of dispersion inherent to the data that both naturally push standard errors in estimation higher, and 
indicate a potential for bi-modal behavior within the sub-group. In fact, using Table 3 standard 
errors to compare one level within a demographic category to the others within that category, we 
may observe potential evidence for some candidates of bi-modal purchase behavior within the 
sub-group (variable (p-val):: “yes” if standard error in Table 3 is largest in category and more than 
one-third larger than next nearest / which half of demographic-demographic variable fits the 
large-standard-error-in-Table-3 criterion, or if “no,” then my hypothesis for bi-modality): 
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*  HfPvIncFmHSEd (0. 361):: yes/HfPvInc; 
*  HfPvIncFmSomCollgEd (0.3):: yes/HfPvInc; 
*  HfPvIncMLHSEd (0.179):: yes/ HfPvInc & Male Less HS; 
*  1xPvIncMLHSEd (0.138):: yes/ Male Less HS; 
*  1xPvIncMSomCollgEd (0.889), 2xPvIncMSomCollgEd (0.599), 3xPvIncMSomCollgEd (0.321):: no/ 
this combination describes an extremely broad range of HH types in the US; some characteristic (and 
unidentified) differences within this group defined only as medium Male HHH Educ and lower-middle 
Income Male HHHs (heterogeneous application of similar nutrition information, perhaps);  
* HfPvIncAfrAm (0.1)::yes/HfPvInc; 
*  2xPvIncAfrAm (0.265), 3xPvIncAfrAm (0.181):: no/ because Afr-Amer has lowest average HH 
Income by racial group, 2x&3xPvInc is more middle class within the group for some, and not for others, 
with a split in behavior based on other characteristics; 
*  HfPvIncAsian (0.354):: yes/HfPvInc; 
*  1xPvIncAsian (0.639):: no/ because Asian has highest average Income by racial group, 1x behaves like 
HfPvInc in this racial group; 
* 4xPvIncOthRace (0.908):: no/ large break in size of ME between lower Income levels and 5xPvInc for 
Other Race; a hinge point in 4xPvInc is consistent with bi-modality in the sub-group; 
*  HfPvIncHHsiz1 (0.583), HfPvIncHHsiz2 (0.142), HfPvIncHHsiz3 (0.752), HfPvIncHHsiz4 (0.94):: 
yes/HfPvInc, and extremely broad range of HH type measuring only by HH Size, which also covers 
4xPvIncHHsiz2 (0.937); 
*  2xPvIncTwoKids (0.283), 4xPvIncTwoKids (0.794), 5xPvIncTwoKids (0.968), 4xPvInc3Kids (0.139):: 
no/ bi-modal by parenting style –  perhaps especially in upper-Income HHs; the p-value is much higher at 
4x- than at 2xPvIncTwoKids, and even higher at 5xPvIncTwoKids, which could also be similar in 
behavior to 5xPvIncNoKids; since only 4xPvInc3Kids misses in 3Kids, followed by the next highest p-
value in the group by far at 5xPvInc3Kids, which also has an even more negative ME, (Inc)3xKids also 
supports the hypothesis that upper-income parents may be more bi-modal in parenting behavior than low- 
and medium-income parents; 
*  HfPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.758), 1xPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.654), 2xPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.222), 
3xPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.527), 5xPvIncFmAgeL30 (0.214):: yes/ Fem Age <30, (and HfPvInc for first 
variable), having only one significant variable in this six-level group serves as the benchmark for multi-
modality in purchase behavior – Fem HHH Age <30 alone describes extremely broad range of HH types 
in the US, by Education level, whether or not married, whether or not children; 
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*  1xPvIncFmAge30L40 (0.814), 5xPvIncFmAge30L40 (0.869):: no/ reasons for Fem Age < 30 persist at 
30L40, and p-values for both these are above any level in Fem Age < 30; for 5xPvInc, possibly like 
reference group 5xPovIncxFmAge50-65 in behavior; 
* 3xPvIncFmAge40L50 (0.342):: no// no immediate explanation as for other sub-groups; may be like 
reference group 5xPvIncFmAge50L65, or bi-modal where portion of 3xPvIncFmAge40L50 are acting 
like reference group; 
*  1xPvIncMAgeL30 (0.65), 3xPvIncMAgeL30 (0.4), 5xPvIncMAgeL30 (0.264):: yes/ Male Age <30, 
parallel explanation to Fem Age < 30; 
*  HfPvIncMAge50L65 (0.843):: yes/HfPvInc, very high p-value may indicate particular multi-modality 
characteristic of very low Income for middle-aged HHH, which may vary by HH Size; 
*  FmLHSEdOneKids (0.801), FmHSEdOneKids (0.623), FmSmColgEdOneKids (0.274), 
FmColgEdOneKids (0.122):: no (except Fem Less HS for first, and very high p-value)/ having only one 
significant variable of five in this group is again a benchmark for bi-modality, here in parenting style, 
which becomes much more uniform in Two Kids, then disperses again in 3 Kids; 
*  FmLHSEd3Kids (0.523), FmHSEd3Kids (0.157), FmSmColgEd3Kids (0.142), FmColgEd3Kids 
(0.402):: no (except Fem Less HS for first)/ four of five variables in a group all having high p-values is a 
benchmark for bi-modality, here in parenting style, which is much more uniform in Two Kids; the 
standard error for 3 Kids is the fifth highest in Table 3, so indicates bi-modal behavior, but 4Kids+ has the 
highest standard error in Table 3 by far, so “no”; 
*   MLHSEd3Kids (0.51), MPostColgEd3Kids (0.141):: yes/ (Male Less HS only), again 3 Kids is fairly 
high standard error in Table 3; 
*  FmLHSEdWhite (0.354):: yes/ Fem Less HS; 
*  FmSomColgEdAfrAm (0.461):: no/ no immediate explanation as for other sub-groups, but given the 
very high rate of incomplete college degrees in the US and the financial problems driving this number, 
Afr-Amer HHs with the lowest average Income of the racial groups may be particularly vulnerable; Afr-
Amer College graduation rates (post-matriculation) are consistently lower,27
*  FmHSEdHspnc (0.124):: no/ some carryover from very high bi-modality and similarity to non-
Hispanic reference group from FmLHSEdHspnc; 
 potentially making the Some 
College sub-group more diverse than for other racial groups; 
*  MLHSEdAsian (0.873):: yes/ Male Less HS & Asian; 
*  MLHSEdHspnc (0.211):: yes/ Male Less HS; 
*   4 Kids+ (0.582):: yes/ 4 Kids+. 
                                                 
27 “Black Student College Graduation Rates Inch Higher But a Large Racial Gap Persists,” 2007. The Journal of 
Blacks in Higher Education: http://www.jbhe.com/preview/winter07preview.html, accessed July 13, 2012.  
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 Many of the highest p-values on demographic variables may indicate both “too similar in 
behavior to its reference group” and “bi-modal purchase behavior within the sub-group” 
(variable (p-val):: proximal reference sub-group/ reason for bi-modality): 
*  4xPvIncAfrAm (0.995), 5xPvIncAfrAm (0.929):: 5xPovIncxWhite/ some HHs in these sub-groups 
may behave very closely to the White reference group, and others may maintain the divergent purchase 
behavior of lower- and middle-Income Afr-Amer HHs; 
*  2xPvIncNoKids (0.777), 3xPvIncNoKids (0.813):: 5xPovIncxNoKids/ as evident in Tables    A-1a & 
A-1c, these sub-groups are likely to “accidentally” cover HHs with relatively old and relatively young 
HHHs across both sexes, forcing bi-modality in purchase behavior which the Female or Male Age <30 
and 30-40 versus the 65+ level clearly demonstrates (after the demographic-demographic variables in 
Table A-3); 
*  FmLHSEdHspnc (0.961), FmPostColgEdHspnc (0.813), MHSEdHspnc (0.832):: (first Fem Less HS) 
& (non-Hispanic), bi-modality possible between HHs displaying any characteristic Hispanic (versus non-
Hispanic)  purchase behavior, and the HHs purchasing in a similar fashion to the non-Hispanic reference 
group. 
 
5.5.1.b    Significance Issues for Marketing-Variable Interacted Demographic-Demographic 
Variable MEs 
Marketing-variable interaction with demographic-demographic variables also generate 
MEs that become elements in combined marginal effect calculation, whose magnitudes are to be 
compared. For all marketing-variable-interacted variables marginal effects equal the (unadjusted) 
OLS-side coefficients of original estimation (and standard errors remain the same). 
There is no particular reason that reactivity to changes in marketing variables should be 
as varied as quantity at purchase is, or that the same demographic-demographic variable sets that 
describe purchase differences well should describe marketing variable reactivity well. Price 
Advertising and Sale may have less impact on market participation and quantity purchased than 
un-identified appetites within the family, or less impact than whether HHs that are not chronic 
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purchasers have guests, birthdays, or holidays to purchase for. The number of occasional versus 
chronic sCSD purchasers in a demographic sub-group could then affect the estimated impact of 
marketing variables and the estimated standard deviation of the mean impact. It is one objective 
of this work to identify for which sub-groups marketing-variable reactions are strongest and in 
what direction – can we empirically identify who may seem to be purchasing in a manner that 
seems economically irrational?  
There are at least three reasons that such identification may not be sharp. First, there is a 
structural factor muting the reactivity to the Price and Advertising indices – because they are 
indices, not accurate measures of the exact prices that a particular HH cares most directly about, 
or the exact exposure that a particular HH receives (due to both data limitations and the decision 
to focus on the sCSD product category rather than particular brands). Similarly the type of Sale 
is not captured in the Sale metric here, only that the Nielsen sample HH identified the item was 
“on sale” in some form at the time of purchase, and to repeat (section 3.4, including footnotes), if 
the item is on sale and no purchase was made, this is not identified in the data vector.  
Second, if every sub-group in a set reacts in roughly the same economically rational way 
to Price or Advertising changes, or buys roughly the same increased amount on Sale, we may 
expect a fair number of MEs that are not significant at the 10% level, because MEs are relative to 
reference sub-groups carved from this set. Although identifying that all or most HH types reacted 
to marketing variable changes in a similar way would itself be an interesting result, in practice 
more marginal effects closer to the reference sub-group reaction will mean fewer significant 
results (see sub-section 5.2.4.c).  
Third, as stated in 5.2.4.c there is a limit to the amount of identifying variability in the 
data, and this structure asks for significance levels four times from the same (sub-group 
167 
identifying) variable, three of which are the original variable interacted with a marketing variable 
(per equation (20)). For any of these three reasons, p-values may tend to run high in the 
marketing-variable interacted sets for reasons derivative of the structure of analysis, not due to a 
failure of defined sub-groups to distinctively impact purchase. High p-values therefore should 
not determine that magnitudes of ME fail to meet primary standards of relevance. 
Advertising in particular is a DMA-wide average for the entire sCSD category. While 
household exposure is scaled by the number and ages of HH members, there is no way to control 
for two other factors which could easily diminish the statistical relevance of weekly changes. 
First, it is a weekly effect entering a HH with lifetime exposure to such advertising. Second, if 
demographic sub-groups vary in their response across DMAs to national and cable advertising 
spots (spanning perhaps Dallas where the week’s average temperature is 100 degrees and Boston 
where the same week’s average temperature is 78 degrees), standard errors on purchase response 
for a demographic group common to both DMAs may be expected to rise. My intuition is that 
Advertising-interacted sub-groups will have the least meaningful p-values, and in fact the lowest 
percent of statistically significant interactions (pval<0.1) occurs for the same 11 sets interacted in 
Advertising as in Price and Sale. The only consistently significant set in Advertising is Income x 
FemaleAge, which could happen randomly. 
Some sets may be highly reactive to changes in one marketing variable and not so much 
in another, and this can be identified. There is no constraint that if a sub-group reacts to a 
marketing-variable change in what seems an economically rational way, that the same sub-group 
should react to all marketing-variable changes in what seems a rational economic way. From the 
BASIC and BROAD analyses including calculated purchase reactions to a plus-one standard 
deviation change in average value of the continuous marketing variable, it is clear that rarely do 
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groups react to all three variables as economic theory may predict. While the selection of 
reference sub-groups is not entirely arbitrary, it is not always a simple matter to infer what 
economic theory may predict as a rational economic reaction, because MEs are relative to their 
reference sub-groups. 
Extending from previous arguments delineating reasons that demographic-demographic 
variable p-values may be high, I recognize the limitations of the methodology, and do not take 
high p-values on marketing-interacted variables as pure indication that the variable has no effect. 
Magnitudes are considered in combined marginal effects, not just signs. By inspection, 
magnitudes on many “insignificant” MEs are in line with significant values that neighbor them in 
one of the levels in the demographic-demographic variable interacted with Price, Sale, or 
Advertising. (Examples of variables “similar to their reference sub-groups” in 5.5.1.a above 
demonstrate the “neighbor them in one of the levels” concept.) 
 
5.5.1.b.i    Significance Issues for Price-Interacted Demographic-Demographic Variable 
MEs 
Looking at a set of MEs, for example all of the Price interactions for the full Female 
Education-Income variable group, we can see how many are not statistically significant at the 
10% level, and compare this to other sets. Patterns within or across these interacted-variable sets 
may offer some insight into HH reactions and purchase behavior, and possibly whether the set 
itself seems to be a good set for describing variability in response. 
Table 16 is an analytic table referencing marketing-variable interaction results in ounces 
from Table A-3. Table 16 presents the ratio of marketing-variable-interacted sub-groups that are 
significant at the 10% level, the percent within each set that are significant at this standard, and 
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comments. If these were ordered from highest percent significant at lowest, 6 of the 11 Price-
interacted groups are over 70% significant, 4 of 11 Sale-interacted groups, and 1 of 11 
Advertising-interacted groups. Below 50% significant are 2 Price groups, 4 Sale groups, and 5 
Advertising groups. So there is some clarity as to which interactions describe the most consistent 
reactivity. Price x Income x Fem/Male Education are both above 80%, as is Sale x Income x 
Race/Hispanic. Price x Income x Race/Hispanic is above 70%. 
Income x Female Educ is the most consistent set in Table 16 (93%), meaning there is 
relatively uniform response to increased Price relative to the reference sub-group (highest 
Income x highest Fem Educ level, Price5xIncxFmPostCollg), reflected in a low number of 
insignificant p-values. The strongest quantity reductions in increasing Price are for HS and Some 
College, with the least at Post College. The only sub-groups failing the 10% standard are at the 
Post College level, but with lower Income than the top level – but not all close sub-groups in 
highest Education have high p-values. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant 
value: -46 to 19. 
Income x Male Educ is also quite consistent as a set (between 80-90%), but opposite the 
Income x Female Educ set, purchase reaction in rising Price is positive relative to the reference 
sub-group, although generally in a lower magnitude than the Female responses. By Education 
level across Income levels, Female HHHs are more price responsive than Males. Most of the 
Male HHHs coefficients close to zero, meaning behavior close to the reference group, are in Post 
College Education (across Income levels). All the other Male Educ levels across Income levels 
are more positively responsive in Price. Within each Male Educ level, lower Income levels tend 
to be more responsive to a Price rise than do higher Income levels. The span in ounces from 
lowest to highest significant value: 8 to 34. 
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Income x Race/Hispanic is consistent as a set (between 70-80%) relative to the 
Price5xIncxWhite reference sub-group. White HHs respond to rising Price with less purchase 
more at higher Income levels than at lower ones, as do Afr-Amer and Other Race HHs. All 
significant responses in Asian are negative, meaning strongly Price responsive, with the highest 
responses at middle Income levels. Hispanic HHs are all between 2 and 9 ounces (positive) 
versus the non-Hispanic base group – positive relative to the base, but not by much, and varying 
little by Income level. The slight positive relative response may simply reflect more downtown 
residents or less access to membership club supermarkets. For Income x Race/Hispanic, the span 
in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -31 to 24. 
For Income x HH Size the base sub-group is Price5xIncxHHsiz1, and it is also consistent 
as a set in Price response relative to the base sub-group. As with Hispanic HHs the consistently 
positive responses tend to be less than 10 ounces per purchase, although the 5xInc sub-groups in 
multi-person HHs tend to be negative, and more price responsive at lower HH Sizes. A small-
magnitude downward trend from 2xInc suggests HHs are more responsive in Price as Income 
increases – perhaps again reflecting motivation to join or access membership big-box chains. The 
span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -7 to 15. 
Income x # of Kids in HH is less consistent (between 60-70%) than previous sets in Price 
responsiveness relative to the base sub-group (Price5xIncxNoKids). Every group, with and 
without Kids, is most strongly negative in lower Income levels, and trends more positive in 
upper Income levels, with OneKids and ThreeKids actually turning positive at upper Income 
levels. This behavior would be consistent with habit of purchase overwhelming a negative Price 
response at upper-Income levels with Kids – however most p-values over 0.1 are for exactly the 
upper-Income sub-groups in OneKids and ThreeKids. This may imply bi-modal behavior in 
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Price response for these groups, or simply purchase behavior too close to the base group 
(although why the latter should be is not easily expected). Price responses clearly differ between 
HH Size and # of Kids across Income levels, again supporting the choice to include both in 
modeling. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -31 to 4. 
Income x Female (Male) Age are inconsistent sets in Price responsiveness (close to 50% 
are not significant at the 10% level). For Females there is little pattern, but there are more 
negatives versus the Price5xIncxFmAge50-65 base sub-group at higher Ages, with least 
consistency at lower Incomes in lowest Age groups. For Males there is also no pattern and small 
magnitudes, but least consistency in Price response at higher Ages and middle Income levels. 
The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value, (Female Age): -5 to 18. The span in 
ounces from lowest to highest significant value, (Male Age): -14 to 9. 
FemaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is a consistent set (between 70-80%) relative to the 
PricexFmPostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group. Almost all MEs are positive, only one 
statistically significant ME in this set is negative. The reference sub-group Price responsiveness 
is thus relatively high. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -10 to 35. 
MaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is a quite consistent set (between 80-90%) relative to 
the PricexMalePostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group, more than for the Female set. All MEs 
are negative. The reference sub-group Price responsiveness is thus relatively low, the opposite of 
the parallel set in Female Educ and # of Kids. Both the Female and Male HHH sets for this 
interaction have relatively strong magnitudes (absolute value from 0) compared to all sets in the 
table, with Inc x Fem Educ arguably highest. The span in ounces from lowest to highest 
significant value: -26 to -6. 
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FemaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic and MaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic are not 
consistent (near 50%) relative to their PricexPostCollgxWhite reference sub-groups. Positive and 
negative MEs in these two sets tend to stay close to 0, suggesting these sets do not describe Price 
reactivity as well as any of the other sets. Exceptions include Asian HHs in Female Educ, which 
account for half of all the significant MEs in the Female Educ set, and in Male Educ LHS and 
Afr-Amer HHs, which together account for 2/3 of the significant MEs, and have higher MEs in 
ounces. So Asian HHs differ from the PricexPostCollgxWhite base in Female Educ, and Afr-
Amer HHs from the same base in Male Educ. 3/5 of Hispanic MEs in either set are not 
significant at the 10% level, and magnitudes are small for the significant values (3/4 are 
negative), so Hispanic HHs are either slightly more or not at all more Price sensitive than non-
Hispanic HHs. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value, (Fem Educ 
Race/Hspnc): -5 to 26. The same span in ounces for Male Educ Race/Hspnc: -4 to 23. 
 
5.5.1.b.ii    Significance Issues for Sale-Interacted Demographic-Demographic Variable 
MEs 
 Income x Female Educ is not a consistent set, but all reactions are negative below the 
Post College level except HfPvIncFmCollgEd. The Sale5xIncxFmPostCollg reference sub-group 
is clearly strong in quantity response when purchasing on Sale. Only the Post College sub-groups 
across Income levels tend to be more positive. Fem Less HS is the most negative (least 
responsive relative to base sub-group, and highly identified in this set), with higher Fem Educ 
levels less negative, although College versus Some College is a potential exception. In Female 
HHH Education, higher Education tends to mean more purchase when on Sale. Statistically 
significant figures for the difference between the lowest groups across Education and the base 
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(=5xIncxFmPostCollg) are frequently in the 2-4-liter range. These MEs are correlates for 
incidence of positive purchase, and do not reflect more or less overall purchase for sub-group 
HHs given the number of purchase weeks for the HH-type in a year. The MEs here would appear 
the same if HHs in the reference group bought only once a year and drank less or if they bought 
the same number of times per year as the other sub-groups in the set and drank much more 
sCSD. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -279 to 39. 
 Income x Male Educ is also not a consistent set, with no significant MEs (to pval<0.1) in 
the Less HS or HS groups. This is unlikely to be because behavior is similar to the 
Sale5xIncxMPostCollg base sub-group, so must reflect multi-modal behavioral response within 
the artificial28
                                                 
28 Category determined in advance by Nielsen choices and mine, not by principal component analysis on raw data in 
characteristic space. 
 category. Relative to the base group, some lesser educated Male HHHs care about 
buying on sale, and others do not. There is a reversal of sign from negative to positive MEs from 
College through Post College, with the only negative signs in the highest Male Education levels 
not significant. P-values also drop significantly for these groups, another indicator that high p-
values here are from multi-modality of behavior rather than similarity to the reference sub-group 
in purchasing behavior. Male HHHs reverse in response to Sale with higher purchase at one 
lower Education level (College) than Female HHHs (Post College), and in much higher 
quantities between the last negative and the positive groups, ranging from 30-250 ounces higher 
for Male HHHs at the higher Education levels versus Some College. MEs are much more 
positive in College than Post College, meaning Sales responsiveness peaks at Male College, 
whereas it peaked in Female Post College. There are pronounced differences again in purchase 
behavior by sex of HHH for SalexIncxEduc, as there frequently has been in previous 
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comparisons – the sex of the HHH does affect purchase and marketing-variable responsiveness. 
The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -155 to 165. 
 Income x Race/Hispanic is a consistent set, with ¾ of the non-significant MEs occurring in 
Hispanic lower Income levels, indicating they do not behave differently than their non-Hispanic 
counterparts at the same Income levels. All significant MEs are positive, meaning that the 
Sale5xPvIncWhite reference group is the least Sale responsive in the set. Positive MEs are of 
highest magnitude for Asian HHs, followed by Other Race (especially at low- and middle-Income 
levels), White, and finally Afr-Am HHs. The exceptionally strong Asian HH effect – up to 12 liters 
difference between Asian and White HH average purchase for HfPvInc – is offset by a different 
Asian variable below. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: 55 to 764. 
 Income x HH Size is not consistent, especially for smaller HHs, indicating that bi-modal 
response to Sale versus the Sale5xPvIncHHsiz1 reference sub-group is stronger in smaller HH 
groups. In contrast to the previous sets, there are no significant MEs larger than 75 ounces. 
Surprisingly, HH Size is a poor descriptor of response to Sale. The span in ounces from lowest to 
highest significant value: -44 to 75. 
 Income x # of Kids in HH is consistent in Sale response, with middle Income in 
ThreeKids perhaps bi-modal. Compared to the Sale5xPvIncNoKids reference sub-group, every 
value in the set is less responsive, except for the highest Income level with Three Kids. All of the 
exceptionally large negative responses by group (i.e. for a single # of Kids across Income levels) 
are at HfPvInc, perhaps indicating less access to price discounts in neighborhoods where 
HfPvInc HHs are more commonly located. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant 
value is third highest among the 11 sets: -480 to 95. Again, a clear difference in HH Size and # 
of Kids in HH justifies the decision to include both regressor sets. 
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 Income x Female (Male) Age are inconsistent sets in Sale responsiveness, with no clear 
patterns in either relative to the SalexIncomexAge50-65 reference sub-groups, aside from more 
negative values being significant in Income x Male Age. The span in ounces from lowest to 
highest significant value, (Female Age): -62 to 59. The span in ounces from lowest to highest 
significant value, (Male Age): -96 to 115. 
 FemaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is a consistent set relative to the 
SalexFmPostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group, except for at ThreeKids, which may indicate 
bi-modal responsiveness to Sale in this group. All significant values are positive, meaning the 
reference sub-group is relatively non-responsive to Sale. The highest responses are at Less HS at 
every level, the fall in ounces to HS from Less HS tending to be around half the number of 
ounces. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -55 to 402. 
 MaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is not a consistent set relative to the 
SalexMPostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group, but MEs tend to be positive. Oddly, all College 
are negative and significant in large amounts relative to the other MEs in the set (buy 3-5 liters 
less when Sale is noted), and these College MEs tend to be less than for the corresponding 
Female set – but Post College does not continue the effect. With No Kids, purchase is higher at 
lower incomes, but significance problems indicate Sale response behavior remains close to the 
reference sub-group. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -154 to 110.  
 FemaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic is consistent relative to the SalexFmPostCollgxWhite 
reference sub-group, with perfect consistency for Asian HHs, and Afr-Amer HHs being the only 
group with two insignificant values. All significant values are negative, with notably high 
magnitudes for Asian HHs (nearly balancing out the very strong positive responses to Sale in 
SalexIncxAsian above), and tame magnitudes relative to some other sets for non-Asian-HH MEs.  
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The reference group is not Sale responsive relative to the entire set. The span in ounces from 
lowest to highest significant value: -468 to -26.  
MaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic sub-groups have only 1/3 (7/20) statistically significant. 
Negative and positive significant responses are almost evenly balanced in both directions from 
zero. Either all Male HHHs are similar in Sale response (and behavior for all groups is similar to 
the reference group), or there is bi-modal behavior across racial groups in Male Education levels. 
The first hypothesis is not supported by results from previous models and other results within the 
REFINED model. Having controlled for HH Size, Age, and # of Kids in HH, the second 
hypothesis is plausible for different applications of the same nutrition education within the same 
level of formal Education, or if beer drinkers are separate from sCSD drinkers. The span in 
ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -155 to 42. Once again responses differ 
dramatically for Male versus Female HHHs for the same racial group and level of Education. 
 
5.5.1.b.iii    Significance Issues for Advertising-Interacted Demographic-Demographic 
Variable MEs 
 The group-within-set average magnitude of reactions in ounces is consistently lower in 
Advertising than for Price, and certainly lower than for Sale. Because these are reactions to a 
weekly change in Advertising relative to the more direct economic impact of Price and Sale 
variables, this is expected. Long-term effect of sCSD industry or industry-leader advertising 
cannot be measured or identified with this data set.  
Income x Female Educ is not a consistent set, but all reactions are negative in Less HS, 
the only consistent group in the set. The Adv5xIncxFmPostCollg reference sub-group is one of 
the stronger positive quantity responses in Advertising, as all but two of the twelve significant 
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MEs relative to the base sub-group are negative in double digits. Within each Education level, 
the HfPvInc sub-group has a relatively positive response versus the other levels within the group, 
except for Post College. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -20 to -9. 
Income x Male Educ is not a consistent set, but all reactions are positive in HS, the only 
consistent group in the set, and this group’s MEs have the largest magnitude of any group 
interacted in Advertising (23 to 37 ounces). Male Educ at HS has the strongest positive reaction 
to Advertising in the table relative to its reference sub-group. The Adv5xIncxFmPostCollg 
reference sub-group response is lower than all significant responses except those for College 
Educ, which are negative relative to this group, nearly opposite the relationship in IncxFemEduc, 
where the high-Income high-Educ base sub-group had nearly the strongest response to 
Advertising. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -12 to 37. 
Income x Race/Hispanic is not consistent, with every racial group having significant 
negative and positive MEs except Asian HHs, which displays all negative significant MEs of the 
second highest magnitude in Advertising interaction (-12 to -39). There is a noticeably strong 
negative reaction in Advertising for HfPvInc in every racial group except Hispanic, meaning that 
the Adv5xPvIncWhite reference group is much more positive in purchase reaction to Advertising 
than are any lowest-Income groups, but that the non-Hispanic reference group differs little from 
the Hispanic, for which all ME magnitudes are low (-6 to 6). The span in ounces from lowest to 
highest significant value in the set (racial groups), is -39 to 18. 
A loose pattern across the four Race groups but not Hispanic is that the significant MEs 
are more negative for lower Income levels, but rise or even flip positive at higher Income levels. 
This enlists as evidence against the hypothesis that lower Income HHs are more likely to be 
responsive to sCSD Advertising, and this pattern also presents in Income x Male Age. Opposing 
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evidence is presented at the HfPvInc level by Income x Male Educ and strongly by Income x HH 
Size, and ignoring significance levels also by Income x Female Educ. 
Income x HH Size is less consistent (60-70%), less so for HH Size=4, possibly indicating 
bi-modal response to Advertising. After HfPvInc, all significant MEs are negative versus the 
Adv5xPvIncHHsiz1 reference sub-group, indicating that the base sub-group has a relatively high 
response within the set. The effect parallels that in the racial group set, but in the opposite 
direction. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -8 to 18. 
Income x # of Kids in HH is not consistent in Advertising response, perhaps due to bi-
modal response behavior in No-, One-, and TwoKids, which display 4 of 17 significant p-values. 
Inc x ThreeKids is completely consistent and strongly negative (the fourth highest magnitude of 
any group in Advertising interaction, -14 to -31). Significant p-values are positive in NoKids, 
and negative for any sub-group with Kids, relative to the Adv5xIncNoKids reference sub-group. 
The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value: -31 to 13. 
Income x Female Age is the only consistent sets in Advertising responsiveness, but with 
no clear patterns relative to the AdvxIncomexFemAge50-65 reference sub-groups – significant 
values are positive and large in <30, positive in 50-65, and mixed in between. The span in ounces 
from lowest to highest significant value: -6 to 21. 
Income x Male Age is less consistent in Advertising responsiveness, with all significant 
values negative relative to the reference sub-group, meaning the AdvxIncomexAge50-65 base 
sub-group is relatively strong in response to Advertising. The span in the 50-65 group is small, 
consistent with approaching the base group in responsiveness. The span in ounces from lowest to 
highest significant value: -22 to -2. 
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FemaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is a less consistent set relative to the 
AdvxFmPostCollgEdNoKids reference sub-group, except for at ThreeKids, which exactly 
opposite the Sale response is the only group that is consistent within the set. All significant 
values in the set are positive, meaning the base sub-group is relatively unresponsive to 
Advertising. The group spanning FemEduc in ThreeKids is the third largest responsive group by 
magnitude of all groups interacted in Advertising (15 to 39). The span in ounces from lowest to 
highest significant value in the set: -14 to 39. 
MaleEducLevel x # of Kids in HH is the least consistent set in the entire table relative to 
its reference sub-group, AdvxMPostCollgEdNoKids. The exception is that all of the strongly 
negative MEs for HS (in the -20s versus all other MEs of -4 to 4) are the only significant values 
in the set. Despite significance questions, NoKids leans negative, where any positive # of Kids 
leans positive in response to Advertising versus the base sub-group. The span in ounces from 
lowest to highest significant value: -27 to -23. 
Paralleling the noticeable separate effect for HfPvInc level across demographic groups 
relative to other sub-group Income levels, Less HS differs from other sub-group Education 
levels. Less HS is strongly negative in Advertising in Inc x Fem Educ (but not in Inc x Male 
Educ), strongly positive in Fem Educ x # of Kids and Male Educ x # of Kids, and consistently 
negative and smaller magnitude than for # of Kids in HH in Fem/Male Educ x racial groups. 
Focusing only on Less HS for # of Kids, the significant MEs rise from 14 in NoKids, to 17 for 
OneKids, 23 for TwoKids, and 39 for ThreeKids, demonstrating a clear significant rise in 
positive effect of Advertising in rising # of Kids for Female HHHs of Less HS level of terminal 
Education. The MEs for Less HS are not significant for the Male HHH groups, but the effect 
noted for Female HHHs is underscored by the nearly uniform fall in purchase of around 20 
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ounces when moving in Female or Male level of Education from Less HS to HS in “Adv x 
(F/M)Educ x #Kids.” This is a perfect case of “insignificant” MEs nestling exactly into a 
noticeable pattern of magnitudes – which they could not if they had no effect or only random 
effect on the dependent variable (relative to the reference sub-group). For Female HHHs the 
relatively high MEs on Less HS are high relative to all other sub-group values in the set, whereas 
for Male HHHs the relatively high values on LHS break from the drop in ME magnitude for HS, 
but match other insignificant sub-group MEs in magnitude. The relatively quite low negative 
MEs in Male HS in the Adv x Male Educ x # of Kids in HH set are the only significant values in 
the set. Clearly the strongly positive Advertising response in Less HS is much stronger in the 
Female set versus the Male set in “Adv x (F/M)Educ x #Kids.” 
FemaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic is less consistent relative to the 
AdvxFmPostCollgxWhite reference sub-group, with the only significant values in Race being the 
perfect consistency for Asian HHs, one significant ME in Afr-Amer at Post College, and one 
significant ME in Hispanic at Fem Less HS. The nearly unbroken block of insignificant MEs in 
this set (outside of Asian HHs) indicates either behavior closely paralleling the base sub-group, 
or bimodality in response behavior, and cannot simply be a result of asking the data for too much 
identifying information, else the Asian HH MEs would also have significance problems (having 
few observations relative to White and Afr-Amer HHs). The significant responses to Advertising 
for Asian Female HHH HHs are strong in magnitude for the Advertising interactions (19 to 28). 
Remember for this group in Sale there were very large negative MEs, but not large enough to 
offset the most positive MEs in Sale interaction for Sale x Income x Asian, and in Price 
interaction, there seemed to be positive MEs for this group, but perhaps not large enough to be 
cumulatively negative with some of the Inc x Asian MEs in Price. Asian HHs is the most 
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responsive to all three marketing variables of any group interacted with marketing variables, and 
generally in the direction economic theory predicts, relative to the relevant reference sub-groups. 
The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value in the set: -7 to 29. 
MaleEducLevel x Race/Hispanic is less consistent relative to the 
AdvxMPostCollgxWhite reference sub-group, with least consistency in White HHs, a bit more in 
Afr-Amer HHs, and more consistent differences in Asian and Hispanic HHs. This may support 
behavior consistent with the base sub-groups in White and Afr-Amer, possibly with bi-modality 
in lower Education groups, based on other results. Asian HH MEs are the strongest within the set 
and negative, meaning lower purchase in rising Advertising relative to the base sub-group. For 
Hispanic versus the base non-Hispanic HHs, the effect is negative in lower Male Educ levels, but 
flips positive at the highest Male Educ levels. Ignoring significance levels and the Asian HH 
exception, purchase reactivity to Advertising seems to be a bit negative at lower Male Educ 
levels and a bit positive at upper Male Educ levels, inconsistent with the Less HS effect noted 
above. The span in ounces from lowest to highest significant value in this set: -16 to 9. 
 There seems to be no clear linear effect in Advertising that spans Income levels, 
Education level, or sex of HHHs.  The highest Incomes tend to be most positively responsive 
across Education levels, the middle Incomes in Race, and lower Incomes in HH Size and # of 
Kids in HH. Results are mixed in Inc x Age for both sexes of HHHs. Less HS seems most 
responsive in # of Kids for Female, and to a lesser extent is at least on par for Male HHHs. But 
in Educ x racial group, higher Education levels tend to break more positive in Advertising 
response in ounces purchased versus lower Education levels. There is no strong and consistent 
support across these single ME levels for my original hypotheses that the effect of Advertising 
would be constrained by the weekly nature of the measure versus lifetime cumulative effect, and 
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by the lack of correlation between product-specific advertising and purchase due to my chosen 
data construction. 
By combining MEs to Household-realistic representations in prediction tables, we can 
better compare true effects of Advertising rather than relying on MEs cross-compared in 
isolation. 
 
5.5.2    Lowest 2-Level by Highest 2-Level Comparisons of CME by Sub-group, and by 
Group (2x2 Inverse Comparisons), “Food Elite” hypothesis introduced 
Having completed the defense of inference on the magnitudes of the elements in 
combined marginal effects and analysis of patterns of significance within the variable and 
interaction-variable elements comprising CMEs (e.g. 1xPvIncFmLHSEd and Adv 
1xPvIncFmLHSEd), I now begin with 2x2-comparison analysis of CMEs in each of the 
marketing variables. This analysis will provide a further way to compare empirical results with 
hypotheses, paralleling ME and CME analyses in BASIC (Table 9) and BROAD (Table 14) 
models, for the CMEs that are combined into the prediction tables. Prediction tables paralleling 
the structures in BASIC and BROAD with marketing variables will be analyzed in 5.5.3. The 
strength of this analysis is that with the exception of Hispanic in the racial group CMEs, every 
CME in every table refers to the same reference sub-group, so there is implicit comparability 
between all the CME values in any single table, from Table 17a to Table 19k. 
For the Tables in Price, Sale, and Advertising, the analyses of the Income x Education 
and Income x Race and Education x Race sets will receive more attention, because they are in 
the closest competition for determining the largest and most consistent demographic 
determinants of purchase patterns. 
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5.5.2.a    2x2 Comparisons and 2x2 Inverse Comparisons of CMEs in Price 
 Table 17a presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Female HHH Education-Level 
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Female 
Educ levels across Income levels we see averages of the values in an Education group that fall 
from 214 to 24. The fall is not linear, but it is mostly one-directional, save for the 25% rise in 
total from HS to Some College. A strictly one-directional fall in group totals on the left side 
would indicate an unambiguously strong education effect, and we almost have that here. Most of 
the change occurs in the drop between Less HS and HS, then there is a modest rise from HS to 
Some College, and then a fall of roughly half to College, and again roughly half to Post College. 
The combined totals in ounces for each group (from 1287 to 120) parallel the differences 
between group averages. Thus accounting for any price effect, Female HHHs with the lowest 
Education level purchase much more than any other Fem Educ group, with a steep drop to High 
School, and very clear drops in higher Education after Some College. Within each Fem Educ 
group, compared to the bottom two Income sub-groups, the top two Income sub-groups purchase 
more by CMEs in Price – all groups “rise in Income,” confirming a positive income effect. 
Percentage changes in 2x2 values29
 In the right half of the table, Income level is fixed, with each level spanning Fem Educ 
levels. A strictly one-directional rise in group totals on the right side would indicate an 
unambiguously strong income effect. There is no clear rise in purchase quantity by group totals 
across the six Income levels (-217 to 929) or across group averages (-43 to 186). Yet comparing 
the top two and bottom two Education levels within each Income level, every Income group has 
 run from 24 to 1334 percent. 
                                                 
29 This is the standard calculation of the absolute value of the ratio of the first value minus the second value over the 
first value. Thus the first value (for example 378.4 in the first group, the sum of the first two sub-group CMEs) 
subtracts the second value (468.8), and this result is divided by the first value. 
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lower purchase in rising Female Education. Percentage changes in 2x2 values run from 39 to 326 
percent. 
 Within each group the quantity purchased described by CME in Price follows 
expectations, providing evidence for an income and an education effect. Is there any evidence 
that one dominates the other for Female Education and Income? The group totals each span 
about 1100 from lowest to highest, which is unhelpful. The near linearity in rising Education 
level across Income levels (the first two left-side columns) is clearly stronger than the up-down-
up-up-down of Income level across Education levels (the first two right-side columns), so the 
education effect is stronger for this set.  
But this result is largely determined by a few consistent shifts. At each Educ level there is 
a large increase from HfPvInc to 1xPvInc, and at below Post College Education levels, a drop of 
over half from 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc. Each of these large moves reflects a strong difference in the 
original mfx-adjusted ME more than a price effect (results in previous tables). These differences 
that precede price effects may be consistent with an Income-based Food Elite who have attained 
a lifestyle critical of sCSD consumption. The 4x- to 5xPvInc fall would be a positive 
demonstration, and the HfPv- to 1xPvInc rise would be a negative demonstration of the same 
effect. Similarly there is a large drop from Less HS to HS at every fixed Income level, and a 
substantial drop from College to Post College (some College to College for 5xPvInc) in every 
fixed Income level except 1xPvInc for which there is still a drop. This may be evidence for an 
Education-based Food Elite, where breakpoints of nutrition awareness applied to HH decision-
making may occur in the jump to HS Educ, and the jump from College to Post College Ed. This 
is a separate line of hypothesis, but one that may be pursued using the same empirical results. 
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Evidence for and against the Food Elite hypothesis will be mentioned occasionally, as a 
secondary avenue of research hypothesis. 
 Table 17b presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Male HHH Education-Level 
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Male 
Educ levels across Income levels we see combined totals of the values in an Education group that 
fall and rise from -526 to 66, without a clear education effect. Four of the five groups fall in 2x2 
comparison in rising Income, which fails to support a positive income effect within levels of 
Male Education, but may offer modest support for an Income-based Food Elite. But any such 
support is offset by the obvious rise from 4x- to 5xPvInc in Education levels below Post College. 
For fixed Income levels across Male Educ levels there is not a strict rise from HfPvInc to 5xInc 
which would unambiguously depict an income effect. 2x2 comparison shows a strict fall in 
purchase associated with rising Education. So between both sexes of HHH in Income x 
Education, there is support for a consistent education effect in both sex of HHH comparisons 
although stronger for Female HHHs, weaker support for a positive income effect, and an obvious 
difference by sex of HHH. 
 Table 17c presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Race/Hispanic sub-groups, 
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the 
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Race/Hispanic levels 
across Income levels we see combined totals of the values that vary significantly, from Asian 
HH’s 1132 high to Other Race HH’s -641 low, with White, Afr-Amer, and Hispanic HH’s all in 
the negative range between -350 and -200. Each group rises in Income by 2x2 comparison, 
suggesting a positive income effect. Across Races, these rises tend to be the largest of any set of 
186 
groups in the 17-set tables: 550 for Asian HHs, 330 for Other Race HHs, 270 for Afr-Amer HHs, 
and around 200 for White HHs. This suggests a strong positive income effect on purchase, 
controlling for any Price effect. Hispanic is unremarkable in its 33-ounce rise, meaning that the 
quantity and price response separating Hispanic from non-Hispanic purchase behaviors is fairly 
consistent across Income levels. This clear income effect across racial groups is supported by the 
negative totals in lower (HfPv- through 2xPvInc) and positive totals in higher (3x- through 
5xPvInc) Income levels on the right half of the table, without there being a strict rise in totals for 
each level in the last numeric column. So there is strong, consistent, but not overwhelming 
support for a positive income effect in Race/Hispanic. 
Table 17d presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Household Size sub-groups, 
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the 
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed HH Size levels 
across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups are in a tight range compared to the 
previous three tables, rising strictly by HH size from HHsize=1 103 to HHsize=4 587. This is a 
clear but un-insightful effect that confirms the efficacy of the data and model structure, and a 
relatively uniform Price response in HH Size. Only HHsize=4 rises in Income in 2x2 
comparison, with HHsize=3 flat. That HH Sizes 1 and 2 are negative in rising HH Income with 
HHsize=1 the stronger, may suggest a Food Elite effect that dissolves as more members enter the 
HH, as the income effect strictly increases in HH size (per column percentage changes in 2x2 
values).  The primary income effect that would be evident in rising level totals on the right side 
were this true does not present. Quantity does rise in 2x2 comparison of HH Size for fixed 
Income level, but this is unremarkable.30
                                                 
30 When there are only three values in a group, as for 5xPvInc x HH Size with its reference sub-group drop here, the 
2x2 comparison uses the lowest and middle value, and the middle and highest value. 
 If it did not, the data or modeling might come into 
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question. HfPvInc is an exception but the magnitudes relative to the other CMEs in the column 
do not suggest this indicates aberrant behavior.  
Table 17e presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Number of Kids in HH sub-
groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding 
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Number of Kids 
in HH levels across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups are in an even tighter 
range than for HH Size, with a low of -46 (OneKid) and a high of 258 (NoKids, total for only 
five Income levels due to base drop). All # of Kids fall in Inc, presenting the second evidence in 
the 17-series tables that lower-Income HHs buy more, even accounting for any Price effect (first 
for Income levels across Race/Hispanic) – and the results are quite strong here, particularly for 
HfPvInc, but holding for 1xPvInc as well. Switching to the right side of the table, there is a strict 
fall in quantity for each rise in fixed Income level across # of Kids up to 4xPvInc, supporting the 
inference that lower-Income HHs purchase more. Further, the quantity accounting for the price 
effect rises with the # of Kids in HH at lower Income levels, but falls in rising # of Kids in HH at 
higher Income levels. This may present evidence of an Income-based Food Elite, with HH 
quantities unadjusted to the per capita level demonstrating lower purchase in ounces only at 
higher Income levels. If this is due to parental restriction of sCSD availability in the HH, it 
supports an Income-based Food Elite hypothesis. If this effect is overwhelmed by more frequent 
incidents of purchase in a month or year by higher-Income HHs, then the effect is a spurious 
result of the data configuration. 
 Table 17f presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Female Age Level sub-groups, 
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the 
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Female Age Level 
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across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups have the smallest span yet (-64 to 
110), meaning that controlling for Price effect, Female Age does not identify particularly 
distinctive behavior across Age group levels. But there are consistencies that appear having 
controlled for the more dynamic Education and racial group factors. Group totals rise strictly in 
Age level from -64 to 110, as do group CME in Price averages from -11 to 22 ounces per 
purchase – there is rising purchase in Age level, which may seem counterintuitive having 
controlled for HH Size and # of Kids in HH. All listed Fem Age levels fall in rising Income, 
again indicating that lower-Income HHs consume more than higher-Income HHs, across Age of 
Female HHH. Holding Income constant across Fem Age levels, the three lower Income group 
totals are together much higher (223+12+195) than the three higher Income group totals (-55-
302+50), further supporting the point. Every fixed Income level of CME in Price rises in 
quantity purchase with Fem Age level, except at the 1xPvInc level. 
 Table 17g presents CMEs in Price for Income-Level by Male Age Level sub-groups, 
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the 
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Male Age Level 
across Income levels we see that combined totals strictly fall from 441 to 176, meaning that 
including any Price effect, younger Male HHHs purchase more ounces when they buy – exactly 
opposite the case for Female HHHs across Age levels. The average difference from <30 to 50-65 
is (73-35) about 40 ounces per purchase. Again the opposite of the Income x Age results for 
Female HHHs in CME in Price, quantities rise in Income for all Male Age levels, with the 
highest CME in every Age group at 4xPvInc. This again allows inference of a Food Elite effect 
from 4x- to 5xPvInc, due to the fall noted in the first three Male Age levels and the implicit “0” 
for the 5xPvIncMAge50-65 reference sub-group. And indeed the right side group totals and 
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averages show much lower values for 5xPvInc than for 4xPvInc or any other Income level, even 
allowing for the dropped CME. Group totals do not rise or fall consecutively or all rise or all fall 
in Age for fixed Income level across Age levels. The positive income effect exists within Age 
levels, but is not robust across them. At the lowest Income level (and 2x- & 4xPvInc), older Male 
HHHs buy less than younger ones, while for the other Income levels, younger Male HHHs buy 
less than older ones. There is more variety in this effect than in Female HHH, where only one 
Income level broke the pattern of older HHHs buying more than younger HHHs. 
 Table 17h presents CMEs in Price for Female HHH Education-Level by Number of Kids 
in HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, 
and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. Holding the # 
of Kids in HH fixed, there is no strict rise or fall across Fem HHH Educ level totals (-295 to 27), 
and only for OneKid does quantity purchased fall in rising Education. For TwoKids and 
ThreeKids, there are rises of 20 and 45 ounces from the lowest to highest level of Education, 
evidence countermanding the strong education effect recognized in Table 17a, but in much 
smaller magnitude, so the robustness of the education effect in 17a remains. The Post College Ed 
No Kids base for Female HHHs is relatively positive, since only 4 of the 19 CMEs in Price are 
positive. All the group totals holding Educ level fixed across # of Kids in HH are negative below 
the Post College level, with no pattern of rise or fall. Any other group average for an Education 
level is less than the Post College average (12, the only positive value). Again, this undermines 
the education effect described earlier, but by too small a magnitude to overwhelm the earlier 
effect. Oddly at the HS and Some College levels, quantity purchased in rising # of Kids actually 
falls by significant amounts, 56 ounces from No or OneKids in HS Educ, and 12 ounces in Some 
College Educ. More Kids may mean less purchase in these specific conditions, including 
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reaction to Price changes relative to the Post College No Kids sub-group. By Education level 
across # of Kids, Fem Less HS purchase the least (-48), followed by Some College (-47), then 
College (-43), then a thirty-ounce rise in group average to HS (-12), and a 24-ounce rise to Post 
College (12). 
 Table 17i presents CMEs in Price for Male HHH Education-Level by Number of Kids in 
HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. There are many 
contrasts to the previous table. Here the MPostCollgNoKids reference sub-group is the lowest 
purchase sub-group in the table, as all other CMEs in Price are positive. The span from lowest to 
highest fixed # of Kids group total (346 to 550) is relatively narrow, and rises as expected in # of 
Kids from No to Two. ThreeKids is exceptional in that it breaks pattern for the lowest total and 
average (356, 69), and that a 2x2 comparison has the group rising in quantity with rising Male 
HHH level of education, while it falls as expected in the other groups. This effect stems in part 
from the lowest CME in the table, for MLessHSThreeKids, which is only one-third of the 
second-lowest CME in ounces. Surprisingly, given other results, Male HHHs with the lowest 
level of Education and ThreeKids purchase less when they do buy (7 ounces) than any other sub-
group except MPostCollgNoKids. Male Less HS Educ level with TwoKids has the highest CME 
in Price in the table, so this ThreeKids result seems anomalous, even if we were to assume twice 
as many purchase incidents for the larger HH. Moving to the right side of the table, the largest 
average across # of Kids is for HS (148), followed by College (121), then Less HS (84), then 
Some College (62), with Post College (36) nearly half of the Some College average. Post 
College is low enough to suggest an education effect, being lower than any other group, and a 
dramatic drop from College. This effect may support an Education-based Food Elite effect, 
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represented as a punctuated education effect kicking in at only the highest Education level. If 
true, this would support the education effect noted in Tables 17a&b, and on nearly the same 
magnitude of effect. This is opposite the result for Female Educ in 17h, with Male Educ in this 
table making up for some of the less pronounced education effect for Male HHH in 17a&b, 
whereas 17h detracts a bit from the original effect. 
 Table 17j presents CMEs in Price for Female HHH Education-Level by Race/Hispanic 
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. Holding racial 
group fixed across Fem Educ levels, there is a span in group totals from the Table-17-set-low of  
-1596 (avg -319) for Asian HHs, to 141 (avg 28) for Hispanic HHs. Note here that Other Race 
needed to be dropped to avoid the dummy-variable trap, but due to the reference sub-group drop 
at White Post College, there was room to re-enter one Other Race value at Post College, in 
Female and in Male HHH education. The Other Race CME value seems consistent with other 
Post College CMEs, which tend to fall from College to Post College, suggesting an education 
effect. For every full-group racial group (not Other Race) there is a rise in purchase in 2x2 
comparison. This seems a clear indication that the large positive income effect in racial group is 
dominating the smaller education effect in racial group. This would be confirmed by a strict rise 
in quantity by fixed Education level across racial groups on the right side of the table. This 
indeed occurs up to the College level, so the large positive income effect does dominate the 
education effect in racial group. The actual group totals and averages are dominated by the 
strongly negative Asian HH CMEs, but as all of the Race CMEs refer to the same base sub-
group, it is the relative change in totals and averages we can focus on not the sign or magnitude 
of the totals or averages. The dramatic fall from College to Post College still suggests an 
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education effect that must be taken seriously, and may well indicate an Education-based Food 
Elite response that is robust to racial group.31
 Table 17k presents CMEs in Price for Male HHH Education-Level by Race/Hispanic 
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The CME group 
totals and averages are less dramatic and sharp than in 17j, but signs on the totals and averages 
are reversed on the left side of the table, ranging from -412 (avg -82) for Afr-Amer HHs to 45 
(avg 9) for Asian HHs. For Asian and Hispanic HHs, two-value CMEs fall in rising Educ as 
expected. The fall in White HHs is too small to be significant, so the 2x2 is “flat in rising 
Education.” The two-value CMEs rise substantially in Education for Afr-Amer HHs. This seems 
to indicate the income effect trumps the education effect in this group, a group that maintains the 
most negative average CME by racial group in the table, relative to the MPostCollgWhite 
reference sub-group. The right-side totals and averages by fixed Education level do not rise or 
fall in pattern, but there is a clear positive quantity for Post College versus every other level, 
exactly opposite the Female HHH Table 17j, presenting counter-evidence to a Food Elite 
hypothesis. 
  
 
5.5.2.b    2x2 Comparisons and 2x2 Inverse Comparisons of CMEs in Sale 
 Table 18a presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Female HHH Education-Level 
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Female 
                                                 
31 This inference is tempered by the replacement of the “White” Educ level in the other fixed Educ level totals and 
averages with “Other Race” in the Post College group only, so then every group total and average is based on four 
values. Because White and Other Race CMEs refer to the same reference sub-group, this substitution is not 
uncomfortably artificial. 
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Educ levels across Income levels we see combined totals of the values in an Education group that 
span from -21 to 538. The most responsive group by group average is Some College (90), 
followed by Less HS (61), HS (39), Post College (39), and College (-3). While the response 
neither rises nor falls strictly in Education level group averages, the two upper Education levels 
are far lower than the two lower Education levels, expressing a strong although not linear 
negative education effect. Quantity purchased on Sale does rise in rising Income for every 
Education level, indicating a positive income effect on CME in Sale. This income effect is not 
underscored by a strict rise in Income group totals on the right side, but there is a general rise in 
Sale purchase in rising Income level evident by totaling the averages of the lower three Income 
levels (82) versus the upper three (181), even if these totals are influenced by extreme values for 
HfPvInc (-72) and 4xPvInc (163). It may not be immediately intuitive that higher Income groups, 
particularly 4xPvInc, buy more on Sale per purchase, because the incentive may seem stronger 
for lower-Income HHs. These correlative results likely reflect relative factors such as access to 
big-box stores, larger family vehicles, or larger homes with more designated pantry space. These 
factors may explain why HfPvInc is the only group with all negative CMEs in Sale relative to 
5xPvInFmPostCollgEd. Four of the six Income groups fall in rising Education, meaning the 
combination of a sub-group’s purchase relative to the base sub-group and the same sub-group’s 
response to Sale relative to the base sub-group is smaller for the two higher Education levels in a 
group than the two lower ones. 
As is apparent from the MEs in ounces for marketing-variable-interacted terms, Sale on 
average displays the most dynamic magnitudes of the marketing variables. Even accounting for 
the relatively strong impact of Sale, for CMEs in Sale, the education effect dominates the income 
effect in all three lower Income levels, and the income effect dominates the education effect in 
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two of the upper three, with the edge going to the education effect over the income effect.32
There is no unambiguous evidence for an Education-based Food Elite behavior here, 
despite the fall in averages for the two highest Education groups from the two lowest, but the 
extreme drop from 164 ounces to 16 ounces in average for the 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc groups may 
support an Income-based Food Elite argument. 
 Even 
the largest Income level average across Education levels (4xPvInc, 819) falls in Educ. This 
finding has policy implications. This argument assumes that rising Education diminishes overall 
purchase of an unhealthful product, rather than better educating shoppers as to the economic 
value of buying any item at a discounted price.  
 Table 18b presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Male HHH Education-Level 
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Male 
Educ levels across Income levels we see combined totals of the values in an Education group that 
fall and rise from -654 to 166, without a clear education effect. Relative to Female HHHs, the 
Male 5xPvIncPostColleg reference sub-group is much more responsive in CMEs in Sale, with 
only 10 of 29 CMEs positive (and only three of the 19 negative CMEs within 50 ounces of the 
base point). If the highest Income-highest-Educated group is that high, we can anticipate a strong 
commitment to either purchase, Sale, or both, and therefore a likely smaller education effect if 
one is detectable. Three of the five groups rise in 2x2 comparison in rising Income, supporting a 
modest claim for a positive income effect within levels of Male Education. Lower-Income HHs 
prefer Sale in groups that fall in Income, as occurs in the lowest and highest education groups. 
                                                 
32 In addition, only the least consistent Income levels – with mixed positive and negative CMEs by Education level – 
rise in Education. Three of the four Income levels designated falling in Education by 2x2 comparison quantity drops 
are larger value changes than both of the two “rises in Education” quantities (each around 60 ounces, at 3x- and 
5xPvInc). 
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This may also suggest that the income effect is stronger than the negative education effect in this 
set. There is a loose pattern of rise in average ounces by Income group from HfPvInc to 5xPvInc, 
except for an extreme dip at 4xPvInc, and a slight dip from 2x- to 3xPvInc. This also supports a 
modest claim for a positive income effect within the set. While there is no strict rise or fall in 
CME average by Education group on the left side, on the right side five of the six Income levels 
rise in Education, perhaps indicating weak dominance of the income over the education effect. 
The drive to get a deal may be overwhelming nutritional concerns, or the existing commitment to 
sCSD purchase despite nutrition awareness may find greater expression when price discounts are 
present. For CMEs in Sale, the dominant education effect for Female HHHs seems to contrast 
with a weakly dominant income effect for Male HHHs. 
For CMEs in Sale the drop in rising Income after level 2xPvInc, from College to Post 
College, offers weak evidence for Food Elite behavior in Income x Male Educ. 
Table 18c presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Race/Hispanic sub-groups, 
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the 
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Race/Hispanic levels 
across Income levels we see combined totals of the values that vary significantly, with only 6 of 
29 CMEs in Sale lower than the relatively low 5xPvIncWhite reference sub-group. Hispanic HHs 
are only slightly more responsive on average than non-Hispanic HHs to Sale, having also 
displayed the least reactivity for CMEs in Price. Other Race HHs are a bit more positive, but 
even White HHs, who host the base sub-group have an average response four times larger. Afr-
Amer HHs are a third more responsive than White HHs in average CME in Sale for the group, 
with notably high responsiveness for HfPvInc (311), which is twice the next nearest Afr-Amer 
CME in Sale (156). Asian HH’s display the most extreme reaction of any group in any CME 
196 
comparison, with the lowest CME (439 for 1xPvInc) being nearly half again the next highest 
non-Asian CME in the table (311 in Afr-Amer). The CME in Sale for 3xPvInc Asian is three 
times the next nearest non-Asian CME in the table. Asian HHs are extremely positive in Sale. 
CMEs in Sale that fall in Income depict lower-Income HHs as preferring Sale more than higher-
Income HHs. All racial groups rise in Income by 2x2 comparison, except for Other Race and 
Afr-Amer HHs, the latter driven by the relatively large HfPvInc CME. Except for Hispanic HHs, 
there is an exceptionally large quantity preference in HfPvInc versus 1xPvInc across racial 
groups (the largest in every Race group but Asian) – meaning that the lowest-Income HHs have 
strong positive Sale responses. This same HfPvInc group in contrast with 1xPvInc for CMEs in 
Price was relatively unresponsive, so the poorest HHs specifically seek Sale for budget 
management in sCSD purchase. The highest average on the right side is for 3xPvInc, but this is 
strongly driven by the 951-ounce Asian HH CME, the group high in 3xPvInc, and to a lesser 
extent by the strangely polar values in Hispanic HHs, the group low in HfPvInc. 
Despite the high group total for HfPvInc, the modest average drop from 4x- to 5xPvInc 
across racial groups and a comparison of the lowest two versus upper two Income level totals 
(bold) do not support an Income-based Food Elite argument. 
Table 18d presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Household Size sub-groups, 
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the 
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed HH Size levels 
across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups are in a tight range compared to the 
previous three tables, rising strictly by HH size from HHsize=1 255 to HHsize=4 651. This is a 
clear but un-insightful effect that confirms the efficacy of the data and model structure, and a 
relatively uniform Sale response in HH Size. For HH Sizes 1 and 3 lower Income HHs respond 
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more strongly to Sale, for a 2x2 result “falling in Inc.” Only HHsize=3 rises in Income in 2x2 
comparison, with HHsize=4 flat. On the right side, the HfPvIncHHsiz1 CME is relatively large 
enough to show higher Sale response for smaller HHs given a fixed level of Income of HfPvInc, 
but all other Income groups react as expected, with larger HHs having larger average CMEs in 
Sale. Across these Income levels there is no particular rise or preference, but the lower three 
Income levels average 92 ounces, a somewhat larger Sale response than the upper three Income 
levels, with their average of 84 ounces. This seems to corroborate results from the first three Sale 
CME tables here (18a–18c). 
Table 18e presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Number of Kids in HH sub-
groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding 
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncNoKids 
reference sub-group is highly responsive to Sale, with all but two of the other 22 CMEs in Sale 
negative, often buying between 2 and 8 liters less per purchase. The “falls in Inc” shows 
significant preference for Sale by lower-Income HHs versus higher in all but OneKids HHs. 
TwoKids HHs are the least responsive to Sale by a large margin, based on group averages. On 
the right side, there is no consistent rise or fall in response by Income group, and the preference 
for Sale by lower-Income HHs is not evident in a bottom-three, top-three average of Income 
group totals. Sale responsiveness oddly drops in rising # of Kids in HH in HfPv-, 3x- and 
4xPvInc groups, and fails to rise in 2xPvInc, counter to any expectation that rising HH budgetary 
pressures in rising # of Kids might provoke more Sale-seeking. For some reason HHs with fewer 
Kids tend to respond more to Sales, although reactions either way are in an extremely tight 
percentage range compared to all other 2x2 comparisons, tending to stay around 40% or less (last 
column). One explanatory hypothesis would be HHs with more Kids not buying large amounts 
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on Sale because they purchase replacement stocks on a regular schedule, not waiting for sale 
incidents to stock up.  
 Table 18f presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Female Age Level sub-groups, 
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the 
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Female Age Level 
across Income levels we see that combined totals for groups have a tempered span as HH Size 
did (-131 to 128), meaning that controlling for Sale effect, Female Age does not identify 
particularly distinctive behavior across Age group levels. But there are consistencies that appear 
having controlled for the more dynamic Education and racial group factors. Group averages rise 
strictly in Age level from -22 to 26 ounces per purchase – there is rising positive response to Sale 
in Age level. By 2x2 comparison, there is strict preference for Sale across all Fem Age groups 
among lower-Income HHs, consistent with HH Size and # of Kids tables. The right-side Age 
group averages do not rise or fall in pattern. CMEs in Sale that rise by 2x2 comparison for fixed 
Income level across Age are largest for lower-Income groups (HfPvInc 146, 2xPvInc 164, versus 
3xPvInc 7, and 4xPvInc 130). The flat 1xPvInc and falling 5xPvInc 2x2 comparison groups 
change by small margins. More experienced Female HHHs tend to prefer Sale purchases to their 
younger counterparts. 
 Table 18g presents CMEs in Sale for Income-Level by Male Age Level sub-groups, 
holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding the 
former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. For fixed Male Age Level 
across Income levels we see that combined totals strictly fall from 329 to 98, meaning that 
including any Sale effect, younger Male HHHs purchase more ounces when they buy – exactly 
opposite the case for Female HHHs across Age levels. This Age-based effect is confirmed on the 
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right side with all but the upper-most Income level falling in 2x2 comparison in rising Age. On 
the left side, the 40-50 and 50-65 Age groups purchase more in rising Income, while the younger 
groups do not. There is no strict rise or fall in Income level, but there is modest support for a 
positive income effect when comparing the three lower-Income level group averages with the 
three higher-Income level group averages. The highest-Income group has the only negative 
group average (-10), offering modest support for an Income-based Food Elite if the effect is 
measured after 4xPvInc. 
 Table 18h presents CMEs in Sale for Female HHH Education-Level by Number of Kids 
in HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, 
and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 
FmPostCollegNoKids reference sub-group is relatively low in Sale response, with only three 
lower CMEs in Sale of the other 15. Holding the # of Kids in HH fixed, there is strict rise across 
Fem HHH Educ level averages to Two Kids (17 to 177), then a drop in average of 150 ounces. 
All fixed-#-of-Kids groups fall in rising Female Educ in 2x2 comparison, indicating a consistent 
education effect, even with Sale. On the right side, Female Less HS have a group average (165) 
almost twice as high as the next nearest average (Post College 87). These highest- and lowest-
Education groups are most consistently positive in Sale response. The two lower Education 
groups together have an average (121) much higher than the two highest Education groups 
averaged together (76), indicating more Sale response in lower Education HHs. Average CME in 
Sale rises in the # of Kids for Less HS, Some College and College in much higher amounts (the 
highest being for Less HS) than HS and Post College fall in # of Kids by 2x2 comparison. The 
positive Sale effect tends on average to rise in # of Kids across all Female Educ levels, but the 
largest such effect in ounces is by far for Less HS.   
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 Table 18i presents CMEs in Sale for Male HHH Education-Level by Number of Kids in 
HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. As for Female 
Educ x # of Kids, the MPostCollegNoKids reference sub-group is relatively low in Sale 
response, with only three lower CMEs in Sale of the other 15. Averages by # of Kids group 
across Male Educ levels are fairly tight in range (119 to 131), except for a fall by half for 
ThreeKids. By 2x2 comparison, all such groups fall in Education meaning lower-educated Male 
HHHs respond more to Sale, just as for Female HHHs. (The same was true in IncomexEduc 
interaction CMEs in Sale only for Female HHs). On the right side, the lower two Education 
levels averaged together (188) are substantially higher than the higher two Education levels 
averaged together (25), meaning a clearly higher response to Sale in lower-educated Male HHH 
homes, indicative of a clear education effect. For any fixed Male Education level, there is no 
preference for Sale in rising # of Kids. As noted by CME in Sale ThreeKid HHs are relatively 
unresponsive. Response in Male College is strikingly wan (average 2 ounces) relative to other 
Education levels, but Post College (48) is also below half the next-highest group average. Male 
HHHs with HS Educ (average 211 ounces) are the big responders in Sale. 
 Table 18j presents CMEs in Sale for Female HHH Education-Level by Race/Hispanic 
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. Holding racial 
group fixed across Fem Educ levels, all full group CMEs are mixed, except Asian HHs which are 
strongly negative, nearly offsetting the extreme positive responses in Table 18c. All group 
averages by racial group are negative compared to the obviously highly responsive 
FmPostCollgEdWhite reference sub-group. White HHs are only slightly negative (-3), with Afr-
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Amer (-37) much more so, but more than an order of magnitude below Asian HHs (-712). 
Against non-Hispanic HH reactions in Sale, the CME in Sale average for Hispanic HHs is 20 
ounces less per purchase. All groups rise in response in rising Female Education, demonstrating 
that higher-educated Female HHHs value Sale purchases more. This is confirmed by averaging 
the lowest two Education group averages versus the highest two on the right side. The effect is 
opposite that noticed for Female Education in Table 18a, but seems to be of too small a 
magnitude to completely offset it. Effects must be agglomerated to full HH characteristic sets to 
tease out such answers. On the right side, the least responsive Fem Educ level across racial 
groups is Less HS (-269), and the most responsive in Sale is College (-118), with the other levels 
fairly close in average group CMEs in Sale (-191 to -199). 
 Table 18k presents CMEs in Sale for Male HHH Education-Level by Race/Hispanic sub-
groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding 
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The CME group totals and 
averages are less sharp than in 18j, with the Asian Male HHH average (-36) quite staid compared 
to the Female HHH average of -711. By 2x2 comparison, Asian Male HHHs fall in rising Educ, 
whereas the other racial groups rise as Female HHHs do, indicating that higher-educated HHHs 
prefer Sale more than lower-educated HHHs. Also, as with Female HHHs, averaging the lowest 
two Education group averages versus the highest two on the right side demonstrates the same 
effect, the lowest response to Sale by far being at the lowest level of Education. 
  
5.5.2.c    2x2 Comparisons and 2x2 Inverse Comparisons of CMEs in Advertising 
 As may be assessed by consulting Table A-3 (or the corresponding letter tables between 
Price and Advertising CME table series 17 and 19), the magnitudes of CMEs comprised of an 
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mfx-adjusted ME for a demographic-demographic sub-group and the ME for a continuous 
marketing variable ME for the same sub-group tend to be the same or smaller in Advertising 
versus Price, and for some groups, often of the same sign relative to the reference sub-group. The 
contours of analysis by set in the 19-series tables will therefore often parallel the analysis of the 
17-series tables, but there are key differences. The third phase of this analysis is presented here, 
followed by prediction tables grouped by combinations of marketing-variable CMEs in realistic 
HH characteristic configurations. 
Table 19a presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Female HHH Education-
Level sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, 
and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 
5xPvIncFmPostCollege reference sub-group is relatively low in CME in Advertising, as only 4 
of 29 values are negative, 3 of them in HfPvInc. For fixed Female Educ levels across Income 
levels we see averages of the values in an Education group that fall from 227 to 19. The fall is 
not linear, but it is mostly one-directional, save for the small rise in total from HS to Some 
College. A strictly one-directional fall in group totals on the left side would indicate an 
unambiguously strong education effect, and we almost have that here. Most of the change occurs 
in the drop between Less HS (227) and HS (107), then there is a modest rise from HS to Some 
College (114), and a then a fall of roughly half to College (65), and a further fall of roughly two-
thirds to Post College (19). The group total quantities in ounces for each group (from 1361 to 96) 
parallel the differences between groups. Thus accounting for any Advertising effect, Female 
HHHs with the lowest Education level purchase much more than any other Fem Educ group, 
with a steep drop to High School, and very clear drops in higher Education after Some College. 
Within each Fem Educ group, compared to the bottom two Income sub-groups, the top two 
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Income sub-groups purchase more by CMEs in Advertising. Thus all groups “rise in Income,” 
confirming a positive income effect.  
Given the core variable ME patterns which the marketing-variable marginal effects 
append, this pattern follows the Price reactions fairly closely. However, the severe drop in 
average CME from Less HS to HS is much smaller in Advertising, meaning a more uniform 
effect across lower Fem Educ levels, with the CME effect clearly higher for the lowest Educ 
level versus the 5xPvIncFmPostCollg reference sub-group. That the averages by group are 
higher in the first four Education-level groups is anticipated given that Price reactions should 
tend negative and Advertising reactions positive given the same reference sub-group for both. 
The strong drops in average from Less HS to HS, and from Some College to Post College may 
indicate that the positive quantity association between weekly Advertising and the same week’s 
purchase tapers sharply in effect when levels of higher critical thinking ability emerge. The fact 
that 2x2 comparison shows purchase quantities falling in Education for every Income level 
supports this hypothesis. But the result is not so simple, as by 2x2 comparison all Education 
groups rise in Income. This suggests a positive income effect that refuses unanimous evidence of 
a pure education effect for CMEs in Advertising for Female HHHs by Income and Educ levels.  
 In the right half of the table, Income level is fixed, with each level spanning Fem Educ 
levels. A strictly one-directional rise in group totals on the right side would indicate an 
unambiguously strong income effect. There is no clear rise in purchase quantity by group 
averages (-25 to 205) across the six Income levels, or even in lower-three versus upper-three 
averages across groups. Any income effect is therefore weak, with less evidence than for the 
education effect. The average fall by 2x2 comparison in Education is larger than the average rise 
by 2x2 comparison in Income, which further supports a dominant education effect reducing 
204 
purchase in rising Advertising. We know from Tables 17a and 18a that Less HS tends negative 
versus the base group, and 1xPvInc and 4xPvInc tend to be high versus the base group. The level 
totals between 17a and 19a for Income levels demonstrate parallel changes between levels 
(roughly +15-20 ounces in 19a). Comparing Advertising effect in 19a to the Price effect in 17a, 
there is no drop off from 3x- to 4x- to 5xPvInc as there was from Some College to Post College 
in average CME. Thus the clear effect in rising to the top levels of Education that reduces 
relative purchase in Advertising CME does not hold in rising to the top levels of Income. The 
Advertising effect holds fairly consistently across Income levels while there is a drop off in 
effect at upper Education levels. This indicates the negative education effect is dominant despite 
a clear positive income effect, and may support an Education-based Food Elite. Both 
observations have policy implications. 
 Table 19b presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Male HHH Education-
Level sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, 
and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 
5xPvIncMPostCollege reference sub-group is relatively high in CME in Advertising, as only 6 of 
29 values are positive, so we may first surmise that upper Income & Education Male HHHs are 
relatively more responsive to Advertising than the same elite group of Female HHHs. For fixed 
Male Educ levels across Income levels we see a steep fall between an average of the first two 
group averages (3, -65), and the top two group averages (-107, -59), demonstrating an education 
effect, although a weaker one than the near-linear drop seen in the last table. Also unlike the last 
table, this negative education effect is not undermined by any apparent positive income effect. 
Only one of the five Education levels rises in Income in 2x2 comparison, and there is no pattern 
or low-versus-high Income contrast on the right side of the table indicating an income effect. 
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Supporting the education effect on the right side, every Income level falls by 2x2 comparison in 
Education, with five of these six falls larger in magnitude than the only rise in Income on the left 
side. So as for Female HHHs, Male HHHs display a negative response in purchase and 
advertising CME in rising Education. There is no parallel support for inference of an Education-
based Food Elite.  
 Table 19c presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Race/Hispanic sub-
groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding 
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncWhite 
reference sub-group is neither high nor low in CME in Advertising, as 11 of the 22 Race CMEs 
that refer to it are positive. Hispanic HHs across Income levels are uniformly less responsive 
than non-Hispanics in CME in Advertising. As a reminder, holding the reference sub-group fixed 
for both, CMEs in Advertising should raise group averages versus CMEs in Price. Against racial 
group averages in 17c, here Hispanic HHs fall by 7 ounces, White HHs fall by 6 ounces, Other 
Race falls by 4 ounces, Asian HHs have no significant difference, and Afr-Amer HHs rise 1.5 
ounces. This result does not depict Afr-Amer HHs having a clearly positive response to 
Advertising, because both CMEs in Advertising and Price are negative relative to the base sub-
group. In fact, the relative positive means that Afr-Amer HHs are less responsive to Price 
changes than the base sub-group to a greater degree than they are less responsive to Advertising 
changes than the base sub-group. None of these results suggest strong consistent behavior 
defined by the racial group characteristic.  
Applying the same cross-table comparison to Income levels, the group average falls for 
HfPvInc (28-ounce drop) and 1x- and 3xPvInc (16- and 2-ounce drops), and rises slightly in 
5xPvInc (2 ounces), more in 4xPvInc (7 ounces), and much more in 2xPvInc (19 ounces). 
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2xPvInc seems to be the big positive responder to Advertising across all of 19c – but the effect is 
isolated, not trending through lower Income groups, as seen by the largest response, the 28-
ounce drop versus the 17c average for HfPvInc. Middle- and higher-Income HHs seem to 
respond roughly the same or more positively than lower Income HHs, evident if we now split the 
lowest two groups versus the upper four, as empirical results suggest we should. There is as yet 
no support that lower-Income HHs are more positive-quantity-purchase responsive than middle- 
or higher-Income HHs to Advertising, while there is some support that lower-educated HHHs are 
more positive in response to Advertising than higher-educated HHHs. If this holds through 
further analysis, policy implications must follow. 
Table 19d presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Household Size sub-
groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding 
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncHHsiz1 
reference sub-group is relatively low in CME in Advertising, with only one sub-group in HH 
Sizes larger than 1 having a negative CME. Against HH Size and Income group averages in 17d, 
here all fall in Advertising CME versus Price CME, except that HHsize=4, HfPvInc, and 
5xPvInc differ by only two ounces from their 17d averages. Despite the low base sub-group 
value, HH Size does not seem to be identifying a purchase response in Advertising, except for a 
counterintuitively negative move from the Price CME averages, when theory predicts a positive 
move in Advertising. Still, quantity rises by 2x2 comparison in growing HH Size at every 
Income level except HfPvInc, where it is flat. Evidence for an income effect on the left side is 
split, and is mixed on the right, except that CME average for the lower three Income levels are 
one-fifth higher when averaged (69) than the average for the top three Income levels (60), so any 
income effect is negative in Advertising. This underscores that Adv x Income x HH Size results 
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should serve to cushion any conclusions as to the effects of Advertising, a result in line with 
previous caveats about interaction with this particular variable, in its marginal “weekly” form. 
Table 19e presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Number of Kids in HH 
sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and 
holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 
5xPvIncNoKids reference sub-group is lower than other NoKids Income-level CMEs and lower-
Income CMEs for HHs with Kids, but generally higher than CMEs for higher-Income levels in 
HHs with Kids. Comparing # of Kids group averages with the averages in 17e, averages rise 
NoKids (20), One- and TwoKids (5, 15), and fall (ThreeKids -18). Only by combining the HH 
Size and # of Kids (per the prediction tables) would it be clear whether there is positive response 
in Advertising, but some of the confusing negatives in HH Size now seem reversible. All levels 
fall in Inc, meaning that lower Income HHs have higher CMEs in Advertising, the effect noted as 
missing in discussion of 19c. This again stresses that while 2-value CMEs do offer useful 
insights, only HH-realistic combinations of characteristics can overcome complexity of results 
and contrast purchase quantities with fewer caveats. The negative income effect is confirmed by 
averaging the lower three Income level averages on the right side with the upper three – lower-
Income HHs are much more responsive in CMEs in Advertising than upper-Income HHs.  
This may be an important indication of parenting styles differing for higher-Income 
HHHs, if differencing the Advertising CME averages from the Price CME averages – which 
would control for the portion of quantities independent of marketing variable interaction – 
confirm the differences. The Advertising CME Income group averages rise or fall versus the 
Price CME averages in ounces: HfPvInc (+25); 1xPvInc (+19); 2xPvInc (-7); 3xPvInc (+2); 
4xPvInc (+1); 5xPvInc(-14). When attempting to control for purchase quantities by demographic 
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sub-group without a marketing-variable-interaction effect, the lower two Income levels separate 
from the flat or negative middle- and upper-Income groups with strong positive CME averages in 
Advertising, opposite the Adv x Income x racial group set. Evidence that lowest-Income HHs do 
respond more positively to Advertising than their higher-Income counterparts is growing, and 
there is some support for purchase differences by parent HHHs between lower-Income HHs and 
middle- or upper-Income HHs. But net results remain mixed, with the negative and positive 
cross-table quantities for the lowest Income groups roughly cancelling each other out between 
racial groups and Kids in HH. Again, prediction tables are the better tool for testing hypotheses 
that include more than two HH characteristics. 
 Table 19f presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Female Age Level sub-
groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding 
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncFmAge50-65 
reference sub-group is lower than most lower Income-level CMEs and higher than two-thirds of 
the higher-Income CMEs. Comparing Fem Age group averages with the averages in 17f, 
averages rise modestly in CMEs in Advertising versus CMEs in Price: <30 (+4), 30-40 (+1), 40-
50 (+1), and 50-65 (+4).  All groups fall in Income in 2x2 comparison, indicating a stronger 
positive effect for lower- versus higher-Income HHs in Fem Age groups. Again cross-table 
comparison of averages for groups by Income levels shows the lowest two Income levels rising 
more than any other group falls. The middle- and upper-Income groups fall by around 3 ounces, 
save 3xPvInc which rises 4 ounces, versus nearly an 8-ounce rise for 1xPvInc, and 11 ounces for 
HfPvInc. Evidence that lower-Income HHs respond most positively by CMEs in Advertising 
continues to grow. All Income levels in 19f rise in Fem Age, except 1xPvInc. I offer no 
hypothesis as to why Advertising effects should rise or fall in Age once other characteristics are 
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controlled for. I do not claim this reflects cumulative Advertising effect extending beyond the 
data set. 
  Table 19g presents CMEs in Advertising for Income-Level by Male Age Level sub-
groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the table, and holding 
the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 5xPvIncMAge50-65 
reference sub-group is lower than all but 4 other CMEs. Comparing Male Age group averages 
with the averages in 17g, averages fall modestly in CMEs in Advertising versus CMEs in Price 
across all Age groups and Income levels, the smallest fall being for Male Age 40-50 (-1), and the 
largest for 4xPvInc (-8). Male Age <30 and 50-65 rise in Income by 2x2 comparison (40, 60), 
meaning larger Advertising responses in higher Incomes, and fall as all the groups in Female 
Age do, for 30-40 (-30) and 40-50 (-7). By 2x2 comparison in fixed Income level across Male 
Age level, there is a mix of three rising and three falling in Male Age, but the magnitudes of falls 
are much larger than for rises, weakly supporting a more positive Advertising effect in lower 
Income HHs. This weak inference favoring more purchase in lower-Income HHs is confirmed by 
comparing the three averages at lower Income levels versus the three highest. 
 Table 19h presents CMEs in Advertising for Female HHH Education-Level by Number 
of Kids in HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the 
table, and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 
FmPostCollgNoKids reference sub-group is relatively responsive in CME in Advertising, higher 
than all but 5 of the 19 other CMEs. Comparing # of Kids group averages with the averages in 
17h, averages fall in CMEs in Advertising versus CMEs in Price across NoKids, OneKids, and 
TwoKids (-24, -7, -13), and rise for ThreeKids (17). Given that Advertising CMEs are expected 
to rise versus Price CMEs, this is a strong negative reaction for all but the ThreeKids group. 
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Whereas in 19a all Income levels fall in rising Education, here the rise in quantity for TwoKids 
and ThreeKids in rising Education are larger in magnitude together than the falls in Education of 
NoKids and OneKids, tempering the education effect noted above. Comparing the 17h fixed 
Female Education level averages versus these, Less HS and Post College rise (+18, +13), while 
HS, Some College and College fall (-17, -16, -14), leaving no clear pattern to characterize the 
effect of Fem Educ level effect in Advertising across # of Kids. The two lower Educ levels 
together have a smaller combined average (-35) than the two highest Educ levels (-16), 
suggesting a larger Advertising effect at higher Fem Educ levels, but the magnitude of this is too 
small to offset the very large difference (roughly +165 for the lower two Educ levels, and +42 
for the higher two) in 19a. The negative Female Education effect persists despite this tempering. 
All groups rise in 2x2 comparison of effect in rising # of Kids, except HS Educ, which displays a 
larger Advertising effect with fewer Kids in HH. 
 Table 19i presents CMEs in Advertising for Male HHH Education-Level by Number of 
Kids in HH sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the 
table, and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 
MPostCollgNoKids reference sub-group is the least responsive sub-group in CME in Advertising 
by far, with every CME above +25. Comparing # of Kids group averages with the averages in 
17i, averages rise in CMEs in Advertising versus CMEs in Price across all levels, by 10 to 13 
ounces, as may be predicted, but opposite the effect in all but ThreeKids for Female Educ. 
Consistent with 19b, where all Income levels fall in rising Education, here all but ThreeKids fall 
in rising Education, confirming an education effect for CMEs in Advertising. The rise in 
ThreeKids is significant, suggesting that for this group the Advertising effect does break from 
the others and is more positive for higher-educated Male HHHs. Comparing the 17i fixed Male 
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Education level averages versus these, all groups rise except HS which falls by 7 ounces. Less 
HS and Some College rise by 20 ounces, a larger effect than the 16- and 7-ounce rises for 
College and Post-College, again supporting a negative quantity effect in rising Male Education 
for CMEs in Advertising. By 2x2 comparison on the right side of the table, the rises and falls in 
rising # of Kids are mixed, in the 20-30 ounce range, suggesting little, just as for Female Educ 
levels in the same comparison. 
 Table 19j presents CMEs in Advertising for Female HHH Education-Level by 
Race/Hispanic sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the 
table, and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 
FmPostCollgWhite reference sub-group is relatively neutral in CME in Advertising, lower than 
most values in White and Afr-Amer, but far greater than CMEs in Asian. Comparing racial 
group averages with the averages in 17j, here White HHs rise slightly (+1), Afr-Amer HHs fall 
by 5 ounces (over half given the low magnitude in Price), Other Race is flat (one CME), and 
Asian HHs rise by 6 ounces, or around 2%. Hispanic HHs fall slightly (-1). So only Asian HHs 
rise slightly in Advertising reactivity versus Price reactivity compared to the base sub-group. All 
racial groups rise in Education by 2x2 comparison, undermining previous results supporting a 
negative education effect in Advertising. Holding racial group fixed across Fem Educ levels, the 
differences from group averages in 17j are small, ranging from -7 ounces for Less HS, to +5 
ounces for College, with the other differences in the 1-to-2 range plus or minus. The results 
slightly favor a positive effect in rising Education, but not enough to upset previous findings.  
 Table 19k presents CMEs in Advertising for Male HHH Education-Level by 
Race/Hispanic sub-groups, holding the latter fixed over a span of the former in the left half of the 
table, and holding the former fixed over a span of the latter in the right half of the table. The 
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MPostCollgWhite reference sub-group is relatively high in CME in Advertising, higher than all 
but 3 CMEs of the 15 others in Race. Comparing racial group averages with the averages in 17k, 
here White HHs rise slightly (+2), Afr-Amer HHs fall by 4 ounces, Other Race falls by half (12 
ounces, one CME), and Asian HHs fall by 13 ounces. Hispanic HHs rise slightly (3). By 2x2 
comparison, Asian and Hispanic HHs fall in rising Educ, whereas Afr-Amer HHs react more in 
Advertising with rising level of Education, and the White difference is not significant. Holding 
racial group fixed across Male Educ levels, the differences from group averages in 17k are 
mixed, ranging from  -16 ounces for Less HS, to -3 and -4 for HS, Some College, and Post 
College, and +6 for College. The results favor a positive effect in rising Education a bit stronger 
than for Female HHHs, but as for Female Educ across racial groups, not enough to upset 
previous support for a negative education effect. 
 
5.5.3    Prediction – REFINED, Combined Marginal Effects Tables 
 For the BASIC and BROAD models, prediction tables for CME in Price were presented 
for demonstration. REFINED prediction tables will be presented for CMEs in all three marketing 
variables. Prediction from estimation should provide a more dynamic range as variables become 
more narrowly defined and the averaging of effect occurs over less broadly defined distributions. 
The span in predicted weekly purchase amounts in ounces for the HHsize=4 BASIC prediction 
for CMEs in Price (Table 10a) was 148, as expected wider than the 121 from Table 3 data 
averages on positive purchase weeks, yet still fairly narrow. In 15a, the BROAD model 
prediction table for CMEs in Price, the span was 222, much more flexible than the BASIC 
prediction range for the same HH profile. The spans for REFINED HHsize=4 in the Price tables 
is 616, for HHsize=4 in the Advertising tables is 655, and for HHsize=4 in the Sale tables is 664 
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– all far more flexible than previous specifications. Expanding from even the BROAD prediction 
tables, there are now a number of cells over 350, incidences over 550, and cells with values less 
than one hundred, and even negative, of course all still relative to the reference characteristic 
assumptions. All extreme-type values are marked in all prediction tables: 25%-shaded totals are 
350+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals 
are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
 Much more of the dynamics of behavior between different HH types is captured in the 
REFINED specification. The shackles of strict incremental rise or fall between Income or 
Education level are gone, as are the fixed increments between racial groups regardless of Income 
or Education level. Each sub-group reacts independently of other sub-groups, even if they share 
common elements. Responses different from base-group assumptions stand now in sharper relief. 
 
5.5.3.a    Prediction – REFINED, Combined Marginal Effects Tables in Price 
Table 20a presents household-realistic predictions of purchase response by demographic 
group and that group’s reaction to a rise in Price (“CMEs in Price”) relative to a reference sub-
group. Every cell holds fixed HHsize=4, # of Kids=2, Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the 
constant is added, as for the first prediction tables in BASIC and BROAD. Cells differ by 
Income level, Education level, and racial group, depending on their placement in the grid. The 
unique combination of reference-group assumptions to which all the cells are relative is not a 
combination presented in any of the prediction table configurations: 5xPvInc, (Fem/Male) Post 
College, White, Non-Hispanic, HH Size=1, No Kids, (Fem/Male) Age 50-65. The reference 
group for season, “spring” is assumed. Changing the season to summer would raise every cell 
value by 26.7 ounces.  
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In the first BROAD model CME in Price table, there were eight (25%-)shaded cells, 
demonstrating high predicted purchase for the lowest Income level, but more strongly predicting 
high purchase for the lowest Education level across fixed Income levels 1xPvInc and 4xPvInc. 
None of the shaded cells were in the Hispanic columns. Here in 20a, 19 of the 88 cells are over 
350 ounces in purchase. By percentage of cells in (half-)column or (half-)row, Hispanics (vs. 
non-Hispanics) are the big purchasers when accounting for reaction to higher Price. This was not 
clear looking at isolated MEs, and certainly not clear at the BASIC and BROAD levels (nor does 
it hold for all three marketing variable prediction table sets). There is a clear insensitivity to Price 
in Hispanic HHs that was not as perceptible in less sophisticated specifications.  
Next by percentage in column or row it is clear that Less High School HHs are least 
Price-sensitive of the Education levels, with HS a distant second: lower Education HHHs are 
least Price-sensitive. Even the Price-insensitive Hispanic HH reaction strictly becomes less 
positive in rising Education in the bottom half of the table (without falling from HS to Some 
College at 4xPvInc). Hispanic HS Ed has 4 of 6 Income levels 25%-shaded, and Hispanic 
College has but 1 of 6. This is a gradient display of the rough effect evident across the top half of 
the table where every corresponding cell quantity drops from HS Ed to College Ed. 
Next by percentage in column or row are HfPvInc x HS Ed (3 of 4), and 5xPvInc x HS 
Ed (3 of 4), both in the upper-left quadrant. Both Income levels are insensitive to Price, but the 
average of the four cells at HfPvInc is over 20 ounces higher than the 5xPvInc average (377 
versus 355). 1x- and 2xPvInc each have 2 cells over 350 across the row, whereas 3x- and 
4xPvInc do not. Lower-Income HHs are less Price sensitive than middle-Income HHs, but not 
less Price-sensitive than upper-Income HHs ($100k/yr+). Perhaps the upper Income HHs no 
longer consider sCSDs to be a portion of the HH budget worthy of concern, or perhaps they do 
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not let Price increases on so small a budgetary item affect their purchase schedule or purchase 
whims as middle-Income HHs relatively seem to. It is possible that the lower-Income HHs 
behavior is not economically rational, because it is so much less Price responsive than the 
reference sub-group. This might indicate habitual behavior trumping economic behavior. It is 
also possible that the behavior is rational in buying more at a higher relative price, because the 
higher margin paid is less than the search cost of matching a lower price given a pre-existing 
commitment to purchase. 
Next by percentage in column or row is White in HS Ed (3 of 6), whose cell values are 
higher than Afr-Amer at every row in the table, so White HHs are less Price sensitive than Afr 
Amer HHs. There are a few values for single MEs in Income and Education x racial group where 
Afr-Amer MEs are higher or very close, but these have all been overturned because Afr-Amer 
HHs are generally more Price-sensitive than White HHs. White HHs are less Price-sensitive than 
Asian HHs at lower Income levels, and more Price-sensitive at higher levels. Asian HHs are 
exceptionally Price sensitive for the lower three Income levels at fixed College Education, and at 
the upper three education levels in fixed 1xPvInc, falling below 100 in these combinations (for 6 
cells in Asian <100 ounces, the 10%-shaded cells, with one duplicate). At the higher fixed level of 
Income, Hispanic HHs have an extreme taper in higher Education levels, generating the only 
other sub-100 CME in 20a. The combination of high Income and high Education triggers a 
reversal of purchase response in Hispanic HHs from the highest value in the table at Less HS 
1xPvInc, to one of the lowest in the table at 4xPvInc Post College. Comparing changes in Income 
level versus changes in Education level in Hispanic half-columns, the education effect is the 
stronger driver of this extreme taper in predicted quantity. 
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Moving now from the prevalence of exceptional predicted quantities to within- and cross-
quadrant analysis, in fixed HS Ed & fixed College Ed across Income levels (top half of table) all 
racial group HHs are less Price sensitive (have higher average quantities) at the lower three 
Incomes than the higher three, except Asian HHs. This may indicate stronger habit in purchase 
behavior or reduced access to price-competitive purchase venues. In Price sensitivity, the income 
effect is negative for all racial group HHs but Asian HHs. Asian HHs are more sensitive to Price 
at higher education levels, and far less sensitive at either lower education levels or higher (top 
three) Income levels. Separating sex of HHH will provide more evidence to analyze this 
apparently anomalous Asian HH behavior. By Income-level-racial-group combination, every 
CME is greater in HS (top-left) than College (top-right), with drops of 150 ounces common, 
strongly underscoring an education effect. There are 10 CMEs in fixed HS over 350, but only 1 
in fixed College. Averaging the values in the top-left (HS) quadrant and subtracting the average 
from the top-right (College) quadrant, HS-educated HHs buy 114 more ounces when they buy 
than do College-educated HHs.  
In the lower-left quadrant there is a strong education effect, but short of a strict fall in 
CME in Price for any racial group but Hispanic. In the lower-right quadrant, there is also a 
strong education effect, but short of a strict fall in CME in Price for any racial group but White, 
with a plateau between two Hispanic Educ levels. All racial groups have much higher CMEs 
comparing the lowest two Educ levels to the top two, for 1x- or 4xPvInc quadrants (the gap is 
smaller in Afr-Amer at 4xPvInc). 
The difference in averages between these two bottom quadrants is HHs with poverty-
level-Income for a family of four buying 57 more ounces at purchase than HHs with Incomes 
four times the poverty-level-Income for a family of four. If the HS-to-College gap can be directly 
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compared to a 4-times-HH-Income gap, we can say by these differences in average that the 
education effect in HHs with both sexes of HHHs is dominant, nearly twice the income effect on 
purchase – and that is allowing that the income effect in Price is negative, the reverse of 
economic expectation (i.e., in the same direction as the education effect). 
In fixed Educ level across Income levels (top half), the first observation is that the effect 
across Income levels is certainly not linear, and in fact peaks in the HS quadrant at three different 
Income levels for four racial groups. This is a strong indictment of the validity of the BASIC 
model, and questions the soundness of the BROAD model. Across the rows, every racial group 
except Asian HHs falls significantly in CME value from 2x- to 3xPvInc, and from 3x- to 4xPvInc, 
and every group including Asian HHs rises significantly from 4x- to 5xPvInc. White and Afr-
Amer HHs fall significantly from HfPv- to 1xPvInc, but Asian and Hispanic HHs do not. Except 
Hispanic HHs all racial groups rise in CME from 1xPvInc to 2xPvInc. The middle Income levels 
seem most Price reactive (fewest 25%-shaded boxes in these rows in top half). There is a twist to 
the argument for an unexpectedly negative income effect. Splitting the three lower-Income-level 
HHs as a separate group from the three upper-Income-level HHs, there is a positive income effect 
within the three-level Income groupings for White and Afr-Amer HHs at either fixed education 
level, and for Hispanics at the College level. This suggests a possible spline in behavior between 
the lower groups and upper groups in Income for certain racial groups. 
Which racial group buys most by quadrant and overall when accounting specifically for 
Price reactivity in the HHsize=4 combination? For the left quadrants (HS and 1xPvInc) Hispanic 
HHs buy more than White HHs. The most reactive is Afr-Amer HHs in HS Ed, and Asian HHs in 
1xPvInc (see Table 20d33
                                                 
33 Table numbering order built for parallel numbering between Tables 10a,b,&c; 15a,b,&c; etc. 
). For the right quadrants (College and 4xPvInc): White HHs are less 
reactive than Hispanic HHs, with Asian HHs most reactive in College Ed, and Afr-Amer HHs 
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most reactive in 4xPvInc. Table-wide highest-to-lowest cell average (least to most Price reactive 
in predicted purchase): Hispanic, White, Afr-Amer, Asian. Relative to a common reference sub-
group, Asian HHs seem the most economically rational in Price reaction, and Hispanic HHs least. 
Table 20b (as 10b and 15b before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Female 
ONLY HHHs. There are now only four cells over 350 ounces, and twice as many values under 
100 ounces, in addition to the first four negative-value cells. Whereas the HHsize=4 table-wide 
span was 616 ounces, the table-wide span here has shrunk to (402-[-65]=) 467 ounces, meaning 
that Female HHHs are less different in their Price response than dual-sexed HHH households. In 
HHsize=4, Hispanics were the least responsive group. Now Hispanic HHs (2 of 22) are second to 
HfPvInc x HS Ed (3 of 4, with HfPvInc in fixed College also relatively high) as least responsive 
to Price rises. As in HHsize=4, Hispanic HHs at the three lowest Income levels tend to have high 
relative values, as do Hispanic HHs across all Education levels in 1xPvInc. The average for the 
first column Hispanic (fixed HS and fixed 1xPvInc, 255) is slightly higher than the HfPvInc 
average cross fixed HS and College Educ levels (251). Less HS was second highest by cell values 
after Hispanic HHs before, and remains high in fixed 4xPvInc, but not very high in fixed 1xPvInc. 
Asian HHs with Female only HHHs are now by far the most responsive in Price of any group, 
having only 6 of 22 cells across the four half-columns over 100 ounces, and four cells more 
responsive than the base sub-group (with one duplicate). For Female HHHs with Two Kids, Asian 
HHs are the most responsive in Price, Hispanic HHs the least, and the difference between White 
and Afr-Amer remains significant, but has narrowed considerably from HHsize=4. 
As in the HHsize=4 table, across Income levels there is obviously no linear trend, and the 
lowest three Income groups are much less responsive – have higher cell values – than the higher 
three Income levels (3x3 comparison). The exception is for Asian fixed College, for which there 
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is a clear reversal of this rule. All but Asian HHs rise from 3x- to 4xPvInc. Except for White (and 
arguably Afr-Amers) HHs in fixed College, there is a large rise in ounces from 4x- to 5xPvInc, so 
the clearly lower levels for the upper versus lower three Income levels does not pre-sage an 
argument for an Income-based Food Elite.  
All racial groups fall in 2x2 comparison of lowest to highest Education levels, except for 
fixed 1xPvInc Asian HHs, and a flatness in Afr-Amer at 4xPvInc. This indicates a solid 
education effect. But whereas in 20a the span in ounces between lowest and highest Educ levels 
(lower half) was much larger than the span in ounces across Income levels (upper half), this is no 
longer true in Female only HHHs. Again, the Female only HHHs are outside of HfPvInc more 
price-responsive than both-sexed HHHs, but the income effect presents stronger than before, 
larger than the education effect in at least this measure. Comparing the 1xPvInc quadrant to the 
4xPvInc quadrant shows a rise in CME cell values in the three Race groups, further supporting a 
stronger income versus education effect in Female HHHs. For Hispanic HHs, the negative 
income effect observed in 20a still holds. 
Comparing cell values in the HS quadrant versus the fixed College quadrant, values 
uniformly fall for White and Afr-Amer HHs, indicating a solid education effect, but tend to rise 
for Asian and Hispanic HHs, failing to support an education effect in this comparative 
dimension. Aside from Asian HHs at 1xPvInc, which are already highly responsive in Price, and 
Afr-Amer HHs also in 1xPvInc, there is a strong percentage drop off from College to Post 
College, perhaps supporting an inference of an Education-based Food Elite. The exception to the 
rule for higher-Income highest-education Afr-Amer Female HHHs – who only in Post College 
have the highest value across the racial groups – may suggest a sub-cultural influence that could 
make information-based policy mechanisms insufficient for some sub-groups. 
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In Table 20d for Female only HHH households, the order of totals by racial group across 
the table remains as for 20a: Hispanic, White, Afr-Amer, Asian. But in contrast Asian Female 
HHHs are most responsive in every quadrant, by a large margin (differences row), and Hispanic 
Female HHHs are relatively even less Price reactive than in dual-sexed HHH households, 
dominating 3 of the 4 quadrants. This has policy implications. 
Table 20c (as 10c and 15c before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Male ONLY 
HHHs. Whereas the HHsize=4 table-wide span was 616 ounces, and the 20b table-wide span was 
467 ounces, Male HHHs vary from highest-Income Asian HHs (707), to highest-Education 
Hispanic HHs (38), for a table-wide span of 669, meaning Male HHHs differ more in their Price 
responses than dual-sexed or Female only HHH households.  
The striking result is that where before Asian Female HHHs were extremely Price 
reactive, Asian Male HHHs are the least Price reactive of any group in the 20-series prediction 
tables, with only 6 of 22 cells below 350, and four of these are paired duplicates, one pair at 349. 
They are much more Price responsive at the higher two levels of education (2x2 and fixed 
College versus fixed HS), but nonetheless display the first very strong positive income effect 
(3x3) yet seen. The only other 350+-ounce cells are at lower Income and lower Education levels 
for Hispanic HHs. The other racial groups join Asian in a clear negative education effect in 2x2 
comparison (Less HS and HS versus College and Post College, lower half). While not uniformly 
falling cell-by-cell between fixed HS and fixed College across Income levels and racial groups, 
Male HHHs more consistently fall for this fixed incremental rise in Education than do Female 
HHHs, demonstrating a solid education effect (weakest at HfPvInc). All racial groups in Male 
HHH fall from HS to Some College, and all fall from College to Post College (except Asian at 
4xPvInc, to a level well below Less HS and HS), further supporting an education effect.  
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Except for Asian HHs, racial groups fall in the upper three Income levels versus the 
lower three. Mixed results across quadrants and racial groups do not suggest that the education or 
income effect clearly dominates the other in magnitude, but the results are more mixed when 
trying to assess a strong income effect (comparing the lower-left to lower-right quadrants), 
giving the edge to the more stable education effect. 
In Table 20d there is a strong turn in which racial group is least responsive to Price rise. 
For Male only HHHs, now Asian HHs stand apart as by far the least responsive in every 
quadrant, and overall, and Afr-Amer HHs stand apart as by far the most responsive to Price rise. 
The increment between the Asian total across cells and the second-least responsive Hispanic 
total (differences, 5257) is larger than the Hispanic total (4946). Asian Male only HHHs do not 
care about Price rises, Afr-Amer Male only HHHs do. Hispanic and White HHs are closer in 
behavior by this measure to Afr-Amer HHs than to Asian HHs. 
 
5.5.3.b    Prediction – REFINED, Combined Marginal Effects Tables in Sale 
Table 21a holds fixed the same variables as 20a (15a, and 10a): HHsize=4, # of Kids=2, 
Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the constant is added in every cell. Cells again differ by 
Income level, Education level, and racial group, depending on their placement in the grid, and 
refer to the same reference-group assumptions as before: 5xPvInc, (Fem/Male) Post College, 
White, Non-Hispanic, HH Size=1, No Kids, (Fem/Male) Age 50-65. The reference group for 
season, “spring” is assumed. The difference between 21a and 20a is that the variable and 
variable-interacted-with-marketing-variable (2-value) MEs that are combined to make cell values 
use the Sale marketing variable instead of the Price marketing variable. 
In 20a, 19 of the 88 cells are over 350 ounces in purchase with Price reaction. Here, 16 of 
the 88 cells are over 350 ounces in purchase, and again six different values (including less than 
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zero, and one duplicate) are less than 100 ounces. This may suggest that there is more uniformity 
in reaction versus the reference sub-group than there was in the Price table (20a). This hypothesis 
may be tested. Statistics characterizing the figures in the two tables do not support that the Price 
table is more variable. The table-wide span in Sale of 662 is higher than the span in Price (616), 
and in Sale the table-wide cell average is 258 (st. dev. 118), not closer to zero than the Price 
table-wide average of 253 (st. dev. 112). Sale reactions may be more uniform in parts of the 
table, but the claim cannot be generalized. HHs are at least as reactive in response to Sale as in 
response to Price, possibly more reactive. 
By percentage of cells in (half-)column or (half-)row, the entire Less HS row (6 of 8 cells 
over 350 ounces) is the most reactive to Sale. There is further a fairly severe drop in magnitude 
in the transition to the HS row, across racial groups in fixed 1x- and 4xPvInc, emphasizing the 
extremity of the Less HS reaction. Given the large-magnitude negative MEs on Sale interaction 
Less HS variables in Table A-3, this result was not clear before prediction analysis. 
HfPvInc in fixed HS (3 of 4) is nearly as strong, but the one value under 350 is less than 
100, whereas in Less HS the un-shaded cells were still half-column highs or proximal. For fixed 
College Ed, HfPvInc is the high value for White and Afr-Amer HHs (making the full HfPvInc 
row 4 of 8). So the least Educated and lowest Income as groups are most responsive to Sale. 
The next strongest reaction to Sale by percentage in column or row is Asian in fixed HS 
Educ (4 of 6). For this same group there is a strong positive (3x3) income effect, but dropping 
down to the lower-left quadrant for Asians with fixed 1xPvInc across Education levels, there is a 
strong (2x2) education effect as well, arguably stronger. The income effect in Asian HHs is also 
apparent comparing the two lower-education cell values across the two lower quadrants, where 
there is a rise to values over 350+, but indeed across all Education levels. The parallel 
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comparison of the jump from fixed HS to fixed College across Income levels of Asian HHs also 
reveals a strong education effect. Asian HHsize=4 simply display both effects strongly.     
Next by percentage in column or row are White HHs, with 5 350+ cells of their 22. 
Outside of these high-value cells White HH cells in Income and Education level remain larger 
than Afr-Amer and Hispanic HHs across the board, with no sub-100-ounce cells. White HHs 
follow lower-educated and higher-income Asian HHs in Sale response. Higher-educated Asian 
and Hispanic HHs are least reactive to Sale across racial groups, especially at the lower three 
Income levels. 
Moving now from the prevalence of exceptional predicted quantities to within- and cross-
quadrant analysis, in fixed HS Ed & fixed College Ed across Income levels (top half of table) all 
sub-groups are less responsive to Sale except White 1xPvInc HHs, indicating a solid education 
effect. All racial groups fall in 2x2 comparison of Education levels in fixed 1x- and 4xPvInc, 
further cementing an education effect (overall fall in purchase quantity including Sale response). 
Discernible income effects are less consistent. White and Afr-Amer HHs fall in bottom-
three versus top-three Income level comparison in fixed HS and College, while Asian and 
Hispanic HHs rise in both Educ levels. Across Education levels in the lower quadrants the move 
from 1x- to 4xPvInc demonstrates mixed, low-magnitude changes for White HHs, falls in Afr-
Amer and Hispanic HHs, but sharp rises in Asian HHs. There is not a consistent income effect 
that applies across racial groups or across Educ levels. Across racial groups, consistency gives 
the edge to the education effect over the income effect, but this is a weaker claim for Asian HHs.    
Which racial group buys most by quadrant and overall when accounting specifically for 
Sale reactivity in the HHsize=4 combination? For the fixed HS Educ and fixed 4xPvInc 
224 
quadrants Asian HHs buy more than White HHs (see Table 21d34
Table 21b (as 10b, 15b, and 20b before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for 
Female ONLY HHHs. There are now only 6 cells over 350 ounces, and subtracting duplicates, 
three times as many values under 100 ounces, in addition to twice as many negative-value cells. 
The table-wide average in Sale for this configuration is 192 (st. dev. 113), lower and tighter than 
for HHsize=4 (258, st. dev. 118) in 21a. Sale reactions are more uniform in Female only HHH 
households than in dual-sexed HHH households.  
). For the fixed College Educ 
and fixed 1xPvInc quadrants White HHs buy more than Asian HHs. Across all four quadrants of 
21a, White HHs are the most reactive to Sale, followed by Asian HHs, and Hispanic HHs are the 
least reactive. Hispanic HH reaction is second highest at the 1xPvInc level. 
The Less HS Educ level (first row in bottom half) was highest in HHsize=4, and for 
nearly every half-column in Female only HHH, the Less HS values remain at or near the highest 
value in the half-column. But the large purchase responders to Sale in Female HHH only HHs 
are in the HfPvInc level (top row). There are large value drops from the Less HS to the HS row, 
and from the HfPvInc to the 1xPvInc row, so these more extreme levels do not reflect end points 
on continua of strict rise or fall in either Income or Education. As for 21a, comparing the lower 3 
Income levels to the higher 3, White and Afr-Amer HHs fall in average quantity by rising 
Income type (a negative income effect), and Asian and Hispanic HHs rise in response 
considering Sale effect in the higher Income type (a positive income effect). Across racial groups 
and education levels moving from fixed 1xPvInc to 4xPvInc, White and Asian HHs rise in 
quantity, demonstrating a positive expected income effect, but Afr-Amer and Hispanic HHs fall 
in quantity for this fixed rise in Income. Given these two assessments of an income effect, only 
                                                 
34 Table numbering order built for parallel numbering between Tables 10a,b,&c; 15a,b,&c; etc. The racial group 
columns are maintained in the same order as for 20a, set from highest to lowest in total quantity across the table. For 
ease of comparison, the 20a column order is maintained across the “d-series” racial group tables. 
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Asian HHs clearly demonstrate a positive income effect for CMEs in Sale, with other racial 
groups rising in one comparison and falling in the other. 
There is a nearly cell-by-cell rise across racial and Income groups moving from fixed HS 
to fixed College Education – a reverse education effect perhaps indicating a “common sense” 
approach to buying more on Sale of a good to which purchase commitment has already been 
made. For 2x2 comparison in the lower half of the table, lower-educated HHs tend to purchase 
more than higher-educated HHs, except for Asian Female HHs in 1xPvInc. There is a weak 
education effect that is not confirmed by both measures. Neither the income nor the education 
effect seems dominant in its expected direction in this configuration. 
Female only HHH Asian HHs are exceptional in having much lower reaction to Sale than 
the White-5xPvInc-PostCollegeEd reference sub-group across 3 of the 5 Education levels and two 
of the lower Income levels in fixed HS Ed, but much higher than average reaction for HfPvInc 
and 3xPvInc in fixed College level. The combination of low Income and lower Education level in 
female-headed Asian HHs seems to sap responsiveness to Sale. In the lower left quadrant (fixed 
1xPvInc), the three lower Education levels for Asian HHs are lower in value than for White HHs, 
while at the other end of the spectrum in the Income-education combination, the two higher Ed 
levels are much higher relative to any other racial group in fixed 4xPvInc. The positive Sale 
reaction arises with higher Education level. The many negative cell values across the Female 
ONLY HHH tables in the REFINED model indicate lower purchase overall for this group. 
In Table 21d, for Female only HHH, we find the only sub-table of any in the d-series 
dominated by Afr-Amer HHs. By table-wide totals, there is a significantly larger preference for 
Sale purchase in female-headed Afr-Amer HHs than any other, followed about one-tenth less by 
White HHs, about 40% less by Asian HHs, and about 50% less by Hispanic HHs (differences). 
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Table 21c (as 10c, 15c, and 20c before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Male 
ONLY HHHs. There are now 22 cells over 350 ounces, but all in one racial group, and over 20 
values under 100 ounces, in addition to 21 negative-value cells. The table-wide average in Sale 
for this configuration is 206 (st. dev. 329), a much wider span than for HHsize=4 (258, st. dev. 
118) in 21a. Sale reactions are far less uniform in Male only HHH households than in dual-sexed 
HHH households or Female only HHH households. 
The striking result is that where before Asian Female HHHs tended to be low-responsive 
to Sale outside of certain Income levels in College Education, every Male HHH cell is over 350 
ounces, and 17 of the 22 Asian cells are over 550 ounces, with two of these over 1000 ounces. 
Asian Male HHHs are extremely reactive to Sale compared to the common base sub-group, 
when all other racial groups together tend in any half-column to have some or most values less 
than 100 ounces. In the HS Ed and 4xPvInc quadrants every Asian Male HH value is above 550, 
with a higher average in HS Ed than in 4xPvInc. The magnitudes are stronger by far at the two 
lowest Education levels than the two highest (2x2) for Asian HHs in the bottom half of the table, 
and this holds for other racial groups at fixed 1xPvInc and 4xPvInc (except not strongly for Afr-
Amer HHs at the higher fixed Income level). Except for White HfPvInc HHs, all cell values fall 
across racial groups and Income levels from the fixed HS to the fixed College quadrant, so there 
is clearly a negative education effect in Male HHH households.  
As with Female only HHHs, White and Afr-Amer HH quantities fall from the lowest three 
Income levels to the upper three (indicating a negative income effect), whereas Asian and 
Hispanic quantities rise in the same 3x3 comparison, for a positive income effect. Comparing the 
fixed 1x- to 4xPvInc cells across racial groups and Education levels, White, Afr-Amer, and 
Hispanic HHs all fall in quantity at the higher Income level, with only Asian HHs rising, and by a 
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substantial amount. So White and Afr-Amer HHs demonstrate negative income effects, Hispanic 
is split in the two measures, and Asian HHs have a strong positive income effect. As for Female 
only HHHs, only Asian HHs show strong education and income effects, with neither clearly 
dominant. For the remaining racial groups, the relatively high values at Less HS tend to push the 
result that the general education effect weakly dominates the general negative income effect. The 
dominance cannot be more than weak, because in the move from the College to Post College row, 
every racial group rises in quantity, as all but White College Ed do from 4xPvInc to 5xPvInc. The 
income effect seems to dominate the education effect at the highest transitions in Income and 
Education level in Male only HHH households. 
Also worthy of note are the particularly negative responses to presence of Sale in fixed 
College Ed and fixed 4xPvInc for Afr-Amer and Hispanic HHs relative to reference sub-groups. 
This either suggests non-economic behavior, which could indicate strongly habitual purchase, or 
a lack of access to shopping venues likely to honor national or DMA-wide sales strategies by 
manufacturers. 
In Table 21d there is a strong turn from 21a and 21b in which racial group is most 
responsive to presence of Sale. These are the most obvious results of this kind. Asian HHs 
dominate in every quadrant, followed by White HHs in every quadrant, with Afr-Amers more 
responsive than Hispanic HHs in the fixed Education quadrants, and less responsive than 
Hispanic HHs in the fixed Income quadrants. For Male only HHHs, Asian HH table totals dwarf 
table totals for White HHs by over 14,000 CME ounces (differences), with White HHs more than 
900 CME ounces over the Afr-Amer and Hispanic HH totals. Hispanic and Afr-Amer HHs are 
least responsive in purchase to presence of Sale, with White HHs far more responsive table-wide, 
and Asian HHs in a class by themselves in extremely strong Sale purchase. To re-iterate an 
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earlier point, any of these racial groups may buy more or less often than another. These CMEs 
are constructed from final OLS-side Heckman regression results on positive purchase. 
 
5.5.3.c    Prediction – REFINED, Combined Marginal Effects Tables in Advertising 
Table 22a holds fixed the same variables as 20a (and 10a, 15a): HHsize=4, # of Kids=2, 
Age of HHHs Fem/Male=40-50, and the constant is added in every cell. Cells again differ by 
Income level, Education level, and racial group, depending on their placement in the grid, and 
refer to the same reference-group assumptions as before: 5xPvInc, (Fem/Male) Post College, 
White, Non-Hispanic, HH Size=1, No Kids, (Fem/Male) Age 50-65. The reference group for 
season, “spring” is assumed. The difference between 22a and 20a (21a) is that the variable and 
variable-interacted-with-marketing-variable (2-value) MEs that are combined to make cell values 
use the Advertising marketing variable instead of the Price (Sale) marketing variable. 
In 20a, 19 of the 88 cells are over 350 ounces in purchase with Price reaction. Here, 21 of 
the 88 cells are over 350 ounces in purchase, and again six different values (including one 
duplicate) are less than 100 ounces. The table-wide span in Advertising of 655 is higher than the 
span in Price (616), and in Advertising the table-wide cell average is 269 (st. dev. 116), not 
closer to zero than the Price table-wide average of 253 (st. dev. 112). In this configuration, HHs 
are at least as reactive in response to Advertising as in response to Price, possibly more reactive. 
This result refutes any original conjecture that this data configuration and method were unlikely 
to identify an Advertising response in weekly purchase of interesting magnitude. 
By percentage of cells in (half-)column or (half-)row, the entire Less HS row (6 of 8 cells 
over 350 ounces) is the most reactive to Advertising, with the lower-Income Hispanic cell over 
550 ounces. The lowest Education level is the most responsive in purchase to Advertising versus 
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the reference sub-group. In fixed HS Ed, HfPvInc and 2xPvInc both have 3 of 4 cells over 350 
ounces. Lower Income levels are more responsive to Advertising (the average for 1xPvInc in this 
half-row is 340, versus the 342 for 2xPvInc).  
The next strongest reaction to Advertising by percentage in column or row is the left-
hand side Hispanic column, covering the lowest Educ and Income levels, fixed HS Ed and fixed 
1xPvInc (8 of 11). The 550+ value is where the lowest Educ and Income levels cross in Hispanic. 
With 3 of 6 cells over 350 ounces, White HHs with fixed HS Ed across Income levels are also 
relatively responsive to Advertising versus other groups in the table. 
Moving now from the prevalence of exceptional predicted quantities to within- and cross-
quadrant analysis, in fixed HS Ed & fixed College Ed across Income levels (top half of table) all 
racial group HHs are more Advertising sensitive (have higher average quantities) at the lower 
three Incomes than the higher three (3x3), except Asian HHs. The difference is not large for 
White and Afr-Amer HHs in fixed College. In Advertising, non-Asian lower-Income HHs 
respond more to Advertising than upper-Income HHs. The income effect is negative for all racial 
group HHs but Asian HHs. The same effect is weakly corroborated comparing the 1xPvInc bloc 
to the 4xPvInc bloc, where cell-by-cell across the same Education-level-Income-group 
combinations most but not all values fall from the lower to the higher fixed-Income-level 
quadrant. These drops are mixed across Education levels in White and Afr-Amer and Asian HHs, 
but are over 200 ounces for each Education level in Hispanic. 1xPvInc Hispanic HHs are much 
more responsive to Advertising than 4xPvInc Hispanic HHs, or indeed any other sub-group, by a 
significant margin. It is worth noting that this very strong effect strictly falls in rising Education 
level for the 1xPvInc Hispanic sub-group, ending at about half the quantity response in Post 
College than at Less HS. At 4xPvInc the drop in purchase from Less HS to Post College in 
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Hispanic is also over 300 ounces per purchase. As the income effect for this very responsive 
group is negative, the education effect dominates any positive income effect.  
This same story plays out for 2x2 comparison of Education levels across the fixed 
Income quadrants, even for Asian HHs, so the education effect tempering Advertising-associated 
purchase quantity dominates any positive income effect across all racial groups. This claim is 
weaker for Asian HHs than for others, but numerically, the HS Ed quadrant average is 112 
ounces higher than the College Ed quadrant average, while the difference between 1xPvInc and 
4xPVInc is -80. Both fixed-Income-level quadrant averages are of the unexpected direction and 
are smaller in magnitude than the fixed-Education-level quadrants. Education simply dominates. 
Which racial group buys most by quadrant and overall when accounting specifically for 
Advertising reactivity in the HHsize=4 combination? For the left quadrants (HS and 1xPvInc) 
Hispanic HHs buy more than White HHs (see Table 22d35
Table 22b (as 10b, 15b, and 20b before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for 
Female ONLY HHHs. There are now only 4 cells over 350 ounces, and subtracting duplicates, 
three times as many values under 100 ounces (including negatives). The table-wide cell average 
in Advertising for this configuration is 169 (st. dev. 100), lower and tighter than for HHsize=4 
(269, st. dev. 116) in 22a. Advertising reactions are more uniform in Female only HHH 
households than in dual-sexed HHH households.  
). For the right quadrants (College and 
4xPvInc): White HHs are more reactive than Hispanic HHs. The most reactive overall are 
Hispanic HHs, followed by White HHs, with the least reactive to Advertising being Asian HHs. 
This is a direct inversion of the most and least reactive racial groups from the 20d Price Analysis 
table. 
                                                 
35 Table numbering order built for parallel numbering between Tables 10a,b,&c; 15a,b,&c; etc. 
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The HfPvInc half-row in fixed HS Ed (3 of 4) is the most reactive group, followed by 
Hispanics in fixed HS Ed and fixed 1xPvInc (2 of 11). Less HS Educ level (first row in bottom 
half) was highest in HHsize=4, and now holds 6 of the 8 highest values in the half-columns in 
the bottom half of the table, but does not stand out as it did in 22a. The lowest Income HHs in 
the second lowest Education level are the most reactive to Advertising in Female HHH only 
HHs. In 3x3 Income level comparison, all racial groups fall in purchase from lower to higher 
Income, again except Asian HHs. Except for Hispanic HHs however, the increment between the 
lower and upper Income groups tends smaller than in previous tables. Particular to the 1xPvInc 
bloc versus the 4xPvInc bloc, all non-Hispanic values except White Post College rise, indicating 
a positive income effect. The weak negative income effect from a 3x3 comparison brackets a 
specific alternative 1xPvInc-4xPvInc comparison that is positive (rising to 4xPvInc) for White, 
Afr-Amer and Asian HHs. For Hispanic Female-headed HHs between fixed 1x- and fixed 
4xPvInc, there is a strong negative effect at every level of Education, for a negative income 
effect.  
There is a clear fall in Advertising-associated quantity in 2x2 comparison across Education 
levels. But as for the 1x- versus 4xPvInc comparison, the fixed HS Ed cell-by-cell comparisons 
with fixed College Ed are mixed, favoring lower values in College, but with numerous exceptions 
in non-White HHs. There are income and education effects in Advertising, and because income 
effects tend negative, the education effect still dominates, but both effects are less robust than for 
Female Only HH CMEs in Price and Sale. 
As in Price and Sale Female HHH only prediction tables, Asian HHs are particularly low 
magnitude, and display all the negative cells (less responsive than the reference sub-group). 
Asian Female only HHs are extremely resistant to any Advertising effect compared to any group 
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in any of the 22-series tables. Given the positive income effect for this group however, the 
negative values cluster at 1x- and 2xPvInc in fixed HS. In Table 22d for Female only HHHs, we 
see the least variance of any sub-table in the order from highest to lowest total table-wide ounces 
by racial group. Whites are more responsive than Hispanics in fixed HS and fixed 4xPvInc 
quadrants. Other than that, the final order from highest to lowest purchase HHs is Hispanic, 
White, Afr-Amer, and Asian, with a large gap between the last two ranks (differences). 
Table 22c (as 10c, 15c, and 20c before it) compares the HHsize=3, Two Kids, for Male 
ONLY HHHs. There are now 22 cells over 350 ounces, 80% in Asian, and 20% in Hispanic, and 
11 values under 100 ounces, including two duplicates. The table-wide cell average in 
Advertising for this configuration is 259 (st. dev. 159), a much less uniform reaction for Male 
only HHH households than in dual-sexed HHH households or Female only HHH households. 
A striking result is that where before Asian Female HHHs tended to be low-responsive to 
Advertising outside of certain Income levels in College Education, every Asian Male HHH cell 
in fixed HS Educ and fixed 4xPvInc is over 350 ounces, and 60% of the Asian cells in the other 
two quadrants (totaling 18 of 22, with of these 4 unique cells) over 550 ounces. Asian Male 
HHHs are extremely reactive to Advertising compared to the common base sub-group, but 
display highest response in fixed HS Ed. The Hispanic 350+ cells are in the lowest two Income 
and Education levels.   
In the bottom half of the table the Less HS and HS rows have the next largest number of 
350+ cells (3 of 8), and the high values for the half-columns are found in these cells for every 
racial group. There is a clear strong education effect across all racial groups in 2x2 comparison 
in education. This is supported by weaker falls in magnitude for cell-by-cell comparison from 
fixed HS to fixed College, except for HfPvInc White and Afr-Amer HHs.  
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In the upper half of the table, 3x3 level comparison across Income in fixed Education 
level shows once again that Asian Male HHHs are the exception to the negative income effect 
that other racial groups demonstrate. The negative income effect is particularly strong for 
Hispanic HHs, and this also holds for the 1xPvInc versus 4xPvInc cell-by-cell comparison. Asian 
HH cells rise from 1x- to 4xPvInc, and White and Afr-Amer HHs are mixed. The education 
effect dominates the income effect in Advertising for Male only HHHs, as it has for all Male 
only HHHs. For Asian HHs demonstrating a positive income effect that directly counters the 
negative education effect, a magnitude comparison of the bottom versus top two levels in Income 
((592+710)-(551 + 526)) and Education ((538+526)-(282+361)), shows a magnitude change 
larger for Education than for Income, confirming an education effect dominating an income 
effect in magnitude.  
In Table 22d there is a strong turn from 22a and 22b in which racial group is most 
responsive to presence of Advertising. In HHsize=4 Asians were third or last, in Female HHH 
only Asian was last by a wide margin, and for Male HHH only, Asian HHs dominate in every 
quadrant, with Afr-Amers last in every quadrant. Hispanic HHs are more responsive than White 
HHs in the lower Income and lower Education fixed quadrants. Overall, as in the Sale (21d) sub-
table, Asian HHs break away from the field rather extremely, but the effect is smaller in 
Advertising. Asian Male only HHHs have twice the total ounces table-wide that second-place 
Hispanic HHs have, with a modest drop to White HHs, and a steeper drop to Afr-Amer HHs 
(differences). Asian Male HHs are most reactive to marketing variable changes of any racial 
group, or even any identified group, while demonstrating both income and education effects. 
Asian Male only HHHs most closely approximate homo economicus in sCSD purchase behavior. 
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5.6    Limitations and Future Research 
5.6.1    Limitations 
Although sCSDs comprise the bulk of all SSBs, my available data is restricted to CSDs. 
Full identification of household purchase behavior across SSBs of similar sugar content is not 
possible with one category, so the level of definitiveness of this work for SSBs, even based on 
the category leader, is not assessable.  
Similarly, data is restricted to the HH level, not the individual level. Any attempt to 
calculate per capita predictions of consumption by demographic sub-group would necessarily be 
suspect to the degree that there are drinkers and non-drinkers of sweetened soft drinks in the 
household, spiking the use number up for one unobservable trait, and dipping it for another. 
Similar research interests from within the medical/nutrition community often have BMI 
or health data as well as SSB consumption reports, and even nutrition beliefs that can be used to 
test correlation with level of formal education. There is no such data linking health 
characteristics or beliefs to the demographic and purchase data for Nielsen HomeScan 
participants, and nonesuch is forthcoming. Creative combinations of databases are beginning to 
be explored in the field of food economics, and this is certainly an interesting area for future 
research. 
Because my estimation strategy masks how often a HH purchases, focusing on purchase 
amount given that a purchase is made, comparing HHs that may buy in bulk infrequently versus 
those that may purchase less at a time but more frequently requires comparison of estimation 
results and predicted values against descriptive statistics. This is necessarily imprecise, but seems 
necessary given the sometimes eyebrow-raising quantities that single Asian male HHHs 
purchase relative to other single male HHH ethnicities. Descriptive statistics indicate atypically 
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high levels of stocking behavior in Asian HHs relative to other ethnic groups. Hispanics tend to 
buy more frequently. Failure to appreciate this can draw one toward misleading conclusions 
viewing prediction table results alone. 
While I selected a reduced-form approach for its strengths and an avoidance of 
neoclassical economic assumptions defended in the coming essays here, not using a model 
derived from consumer demand theory removes the option to calculate conventional cross-price-
elasticities of demand or run counterfactual analyses after the estimation process. 
 
5.6.2    Future Research 
The results of this estimation strategy are so rich, that there is much opportunity to further 
explore them for other surprising results, or for results useful to particular demographic groups. 
For example I intend to at least construct prediction tables to see how single mothers’ household 
purchase varies across number of children, the mother’s age range, and by racial group. Beyond 
the finding here that single fathers of two kids seem to be more restrictive in purchase than single 
mothers of two kids, other aspects of parenting, including further contrasts by gender of HHH 
may prove interesting to study. 
It is also possible within the existing result set to focus on specific marketing-variable 
purchase reactivity for high-purchase groups already identified, by varying in prediction-table 
combination related household characteristics such as age and family size. This may identify 
lifestyle differences that could be exploited in policy design. 
I would like to determine if there are enough households in the available Nielsen database 
(at the Zwick Center at the University of Connecticut) that spans the CSD, candy and gum, 
ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, and salty snack categories, to find non-purchasers of sCSDs for 
whom there is demographic data, to see if cluster analysis or principal-component analysis alone 
236 
can associate demographic characteristics shared by heavy sCSD-purchasers as distinct from 
those of non-purchasers, or from diet CSD drinkers.  
There was not time to look for natural experiments in the data such as soft-drink taxes or 
local marketing restrictions that came into effect during the 2006 – 2008 period. These are 
natural fodder for the study of policy effects. 
Subjecting the same or similar data to conventional structural demand estimation and 
elasticity calculation, then constructing results to a similar point would allow a comparison of 
methods. I am quite interested to discover how much results differ, and infer which estimated 
sCSD purchase differences are due to estimation assumptions, which to estimation strategies, 
which to methodological or data limitations, and which to robust factors identified by both 
methodologies. 
I am also interested in simply replicating the method here for diet CSDs and for other 
products within the already purchased data categories (listed above) to see if socio-
demographically identified high-purchase patterns replicate for non-caloric soft drinks or across 
other unhealthful food products that are not generally considered to be candy. 
I am currently working with others to estimate demand with a different variant to a 
classical structural model. By estimating a mean demand for the population, and characterizing 
high purchasers as “inefficient” (as will be defined in Essay Two for sCSD consumers who do 
not appreciate long-term health effects from overconsumption), we analyze this inefficiency as a 
type of technical inefficiency in the manner of a production frontier (failure to produce adequate 
health). This work may be modified in a later work to attempt to identify latent classes of health 
producers within demographic groups. 
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5.7    SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
From the descriptive statistics – data means for variables only, with no regression control 
for other factors – a few results may not be intuitive. From Table 1, it is noteworthy that 30.5% 
of all sweetened carbonated soft-drink purchases are associated with price promotions (i.e., 
sCSD purchased during price-promotion, or “on sale”). Coupled with the frequency with which 
households purchase more than two liters a week (HH mean/yr. = 7.77), it is reasonable to infer 
that many households engage in stocking behavior. The following observations are for Table 3, 
in which zero-purchase weeks are not considered, and refer to numbers in ounces per household 
per purchase week. 
Across six income levels for households (HHs) from half the poverty level for a family 
of four to five or more times the poverty level for a family of four, highest average purchase is 
almost identical for HHs earning 3 and 4 times the poverty level (≈285 oz), perhaps suggesting 
that purchase rises with household income, but not in a linear fashion. For both Female and Male 
heads-of-household (HHHs) level of terminal education from less-than-high-school to post-
college, the less-than-high-school and high-school (HS) levels stand out as substantially higher 
than other levels (≈305-320 oz), and from high-school level drop consistently with rising 
education. Racial group is self-identified as White, Asian, African American (Afr-Amer), and 
Other Race HHs, with Hispanic being a separately self-identified racial group that requires 
identification with one of these four main groups. (The Table 5 correlation matrix shows that 
Other Race and Hispanic are correlated at 0.53). From the racial groups, Asian HHs purchase 
most (≈286 oz), and African-American HHs the least (≈243 oz). Across age categories for both 
Female and Male HHHs, the 40-50 years category is largest (≈295 oz F, ≈298 oz M). Male-Only 
HHH HHs average 4 oz./wk higher than Female-Only HHs, across all other features. 
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Graphing average weekly sCSD-industry-wide Price across all 16 designated marketing 
areas (DMAs are specific urban-suburban-exurban combination markets defined by local 
television broadcast range) against estimated sCSD-industry-wide advertising exposure (at the 
HH level) across all DMAs indicates some pulsing in industry-wide advertising frequency. 
Advertising pulses do not seem to be correlated with industry-average rises in price (a potential 
marketing strategy). Quantity purchased often peaks when average price dips. Population wide, 
consumers do not buy substantially more in weeks following industry-wide advertising pulses. 
Heckman two-step regression model results are generated for three levels of model 
(model names are not acronyms): the BASIC model, for which demographic characteristic 
variables except for racial group are categoric; the BROAD model for which demographic 
categories are divided into levels within each category;36 and the REFINED model for which 
each demographic variable is a combination of an Income level and another demographic 
characteristic from the variable levels, or an Education level and another demographic 
characteristic from the variable levels.37
                                                 
36 Variable levels are so defined: six levels for Income (from half the poverty level for a family of four [HfPvInc], to 
1xPvInc, 2xPvInc, etc., to five or more PvInc), five levels of (Fem/Male HHH) Education (Less HS, HS, Some 
College, College, Post College); HH Sizes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5+;  Number of Kids in HH 1,2,3, and 4+; (Fem/Male 
HHH) Age levels under 30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-65, 65+. From each, for the BROAD model, one level must be 
dropped. The base group assumptions are: White (for Race= White, Afr-Amer, Asian, or Other Race), non-Hispanic 
(for Hispanic), highest-level Income and highest-level (Female or Male HHH) Education, HH Size=1, No Kids, 
(F/M HHH) Age 50-65, and spring for season. 
 The REFINED model specification allows degrees of 
37 Reference (base) group assumptions for the REFINED model are constructed so as not to conflict with those of 
the BASIC and BROAD models. The REFINED models use the highest Income and Education levels (5xPvInc, 
Fem Post Collg Educ, Male Post Collg Educ), White (for Race), Non-Hispanic (for Hispanic), HHsize=1, NoKids, 
FemAge50-65, and MaleAge50-65 for reference group demographic variables, (and Spring for season again). As 
demographic characteristics are interacted to identify sub-groups, there are in the REFINED model eleven base sub-
groups (including for example 5xPvIncxFmPostCollgEd and MalePostCollgEdxWhite). 
   The interaction of demographic categories necessitates a second level of variable drop to avoid the dummy-
variable trap. So certain category levels were regressed separately, rather than being interacted with demographic or 
marketing variables, or than being dropped entirely, in which case their effects would have been absorbed into the 
intercept with other reference-group effects. Thus one group for each category to be interacted with Income or with 
Male/Female Education has been dropped, with the binary Hispanic category requiring no further drop, and with the 
No Female/Male HHH groups applying as separately-regressed groups for all sex-of-HHH-specific categories. 
Choices for these “category level drops” are reasonable given results from previous models and iterations: No Man 
HH Head, No Fem HH Head, Other Race, HH size 5Plus, _4KidsPlus, Female Age 65+, Male Age 65+. 
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estimated effects to vary across levels within one category while remaining fixed at one level in 
another category, rather than being fixed increments independent of another category, as they are 
in the BASIC and BROAD models. Thus the REFINED model enables observation of how for 
example Whites and Asians may differ in purchase response to rising sCSD Price as HH Income 
rises for each level from low to high Income. Each model has a version where every 
demographic variable is interacted separately with either the Price, Sale, or Advertising 
marketing variable. The dependent variable in all regressions is: weekly purchase of sCSDs at 
the HH level, in ounces (for weeks that purchase occurs).  
For all regression results, heterogeneity is controlled for, and endogeneity between the 
price vector and purchase quantity (dependent variable) vectors is rejected. Standard goodness-
of-fit measures to compare models do not apply for the two-step Heckman (“Heckit” model), but 
as model sophistication goes up (more explanatory variables in the REFINED than the BROAD 
model, and in the BROAD versus the BASIC model), the magnitudes of “catch-all” constants, 
binaries, and un-interacted marketing variables (Price, Sale, Advertising) all fall. This provides 
some empirical evidence that the most complex models fit the data best. Across the BASIC and 
BROAD models with and without marketing-variable interactions, and the REFINED model (run 
only including marketing-variable interaction with demographic variable binaries), only one of 
the “catch-all” variables common to all five models was of an unexpected sign and statistically 
significant, and that variable is not used in isolation for interpretation. The models all fit well 
with expectations for simple (un-interacted) variables, indicating a robust overall modeling 
structure. While only the REFINED model is suitable for addressing the primary research 
questions of interest here, there is compelling evidence that allowing for flexibility in degree of 
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effect within levels of a demographic variable category does provide further defensible analytical 
insights beyond results inferable from the BASIC and BROAD models. 
All results discussed from this point are for models with marketing-variable interactions. 
Given the nature of estimation to determine the purchase response associated with a particular 
demographic characteristic to a particular sCSD industry marketing-mix variable (Price, Sale, or 
Advertising), no single estimation coefficient is used in isolation to infer purchase behavior for a 
demographic group or sub-group in any of the three model levels with marketing-variable 
interactions. (A sub-group is a slice of a group defined by a particular characteristic, as for 
example, lower-educated Asian HHs within Asian HHs or within lower-educated HHs.) Thus, 
instead of interpreting the heckman-adjusted marginal effects for any group or sub-group alone, a 
group/sub-group marginal effect is combined with a marketing-variable-specific marginal effect.  
For example, in the BASIC model, HH Income (HH Inc) is a variable. The combined 
marginal effect (CME) must be specific to a marketing variable, for example Price, at a selected 
value: CME in Price for HH Inc = δy/δx of HH Inc + (δy/δx of Price x HH Inc* the average of 
Wkly Price in the DMA). Rather than individual coefficients (or more accurately, rather than 
individual heckman-adjusted marginal effects), CMEs then become the elements for inference 
and interpretation. All results discussed from this point are from marketing-variable-specific 
CMEs, or from predicted values built from them. Tables for marketing-variable-specific CMEs 
by demographic characteristic exist for each model level, as do tables of predicted values by 
composite-characteristic HH type built from these CMEs. 
For each model level, Prediction Tables are constructed so that each table cell represents 
a predicted weekly HH purchase quantity for a single representative HH type, comprised of 
estimation results for specific characteristics. (Hundreds of such household-representative 
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combinations may be constructed from the regression results of the REFINED model.) Each HH 
type must exist in all demographic dimensions upon which regression was conducted: Income, 
(Female/Male HHH) Education level, racial group, HH size, # of Kids in HH, (Female/Male 
HHH) Age. Thus, with sex of HHH difference, there are seven characteristics that can vary. All 
prediction tables reported here are fixed in HHH Age, at 40-50 years, and the reference season 
spring is assumed for all cells. One table type has Male and Female HHHs, and two children, for 
a HH size=4. There is a single Male or single Female HHH head variant of the HH size=4 table, 
with all other characteristics the same (so HH size=3 for each). This isolates sex-of-HHH-
specific parenting choices reflected in sCSD purchase for two-child single-parent homes.  
Fixing certain demographic characteristics enables analysis according to variation in 
other characteristics, particularly variation in the primary variables of interest to the core 
research questions here: Income level, Education level, and racial group. Secondarily, the sex of 
the HHH is compared for purchase-reactivity to marketing variables. The household types whose 
reactions are reported in prediction tables are held the same across the BASIC, BROAD, and 
REFINED models for Price-reactive purchases, to allow for direct comparison across estimation 
results. In the REFINED model, prediction tables depicting reactions to rising Price for HH 
Size=4 show a flexibility in response across Income and Education levels by racial group that 
exposes restrictive weaknesses in the BASIC and BROAD models. 
In the top half of prediction tables, Income level varies across one of two fixed Education 
levels (one low, one high) and across racial groups. In the bottom half of prediction tables, 
Education level varies across one of two fixed Income levels (one low, one high) and across 
racial groups. It is then possible to determine whether one HH type is predicted to buy more than 
a reference group, or to compare a set of HH types to another set. For example one common 
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comparison is whether the two lowest-Income HH types buy more or less than the two highest-
Income HH types for a fixed level of education. If they do, I refer to this as HH purchase “rising 
in Income.” The result can easily be compared across racial groups, given the construction of the 
table. This checks the robustness of any (expected positive) income or (expected negative) 
education effect across sub-cultural categorization, similar to the way that breaking the Income 
and Education categoric variables into levels allows a check for the robustness of income or 
education effects. 
Because Income and (Fem/Male) Education are categoric variables in the BASIC model, 
assumptions had to be made to break results into levels that approximate levels in the BROAD 
and REFINED prediction tables. The effort exposed serious restrictions to the BASIC model’s 
category-level analysis, provoking for example the result that in considering HH reaction to 
rising Price in a week, the magnitude of a positive income effect dominated the magnitude of a 
negative education effect in HH purchase – a result not borne out in the larger models. I will use 
the term the “income effect dominated the education effect” to mean that one set of variables’ 
directions and magnitudes appear to overwhelm another variables’ set of directions and 
magnitudes – meaning it more robustly explains more variability in HH purchase. This result can 
be weak or strong domination, based on multiple comparisons enabled by the structure of 
prediction tables, where levels of one variable (Income or Education) differ while held fixed at a 
low or high level of another variable level (Education or Income).  
 
Results by Variable Type 
 There are many possible ways to report results across HH characteristics and their 
responses to individual marketing variables, as well as many possible ways to construct HH 
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types for prediction analysis, even for the few HH-type combinations presented here. Every 
choice to group results in one way forces a division, and a consequent need to refer back across 
dividing lines to a previous variable group. One method follows. 
  
Marketing-Mix Variables: 
Based on the magnitudes of responses to marketing-mix variables across demographic 
characteristics in the BASIC model, there is evidence that the purchase reactions to Sale are 
larger than for Price or Advertising. From BASIC and BROAD model results, and with few 
exceptions (such as Hispanic HHs, BROAD) groups tend to either be more responsive to Price 
changes or incidence of Sale, but not both. This result is consistent with the theory that 
consumers seek lower (average) price for readily available non-credence goods, whether they use 
weekly prices or occasional price-promotions to achieve this. In the REFINED model, HHs tend 
to respond with purchase to Sale or Advertising incentives in at least the same magnitude as to 
Price incentives. It is important to remember that weekly Price and Advertising data are 
weighted averages across the entire sCSD industry within the same DMA in which HH-level 
observations are collected, so by construction, these cannot be particularly flexible to a weekly 
change in price for a particular HH’s preferred brand(s).38
                                                 
38 The orientation at the product category rather than product brand level is motivated by medical/nutrition and 
decision-theory/behavioral-economic literature, where the influence of caloric sweeteners on choice behavior and 
health are not dependent on brand. It is beyond the scope of this work to defend the degree to which positive 
consumer associations developed by one product’s advertising campaign may spill over to other brands, but the 
effect is documented for soft drinks (Zheng, Yuqing and Kaiser, Harry M. Advertising and U.S. Nonalcoholic 
Beverage Demand. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2008, vol. 37, issue 2, pp. 147-159.) 
 The magnitude of the response to 
changes in weekly Advertising is against my expectation that it might have a small effect on 
purchase, given that most of the effects from sCSD-industry advertising may well have 
accumulated over many years. Again, there was no visible evidence from graphing Advertising 
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exposure against quantity purchased across the entire population that weekly advertising strongly 
motivated increased purchase in the same week or the next few weeks, but certain sub-groups 
have high purchases correlated with increased exposure to Advertising. 
 
Demographic Variables: 
Income 
The BASIC model restricts prediction table results to fixed incremental changes, so changes in 
response to a marketing variable by Income or Education level are fixed in size. But CME results 
show that HHs with lower Income or lower Education respond less to Price incentives, and more 
to increases in Sale and Advertising (although Price responsiveness falls in rising Female 
Education, and Sale response rises). I suggest that this combination of marketing-variable 
reactions – Price-insensitive, Advertising-sensitive, higher Sale purchase – characterizes lower-
Income and lower-educated HHs as likely habitual buyers of sCSDs. The only worse group 
would also be insensitive to Sale, and there is some evidence that lower-educated and lower-
Income Female HHHs may fall into this group. The BASIC model predicts an income effect 
dominating an education effect, with the racial group third in the magnitudes that determine the 
span of differences in purchase between HH types. But given the model’s constraints, these 
results are overturned in larger models. Lower HH Sizes respond more to an increase in “Sale” 
than larger HHs – an interesting result indicating more regularly-timed (habitual) purchase in 
larger households. 
In the BROAD model, higher Income HHs are more responsive to Sale than lower-
Income HHs, in contrast to BASIC results, while HHs at all Income levels were more responsive 
to Price than the highest-income (base) group. In BROAD prediction tables, purchase does not 
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strictly rise in rising Income level, as in the BASIC model, and the education effect dominates 
any income effect in magnitude (i.e., the amount that increasing Education decreases purchase in 
a rising marketing variable is larger than the amount that increasing Income raises it, if and when 
it raises it). If one divides the differences in purchase by HH Size to be per capita, differences in 
Educ level also dominate differences in rising HH Size. 
In the REFINED model, middle-income HHs (from twice through four times the poverty 
level for a family of four) seem most responsive to Price change, while the lowest- and highest-
income HHs are least Price-sensitive (have the highest purchase in ounces). This result may be 
motivated by a strong habit of regular purchase behavior, such that Price changes do not provoke 
much purchase change at these income levels. In addition, the lowest-income HHs may have 
reduced access to price-competitive purchase venues, and the highest-income HHs may have 
even less concern for the price of sCSDs as a portion of their HH budget than other income 
levels. HHs with lower Income in combination with lower Education display a strong pattern of 
least response to rising Price, indicative of stronger habit in purchase. Across the four racial 
groups (White, Afr-Amer, Asian, Hispanic) in the prediction table, all purchase more in rising 
Price at the highest HH income level versus the second highest, indicating an insensitivity to 
Price that may be Income- or habit-based. As occurs in most prediction tables constructed here, 
Asian HHs present some exceptions to other behavior described.  
Because response to Price is lowest at the lowest Income level, is higher in middle 
Income, and is low again at the highest level of Income (with HS Education the fixed level 
across these Income levels), the income effect is clearly not linear, as determined by the BASIC 
model. Extreme differences in purchase reaction between Income levels within a racial group 
indicate that the uniform changes across Income levels within a racial group as constrained by 
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the BROAD model similarly do not hold. The REFINED model indeed discovers differences in 
purchase response that the BASIC and BROAD models are incapable of identifying. 
Again for response to Sale, the lowest Income group (with HS Educ or Collg Ed fixed) is 
highly responsive to Sale, but less responsive than the combination of lowest Education level and 
either (fixed) 1xPvInc or 4xPvInc. Income effects are less clear than education effects in Sale, 
and for White and Afr-Amer HHs the income effect is actually negative. For White and Afr-
Amer HHs the education effect is clearly dominant. For Hispanic HHs, the education effect is 
less dominant, and for Asian HHs, it is weakly dominant. 
For response in weekly purchase to increased Advertising, lower-income HHs are more 
responsive than higher-income HHs. The effect is fairly robust across racial groups except Asian 
HHs, being particularly strong in Hispanic HHs. 
 
Income by Sex of HHH (REFINED prediction tables only) 
For Female Only HHHs, HHs at HfPvInc are by far the least responsive to rising Price. 
The predicted purchase average over the three lower Income levels is higher than the average 
over the upper three Income levels (in all but Asian HHs). That lower-Income HHs are less 
responsive than upper-Income HHs (except Asian) defines a negative  income effect. Despite a 
solid education effect, the span in purchase amount across Educ levels is less than the span 
across Income levels, so Income level better describes differences in purchase behavior – 
although purchase falls less consistently across Income than across Female only HHH Education 
levels. Male Only HHHs similarly respond less to rising Price at the three lower Income levels, 
except Asian HHs for fixed higher (College) Educ level. For Male Only HHHs there is no clear 
domination across Income or Education levels in magnitude, but both tend to fall in rising level 
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(except for Male HHH Asian HHs), suggesting either that sCSDs tend to be an inferior good, 
and/or that the education effect may be weakly dominant. 
For Female Only and Male Only HHHs in rising Sale, White and Afr-Amer lower-
Income HHs respond more to Sale, while for Asian and Hispanic HHs higher-Income HHs 
respond more to Sale. The education effect weakly dominates the income effect in sex-of-HHH 
response to increased Sale. 
For Female Only and Male Only HHHs in rising Advertising, the combination of HS 
Educ and lowest level of Income (HfPvInc) is most positive in response, with lower-Income HHs 
more responsive generally versus higher Income (in all but Asian HHs), but the differences are 
smaller than in Price and Sale prediction tables, suggesting that any positive Advertising effect is 
more universal in overall effect than Price or Sale effects. 
With exceptions for Male HHH Asian HHs, results comparing the lowest two with the 
highest two Income levels in Price, Sale, and Advertising tend to favor a negative income effect. 
This offers broad evidence that sCSDs are an inferior good. The strength of this result is 
mitigated by the common effect of a rise in purchase from the 4xPvInc to the 5xPvInc(plus) sub-
group, which: a) emphasizes the non-linearity in response patterns; and b) undermines 
occasional evidence for an income-based “food elite” (who would tend to eschew a 
fundamentally unhealthful product). An education-based “food elite” purchase group also fails 
to garner general support from this single-product analysis of HHs that actually purchase 
sCSDs during the three years of data. 
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Education 
In the BASIC model the Female HHH education effect is larger than the Male HHH 
education effect, across types of analysis. BROAD model combined marginal effects (in Table 
14, before prediction table analysis) indicate the education effect dominates the income effect, 
and in span from lowest to highest Educ level, tends larger than any difference attributed to 
racial grouping. In the BROAD model prediction tables for rising Price, the education effect 
clearly dominates the income effect, and as stated in the Income results above, the combination 
of one of the lowest Educ levels with one of the lowest Income levels generates the least 
response to rising Price, an indicator of habitual purchase. The effect is robust across all racial 
groups (except for higher-Income Asian HHs). There are kinked drops in purchase beginning at 
Some College for Female only HHHs, but at College for Male only HHHs, indicating that 
applied nutrition awareness may kick in for Males at a higher Educ level than for Females. 
In rising Price, REFINED model prediction tables demonstrate a clear strong education 
effect that dominates any (expected positive) income effect. Fixed HS Educ across Income levels 
is dramatically larger than fixed College Educ across Income levels, averaging over 110 oz/week 
and often much more, across all racial groups. 
In rising Sale, REFINED model prediction tables (HH Size=4) show that HHs with Less-
than-HS Educ are extremely responsive to Sale (followed by lowest Income level), with a 
marked drop off even to HS Educ. Beyond this there is a strong education effect favoring higher 
Sale response at lower Educ levels. 
In rising Advertising, REFINED model prediction tables show that Less HS Educ is 
again the most positive in purchase reaction. Once again, the education effect dominates any 
positive income effect across all racial groups (although weakly for Asian HHs). 
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Education by Sex of HHH (REFINED prediction tables only) 
 In the Price prediction tables, Male Only HHH HHs have a more consistent education 
effect than Female Only HHs, as only White and Hispanic HHs demonstrate a strong education 
effect in Female Only HHs. In the Sale prediction tables, neither the education nor the income 
effect clearly dominates in its expected direction for Female Only HHs, but education dominates 
income in Male HHs. In the Advertising prediction tables, the education effect dominates the 
income effect for Female Only HHs, but less robustly than in the Price and Sale tables. For Male 
Only HHs responding to Advertising, the education effect again dominates any positive income 
effect (even for Asian HHs, which alone demonstrate a clear positive income effect). 
Given the strength in direction and magnitude of the fall in sCSD purchase in rising 
Education, there appears to be sufficient support for the assumption that the level of formal 
education of the HHH can effectively proxy for the critical thinking necessary for nutrition 
awareness to apply to actual purchase. The evidence is neither linear nor overwhelming.39
 
  
Racial Group (including by Sex of HHH) 
Each of the four racial groups whose behavior is predicted from estimation results reacts 
to marketing variable changes in a unique way. From the BASIC prediction table in rising Price, 
with its constrained increments of change, racial-group purchasing from highest amount (least 
price-insensitive) to lowest amount (most price-sensitive) are: White > Asian > Hispanic > Afr-
Amer. Lower sensitivity to Sale and Advertising than the White base group also remains fixed 
from BASIC model constraints. The BROAD prediction table in rising Price (also HH Size=4), 
                                                 
39 In combination with the weak support for the demonstration of an education-based “food elite,” these results 
together may indicate a possible “halo effect,” whereby some people with higher levels of formal education 
overestimate the health of their overall diet and exercise regime, and assuming they have compensated for sCSD 
health impacts, allow for more sCSD purchase. 
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is like the BASIC model also constrained such that a racial group may differ only in a fixed 
amount from another across Income or Education levels. From highest to lowest predicted 
purchase racial groups change in order: Asian > White > Hispanic > Afr-Amer. So relaxing a 
constraint even slightly has important effects for inference and rank order of response. Estimated 
marketing-variable reactions for Hispanic HHs are far less dynamic in the BROAD than in the 
REFINED model. 
For the REFINED prediction table in rising Price (also HH Size=4), some racial group 
rankings change with the quadrant of the table, indicating exactly the variability in response by 
racial groups at different Education and Income levels that I originally hypothesized. For 
example, in the low-(fixed)Education, and low-(fixed)Income quadrants, Hispanic HHs purchase 
more than White HHs in rising Price, and Afr-Amer HHs are the most Price reactive; whereas 
for the high-(fixed) Education and high-(fixed)Income quadrants, Asian HHs are the most 
reactive in high Education, and Afr-Amer HHs are the most reactive in high Income. Across the 
REFINED Price prediction table (HH Size=4): Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer > Asian. For 
Female Only HHH the order is the same, again suggesting that Asian HHs are the most negative 
in responsive to Price rise, and Hispanic HHs the least responsive. For Male Only HHH: Asian > 
Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer. These outcomes greatly differ from the BASIC and BROAD 
model results immediately above, and from the HH Size = 4 results. 
For the REFINED prediction table in rising Sale, HH Size=4 with both sexes of HHHs: 
White > Asian > Afr-Amer > Hispanic, indicating a strong Sale preference for White HHs 
(although Hispanic HHs are quite high in Sale at 1xPvInc). For Female Only HHHs: Afr-Amer > 
White > Asian > Hispanic – the only table-wide dominance of Afr-Amer response to a marketing 
variable. Quadrants with fixed lower Educ and Income levels show very low response to Sale by 
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Asian Female HHHs. For Male Only HHHs: Asian (by a vast amount) > White (by a lot) > Afr-
Amer > Hispanic. While Female HHHs prefer Sale generally to Male HHHs, the favoring of Sale 
by Asian Male HHHs is exceptional, as is the degree to which Afr-Amer and Hispanic Male 
Only HHHs fail to respond as much as the reference-sub-group does, relative to these other racial 
groups. 
For the REFINED prediction table in rising Advertising, HH Size=4: Hispanic > White > 
Afr-Amer > Asian. This identical ordering to the REFINED Price table represents a direct 
inversion to the Price response, such that Hispanic HHs (HH Size=4) are the least responsive in 
rising Price, the most responsive in rising Advertising, and the least responsive in rising Sale, 
i.e. the least economically rational of any racial group, and most indicative of habitual purchase 
behavior. In contrast, Asian HHs (HH Size=4) being nearly the opposite in response and ranking 
to Hispanic HHs (edged out by White HHs in high Sale response), are the most economically 
rational to marketing variable incentives. The order for Female Only HHHs in rising Advertising 
is the same as for HH Size=4, but the Male Only HHH again differs by the extremely strong 
Asian HH response, and exceptionally weak Afr-Amer response at higher levels of Education: 
Asian > Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer; raising the Asian Male Only HHH ranking to first, from 
its HH Size=4 last place. 
White 
In the REFINED prediction tables for Price, White HHs with fixed HS Educ level are less 
Price sensitive than Afr-Amer HHs, and less than Asian HHs at the lower three Income levels. In 
Female Only HHHs, the gap between White and Afr-Amer HHs is smaller than in HHsize=4, 
indicating a more common Female HHH behavior in single-sex of HHH homes for these two 
racial groups. 
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Afr-Amer 
 By descriptive statistics Afr-Amer HHs have the lowest average Income and Education 
levels in the panel. In rising Price, Female Only Afr-Amer HHHs are the only group whose 
purchase does not drop substantially at both higher Income and higher Education, leading all 
other racial groups only at the interaction level including both high Income and Post College. For 
this group, there is weak support for the notion that giving them more product or nutrition 
information will lower purchase. This may suggest a sub-cultural influence that could make 
education-based policy mechanisms insufficient for this sub-group, or that may require specific 
education targeting to overcome. Male Only Afr-Amer HHHs have strong Price responses and a 
clearly strong education effect, coupled with a negative income effect, so the expected education 
effect clearly dominates for them, restricting the scope of the sub-cultural influence that may 
demand more specific message targeting. In contrast, Female Only Afr-Amer HHHs have a very 
strong net Sale response, while Male Only Afr-Amer HHHs have a very weak or negative 
response to Sale (versus the base group) in higher Educ levels and higher Income levels. 
Asian 
By descriptive statistics Asian HHs have the highest average Incomes and Education 
levels in the panel (by a lot). In the REFINED prediction tables for Price (HHsize=4), Asian HHs 
are the most responsive in Price (least purchase in rising Price, reversing the conclusion from 
BASIC and BROAD models) at the 3 higher Education levels and at the 3 lower Income levels, 
but not in the 3 higher Income levels or both lowest Education levels. Positive income and 
negative education effects are strong in relative quadrants, but the education effect has the larger 
span in ounces (for larger overall effect). The education effect kicks in at Some College for 
HHsize=4 and Male Only, and at HS for Female Only HHHs, both inflection points being at 
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lower levels of Education than for Female or Male Only HHHs in other racial groups. For 
Female Only HHHs in Price, Asian HHs are by far the most responsive. For Male Only HHHs in 
Price, Asian HHs are by far the least responsive (opposite Fem Only). Still for Male Only, there 
remain clear education and income effects, and as with Female Only HHHs, the contrast between 
the lower and upper three Income levels is maintained. 
 In the REFINED prediction tables for Sale, despite positive income and negative 
education effects across Asian HHs, lower Education has a more positive effect on purchase in 
presence of Sale than does lower Income. For Female Only HHHs, lower Education levels are 
the least reactive in the table, and lower Income levels tend to be markedly nonreactive in Sale, 
but this behavior flips positive in higher Education at fixed higher Income. For Male Only 
HHHs, strongly contrasting with Female Only, we find the largest response of any group across 
REFINED prediction table sets by far, with 17 of 22 cells higher than 550 ounces above base-
group levels, and with 2 over 1000 ounces/week higher, while all other Male Only HHH racial 
groups tend to be fewer than 100 ounces above the base group. There are income and education 
effects, but education dominates. Results are similar but less dramatic in the REFINED 
prediction tables for Advertising. The education effect that dominates for Male Only may hold 
for HH Size=4, and may or may not hold for Female Only HHHs in rising Advertising. 
Hispanic 
By descriptive statistics Hispanic HHs are second by far in average Incomes and 
Education levels to Asian HHs, but are above White HHs. Hispanics demonstrate weak 
responsiveness to marketing variables, even resistance to them, in the BASIC and BROAD 
models. They are the least sensitive to Price changes in the REFINED prediction tables of any 
racial group. There is a pronounced negative education effect, and a negative income effect 
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(which may confirm sCSDs are an inferior good, even for a generally habitual purchaser by 
racial characteristic). Female Only HHHs are very unresponsive to Price at lower Income and 
Education levels, and even for fixed College Education across lower Income levels. For Male 
Only HHHs, lower Education and lower Income also drive very low responses to rising Prices, 
again indicating strong habitual purchase. A rise toward higher levels of Income or Education 
reverses this lack of response more strongly than for other racial groups at combined high levels.  
In the REFINED prediction tables for Sale, the combination of lowest Educ level and 
lowest Income level creates very high response, but the effect fades quickly relative to other 
racial groups as either Education or Income level rises. Female Only HHHs are particularly 
unresponsive to increase in Sale (as for increase in Price), and particularly responsive to 
Advertising compared to other racial groups. This defines Female Only Hispanic HHHs 
generally as the most likely to be habitual purchasers of any sex-of-HHH-racial-group 
combination, and may further imply the least stocking behavior. Hispanic Male Only HHHs are 
not far behind, with weak Price and strong Advertising responses at lower Income and Education 
levels, and relatively weak Sale response overall. (Asian Male Only HHs, in contrast, seem to 
offset their Price insensitivity and high responsiveness to Advertising with extremely high 
purchases in increased Sale.)40
                                                 
40 The frequency of purchase is not maintained as a direct characteristic in the second stage of the two-step Heckman 
estimation. The move for Asian HHs from lowest purchase by racial group in Table 2 to highest by racial group in 
Table 3 indicates infrequent purchase that is very high quantity when purchase is made. Asian Male HHs seem to 
purchase large amounts infrequently, in which case their cumulative average consumption might be lower than that 
of Hispanic HHs.  
 To be clear, single-sex HHH Hispanic HHs are much less Sale-
reactive than dual-sex HHHs Hispanic HHs, but the dual-sex HHHs HHs are more Advertising-
reactive and much less Price-reactive in purchase. The drop in average purchase in the Price and 
Advertising tables for rising Income, and the strong education effect in these tables for all 
Hispanic HHs, with a strong linear (negative) effect in rising education in Advertising for HH 
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Size=4 Hispanic HHs, offers hope that (education) policy intervention may help override sub-
cultural tendencies that are associated with relatively heavy sCSD purchase. 
 
Indicators of Parental Choice by Income or Education Level 
The interaction of Income level with # of Kids in HH, and Educ level of HHH-sex with # 
of Kids in HH may be analyzed using sets of combined marginal effects (again, CMEs; an 
analysis conducted before aggregating to a full-characteristic HH type, as in prediction tables.) 
Reactions can be identified for a demographic variable level by fixing either Income (Educ) level 
across the range in # of Kids in HH, or also by fixing # of Kids in HH across the range of Income 
(Educ) levels. (This was done for all variables in the full results set, but parenting indicators are 
intriguing.) There are two ways to identify an income (educ) effect, and these may conflict. For a 
fixed # of Kids in HH, say No Kids, the total purchase for the two lowest Income (Educ) levels 
may be higher or lower than the total for the two highest levels. If the second sum in this “2x2 
comparison” is substantially lower (say greater than a 5% difference) than the first, then 
purchase “falls in rising Income” for No Kids. For CMEs including Price-interaction effects 
(“CMEs in Price”), this would mean higher-Income HHs are more Price sensitive, i.e. buy less in 
rising Price. This would indicate either that lower-Income HHs are not Price sensitive – perhaps 
due to habitual purchase or lack of access to price-competitive shopping venues – and/or may 
indicate that sCSDs are an inferior good. 
For CMEs in Price there is a strong negative income effect suggested by falling purchase 
in rising Income for every level of # of Kids, from No Kids, through 3 Kids.41
                                                 
41 Regarding HHs with 4 or more Kids in HH, see the second footnote in this summary. 
 A second level of 
comparison sets the lower three levels of Income (each fixed Income level ranging across the # 
of Kids) versus the higher 3 levels of Income. HHs with Income level Half-, 1x-, or 2xPv4Inc 
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demonstrate rising purchase in rising Price as the # of Kids in HH increases, indicating strongly 
habitual purchase favoring sCSD consumption in lower-Income HHs with more children. 
However, for the 3x-,  4x-, and 5xPv4Inc (and above) HHs, purchase tends to fall in rising Price 
as the # of Kids in HH rises. This may indicate a difference in parenting style by broad HH 
income category (having controlled for education and other effects), with higher-Income HHs 
less favorable to sCSDs. Notably, the exact pattern repeats for CMEs in Advertising, but is only 
modestly reflected in CMEs in Sale. There is no such consistent result for Female/Male Only 
HHH Education level and # of Kids in HH for CMEs in Price, Sale, or Advertising, but it seems 
that Female Only HHHs buy more in rising Price than do Male Only HHHs when Kids are 
present, suggesting higher tolerance of sCSD-drinking in the Female Only HHH HHs. There 
seems to be a negative education effect on quantity purchased in Sale for both single-sex HHH 
types, with Female Only HHHs buying more in Sale than Male Only HHHs when Kids are in the 
HH. There seems to be a stronger positive Advertising effect for Female Only versus Male Only 
HHHs with children. Together these results indicate that in response to each of the marketing-
mix variables tested here, Male Only HHHs tend to purchase less in response to these than 
Female Only HHHs do, when children are present in either HH. This effect overrides the general 
tendency of Male Only HHHs to purchase more than Female Only HHs. When facing similar 
Pricing, Sale, and Advertising incentives, single fathers seem to be more strict against sCSD 
purchase than single mothers. 
 
Age, Sex of HHH, HH Size – More Generalized Characteristics 
Age is a very general category, although not so general as HH Size, from which little 
policy-relevant results may be derived, despite HH Size results conforming closely with 
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economic expectations in every version of every model. Larger HHs purchase more and are Price 
sensitive, although, perhaps counterintuitively, smaller HH sizes are more Sale sensitive, perhaps 
indicating less habitual purchase. The non-linearity of categoric variable values is apparent for 
many variables in the move from the BASIC to BROAD to REFINED model, but the restriction 
of linear effect on (Fem/Male) Age in BASIC is particularly constraining: because 
(Female/Male) Age is positive, this indicates that the 65+ group buys more than the 30-or-under 
crowd. In the BROAD model the youngest Male group is much higher in purchase and more 
Price and Sale sensitive than the next nearest (and next youngest) group, for a reversal of 
estimated behavior from BASIC. 
Female HHH Age results (again, a general characteristic) for the REFINED model CMEs 
confirm that lower-Income Female Only HHH HHs are less responsive to Price increase and 
more responsive to Sale and to Advertising, matching the highly habitual consumer profile of 
Hispanic Female HHHs, and are thus appropriate targets for any policy intervention to reduce 
consumption. This is exactly the type of effect this empirical approach can identify, despite the 
very general and robust effect that Male Only HHHs purchase more sCSDs than Female Only 
HHHs. Older Female HHHs buy more when they buy, independent of any Price or Sale effects, 
possibly associated with older children.  
Male HHHs are, contrary to Female HHHs by Age group, more responsive to Price. 
Younger Male HHHs generally tend to be more responsive to Sale (than older Male HHHs), 
while lower-Income Male HHHs respond more to Sale in higher Age brackets. Response to 
Advertising is mixed across Male HHH Age brackets, but there is weak support for the 
contention that lower-Income HHs are more responsive to Advertising (in the same direction but 
with a weaker effect than for Female HHHs). 
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Clear HHH-sex differences in purchase response to marketing variables present 
themselves consistently in the Age CME comparisons and elsewhere. Results from the BROAD 
model show that Male Only HHH purchase is higher than Female Only HHH purchase 
generally, an effect robust across racial groups. REFINED model raw coefficients (not CMEs) 
show many Male HHH averages by Age group purchasing over twice the amounts Female HHHs 
do (controlling for other variables), although this is reversed at the highest Age group in both 
sexes of HHHs. Still, lower-educated Female Only HHHs buy in volumes closer to what Male 
Only HHHs buy at any Educ level. In REFINED model prediction tables, Female Only HHH 
behavior demonstrates a smaller span of HH-type purchase reactions than HH Size=4 results, 
while Male Only HHHs is more dispersed than dual-sex HHHs results. Female HHHs react to 
marketing variables more similarly to each other than do Male HHHs or HHs where both sexes 
head the household. This may imply that policies targeting Female HHH shoppers may have 
more focused effect toward intended goals than broad campaigns, or campaigns targeting Male 
HHHs. 
 
5.7.1    Summary of Results Compared with Related Literature 
There are significant differences in consumer HH purchase patterns by HHH-income and HHH-
education level, and by racial grouping, similar to what Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock, among 
others, have found. Very few sub-groups display little purchase relative to their reference group. 
This seems to support Huston and Finke’s finding that most American diets need improvement. 
Results here confirm Beydoun and Wang’s association of lower diet quality with lower 
education or lower income. Results here support general findings offered by Thompson et al., but 
my method identifies informative levels of variation across the interacted primary characteristic 
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variables – education level, income level, and racial group – that Thompson et al. could not 
discover with their method. 
To the extent that level of formal education for the head of household does proxy for the 
ability to retain and apply nutrition knowledge and beliefs in consumption choices, results here 
support the findings that Zoellner et al. generated using a constructed health literacy variable. 
In the coming policy chapter, I refer to Powell and Chaloupka 2010, and Fletcher, 
Frisvold, and Teft 2011, who argue that soft-drink taxes of feasible size are unlikely to reduce 
sCSD purchase for most groups. This seems quite true for lower-income HHs here, who often 
buy the same or more sCSDs in purchase weeks as HHs earning far more, meaning they spend 
three or more times the percentage of their declared income on sCSDs. Small taxes will not 
dissuade this level of commitment.42
I did not anticipate that sCSD-industry-wide advertising in a purchase-week would have 
much effect on that week’s purchase, as it seems quite marginal to the stock of advertising 
goodwill built over decades, and is persuasive not informative (see Essay Three). Television 
advertising for sCSDs does influence purchase in the week in which it broadcasts, in accordance 
with findings discussed in Della Vigna and Gentzkow 2010.  
  
  
                                                 
42 For White, dual-parents-of-two households with high-school level of education for the HHHs, a family of four at 
the poverty level is predicted from empirical estimation results in Chapter 5, Table 20a, to buy 329 ounces per 
purchase week, versus 291 ounces for an otherwise similar family earning four times the poverty level. Results are 
parallel for African-American households with similar attributes, and the difference is much larger for Hispanic 
households. 
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5.8    Executive Summary of Results  
 Effects strongly identified in the BASIC and BROAD models, especially by racial 
group, include implausibly narrow differences in purchase. The REFINED model offers some 
key reversals of effects identified in simpler models, indeed discovering differences in purchase 
response that the BASIC and BROAD models are incapable of identifying. The breadth of 
results from the REFINED model enables deep analysis. Incremental changes between levels 
within a category and particularly within interacted demographic categories tend not to be linear, 
overturning assumptions implicit in models with categoric variables.  
 
Marketing Variables 
 At the sCSD product category level, households (HHs) tend to respond with purchase to 
Sale or Advertising incentives in at least the same magnitude as to Price incentives. 
 Any positive Advertising effect is more universal in overall effect than Price or Sale 
effects. 
 
Income 
 HHs with lower Income in combination with lower Education display a strong pattern of 
least negative response to rising Price, indicative of stronger habit in purchase. 
 For response in weekly purchase to increased Advertising, lower-income HHs are more 
responsive than higher-income HHs. The effect is fairly robust across racial groups 
except Asian HHs, being particularly strong in Hispanic HHs. 
 Income effects often tend negative, offering broad but not definitive evidence that sCSDs 
are an inferior good. 
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Education 
 At fixed HS Educ across Income levels, purchase averages are much larger than for fixed 
College Educ across Income levels, averaging over 110 oz/week and often much more, 
across all racial groups. 
 The education effect dominates any income effect across all racial groups (although 
weakly for Asian HHs). 
 There is a strong education effect favoring higher Sale response at lower Educ levels. 
 There appears to be sufficient support for the assumption that the level of formal 
education of the head of household (HHH) can effectively proxy for the critical thinking 
necessary for nutrition awareness to apply to actual purchase. 
 
Racial Group 
 Each of the four racial groups whose behavior is predicted from estimation results reacts 
to marketing variable changes in a unique way. For the prediction table in rising Price 
(HH Size=4 = Male and Female HHHs + 2 Kids), some racial group rankings change 
with the quadrant of the table, indicating exactly the variability in response by racial 
groups at different Education and Income levels that I originally hypothesized. 
 
 HHsize=4, Highest to Lowest Purchase Response to an increase in: 
Price: Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer > Asian 
 Sale: White > Asian > Afr-Amer > Hispanic 
             Advertising: Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer > Asian 
 
 and, for example, the same for a Male HH only, also with 2 Kids: 
Price:  Asian > Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer 
 Sale:  Asian (vastly) > White (by a lot) > Afr-Amer > Hispanic 
       Advertising:  Asian > Hispanic > White > Afr-Amer 
 
 Hispanic HHs (HH Size=4) are the least responsive in rising Price, the most responsive in 
rising Advertising, and the least responsive in rising Sale, i.e. appear to be the least 
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economically rational of any racial group, and most indicative of habitual purchase 
behavior. In contrast, Asian HHs (HH Size=4), being nearly the opposite in response and 
ranking to Hispanic HHs, are the most economically rational to marketing variable 
incentives. This does not hold for Male only HHHs. 
 
 
Age / HH Size / Sex of HHH 
 Female HHHs react to marketing variables more similarly to each other than do Male 
HHHs or HHs where both sexes head the household. This may imply that policies 
targeting Female HHH shoppers may have more focused effect toward intended goals 
than broad campaigns, or campaigns targeting Male HHHs. 
 Female HHH Age results confirm that lower-Income Female Only HHHs are less 
responsive to Price increase and more responsive to Sale and to Advertising, matching a 
highly habitual consumer. They are excellent targets for policy focus. 
 
Higher-Income Parents Lower sCSD Purchase with More Children 
 HHs at the lower three Income levels rise in sCSD purchase in rising Price as the # of 
Kids in HH increases, whereas HHs at the upper three Income levels fall in sCSD 
purchase in rising Price as the # of Kids in HH rises. 
o difference in parenting style(?) 
 
Single Fathers More Strict than Single Mothers 
 Male Only HHHs tend to purchase less in response to marketing-mix variables than 
Female Only HHHs do, when children are present. 
 This effect overrides the general tendency of Male Only HHHs to purchase more than 
Female Only HHs, an effect robust across racial groups. 
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General Remarks 
 Results support dietary-recall-based analyses 
o add detail, and prediction tables include implicit checks on the robustness of 
effects identified in this analysis 
o based on robust modeling of actual consumer behavior  
 Education level explains more variability than Income level 
o Education-based interventions more likely to affect behavior than tax-based 
mechanisms 
o Tax-per-ounce revenue could fund education initiatives 
 Targeting policy may not be warranted, but lower-income Female HHHs, Hispanics, 
young Male HHs, and Asian Male HHHs are good candidates. 
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Table 1.    Descriptive Statistics – Variables for BASIC Model† 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max No. of obs. 
Wkly HH Purchase Total (oz.) 47.8 163.6 0 12235.6 2,666,124 
Wkly HH Purchase Total (oz.)^ 277.4 302.8 8 12235.6 459,392 
# of Weeks/yr. HH Purchases  ≥ 67 ozs. 7.77 9.167 0 52 2,666,124 
Avg Price in $/oz. in a DMA / wk 0.022 0.0025 0.0095 0.0336 2,666,124 
2006-8 Real Avg Price, $/oz. in a DMA / wk+ 0.0233 0.0103 0 0.4922 2,666,124 
HH Avg. Advert Exposure (GRPs) 1181.4 872.2 6.2 5841.3 2,666,124 
On Sale, portion of positive purchases^* 0.305 0.460 0 1 459,392 
On Sale^ 328.5 0.835 326.9 330.1 140,000 
HH Income 20.848 5.829 3 27 2,666,124 
Female Head of HH Edu 3.782 1.697 0 6 2,666,124 
Male Head of HH Edu 3.149 2.133 0 6 2,666,124 
White* 0.761 0.426 0 1 2,666,124 
African American* 0.134 0.341 0 1 2,666,124 
Asian* 0.046 0.209 0 1 2,666,124 
Other Race* 0.059 0.235 0 1 2,666,124 
Hispanic* 0.077 0.266 0 1 2,666,124 
HH Size 2.416 1.341 1 9 2,666,124 
No Kids in HH* 0.731 0.443 0 1 2,666,124 
Kids in HH* 0.269 0.443 0 1 2,666,124 
Kids in HH, Wkly HH Purchase Total (oz.) 69.1 0.235 68.6 69.5 716,708 
Kids in HH, Wkly HH Purchase Total (oz.)^ 301.8 0.792 300.2 303.3 164,012 
Female Head of HH Age 5.819 2.814 0 9 2,666,124 
Male Head of HH Age 4.908 3.387 0 9 2,666,124 
 Ssn1 / Spring* 0.231 0.422 0 1 2,666,124 
Ssn2 / Summer* 0.256 0.437 0 1 2,666,124 
Ssn 3 / Autumn* 0.263 0.440 0 1 2,666,124 
Ssn 4 / Winter*      0.250 0.433 0 1 2,666,124 
Race-/Hispanic-Specific Means:      
White - Income 20.808 5.826 3 27 2,029,492 
African Amer. - Income 20.236 5.995 3 27 358,168 
Asian - Income 23.413 4.742 3 27 121,560 
Other Race - Income 20.785 5.740 3 27 156,904 
Hispanic - Income 21.251 5.690 3 27 204,748 
White - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male) 3.46 . 0 6 2,029,492 
Afr. Amer. - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male) 3.17 . 0 6 358,168 
Asian - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male) 4.33 . 0 6 121,560 
Other Race - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male) 3.53 . 0 6 156,904 
Hispanic - Educ Level (avg Fem & Male) 3.67 . 0 6 204,748 
White – HH Size 2.361 1.303 1 9 2,029,492 
African Amer.– HH Size 2.407 1.434 1 9 358,168 
Asian– HH Size 2.795 1.298 1 8 121,560 
Other Race– HH Size 2.858 1.497 1 9 156,904 
Hispanic– HH Size 2.970 1.433 1 9 204,748 
† Default reference quantities are for averages that include all observations, inclusive of zero-purchase weeks.  
^ Indicates mean in ounces calculated for positive purchase weeks only; not averaged across zero-purchase weeks. 
+The fifth row is calculated from the data configuration for the BROAD model, and represents inflation-adjusted 
statistics. The small number of prices per ounce in the data registering above $0.50/oz, this being over twenty times 
the average, were discarded as faulty data entries, generating the $0.492 maximum price per ounce in the inflation-
adjusted price set. Zero price in this row is possible , given rare and restrictive promotion campaigns. 
* Indicates a binary variable (min=0, max=1). Reported means present the portion of this variable (=1) within the 
full-sample category. 
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Table 2.   Decomposition of Demographic Variables to Category Levels – Mean  
Value of HH Total Oz Purchased in a Week, Including No-purchase Weeks 
Variable 
mean 
Wkly HH 
Buy in Oz. 
Std. 
Err. 
Number of 
Obs. 
HalfPov4Inc 47.422 0.508 96,068 
1xPov4Inc 46.997 0.333 246,108 
2xPov4Inc 48.091 0.210 588,140 
3xPov4Inc 51.606 0.209 678,236 
4xPov4Inc 49.426 0.228 558,688 
5xPov4Inc 40.930 0.208 498,884 
    
Fem Less HS 78.980 0.862 62,220 
Fem HS 63.941 0.267 525,956 
Fem Some Collg 51.174 0.192 742,772 
Fem Collg 42.471 0.181 708,292 
Fem Post Collg 31.329 0.233 313,148 
    
Male Less HS 72.246 0.693 85,688 
Male HS 69.470 0.325 405,112 
Male Some Collg 57.772 0.236 567,212 
Male Collg 44.895 0.204 597,604 
Male Post Collg 36.499 0.259 294,840 
    
White 48.634 0.116    2,029,492 
African American 45.089 0.249 358,168 
Asian 34.448 0.447 121,560 
Other Race 53.552 0.431 156,904 
 Hispanic 52.354 0.364 204,748 
    
HH size 1 23.550 0.125 715,416 
HH size 2 43.872 0.155 998,472 
HH size 3 62.885 0.294 399,916 
HH size 4 70.593 0.343 342,452 
HH size 5+ 83.217 0.495 209,868 
    
No Kids 39.983 0.106   1,949,416 
One Kids 66.878 0.338 331,316 
Two Kids 69.342 0.384 269,064 
Three Kids 72.638 0.714 85,276 
4 Kids+ 80.112 1.247 31,052 
    
Fem Age <30 49.844 0.594 65,444 
Fem Age30-40 53.231 0.285 346,540 
Fem Age40-50 62.462 0.252 601,156 
Fem Age50-65 47.734 0.169 910,540 
Fem Age 65+ 32.015 0.195 428,708 
    
Male Age <30 52.669 0.831 37,452 
Male Age30-40 56.497 0.339 263,212 
Male Age40-50 63.744 0.275 501,440 
Male Age50-65 54.679 0.204 768,136 
Male Age65+ 36.520 0.221 380,216 
    
No Fem  HH Hd 35.041 0.253 313,736 
No Male HH Hd 31.784 0.149 715,668 
    
 Ssn1 / Spring 46.146 0.197 615,777 
Ssn2 / Summer 52.899 0.217 683,449 
Ssn 3 / Autumn 46.877 0.195 700,367 
Ssn 4 / Winter      45.070 0.189 666,531 
Bold numbers indicate highest mean in category. 
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Table 3.    Decomposition of Demographic Variables to Category Levels – Mean 
Value of HH Total Oz Purchased in a Week, Purchase Observations Only 
Variable 
mean 
Wkly HH 
Buy in Oz. 
Std. 
Err. 
Number of 
Obs. 
HalfPov4Inc 262.624 2.158 17,347 
1xPov4Inc 267.300 1.494 43,271 
2xPov4Inc 270.755 0.904 104,465 
3xPov4Inc 285.142 0.887 122,750 
4xPov4Inc 285.759 1.018 96,633 
5xPov4Inc 272.526 1.040 74,926 
    Fem LessHS 318.998 2.676 15,405 
Fem HS 307.187 0.982 109,477 
Fem SomCollg 280.665 0.798 135,431 
Fem Collg 263.727 0.864 114,064 
Fem PostCollg 246.893 1.424 39,736 
    Male LessHS 312.754 2.281 19,794 
Male HS 314.752 1.145 89,414 
Male SomCollg 290.227 0.898 112,908 
Male Collg 266.422 0.939 100,703 
Male PostCollg 261.029 1.413 41,227 
    White 284.196 0.520 347,300 
African American 242.562 1.034 66,578 
Asian 286.717 2.984 14,605 
Other Race 271.848 1.693 30,909 
 Hispanic 263.580 1.413 40,668 
    HH size 1 214.016 0.878 78,724 
HH size 2 268.090 0.729 163,396 
HH size 3 289.340 1.037 86,917 
HH size 4 308.645 1.143 78,325 
HH size 5+ 335.663 1.537 52,030 
    No Kids 263.876 0.536 295,380 
One Kids 294.807 1.150 75,160 
Two Kids 304.538 1.294 61,265 
Three Kids 312.842 2.382 19,800 
4 Kids+ 319.462 3.861 7,787 
    Fem Age <30 255.002 2.268 12,792 
Fem Age30-40 276.784 1.123 66,647 
Fem Age40-50 295.245 0.935 127,181 
Fem Age50-65 284.038 0.756 153,020 
Fem Age 65+ 251.962 1.160 54,473 
    Male Age <30 259.750 3.119 7,594 
Male Age30-40 282.056 1.285 52,722 
Male Age40-50 297.694 0.998 107,372 
Male Age50-65 293.162 0.845 143,269 
Male Age65+ 261.554 1.182 53,089 
    No Fem  HH Hd 242.799 1.400 45,279 
No Male HH Hd 238.573 0.856 95,346 
     Ssn1 / Spring 264.399 0.857 107,472 
Ssn2 / Summer 292.589 0.938 123,566 
Ssn 3 / Autumn 279.207 0.897 117,586 
Ssn 4 / Winter      271.201 0.859 110,768 
Bold numbers indicate highest mean in category. 
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Table 4 (set).    Frequency Distributions for Demographic Variables 
 Number of observations:  2,666,124
 
 
Income Category Levels   % pop. 
0 to ½ x Pov4Inc   (HalfPov4Inc) 0.038 
½ to 1 x Pov4Inc    (1xPov4Inc) 0.098 
1 to 2 x Pov4Inc     (2xPov4Inc) 0.232 
2 to 3 x Pov4Inc   (3xPov4Inc) 0.270 
3 to 4 x Pov4Inc   (4xPov4Inc) 0.206 
  4 or more x Pov4Inc 0.156 
Total 1.000 
 
 
Household Size Category 
Levels % pop. 
HHsiz1 (HH = 1 member) 0.156 
Hhsiz2 0.332 
Hhsiz3 0.195 
Hhsiz4 0.183 
Hhsiz5plus 0.135 
Total 1.000 
 
 
Race Category Levels 
& Hispanic % pop. 
White 0.761 
African American (AfrAm) 0.134 
Asian 0.046 
OtherRace 0.059 
Total 1.000 
Hispanic (crosses categories) 0.077 
 
 
Female Education Levels % pop. 
Fem Less HS 0.037 
Fem HS 0.246 
Fem Some Collg 0.298 
Fem Collg 0.240 
Fem Post Collg 0.080 
Total* 0.901 
 
 
Male Education Levels % pop. 
Male Less HS 0.047 
Male HS 0.203 
Male Some Collg 0.249 
Male Collg 0.217 
Male Post Collg 0.085 
Total* 0.801 
 
 
 
 
Male Age Categories % pop. 
MaleAgeL30 0.018 
MaleAge30L40 0.124 
MaleAge40L50 0.249 
MaleAge50L65 0.308 
MaleAge65plus 0.103 
Total* 0.801 
 
Female Age Categories % pop. 
FemAgeL30 0.030 
FemAge30L40 0.154 
FemAge40L50 0.293 
FemAge50L65 0.319 
FemAge65plus 0.104 
Total* 0.901 
 
*Totals for Male- and Female-headed 
households do not total to 1, because “No 
Male Head”(=19.9% of all HHs) and “No 
Fem Head”(=9.9% of all HHs) are required 
options within the Nielsen categories for 
gender head-of-household observations. 
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Table 6.    BASIC Model, No Marketing Variable Interactions‡ 
    Number of obs.: 2,666,124 
Variable Coeff. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
Wkly Price (DMA) -1106.018 22.071 -50.110 0.000 
Disc/Sale 58.835 1.000 58.860 0.000 
Wkly Advert 0.020 0.001 35.060 0.000 
HH Inc 3.028 0.078 39.030 0.000 
Female Edu -5.959 0.404 -14.760 0.000 
Male Edu -4.762 0.430 -11.060 0.000 
Afr Amer -15.755 1.325 -11.890 0.000 
Asian 37.188 2.707 13.740 0.000 
OtherRace 19.562 1.793 10.910 0.000 
Hispnc -20.359 1.589 -12.810 0.000 
HHsize 25.764 0.448 57.570 0.000 
Kids There (All) -2.554 1.397 -1.830 0.067 
Fem Age 3.004 0.231 13.000 0.000 
Male Age 2.798 0.240 11.660 0.000 
Ssn2 46.721 1.254 37.270 0.000 
Ssn3 45.933 1.222 37.590 0.000 
Ssn4 45.678 1.276 35.810 0.000 
_cons 84.061 0.704 119.340 0.000 
     
Probit y     
Wkly P Index 27.629 0.214 129.050 0.000 
Wkly Advert 0.000 0.000 -43.380 0.000 
HH Inc -0.054 0.000 -123.420 0.000 
Female Edu -0.005 0.002 -2.300 0.021 
Male Edu -0.005 0.002 -2.160 0.030 
Afr Amer -0.200 0.008 -25.970 0.000 
Asian -0.205 0.014 -14.270 0.000 
OtherRace -0.193 0.011 -17.690 0.000 
Hispnc -0.163 0.010 -16.820 0.000 
HHsize -0.057 0.003 -20.550 0.000 
Kids There (All) 0.105 0.008 12.390 0.000 
Fem Age -0.069 0.001 -54.060 0.000 
Male Age -0.016 0.001 -12.130 0.000 
WksHHTotOz 0.161 0.000 466.350 0.000 
MovgAvgHHStock 0.000 0.000 -29.230 0.000 
_cons -1.055 0.002 -488.760 0.000 
     
mills lambda -52.321 0.409 -127.830 0.000 
     
rho -0.420    
sigma 124.506    
lambda -52.321 0.409   
     
‡ Reference Groups: White, Non-Hispanic, No Kids 
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Table 7.    BASIC Model, No Marketing Variable Interactions‡ 
 
variable 
ME = 
dy/dx† X* 
ME x X* 
(oz at 
purchase) †† 
Wkly Price (DMA) -1106.018 0.007 -8.192 
Disc/Sale 58.835 - 58.835 
Wkly Advert 0.020 374.631 7.424 
HH Inc 3.028   
Female Edu -5.959   
Male Edu -4.762   
Afr Amer -15.755   
Asian 37.188   
OtherRace 19.562   
Hispnc -20.359   
HHsize 25.764   
Kids in HH -2.554   
Fem Age 3.004   
Male Age 2.798   
Ssn2 46.721   
Ssn3 45.933   
Ssn4 45.678   
WksHHTotOzGrtr67 0.161   
MovgAvgHHStock6 -0.0003 39.359  
‡ Reference Groups: White, Non-Hispanic, No Kids. 
† All variables significant to the 1% level, except Kids in HH, p-value=0.067. 
* “X” is the average value at which continuous variables are calculated. 
†† This column demonstrates the way inference in ounces is done for the marketing-mix 
variables. It will not be reproduced in later tables, to conserve presentation space.  
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Table 8.     BASIC Model, With Marketing Variable Interactions‡ 
Number of obs.: 2,666,124 
Censored obs = 2,206,732 
Uncensored obs = 459,392 
 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. z P>|z| δy/δx* P>|z| X^ 
Wkly Price (DMA) -179.840 63.014 -2.850 0.004 826.475 0 0.007 
Disc/Sale 81.460 3.795 21.470 0.000 81.460 0 - 
Wkly Advert 0.055 0.002 34.150 0.000 0.050 0 374.631 
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. z P>z δy/δx* P>|z|       
HH Inc 6.168 0.154 39.940 0.000 4.311 0  
Female Edu -9.143 0.819 -11.160 0.000 -9.334 0  
Male Edu 0.523 0.873 0.600 0.549 0.333 0.704  
Afr Amer -23.000 2.742 -8.390 0.000 -30.362 0  
Asian -4.772 5.801 -0.820 0.411 -12.330 0.034  
OtherRace 15.992 3.696 4.330 0.000 8.871 0.017  
Hispnc -5.641 3.237 -1.740 0.081 -11.622 0  
HHsize 29.124 0.907 32.120 0.000 27.051 0  
Kids There (All) 7.050 2.905 2.430 0.015 10.857 0  
Fem Age 11.884 0.477 24.920 0.000 9.382 0  
Male Age 3.094 0.504 6.140 0.000 2.498 0  
     
OLS coeff/ME, in oz, by 
multiplying avg value ‘X’ 
P x HH Inc -47.572 3.277 -14.520 0.000 -0.352   
P x Female Edu 85.187 15.124 5.630 0.000 0.631   
P x Male Edu -34.992 16.045 -2.180 0.029 -0.259   
P x Afr Amer -35.550 53.779 -0.660 0.509 -0.263   
P x Asian 217.023 103.519 2.100 0.036 1.607   
P x OtherRace -134.097 66.871 -2.010 0.045 -0.993   
P x Hispnc 289.897 58.864 4.920 0.000 2.147   
P x HHsize -319.661 18.610 -17.180 0.000 -2.368   
P x Kids There (All) 63.099 56.785 1.110 0.266 0.467   
P x Fem Age -146.960 9.662 -15.210 0.000 -1.089   
P x Male Age -6.345 10.073 -0.630 0.529 -0.047   
Sale x HH Inc -0.715 0.175 -4.080 0.000 -0.715   
Sale x Female Edu 1.768 0.844 2.100 0.036 1.768   
Sale x Male Edu -2.264 0.903 -2.510 0.012 -2.264   
Sale x Afr Amer 22.006 2.895 7.600 0.000 22.006   
Sale x Asian 95.268 5.440 17.510 0.000 95.268   
Sale x OtherRace 1.968 3.901 0.500 0.614 1.968   
Sale x Hispnc -2.254 3.455 -0.650 0.514 -2.254   
Sale x HHsize -0.495 0.950 -0.520 0.602 -0.495   
SalexKidsThere(All) -23.977 2.966 -8.080 0.000 -23.977   
Sale x Fem Age -1.055 0.492 -2.140 0.032 -1.055   
Sale x Male Age -0.814 0.505 -1.610 0.107 -0.814   
Adv x HH Inc -0.001 0.000 -12.660 0.000 -0.403   
Adv x Female Edu 0.000 0.000 -0.370 0.713 -0.057   
Adv x Male Edu -0.004 0.000 -8.250 0.000 -1.395   
Adv x Afr Amer -0.001 0.001 -0.570 0.568 -0.301   
Adv x Asian 0.005 0.003 1.590 0.113 1.793   
Adv x OtherRace 0.006 0.002 3.240 0.001 2.293   
Adv x Hispnc -0.014 0.002 -8.740 0.000 -5.258   
273 
Adv x HHsize 0.004 0.000 8.000 0.000 1.416   
AdvxKidsThere(All) -0.006 0.001 -4.110 0.000 -2.271   
Adv x Fem Age -0.003 0.000 -12.990 0.000 -1.192   
Adv x Male Age 0.000 0.000 0.970 0.330 0.093   
Ssn2 32.933 1.263 26.080 0.000 32.933   
Ssn3 26.677 1.251 21.330 0.000 26.677   
Ssn4 20.581 1.327 15.510 0.000 20.581   
_cons 69.461 0.734 94.690 0.000    
        
Probit y        
Wkly P DMA 27.629 0.214 129.050 0.000    
Wkly Advert 0.000 0.000 -43.380 0.000    
HH Inc -0.054 0.000 -123.420 0.000    
Female Edu -0.005 0.002 -2.300 0.021    
Male Edu -0.005 0.002 -2.160 0.030    
Afr Amer -0.200 0.008 -25.970 0.000    
Asian -0.205 0.014 -14.270 0.000    
OtherRace -0.193 0.011 -17.690 0.000    
Hispnc -0.163 0.010 -16.820 0.000    
HHsize -0.057 0.003 -20.550 0.000    
Kids There (All) 0.105 0.008 12.390 0.000    
Fem Age -0.069 0.001 -54.060 0.000    
Male Age -0.016 0.001 -12.130 0.000    
WksHHTotOzGrtr67 0.161 0.000 466.350 0.000    
MovgAvgHHStock6 0.000 0.000 -29.230 0.000    
_cons -1.055 0.002 -488.760 0.000    
        
mills        
lambda -45.104 0.420 -107.270 0.000    
        
rho -0.370       
sigma 121.842       
lambda -45.104 0.420      
‡ Reference Groups: White, Non-Hispanic, No Kids 
* δy/δx is the marginal effect of the variable, for inference.  Lighter-shaded cells are values for 
variables regressed on either the OLS-side or the Probit-side equation only, and are therefore 
unadjusted from the first numeric column. 
^ “X” is the average value at which marketing variables are calculated. 
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Table 10a.    BASIC Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 224 194 217 210 204 174 197 190 
1xPvInc 234 204 227 220 214 184 207 199 
2xPvInc 246 216 239 231 226 196 219 211 
3xPvInc 270 239 263 255 250 219 243 235 
4xPvInc 286 255 279 271 266 235 258 251 
5xPvInc 310 279 302 295 289 259 282 275 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 233 202 225 218 280 250 273 265 
HS 223 192 215 208 270 239 263 255 
Sm Collg 212 182 205 198 260 229 253 245 
Collg 202 172 195 188 250 219 243 235 
Post Collg 192 162 185 177 240 209 232 225 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10b.    BASIC Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 187 157 180 173 170 139 163 155 
1xPvInc 197 167 190 182 180 149 172 165 
2xPvInc 209 179 202 194 192 161 184 177 
3xPvInc 233 202 225 218 215 185 208 201 
4xPvInc 249 218 241 234 231 201 224 216 
5xPvInc 272 242 265 258 255 224 248 240 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 206 158 199 191 242 211 234 227 
HS 197 167 190 182 233 202 225 218 
Sm Collg 188 158 181 174 224 194 217 209 
Collg 180 149 172 165 215 185 208 201 
Post Collg 171 140 164 156 207 176 199 192 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 10c.    BASIC Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 182 152 175 167 179 149 172 165 
1xPvInc 192 161 185 177 189 159 182 174 
2xPvInc 204 173 197 189 201 171 194 186 
3xPvInc 228 197 220 213 225 194 218 210 
4xPvInc 243 213 236 229 241 210 233 226 
5xPvInc 267 237 260 252 264 234 257 250 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 193 163 186 179 229 198 222 214 
HS 192 161 185 177 228 197 220 213 
Sm Collg 191 160 183 176 226 196 219 211 
Collg 189 159 182 174 225 194 218 210 
Post Collg 188 157 181 173 224 193 216 209 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 11.    BROAD Model (Demographic Variables Decomposed into Distinct Levels), 
No Marketing Variable Interactions‡  
Number of obs.: 2,666,124   
Censored obs = 2,206,732 
Uncensored obs = 459,392 
 
Variable Coeff. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z δy/δx* P>|z|      
X^ 
Wkly Price (DMA) -2622.694 20.296 -129.220 0.000 -1313.277 0 0.007 
Disc/Sale 53.248 0.991 53.730 0.000 53.248 0 - 
Wkly Advert 0.010 0.001 18.080 0.000 0.011 0 374.631 
HalfPov4Inc -27.143 2.249 -12.070 0.000 -23.124 0  
1xPov4Inc -39.429 1.846 -21.360 0.000 -32.550 0  
2xPov4Inc -45.286 1.696 -26.700 0.000 -33.765 0  
3xPov4Inc -34.326 1.586 -21.640 0.000 -24.520 0  
4xPov4Inc -16.929 1.571 -10.770 0.000 -11.388 0  
Fem Less HS 112.697 2.684 41.980 0.000 90.944 0  
Fem HS 94.098 1.950 48.250 0.000 72.320 0  
Fem Som Collg 65.015 1.952 33.300 0.000 49.301 0  
Fem Collg 42.582 2.032 20.960 0.000 29.142 0  
Male Less HS 108.038 2.586 41.780 0.000 79.871 0  
Male HS 105.467 2.014 52.360 0.000 78.877 0  
Male Som Collg 73.975 2.016 36.690 0.000 56.834 0  
Male Collg 51.079 2.048 24.940 0.000 35.426 0  
Afr Amer -20.412 1.287 -15.860 0.000 -18.991 0  
Asian 52.857 2.595 20.370 0.000 40.670 0  
Other Race 19.560 1.700 11.500 0.000 17.573 0  
Hispnc -12.300 1.513 -8.130 0.000 -20.989 0  
HH size 2 68.032 1.453 46.810 0.000 53.733 0  
HH size 3 92.918 1.807 51.420 0.000 77.661 0  
HH size 4 118.167 2.196 53.800 0.000 100.894 0  
HH size 5+ 165.661 2.474 66.970 0.000 140.889 0  
One Kids -2.830 1.521 -1.860 0.063 -4.170 0.007  
Two Kids -18.734 1.922 -9.750 0.000 -19.895 0  
Three Kids -46.140 2.712 -17.020 0.000 -40.983 0  
4 Kids+ -37.294 3.636 -10.260 0.000 -30.922 0  
Fem Age <30 16.362 2.473 6.620 0.000 2.430 0.335  
Fem Age30-40 18.471 1.722 10.720 0.000 7.845 0  
Fem Age40-50 12.962 1.441 9.000 0.000 8.758 0  
Fem Age 65+ 0.219 1.814 0.120 0.904 -8.076 0  
Male Age <30 38.687 3.005 12.880 0.000 28.695 0  
Male Age30-40 30.149 1.770 17.030 0.000 19.169 0  
Male Age40-50 20.666 1.462 14.130 0.000 15.490 0  
Male Age 65+ 8.747 1.915 4.570 0.000 -4.060 0.037  
Ssn2 31.926 1.258 25.370 0.000 31.926 0  
Ssn3 25.671 1.243 20.650 0.000 25.671 0  
Ssn4 18.944 1.318 14.380 0.000 18.944 0  
No Fem HH Hd 152.522 2.116 72.090 0.000 95.768 0  
No Male HH Hd 133.940 2.132 62.830 0.000 81.109 0  
_cons 65.367 0.690 94.690 0.000    
        
Probit y        
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Wkly P DMA 45.988 0.263 174.980 0.000    
Wkly Advert 0.000013 0.000 4.030 0.000    
HalfPov4Inc 0.143 0.015 9.750 0.000    
1xPov4Inc 0.246 0.012 20.950 0.000    
2xPov4Inc 0.416 0.011 39.570 0.000    
3xPov4Inc 0.352 0.010 36.180 0.000    
4xPov4Inc 0.197 0.010 20.700 0.000    
Fem Less HS -0.733 0.017 -42.210 0.000    
Fem HS -0.738 0.011 -65.860 0.000    
Fem Som Collg -0.535 0.011 -48.890 0.000    
Fem Collg -0.457 0.011 -40.760 0.000    
Male Less HS -0.941 0.016 -58.600 0.000    
Male HS -0.894 0.012 -76.950 0.000    
Male Som Collg -0.584 0.011 -51.570 0.000    
Male Collg -0.534 0.011 -46.890 0.000    
Afr Amer 0.050 0.008 6.190 0.000    
Asian -0.417 0.015 -28.420 0.000    
Other Race -0.069 0.011 -6.150 0.000    
Hispnc -0.300 0.010 -29.860 0.000    
HH size 2 -0.490 0.009 -55.970 0.000    
HH size 3 -0.521 0.011 -45.610 0.000    
HH size 4 -0.588 0.014 -41.190 0.000    
HH size 5+ -0.833 0.017 -50.300 0.000    
One Kids -0.047 0.010 -4.680 0.000    
Two Kids -0.041 0.013 -3.120 0.002    
Three Kids 0.183 0.018 9.990 0.000    
4 Kids+ 0.228 0.025 9.240 0.000    
Fem Age <30 -0.476 0.016 -29.580 0.000    
Fem Age30-40 -0.366 0.011 -33.510 0.000    
Fem Age40-50 -0.146 0.009 -16.070 0.000    
Fem Age 65+ -0.287 0.011 -26.510 0.000    
Male Age <30 -0.344 0.020 -17.440 0.000    
Male Age30-40 -0.377 0.011 -33.550 0.000    
Male Age40-50 -0.180 0.009 -19.430 0.000    
Male Age 65+ -0.439 0.011 -38.190 0.000    
No Fem HH Hd -1.806 0.012 -144.760 0.000    
No Male HH Hd -1.693 0.012 -138.670 0.000    
WksHHTotOzGrtr67 0.178 0.000 482.180 0.000    
MovgAvgHHStock6 -0.00039 0.000 -35.820 0.000    
_cons -1.172 0.002 -558.190 0.000    
        mills        
lambda -35.164 0.388 -90.700 0.000    
        rho -0.294       
sigma 119.480       
lambda -35.164 0.388      
‡ Reference Groups: 5xPovInc, FemPostCollg (MalePostCollg), White, Non-Hispanic, HHsiz1, 
NoKids, FemAge50-65 (MaleAge50-65) 
* δy/δx is the marginal effect of the variable, for inference.  Lighter-shaded cells are values for 
variables regressed on either the OLS-side or the Probit-side equation only, and are therefore 
unadjusted from the first numeric column. 
^ “X” is the average value at which marketing variables are calculated. 
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Table 12.    BROAD Model, No Marketing Variable Interactions‡ 
variable ME =dy/dx† X* ME x X* (oz at purchase) †† 
Wkly Price (DMA) -1313.277 0.007 -9.727 
Disc/Sale 53.248 - 53.248 
Wkly Advert 0.011 374.631 3.958 
HalfPov4Inc -23.124   
1xPov4Inc -32.550   
2xPov4Inc -33.765   
3xPov4Inc -24.520   
4xPov4Inc -11.388   
Fem Less HS 90.944   
Fem HS 72.320   
Fem Som Collg 49.301   
Fem Collg 29.142   
Male Less HS 79.871   
Male HS 78.877   
Male Som Collg 56.834   
Male Collg 35.426   
Afr Amer -18.991   
Asian 40.670   
Other Race 17.573   
Hispnc -20.989   
HH size 2 53.733   
HH size 3 77.661   
HH size 4 100.894   
HH size 5+ 140.889   
One Kids -4.170   
Two Kids -19.895   
Three Kids -40.983   
4 Kids+ -30.922   
Fem Age <30 2.430   
Fem Age30-40 7.845   
Fem Age40-50 8.758   
Fem Age 65+ -8.076   
Male Age <30 28.695   
Male Age30-40 19.169   
Male Age40-50 15.490   
Male Age 65+ -4.060   
No Fem HHH 95.768   
No Male HHH 81.109   
Ssn2 31.926   
Ssn3 25.671   
Ssn4 18.944   
WksHHTotOzGrtr67 0.178   
MovgAvgHHStock6 -0.0004 39.359  
‡ Reference Groups: 5xPv4Inc, FemPostCollg, MalePostCollg, White and non-Hispanic, 
HHsize=1 and No Kids, and Fem/Male Age 50-65 
† All variables significant to the 1% level, except Fem Age <30, p-value=0.335, and Male Age 
65+, pval=0.037. 
* “X” is the average value at which continuous variables are calculated. 
†† This column demonstrates the way inference in ounces is done for the marketing-mix 
variables. It will not be reproduced in later tables, to conserve presentation space. 
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Table 13.    BROAD Model (Demographic Variables Decomposed into Distinct Levels), 
With Marketing Variable Interactions‡ 
Number of obs.: 2,666,124  
Censored obs = 2,206,732 
Uncensored obs = 459,392 
 
Variable Coeff. 
Std. 
Err. z P>|z| δy/δx* 
P>|z| 
X^ 
Wkly Price (DMA) -1160.794 68.004 -17.070 0.000 103.811 0.129 0.007 
Disc/Sale 73.207 3.850 19.010 0.000 73.207 0 - 
Wkly Advert 0.022 0.002 12.160 0.000 0.022 0 374.631 
Variable Coeff. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z δy/δx* P>|z|       
HalfPov4Inc 20.006 4.552 4.390 0.000 23.887 0  
1xPov4Inc -11.456 3.652 -3.140 0.002 -4.812 0.189  
2xPov4Inc -17.027 3.360 -5.070 0.000 -5.901 0.08  
3xPov4Inc -4.647 3.160 -1.470 0.141 4.824 0.128  
4xPov4Inc 5.616 3.225 1.740 0.082 10.967 0.001  
Fem Less HS 116.677 5.421 21.520 0.000 95.667 0  
Fem HS 103.146 3.555 29.020 0.000 82.113 0  
Fem Som Collg 61.712 3.529 17.490 0.000 46.535 0  
Fem Collg 53.872 3.762 14.320 0.000 40.890 0  
Male Less HS 102.127 4.930 20.720 0.000 74.921 0  
Male HS 90.086 3.477 25.910 0.000 64.402 0  
Male Som Collg 77.077 3.456 22.300 0.000 60.520 0  
Male Collg 55.129 3.619 15.230 0.000 40.010 0  
Afr Amer -38.435 2.789 -13.780 0.000 -37.062 0  
Asian 21.096 5.791 3.640 0.000 9.324 0.108  
Other Race 2.809 3.701 0.760 0.448 0.889 0.811  
Hispnc -11.472 3.254 -3.530 0.000 -19.864 0  
HH size 2 90.340 3.062 29.500 0.000 76.527 0  
HH size 3 113.846 3.905 29.150 0.000 99.109 0  
HH size 4 141.730 4.785 29.620 0.000 125.046 0  
HH size 5+ 186.163 5.410 34.410 0.000 162.236 0  
One Kids -0.726 3.347 -0.220 0.828 -2.021 0.547  
Two Kids -7.848 4.242 -1.850 0.064 -8.969 0.035  
Three Kids -40.838 5.986 -6.820 0.000 -35.858 0  
4 Kids+ -50.018 7.824 -6.390 0.000 -31.999 0  
Fem Age <30 -19.409 5.186 -3.740 0.000 -32.867 0  
Fem Age30-40 -7.501 3.605 -2.080 0.037 -17.764 0  
Fem Age40-50 4.596 3.106 1.480 0.139 0.535 0.864  
Fem Age 65+ 5.515 4.067 1.360 0.175 -2.497 0.54  
Male Age <30 66.416 6.191 10.730 0.000 56.765 0  
Male Age30-40 33.429 3.706 9.020 0.000 22.824 0  
Male Age40-50 32.967 3.074 10.720 0.000 27.968 0  
Male Age 65+ -2.424 4.251 -0.570 0.569 -14.795 0.001  
     
OLS coeff/ME, in oz, by 
multiplying avg value ‘X’ 
P x HfPv4Inc -884.439 94.466 -9.360 0.000 -6.551   
P x 1Pov4Inc -426.016 72.210 -5.900 0.000 -3.155   
P x 2Pov4Inc -573.776 64.845 -8.850 0.000 -4.250   
P x 3Pov4Inc -455.155 59.266 -7.680 0.000 -3.371   
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P x 4Pov4Inc -630.403 60.977 -10.340 0.000 -4.669   
P x Fem Less HS -1116.282 108.146 -10.320 0.000 -8.268   
P x Fem HS -793.945 66.452 -11.950 0.000 -5.881   
P x Fem Som Collg -363.988 62.724 -5.800 0.000 -2.696   
P x Fem Collg -646.274 68.765 -9.400 0.000 -4.787   
P x Male Less HS -31.203 94.170 -0.330 0.740 -0.231   
P x Male HS 55.423 63.481 0.870 0.383 0.411   
P x Male Som Collg -157.910 60.449 -2.610 0.009 -1.170   
P x Male Collg -135.778 66.025 -2.060 0.040 -1.006   
P x Afr Amer 122.714 54.507 2.250 0.024 0.909   
P x Asian 59.108 104.351 0.570 0.571 0.438   
P x Other Race 21.364 67.558 0.320 0.752 0.158   
P x Hispnc 436.223 60.152 7.250 0.000 3.231   
P x HHsiz2 -835.257 60.434 -13.820 0.000 -6.187   
P x HHsiz3 -1066.309 79.897 -13.350 0.000 -7.898   
P x HHsiz4 -1010.427 99.555 -10.150 0.000 -7.484   
P x HHsiz5plus -1522.518 114.855 -13.260 0.000 -11.277   
P x One Kids 93.116 66.576 1.400 0.162 0.690   
P x Two Kids -65.866 87.727 -0.750 0.453 -0.488   
P x Three Kids 26.474 124.464 0.210 0.832 0.196   
P x 4 Kids+ -255.021 175.401 -1.450 0.146 -1.889   
P x FemAgeL30 624.141 87.749 7.110 0.000 4.623   
P x FemAge30L40 481.915 68.508 7.030 0.000 3.570   
P x FemAge40L50 183.085 62.179 2.940 0.003 1.356   
P x FemAge65+ 222.291 91.155 2.440 0.015 1.647   
P x MaleAgeL30 -336.826 94.800 -3.550 0.000 -2.495   
P x MaleAge30L40 -76.469 66.298 -1.150 0.249 -0.566   
P x MaleAge40L50 -262.456 58.055 -4.520 0.000 -1.944   
P x MaleAge65+ -35.811 94.774 -0.380 0.706 -0.265   
Sale x HfPv4Inc -29.463 4.738 -6.220 0.000 -29.463   
Sale x 1Pov4Inc -11.919 3.782 -3.150 0.002 -11.919   
Sale x 2Pov4Inc 2.521 3.311 0.760 0.446 2.521   
Sale x 3Pov4Inc -13.833 3.163 -4.370 0.000 -13.833   
Sale x 4Pov4Inc 4.042 3.255 1.240 0.214 4.042   
Sale x Fem Less HS 5.979 5.302 1.130 0.260 5.979   
Sale x Fem HS 4.979 3.352 1.490 0.137 4.979   
Sale x Fem SomCollg 17.455 3.439 5.080 0.000 17.455   
Sale x Fem Collg 5.666 3.747 1.510 0.130 5.666   
Sale x Male Less HS -20.011 4.701 -4.260 0.000 -20.011   
Sale x Male HS -4.051 3.132 -1.290 0.196 -4.051   
Sale x MaleSomCollg -15.739 3.275 -4.810 0.000 -15.739   
Sale x Male Collg -11.156 3.590 -3.110 0.002 -11.156   
Sale x Afr Amer 26.881 2.916 9.220 0.000 26.881   
Sale x Asian 67.018 5.463 12.270 0.000 67.018   
Sale x Other Race 12.259 3.883 3.160 0.002 12.259   
Sale x Hispnc -1.818 3.467 -0.520 0.600 -1.818   
Sale x HHsiz2 -17.906 3.368 -5.320 0.000 -17.906   
Sale x HHsiz3 -10.797 4.121 -2.620 0.009 -10.797   
Sale x HHsiz4 -25.256 4.947 -5.100 0.000 -25.256   
Sale x HHsiz5+ -23.815 5.567 -4.280 0.000 -23.815   
Sale x One Kids -8.275 3.375 -2.450 0.014 -8.275   
Sale x Two Kids -29.486 4.267 -6.910 0.000 -29.486   
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Sale x Three Kids 12.971 5.983 2.170 0.030 12.971   
Sale x 4 Kids+ 22.658 8.506 2.660 0.008 22.658   
Sale x FemAgeL30 -13.718 5.923 -2.320 0.021 -13.718   
Sale x FemAge30L40 -8.436 3.743 -2.250 0.024 -8.436   
Sale x FemAge40L50 5.485 3.087 1.780 0.076 5.485   
Sale x FemAge65+ -13.129 3.754 -3.500 0.000 -13.129   
Sale x MaleAgeL30 3.008 7.381 0.410 0.684 3.008   
Sale x MaleAge30L40 5.829 3.921 1.490 0.137 5.829   
Sale x MaleAge40L50 -12.553 3.114 -4.030 0.000 -12.553   
Sale x MaleAge65+ 5.311 4.041 1.310 0.189 5.311   
Adv x HfPv4Inc -0.010 0.002 -4.390 0.000 -3.846   
Adv x 1Pov4Inc -0.008 0.002 -4.390 0.000 -3.045   
Adv x 2Pov4Inc -0.007 0.002 -4.000 0.000 -2.471   
Adv x 3Pov4Inc -0.007 0.002 -4.560 0.000 -2.712   
Adv x 4Pov4Inc -0.004 0.002 -2.280 0.023 -1.412   
Adv x Fem Less HS 0.004 0.003 1.710 0.088 1.676   
Adv x Fem HS -0.006 0.002 -3.550 0.000 -2.251   
Adv x Fem SomCollg -0.005 0.002 -2.900 0.004 -1.874   
Adv x Fem Collg -0.007 0.002 -3.830 0.000 -2.725   
Adv x Male Less HS -0.005 0.002 -2.020 0.044 -1.798   
Adv x Male HS -0.001 0.002 -0.810 0.417 -0.486   
Adv x Male SomCollg -0.006 0.002 -3.630 0.000 -2.253   
Adv x Male Collg -0.008 0.002 -4.480 0.000 -3.043   
Adv x Afr Amer 0.004 0.001 2.980 0.003 1.589   
Adv x Asian 0.003 0.003 0.900 0.366 1.022   
Adv x Other Race 0.009 0.002 4.580 0.000 3.243   
Adv x Hispnc -0.012 0.002 -7.340 0.000 -4.430   
Adv x HHsiz2 -0.003 0.002 -1.770 0.077 -1.100   
Adv x HHsiz3 0.000 0.002 0.090 0.928 0.070   
Adv x HHsiz4 -0.001 0.002 -0.510 0.612 -0.470   
Adv x HHsiz5+ 0.009 0.003 3.360 0.001 3.483   
Adv x One Kids -0.002 0.002 -1.170 0.243 -0.736   
Adv x Two Kids 0.000 0.002 0.230 0.820 0.182   
Adv x Three Kids -0.003 0.003 -1.150 0.250 -1.303   
Adv x 4 Kids+ 0.017 0.004 4.060 0.000 6.477   
Adv x FemAgeL30 0.011 0.003 4.100 0.000 4.271   
Adv x FemAge30L40 0.007 0.002 3.790 0.000 2.606   
Adv x FemAge40L50 -0.001 0.002 -0.770 0.444 -0.444   
Adv x FemAge65+ -0.008 0.002 -4.060 0.000 -2.981   
Adv x MaleAgeL30 -0.019 0.003 -5.700 0.000 -7.127   
Adv x MaleAge30L40 -0.006 0.002 -3.260 0.001 -2.335   
Adv x MaleAge40L50 -0.004 0.002 -2.350 0.019 -1.370   
Adv x MaleAge65+ 0.005 0.002 2.400 0.016 1.882   
Ssn2 28.911 1.260 22.940 0.000 28.911   
Ssn3 21.420 1.251 17.120 0.000 21.420   
Ssn4 13.604 1.330 10.230 0.000 13.604   
No Fem HH Hd 118.783 2.471 48.060 0.000 65.244 0  
No Male HH Hd 106.585 2.355 45.270 0.000 56.842 0  
_cons 59.823 0.718 83.300 0.000    
        
Probit y        
Wkly P DMA 45.988 0.263 174.980 0.000    
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Wkly Advrt 0.000 0.000 4.030 0.000    
HalfPov4Inc 0.143 0.015 9.750 0.000    
1xPov4Inc 0.246 0.012 20.950 0.000    
2xPov4Inc 0.416 0.011 39.570 0.000    
3xPov4Inc 0.352 0.010 36.180 0.000    
4xPov4Inc 0.197 0.010 20.700 0.000    
Fem Less HS -0.733 0.017 -42.210 0.000    
Fem HS -0.738 0.011 -65.860 0.000    
Fem Som Collg -0.535 0.011 -48.890 0.000    
Fem Collg -0.457 0.011 -40.760 0.000    
Male Less HS -0.941 0.016 -58.600 0.000    
Male HS -0.894 0.012 -76.950 0.000    
Male Som Collg -0.584 0.011 -51.570 0.000    
Male Collg -0.534 0.011 -46.890 0.000    
AfrAm 0.050 0.008 6.190 0.000    
Asian -0.417 0.015 -28.420 0.000    
Other Race -0.069 0.011 -6.150 0.000    
Hispnc -0.300 0.010 -29.860 0.000    
HH size 2 -0.490 0.009 -55.970 0.000    
HH size 3 -0.521 0.011 -45.610 0.000    
HH size 4 -0.588 0.014 -41.190 0.000    
HH size 5+ -0.833 0.017 -50.300 0.000    
One Kids -0.047 0.010 -4.680 0.000    
Two Kids -0.041 0.013 -3.120 0.002    
Three Kids 0.183 0.018 9.990 0.000    
4 Kids+ 0.228 0.025 9.240 0.000    
Fem Age <30 -0.476 0.016 -29.580 0.000    
Fem Age30-40 -0.366 0.011 -33.510 0.000    
Fem Age40-50 -0.146 0.009 -16.070 0.000    
Fem Age 65+ -0.287 0.011 -26.510 0.000    
Male Age <30 -0.344 0.020 -17.440 0.000    
Male Age30-40 -0.377 0.011 -33.550 0.000    
Male Age40-50 -0.180 0.009 -19.430 0.000    
Male Age 65+ -0.439 0.011 -38.190 0.000    
No Fem HH Hd -1.806 0.012 -144.76 0.000    
No Male HH Hd -1.693 0.012 -138.67 0.000    
WksHHTotOzGrtr67 0.178 0.000 482.180 0.000    
MovgAvgHHStock6 0.000 0.000 -35.820 0.000    
_cons -1.172 0.002 -558.19 0.000    
        
mills        
lambda -33.966 0.389 -87.220 0.000    
        
rho -0.286       
sigma 118.925       
lambda -33.966 0.389      
‡ Reference Groups: 5xPovInc, FemPostCollg (MalePostCollg), White, Non-Hispanic, 
HHsiz1, NoKids, FemAge50-65 (MaleAge50-65) 
* δy/δx is the marginal effect of the variable, for inference.  Lighter-shaded cells are 
values for variables regressed on either the OLS-side or the Probit-side equation 
only, and are therefore unadjusted from the first numeric column. 
^ “X” is the average value at which marketing variables are calculated. 
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Table 14.    BROAD Model With Marketing Variable Interactions – Combined Marginal 
Effects  of Variable and Variable Interacted with Marketing Variable, and 
Change in Marginal Effects with Change from Marketing Variable Averages‡ 
Variable 
Marg. 
Effect 
Combined 
MEs of  
Variable + 
Price x 
Variable1 
CME  
Change,   
Plus 1  
St. Dev. 
in Price2 
Combined 
MEs of  
Variable + 
Advert. x 
Variable1 
CME 
Change, 
Plus 1  
St. Dev. 
Advert 2 
Combined 
MEs of  
Variable + 
Sale x 
Variable1 
ME for 
same 
variables 
from 
Table 12 
HalfPov4Inc 23.887 17.336 -3.900 20.041 -4.057 -5.576 -23.124 
1xPov4Incp -4.812 -7.968 -1.879 -7.857 -3.212 -16.731 -32.550 
2xPov4Incppp -5.901 -10.151 -2.530 -8.373 -2.607 -3.380 -33.765 
3xPov4Incppp 4.824 1.452 -2.007 2.112 -2.861 -9.009 -24.520 
4xPov4Incppp 10.967 6.298 -2.780 9.555 -1.489 15.009 -11.388 
Fem Less HS 95.667 87.399 -4.923 97.344 1.768 101.646 90.944 
Fem HS 82.113 76.232 -3.501 79.862 -2.375 87.092 72.320 
Fem Som Collg 46.535 43.839 -1.605 44.661 -1.977 63.991 49.301 
Fem Collg 40.890 36.103 -2.850 38.165 -2.875 46.556 29.142 
Male Less HS 74.921 74.690 -0.138 73.123 -1.896 54.909 79.871 
Male HS 64.402 64.812 0.244 63.916 -0.512 60.351 78.877 
Male Som Collg 60.520 59.350 -0.696 58.267 -2.377 44.780 56.834 
Male Collg 40.010 39.004 -0.599 36.967 -3.210 28.854 35.426 
Afr Amer -37.062 -36.153 0.541 -35.473 1.676 -10.181 -18.991 
Asianpp 9.324 9.762 0.261 10.346 1.078 76.343 40.670 
Other Race 0.889 1.048 0.094 4.132 3.421 13.148 17.573 
Hispnc -19.864 -16.633 1.924 -24.294 -4.673 -21.682 -20.989 
HH size 2 76.527 70.341 -3.683 75.427 -1.161 58.621 53.733 
HH size 3 99.109 91.211 -4.702 99.179 0.074 88.312 77.661 
HH size 4 125.046 117.561 -4.456 124.575 -0.496 99.790 100.894 
HH size 5+ 162.236 150.959 -6.714 165.718 3.674 138.421 140.889 
One Kidsppp -2.021 -1.331 0.411 -2.756 -0.776 -10.296 -4.170 
Two Kidsp -8.969 -9.457 -0.290 -8.788 0.192 -38.455 -19.895 
Three Kids -35.858 -35.662 0.117 -37.161 -1.375 -22.887 -40.983 
4 Kids+ -31.999 -33.888 -1.125 -25.522 6.832 -9.341 -30.922 
Fem Age <30 -32.867 -28.244 2.752 -28.596 4.505 -46.585 2.430 
Fem Age30-40 -17.764 -14.194 2.125 -15.158 2.749 -26.200 7.845 
Fem Age40-50ppp 0.535 1.892 0.807 0.092 -0.468 6.021 8.758 
Fem Age 65+ppp -2.497 -0.850 0.980 -5.478 -3.145 -15.626 -8.076 
Male Age <30 56.765 54.270 -1.485 49.638 -7.518 59.773 28.695 
Male Age30-40 22.824 22.257 -0.337 20.489 -2.463 28.652 19.169 
Male Age40-50 27.968 26.024 -1.157 26.598 -1.445 15.415 15.490 
Male Age 65+ -14.795 -15.060 -0.158 -12.912 1.986 -9.484 -4.060 
   22 of 33  11 of 33 15 of 33  
‡ Reference Groups: 5xPovInc, FmPostCollg (MalePostCollg), White, Non-Hispanic, HH size=1, NoKids, 
FemAge50-65 (MaleAge50-65) 
1Given average of: Price or Advert. For Sale, Sale-interaction coefficients added to corresponding variables, no average 
on a binary, so no standard deviation shock. 
2Means and standard deviations of Price and Advertising are projection-factor weighted, consistent with the data 
matrix used in estimation: Mean (st. dev.): Price 0.0071 (0.0044); Advert 374.6307 (395.200). If Change in ME value 
is of expected sign for economic behavior associated with a normal good, value is in bold, ratio of bold values to all is 
in last row. For Sale, value is in bold if ME rises versus variable ME alone. 
p Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.01. See main text for figure. 
pp Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.05. See main text for figure. 
ppp Variable has CME in at least one marketing variable with p-value greater than 0.10. See main text for figure. 
288 
 
 
 
Table 15a.    BROAD Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 354 318 364 338 288 252 298 272 
1xPvInc 329 293 339 312 263 227 273 246 
2xPvInc 327 291 336 310 261 225 271 244 
3xPvInc 338 302 348 322 272 236 282 256 
4xPvInc 343 307 353 327 277 241 287 261 
5xPvInc 337 301 347 320 271 235 281 254 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 350 314 360 333 364 328 374 348 
HS 329 293 339 312 343 307 353 327 
Sm Collg 291 255 301 274 305 269 315 289 
Collg 263 227 273 246 277 241 287 261 
Post Collg 188 152 198 171 202 166 212 186 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
 
 
 
Table 15b.    BROAD Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 263 227 273 247 223 187 233 207 
1xPvInc 238 202 248 221 198 162 208 181 
2xPvInc 236 200 246 219 196 160 206 179 
3xPvInc 248 211 257 231 207 171 217 191 
4xPvInc 252 216 262 236 212 176 222 196 
5xPvInc 246 210 256 229 206 170 216 189 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 249 213 259 233 264 227 273 247 
HS 238 202 248 221 252 216 262 236 
Sm Collg 206 170 215 189 220 184 230 203 
Collg 198 162 208 181 212 176 222 196 
Post Collg 162 126 172 145 176 140 186 159 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 15c.    BROAD Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 276 240 286 259 250 214 260 234 
1xPvInc 251 215 261 234 225 189 235 208 
2xPvInc 249 212 258 232 223 187 233 206 
3xPvInc 260 224 270 244 234 198 244 218 
4xPvInc 265 229 275 248 239 203 249 223 
5xPvInc 259 223 269 242 233 197 243 216 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 261 225 270 244 275 239 285 258 
HS 251 215 261 234 265 229 275 248 
Sm Collg 245 209 255 229 260 223 269 243 
Collg 225 189 235 208 239 203 249 223 
Post Collg 186 150 196 169 200 164 210 184 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 16.    REFINED Model P-value Significance Patterns of Marketing-Variable Interaction 
MEs, by Demographic-Demographic Set 
 
 Demog-Demog Set 
#signf. 
/ Set 
% 
signf. Comments 
  Income x Fem HHH Education 27/29 93.1% 
Almost all are neg.; most consistent of any reaction in P; 
strong magnitude 
  Income x Male HHH Education 24/29 82.8% Almost all are pos.; very consistent in P 
  Income x Race (/Hispanic) 20/28 71.4% consistent in P; often pos.  in lower Incs, neg. in higher 
  Income x HH Size 17/22 77.3% consistent in P; trend down from 2xPvInc 
  Income x # of Kids in HH 15/22 68.2% less consistent in P; trend up in rising Inc from low to high 
Price x Income x Fem HHH Age 13/23 56.5% not consistent in P, least at lower Incs, lowest Age levels 
  Income x Male HHH Age 13/23 56.5% not consistent in P, least at middle Incs, higher Age levels 
  Fem HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 15/19 78.9% Almost all are pos.; consistent in P; strong magnitude 
  Male HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 17/19 89.5% Almost all are neg.; very consistent in P; strong magnitude 
  Fem HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc) 10/20 50.0% not consistent in P, except Asian HHs 
  Male HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc) 9/20 45.0% not consistent in P, except Afr-Amer & Less HS Educ HHs 
     
 Income x Fem HHH Education 16/29 55.2% not consistent in Sale, except at Less HS, flip pos in high Educ 
 Income x Male HHH Education 12/29 41.4% not consistent in Sale, except College, flip pos in high Educ 
 Income x Race (/Hispanic) 25/29 86.2% very consistent in Sale, except Hisp.; all pos, Asian very high 
 Income x HH Size 11/22 50.0% not consistent in Sale, worst for small HHs; not responsive 
 Income x # of Kids in HH 19/22 86.4% very consistent in Sale; very responsive, most at HfPvInc 
Sale x Income x Fem HHH Age 13/23 56.5% not consistent in Sale 
 Income x Male HHH Age 14/23 60.9% not consistent in Sale, except Age <30 mixed pos & neg 
 Fem HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 11/15 73.3% consistent in Sale, all pos, very strong in Less HS 
 Male HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 7/15 46.7% not consistent in Sale 
 Fem HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc) 15/20 75.0% consistent in Sale, esp. Asian, all neg 
 Male HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc) 7/20 35.0% very inconsistent in Sale; bi-modal responses throughout set? 
     
  Income x Fem HHH Education 12/29 41.4% 
not consistent in Adv, except Less HS, all but 1 signf is neg; 
relatively pos for HfPvInc before Post College 
  Income x Male HHH Education 12/29 41.4% 
not consistent in Adv, except HS, all signif.s are  pos but 
College 
  Income x Race (/Hispanic) 14/29 48.3% 
not consistent in Adv; mixed pos & neg, Asian signif.s  neg 
large magnitude, Hispnc mixed  small magnitude 
  Income x HH Size 15/22 68.2% less consistent in Adv, all signif. neg above HfPvInc 
  Income x # of Kids in HH 10/22 45.5% not consistent in Adv, except for ThreeKids strongly neg 
 Adv.  x Income x Fem HHH Age 18/23 73.9% consistent in Adv, signif.s are mixed, except <30 50-65 pos 
  Income x Male HHH Age 13/23 60.9% less consistent in Adv, , signif.s are neg, strong at HfPvInc 
  Fem HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 10/15 66.7% 
less consistent in Adv, except Less HS & ThreeKids strong 
pos 
  Male HHH Educ x # of Kids in HH 4/15 26.7% least consistent in Adv, except HS signif. & strong neg 
  Fem HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc) 13/20 65.0% less consistent in Adv, except Asian signif. & strong pos 
  Male HHH Educ x Race (/Hispnc) 12/20 60.0% less consistent in Adv, except Asian neg  & Hispnc mixed 
29
1 
 
Ta
bl
e 
17
a.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 L
ev
el
 o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
LH
SE
d 
12
2.
05
4 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
LH
SE
d 
12
2.
05
4 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
25
6.
36
7 
 
37
8.
42
1 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
H
SE
d 
0.
45
1 
-2
17
.6
75
 
12
2.
50
5 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
19
2.
60
9 
12
87
.1
84
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
23
.8
96
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
2.
93
0 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
32
6.
31
7 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
24
7.
30
6 
 
46
8.
84
8 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
25
.8
76
 
 
-2
77
.2
50
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
31
5.
76
0 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
51
.3
74
 
-4
3.
53
5 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
15
3.
08
8 
21
4.
53
1 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
25
6.
36
7 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
H
SE
d 
0.
45
1 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
11
6.
74
0 
73
8.
30
1 
37
3.
10
7 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
11
6.
74
0 
 
11
7.
19
2 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
14
2.
13
8 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
40
.2
17
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
41
.3
31
 
41
3.
15
3 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
64
.0
13
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
11
3.
31
5 
 
22
3.
05
6 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
62
.4
21
 
 
19
2.
21
0 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
10
9.
74
1 
14
7.
66
0 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
14
0.
38
0 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
19
2.
60
9 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
51
.8
30
 
68
.8
59
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
41
.3
31
 
32
7.
53
4 
23
3.
94
0 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
2.
93
0 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
62
.3
42
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
86
.6
41
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
14
2.
13
8 
 
79
.2
07
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
37
.2
10
 
 
31
.2
52
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
62
.3
42
 
53
0.
99
3 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
25
4.
03
3 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
.9
58
 
65
.5
07
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
10
9.
02
3 
 
28
0.
42
1 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
24
7.
30
6 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
19
7.
95
4 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
62
.4
21
 
55
1.
39
8 
30
9.
72
7 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
82
.4
66
 
88
.4
99
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
10
9.
02
3 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
57
.1
73
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
25
.8
76
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
91
.4
65
 
 
13
2.
64
8 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
11
3.
31
5 
 
-1
2.
56
1 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
41
.1
83
 
11
0.
28
0 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
37
.2
10
 
27
1.
13
0 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
13
34
.1
17
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
31
5.
76
0 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
91
.4
65
 
 
15
5.
01
5 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
14
0.
38
0 
92
9.
36
1 
45
6.
14
0 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
14
8.
51
2 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
19
7.
95
4 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
39
.6
53
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
6.
50
3 
45
.1
88
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
14
8.
51
2 
 
27
5.
26
7 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
51
.3
74
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
12
6.
75
5 
18
5.
87
2 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
10
9.
74
1 
12
0.
34
7 
-4
1.
63
3 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
15
3.
08
8 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
.9
58
 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
50
3.
37
8 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
51
.8
30
 
29
3.
88
7 
20
4.
91
8 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
41
.1
83
 
 
16
7.
93
8 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
82
.4
66
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
56
.5
83
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
12
6.
75
5 
24
.0
69
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
6.
50
3 
73
.4
72
 
88
.9
69
 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
 
29
2 
  
Ta
bl
e 
17
b.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 L
ev
el
 o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
LH
SE
d 
-2
0.
82
4 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
LH
SE
d 
-2
0.
82
4 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
63
.3
81
 
 
42
.5
57
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
H
SE
d 
-1
25
.1
19
 
-3
33
.7
20
 
-1
45
.9
43
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
73
.7
06
 
59
.4
97
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
11
8.
61
2 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-3
6.
82
2 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
3.
43
5 
3x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-4
8.
84
5 
 
-7
.9
21
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-9
9.
00
5 
 
-1
50
.9
56
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-1
00
.6
29
 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
1.
95
0 
-6
6.
74
4 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
92
.7
08
 
9.
91
6 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
63
.3
81
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
H
SE
d 
-1
25
.1
19
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-5
2.
60
2 
-1
00
.4
49
 
10
.7
79
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-5
2.
60
2 
 
-1
77
.7
21
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
14
.2
57
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
12
64
.1
70
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-5
5.
48
9 
-4
63
.4
90
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
13
.0
72
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-8
1.
73
5 
 
-1
25
.4
85
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-2
9.
32
7 
 
-2
00
.9
52
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
3.
75
0 
-2
0.
09
0 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
42
.8
53
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
73
.7
06
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-5
8.
09
9 
-7
7.
24
8 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-5
5.
48
9 
-8
5.
97
6 
18
.2
16
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-3
6.
82
2 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
28
.7
22
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
82
9.
64
3 
1x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
14
.2
57
 
 
-2
2.
56
6 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
5.
19
2 
 
-1
32
.9
14
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
28
.7
22
 
66
.0
58
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
18
9.
03
7 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
7.
72
2 
-1
7.
19
5 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
39
.8
10
 
 
20
.0
92
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-4
8.
84
5 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-3
7.
95
2 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-2
9.
32
7 
-1
26
.2
42
 
-7
8.
17
2 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
58
.0
44
 
11
.0
10
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
39
.8
10
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
12
.4
19
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-9
9.
00
5 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
0.
16
5 
 
-8
7.
88
0 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-8
1.
73
5 
 
-1
80
.7
40
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
7.
71
6 
-2
5.
24
8 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
5.
19
2 
-5
26
.2
10
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
10
.7
19
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-1
00
.6
29
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
0.
16
5 
 
-2
00
.1
13
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
42
.8
53
 
-5
51
.9
41
 
-2
43
.4
82
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
49
.3
24
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-3
7.
95
2 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
11
.1
00
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
0.
79
0 
-8
7.
70
2 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
49
.3
24
 
 
-2
70
.5
07
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
1.
95
0 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
21
.1
84
 
-1
10
.3
88
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
3.
75
0 
-2
92
.3
22
 
-9
5.
70
0 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
92
.7
08
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
7.
72
2 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
45
.1
40
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-5
8.
09
9 
41
.8
63
 
34
.6
08
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
7.
71
6 
 
-1
38
.8
99
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
58
.0
44
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
79
.0
38
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
21
.1
84
 
-5
8.
46
4 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
0.
79
0 
10
.4
66
 
7.
25
4 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
29
3 
  
Ta
bl
e 
17
c.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 R
ac
e 
/ H
is
pa
ni
c 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
W
hi
te
 
-5
8.
85
5 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
W
hi
te
 
-5
8.
85
5 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
1x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-1
92
.3
57
 
-2
56
.6
73
 
-2
51
.2
12
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
fr
A
m
 
-5
9.
28
0 
-2
87
.7
27
 
2x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-6
2.
48
7 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
12
2.
70
0 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
si
an
 
43
.8
86
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
36
.6
83
 
 
57
.0
25
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
th
R
ac
e 
-1
74
.9
60
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
20
.3
42
 
-5
1.
33
5 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
sp
nc
 
-3
8.
51
7 
-5
7.
54
5 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-1
92
.3
57
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
fr
A
m
 
-5
9.
28
0 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-2
29
.6
95
 
-7
57
.5
63
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-2
29
.6
95
 
 
-2
88
.9
75
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
-1
7.
14
1 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-4
5.
65
0 
-3
33
.3
06
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
93
.5
23
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-2
59
.5
05
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
20
.0
37
 
 
-1
8.
71
7 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-5
8.
86
6 
-1
51
.5
13
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-1
1.
14
6 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-6
2.
48
7 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-7
.5
71
 
-5
5.
55
1 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-4
5.
65
0 
-2
00
.7
61
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
si
an
 
43
.8
86
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
81
.7
76
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
-1
7.
14
1 
 
26
.7
45
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-1
32
.5
74
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
81
.7
76
 
11
32
.0
91
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
20
56
.4
19
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-4
1.
82
6 
-4
0.
15
2 
3x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
44
6.
84
0 
 
57
6.
73
0 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
36
.6
83
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
25
6.
12
9 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
20
.0
37
 
49
0.
59
1 
5x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
32
0.
60
1 
18
8.
68
2 
 
 
 
X
†   
   
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
th
R
ac
e 
-1
74
.9
60
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
44
6.
84
0 
(4
) 
1x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-2
59
.5
05
 
-6
41
.4
40
 
-4
34
.4
65
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-1
2.
96
9 
12
2.
64
8 
2x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-1
32
.5
74
 
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
75
.8
53
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
20
.3
42
 
 
X
† 
 
 
-1
04
.9
11
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-1
1.
14
6 
21
2.
41
5 
4x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-8
.0
08
 
(4
) 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
25
6.
12
9 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-6
6.
39
4 
-1
28
.2
88
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-8
.0
08
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
sp
nc
 
-3
8.
51
7 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-4
4.
90
2 
42
.4
83
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-5
8.
86
6 
 
-9
7.
38
4 
 
 
X
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-4
1.
82
6 
-2
16
.4
48
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
34
.0
04
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-7
.5
71
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-1
2.
96
9 
 
-6
4.
26
9 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
32
0.
60
1 
22
7.
26
9 
4x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-4
4.
90
2 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-6
6.
39
4 
(4
) 
5x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-1
9.
36
7 
-3
6.
07
5 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-1
9.
36
7 
56
.8
17
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
PC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
 
29
4 
    
Ta
bl
e 
17
d.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
 S
iz
e 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z1
 
-2
.4
96
 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z1
 
-2
.4
96
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
10
4.
08
9 
10
3.
01
8 
10
1.
59
2 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z2
 
43
.1
19
 
70
.6
56
 
40
.6
22
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
58
.0
23
 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
15
5.
71
1 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z3
 
24
.1
19
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
26
.0
66
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-2
5.
29
4 
 
-5
6.
59
8 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z4
 
5.
91
5 
17
.6
64
 
30
.0
34
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-3
1.
30
4 
20
.6
04
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
10
4.
08
9 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
99
.6
30
 
48
9.
11
2 
20
3.
71
8 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z2
 
43
.1
19
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
13
7.
45
5 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
40
.0
93
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
99
.6
30
 
 
14
2.
74
8 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
14
7.
93
9 
12
2.
27
8 
28
5.
39
4 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
96
.5
69
 
41
2.
09
9 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
11
.5
76
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
58
.0
23
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
46
.5
59
 
 
12
6.
22
3 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
96
.5
69
 
36
2.
06
2 
15
4.
59
2 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
5.
67
9 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
98
.7
98
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
34
.2
04
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
12
0.
54
5 
68
.6
83
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
10
8.
67
2 
90
.5
15
 
20
7.
47
0 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z3
 
24
.1
19
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-2
5.
29
4 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
13
7.
45
5 
 
16
1.
57
4 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
46
.5
59
 
22
2.
55
3 
21
.2
65
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
98
.7
98
 
49
3.
66
5 
fla
t i
n 
In
c 
2.
57
5 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
67
.5
58
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
84
6.
57
4 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
67
.5
58
 
 
16
5.
73
4 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
13
3.
73
0 
55
.6
38
 
20
1.
28
8 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
49
.8
70
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-3
1.
30
4 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
11
5.
86
5 
82
.2
77
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
5.
67
9 
74
.5
97
 
-2
5.
62
6 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z4
 
5.
91
5 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
49
.8
70
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
49
1.
10
5 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
14
7.
93
9 
 
15
3.
85
4 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
50
.3
53
 
18
.6
49
 
10
0.
22
3 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
10
8.
67
2 
58
7.
30
9 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
24
.1
79
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
13
3.
73
0 
 
19
1.
05
4 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
12
0.
54
5 
37
7.
11
0 
23
6.
40
9 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
50
.3
53
 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
11
5.
86
5 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
8.
52
6 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
14
0.
70
1 
97
.8
85
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
14
0.
70
1 
12
5.
70
3 
25
6.
56
5 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
 
29
5 
 
  
Ta
bl
e 
17
e.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
N
oK
id
s 
17
4.
36
1 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
N
oK
id
s 
17
4.
36
1 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
71
.6
07
 
 
24
5.
96
8 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
ne
K
id
s 
16
7.
20
8 
75
5.
61
2 
34
1.
56
9 
 
2x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
2.
65
7 
25
7.
85
4 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
96
.2
48
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Tw
oK
id
s 
24
2.
59
1 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
21
.2
18
 
3x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-1
8.
77
7 
(5
) 
9.
22
9 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
3K
id
s 
17
1.
45
1 
18
8.
90
3 
41
4.
04
2 
 
4x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
28
.0
06
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
71
.6
07
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
51
.5
71
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
39
.4
65
 
33
4.
08
1 
11
1.
07
2 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
ne
K
id
s 
16
7.
20
8 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
81
.8
37
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
10
0.
77
8 
1x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
39
.4
65
 
 
20
6.
67
3 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
14
1.
17
1 
83
.5
20
 
22
3.
00
9 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-7
1.
07
8 
-4
6.
08
3 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
13
6.
78
6 
 
2x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
2.
65
7 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-1
05
.6
52
 
 
-7
6.
02
6 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-7
1.
07
8 
-1
19
.4
75
 
-6
8.
42
1 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-3
5.
57
3 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
18
.1
51
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
25
.3
82
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-4
0.
45
3 
-7
.6
80
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-6
9.
20
5 
-2
9.
86
9 
-5
1.
05
4 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Tw
oK
id
s 
24
2.
59
1 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-1
8.
77
7 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
81
.8
37
 
 
32
4.
42
9 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-1
05
.6
52
 
-3
11
.4
33
 
-1
24
.4
29
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
18
.1
51
 
23
9.
67
3 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
10
3.
55
5 
 
3x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-9
1.
37
2 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
50
.2
91
 
3x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-9
1.
37
2 
 
-1
1.
53
4 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-9
5.
63
3 
-7
7.
85
8 
-1
87
.0
05
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-1
.2
30
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
28
.0
06
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-1
0.
30
4 
39
.9
45
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-3
5.
57
3 
-5
6.
08
6 
-7
.5
68
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
3K
id
s 
17
1.
45
1 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-1
.2
30
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
54
1.
13
7 
1x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
14
1.
17
1 
 
31
2.
62
2 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-4
7.
28
8 
-1
4.
02
2 
-4
8.
51
9 
 
2x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-6
9.
20
5 
47
.7
17
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
13
2.
00
9 
 
X
 
 
-1
03
.5
37
 
-5
0.
75
7 
 
3x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-9
5.
63
3 
 
-1
00
.0
68
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-4
0.
45
3 
(3
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
24
.2
86
 
4x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-4
7.
28
8 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-1
0.
30
4 
-3
4.
51
2 
-6
3.
08
4 
 
5x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-5
2.
78
0 
7.
95
3 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-5
2.
78
0 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
   
29
6 
   
Ta
bl
e 
17
f. 
   
Su
b-
gr
ou
p 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 F
em
al
e 
A
ge
 L
ev
el
 o
f H
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
L3
0 
2.
73
2 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
L3
0 
2.
73
2 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
6.
49
2 
 
9.
22
4 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
30
L4
0 
32
.4
60
 
22
2.
68
7 
35
.1
92
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
19
.9
81
 
-6
3.
94
7 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
10
25
.8
53
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
40
L5
0 
11
2.
39
6 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
 A
ge
 
43
2.
77
8 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-7
.7
51
 
 
-8
5.
40
1 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
50
L6
5 
75
.0
99
 
55
.6
72
 
18
7.
49
5 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
05
.7
27
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
6.
49
2 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
20
.3
26
 
-1
0.
65
8 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
9.
76
8 
12
.5
35
 
16
.2
60
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
30
L4
0 
32
.4
60
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-2
8.
87
3 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 F
m
 A
ge
 
12
2.
91
0 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
9.
76
8 
 
42
.2
28
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
25
.1
47
 
3.
13
4 
-3
.7
25
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
52
.4
82
 
-1
4.
02
2 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
30
0.
96
5 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
19
.9
81
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-2
3.
86
9 
 
-8
4.
86
4 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
52
.4
82
 
19
5.
01
7 
72
.4
64
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-8
8.
81
8 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
70
.8
86
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
 A
ge
 
69
.1
24
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
3.
95
4 
-2
.3
37
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
51
.6
67
 
48
.7
54
 
12
2.
55
4 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
40
L5
0 
11
2.
39
6 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-7
.7
51
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-2
8.
87
3 
 
83
.5
23
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-2
3.
86
9 
-5
5.
16
8 
-3
1.
62
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
70
.8
86
 
91
.3
65
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
15
8.
29
7 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-1
4.
35
3 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
 A
ge
 
25
.5
26
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-1
4.
35
3 
 
-4
8.
69
2 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-9
.1
96
 
-1
3.
79
2 
-2
3.
54
8 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-7
5.
11
6 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
05
.7
27
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
26
.4
25
 
15
.2
27
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-8
8.
81
8 
-3
02
.6
58
 
-1
94
.5
45
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
50
L6
5 
75
.0
99
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-7
5.
11
6 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
 A
ge
 
44
.4
28
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
25
.1
47
 
10
9.
72
1 
10
0.
24
7 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-3
2.
99
7 
-7
5.
66
4 
-1
08
.1
13
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
51
.6
67
 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
14
2.
08
9 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
20
.3
26
 
50
.7
05
 
24
.2
80
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-9
.1
96
 
 
-4
2.
19
3 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
3.
95
4 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
 A
ge
 
25
.1
19
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-3
2.
99
7 
21
.9
44
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
26
.4
25
 
16
.9
02
 
30
.3
79
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
   
29
7 
   
Ta
bl
e 
17
g.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 M
al
e 
A
ge
 L
ev
el
 o
f H
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
L3
0 
13
1.
24
7 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
L3
0 
13
1.
24
7 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-3
.2
53
 
 
34
8.
24
1 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
30
L4
0 
96
.1
23
 
27
4.
13
4 
22
7.
37
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
15
3.
74
4 
44
0.
59
3 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
33
.1
16
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
40
L5
0 
49
.7
70
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
 A
ge
 
79
.4
32
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
1.
52
4 
 
43
0.
08
6 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-3
.0
05
 
68
.5
34
 
46
.7
64
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
18
4.
15
0 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-3
.2
53
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
3.
77
0 
73
.4
32
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
48
.8
36
 
15
3.
03
0 
45
.5
82
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
30
L4
0 
96
.1
23
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
56
.1
99
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 M
 A
ge
 
13
5.
72
1 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
48
.8
36
 
 
12
1.
02
3 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
51
.2
48
 
38
.2
57
 
10
7.
44
7 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
33
.3
52
 
30
7.
75
8 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
28
.6
38
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
15
3.
74
4 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
26
.0
02
 
 
18
9.
64
5 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
33
.3
52
 
25
2.
77
3 
18
7.
09
5 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
97
.5
62
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
48
.5
17
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
 A
ge
 
64
.8
96
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
5.
88
3 
51
.2
93
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
17
.1
60
 
63
.1
93
 
65
.6
78
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
40
L5
0 
49
.7
70
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
1.
52
4 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
56
.1
99
 
 
67
.3
45
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
26
.0
02
 
67
.9
81
 
14
.4
78
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
48
.5
17
 
29
2.
24
5 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
3.
81
0 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
27
.7
52
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 M
 A
ge
 
26
9.
54
8 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
27
.7
52
 
 
26
0.
59
2 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
25
.7
51
 
16
.9
95
 
53
.5
03
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
98
.4
07
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
18
4.
15
0 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
11
.6
00
 
48
.7
08
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
97
.5
62
 
46
4.
50
8 
28
1.
71
2 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-3
.0
05
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
98
.4
07
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
 A
ge
 
35
.1
13
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
51
.2
48
 
17
5.
54
3 
-3
1.
55
2 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
84
.3
89
 
11
6.
12
7 
18
2.
79
6 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
17
.1
60
 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
12
8.
30
2 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
3.
77
0 
3.
71
3 
-7
.8
87
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
25
.7
51
 
 
13
0.
39
0 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
5.
88
3 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 M
 A
ge
 
32
1.
66
9 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
84
.3
89
 
35
.1
09
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
11
.6
00
 
1.
23
8 
17
.4
83
 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
   
29
8 
     
Ta
bl
e 
17
h.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 L
ev
el
 o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
Fm
LH
SN
oK
id
s 
-1
15
.4
96
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SN
oK
id
s 
-1
15
.4
96
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SN
oK
id
s 
-3
5.
57
5 
-2
95
.0
96
 
-1
51
.0
71
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SO
ne
K
id
s 
-3
.1
86
 
-1
92
.3
58
 
-1
18
.6
82
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-7
8.
65
6 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
Ed
 
4.
66
4 
 
Fm
LH
ST
w
oK
id
s 
-9
9.
49
9 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
37
.9
21
 
Fm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-6
5.
36
9 
-7
3.
77
4 
-1
44
.0
25
 
 
 
Fm
LH
S3
K
id
s 
25
.8
23
 
-4
8.
09
0 
-7
3.
67
6 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SN
oK
id
s 
-3
5.
57
5 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SO
ne
K
id
s 
-3
.1
86
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SO
ne
K
id
s 
39
.5
30
 
-4
9.
12
6 
3.
95
5 
 
Fm
H
SO
ne
K
id
s 
39
.5
30
 
27
.0
99
 
36
.3
44
 
 
 
Fm
H
ST
w
oK
id
s 
-2
2.
67
3 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
14
42
.1
09
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
-9
.7
64
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
98
.5
72
 
 
Fm
H
S3
K
id
s 
-3
0.
40
8 
-1
2.
28
1 
-5
3.
08
1 
 
Fm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
-2
6.
66
4 
 
0.
51
9 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-7
8.
65
6 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
27
.1
83
 
5.
42
0 
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
-9
.7
64
 
-1
88
.8
94
 
-8
8.
42
0 
 
Fm
LH
ST
w
oK
id
s 
-9
9.
49
9 
 
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-6
5.
81
3 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
13
.6
33
 
Fm
H
ST
w
oK
id
s 
-2
2.
67
3 
-2
90
.7
87
 
-1
22
.1
72
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-3
4.
66
1 
-4
7.
22
4 
-1
00
.4
74
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-6
5.
81
3 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
15
.8
55
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-6
5.
36
9 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-6
6.
33
6 
 
-1
02
.8
02
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
-2
6.
66
4 
-1
73
.6
28
 
-9
2.
03
3 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-3
6.
46
6 
-5
8.
15
7 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-6
6.
33
6 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
11
.3
42
 
Fm
LH
S3
K
id
s 
25
.8
23
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-1
5.
25
9 
-4
3.
40
7 
-8
1.
59
5 
 
Fm
H
S3
K
id
s 
-3
0.
40
8 
-8
.7
30
 
-4
.5
85
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
27
.1
83
 
36
.4
92
 
-9
.2
83
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-3
4.
66
1 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
76
5.
60
3 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-3
6.
46
6 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
20
0.
28
2 
Fm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-1
5.
25
9 
 
30
.5
16
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
45
.7
75
 
12
.1
64
 
9.
30
9 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
45
.7
75
 
-1
.7
46
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
    
29
9 
    
Ta
bl
e 
17
i. 
   
Su
b-
gr
ou
p 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 L
ev
el
 o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
M
LH
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
81
.1
13
 
 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
81
.1
13
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
14
4.
19
8 
41
2.
67
1 
22
5.
31
1 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
71
.1
47
 
33
6.
94
8 
15
2.
26
0 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
77
.3
93
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
19
.6
16
 
 
M
LH
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
17
7.
61
2 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
21
.2
98
 
M
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
10
9.
96
7 
10
3.
16
8 
18
1.
11
4 
 
 
M
LH
SE
d3
K
id
s 
7.
07
6 
84
.2
37
 
18
4.
68
8 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
14
4.
19
8 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
71
.1
47
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
16
4.
12
1 
59
2.
91
1 
30
8.
31
9 
 
M
H
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
16
4.
12
1 
45
8.
62
4 
23
5.
26
8 
 
 
M
H
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
17
0.
62
4 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
7.
69
6 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
52
.7
27
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
27
.4
75
 
 
M
H
SE
d3
K
id
s 
11
3.
96
8 
14
8.
22
8 
28
4.
59
2 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
11
8.
59
9 
 
17
0.
62
9 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
77
.3
93
 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
52
.0
29
 
91
.7
25
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
52
.7
27
 
24
8.
10
1 
13
0.
12
0 
 
M
LH
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
17
7.
61
2 
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
53
.8
41
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
9.
32
9 
M
H
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
17
0.
62
4 
54
9.
68
0 
34
8.
23
7 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
64
.1
40
 
62
.0
25
 
11
7.
98
1 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
53
.8
41
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
57
.6
14
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
10
9.
96
7 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
12
4.
72
4 
 
14
7.
60
2 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
11
8.
59
9 
48
2.
76
2 
22
8.
56
6 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
22
.8
78
 
10
9.
93
6 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
12
4.
72
4 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
11
.2
13
 
M
LH
SE
d3
K
id
s 
7.
07
6 
 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
12
9.
47
1 
12
0.
69
0 
25
4.
19
5 
 
M
H
SE
d3
K
id
s 
11
3.
96
8 
34
6.
46
7 
12
1.
04
4 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
64
.1
40
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
33
.2
43
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
52
.0
29
 
10
6.
71
9 
74
.9
07
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
12
9.
47
1 
 
16
1.
28
3 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
22
.8
78
 
(3
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
26
.9
90
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
31
.8
12
 
69
.2
93
 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
31
.8
12
 
35
.5
73
 
54
.6
90
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
     
30
0 
    
Ta
bl
e 
17
j. 
   
Su
b-
gr
ou
p 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 L
ev
el
 o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 R
ac
e 
/ H
is
pa
ni
c 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
Fm
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
3.
35
4 
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
3.
35
4 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
Fm
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
54
.2
71
 
11
0.
18
7 
40
.9
17
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
14
.4
02
 
-4
54
.9
87
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
17
.9
77
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
69
.2
91
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-3
30
.4
64
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
51
.2
92
 
27
.5
47
 
69
.2
70
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
3.
23
4 
-1
13
.7
47
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
54
.2
71
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
14
.4
02
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
40
.3
56
 
-2
66
.9
61
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
40
.3
56
 
41
.7
89
 
-7
4.
04
6 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
-3
82
.1
35
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
15
.6
77
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
23
5.
26
4 
 
Fm
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
20
.5
46
 
-6
6.
74
0 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
59
.4
70
 
 
10
0.
15
8 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
17
.9
77
 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
40
.6
88
 
8.
35
8 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
15
.6
77
 
-2
39
.7
85
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-3
30
.4
64
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-3
14
.4
29
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
-3
82
.1
35
 
-1
59
5.
94
1 
-7
12
.5
99
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
40
.9
90
 
-5
9.
94
6 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-3
14
.4
29
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
20
.1
64
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
51
.2
92
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-2
45
.9
88
 
 
-5
68
.9
13
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
59
.4
70
 
-6
2.
62
8 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-3
22
.9
25
 
-3
19
.1
88
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-2
45
.9
88
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
-2
9.
26
6 
  
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
72
.5
98
 
-1
5.
65
7 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
3.
23
4 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
20
.5
46
 
14
1.
23
0 
23
.7
80
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
40
.6
88
 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
40
.9
90
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
22
1.
53
4 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-3
22
.9
25
 
-3
07
.6
41
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
72
.5
98
 
 
76
.4
61
 
 
 
! F
m
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
-2
9.
26
6 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
3.
86
3 
28
.2
46
 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
3.
86
3 
-7
6.
91
0 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
     
30
1 
     
Ta
bl
e 
17
k.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 P
ri
ce
 –
 L
ev
el
 o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 R
ac
e 
/ H
is
pa
ni
c 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 P
ri
ce
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
M
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-8
9.
03
3 
 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-8
9.
03
3 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
M
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-5
1.
79
0 
-2
14
.3
79
 
-1
40
.8
22
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
30
.3
96
 
-2
24
.4
01
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-5
9.
91
4 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
Ed
 
2.
28
4 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
16
.1
19
 
(4
) 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
3.
64
3 
-5
3.
59
5 
-1
44
.0
38
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-2
1.
09
1 
-5
6.
10
0 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-5
1.
79
0 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
30
.3
96
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-9
5.
49
5 
-4
6.
85
4 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-9
5.
49
5 
-4
11
.7
82
 
-2
25
.8
90
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
10
6.
85
1 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
04
.9
61
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
64
.1
73
 
 
M
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-6
.4
20
 
-1
1.
71
3 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-6
8.
42
8 
 
-8
0.
93
1 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-5
9.
91
4 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
2.
50
2 
-8
2.
35
6 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
04
.9
61
 
-2
63
.7
18
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
16
.1
19
 
  
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-6
9.
08
8 
(4
) 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
10
6.
85
1 
45
.1
75
 
12
2.
97
0 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-2
9.
75
5 
-6
5.
92
9 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-6
9.
08
8 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
10
7.
08
0 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
3.
64
3 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-7
9.
49
2 
 
-8
.7
07
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-6
8.
42
8 
-2
12
.4
76
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
70
.7
86
 
9.
03
5 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-7
9.
49
2 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
22
.1
12
 
  
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-5
0.
91
2 
-5
3.
11
9 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-2
1.
09
1 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-6
.4
20
 
-1
23
.6
67
 
-2
7.
51
1 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
2.
50
2 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-2
9.
75
5 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
14
1.
35
6 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
70
.7
86
 
64
.9
07
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-5
0.
91
2 
 
-6
6.
40
0 
 
 
! M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
22
.1
12
 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-1
5.
48
8 
-2
4.
73
3 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-1
5.
48
8 
16
.2
27
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 P
ric
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r P
ric
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 P
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
P.
 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
 
   
30
2 
 
Ta
bl
e 
18
a.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 L
ev
el
 o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
LH
SE
d 
-3
4.
10
1 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
LH
SE
d 
-3
4.
10
1 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
10
7.
76
7 
 
73
.6
66
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
H
SE
d 
-3
6.
20
8 
-3
60
.2
69
 
-7
0.
30
9 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
17
6.
05
5 
36
5.
81
4 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
80
.0
40
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
3.
14
7 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
22
2.
59
2 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
-1
6.
53
6 
 
13
2.
62
9 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-9
9.
05
1 
 
-2
26
.8
12
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
18
7.
14
2 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
27
.7
61
 
-7
2.
05
4 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
-5
4.
51
3 
60
.9
69
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
10
7.
76
7 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
H
SE
d 
-3
6.
20
8 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
58
.7
73
 
42
2.
23
8 
16
6.
54
1 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
58
.7
73
 
 
22
.5
65
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
13
1.
13
4 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
25
.2
05
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
35
.8
54
 
23
4.
86
5 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
81
7.
76
0 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
55
.0
13
 
 
12
4.
56
3 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
-3
0.
64
5 
 
20
7.
09
2 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
69
.5
50
 
84
.4
48
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
15
1.
33
6 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
17
6.
05
5 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
55
.7
56
 
39
.1
44
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
35
.8
54
 
35
1.
29
1 
21
1.
90
9 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
3.
14
7 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
86
.7
89
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
75
.1
81
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
13
1.
13
4 
 
67
.9
87
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
19
.3
23
 
 
52
.5
93
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
86
.7
89
 
53
8.
49
9 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
38
9.
03
4 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
33
.2
71
 
70
.2
58
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
51
.2
44
 
 
33
2.
47
9 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
-1
6.
53
6 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
22
6.
59
1 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
-3
0.
64
5 
17
.4
95
 
-4
7.
18
2 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
10
5.
88
8 
89
.7
50
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
51
.2
44
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
12
8.
46
8 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-9
9.
05
1 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
5.
29
2 
 
13
.4
32
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
55
.0
13
 
 
-4
4.
03
8 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
58
.7
24
 
3.
49
9 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
19
.3
23
 
-2
0.
91
3 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
21
1.
48
1 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
18
7.
14
2 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
5.
29
2 
 
49
.0
94
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
15
1.
33
6 
81
9.
19
6 
33
8.
47
8 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
92
.9
64
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
22
6.
59
1 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
24
.9
21
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
3.
87
0 
-3
.4
86
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
92
.9
64
 
 
25
4.
12
6 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
27
.7
61
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
16
1.
16
2 
16
3.
83
9 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
69
.5
50
 
19
4.
94
6 
-5
8.
21
1 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
-5
4.
51
3 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
33
.2
71
 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
47
7.
74
0 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
55
.7
56
 
63
.2
60
 
1.
24
3 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
58
.7
24
 
 
21
9.
88
6 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
10
5.
88
8 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
48
91
.1
06
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
16
1.
16
2 
38
.9
89
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
3.
87
0 
15
.8
15
 
62
.0
17
 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
-
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
 
30
3 
Ta
bl
e 
18
b.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 L
ev
el
 o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
LH
SE
d 
-5
4.
92
1 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
LH
SE
d 
-5
4.
92
1 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
99
.5
64
 
 
44
.6
43
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
H
SE
d 
-1
90
.9
34
 
-4
84
.5
99
 
-2
45
.8
55
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
65
.2
88
 
8.
16
1 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
19
1.
57
1 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-2
16
.3
65
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
90
.8
98
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-6
0.
88
9 
 
-4
0.
88
0 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-2
3.
65
1 
 
-2
2.
37
9 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-5
9.
25
1 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
1.
27
2 
-9
6.
92
0 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
18
.3
71
 
1.
36
0 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
99
.5
64
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
H
SE
d 
-1
90
.9
34
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-8
8.
23
2 
-6
9.
74
9 
11
.3
32
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-8
8.
23
2 
 
-2
79
.1
66
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
7.
01
6 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
31
2.
36
2 
2x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-5
2.
41
6 
-6
54
.8
81
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
13
.7
91
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
43
.3
98
 
 
-2
4.
06
5 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-8
2.
63
4 
 
-2
40
.6
65
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
7.
46
3 
-1
3.
95
0 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
39
.0
19
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
65
.2
88
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
01
.6
45
 
-1
09
.1
47
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-5
2.
41
6 
97
.1
90
 
12
.8
72
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-2
16
.3
65
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
.7
28
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
60
7.
34
3 
1x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
7.
01
6 
 
-2
73
.3
81
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
69
.1
39
 
 
91
.0
47
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
.7
28
 
-4
64
.6
13
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
58
.3
38
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
21
.9
07
 
19
.4
38
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
0.
61
0 
 
-1
13
.8
95
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-6
0.
88
9 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-9
5.
56
0 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-8
2.
63
4 
-2
16
.4
86
 
-1
43
.5
23
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
8.
33
4 
-7
7.
43
6 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
0.
61
0 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
98
.3
60
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-2
3.
65
1 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
26
.6
46
 
 
-2
.3
54
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
43
.3
98
 
 
19
.7
47
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-2
9.
00
0 
-4
3.
29
7 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
69
.1
39
 
16
6.
08
1 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
15
5.
97
6 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-5
9.
25
1 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
26
.6
46
 
 
50
.5
49
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
39
.0
19
 
-3
62
.5
21
 
-1
98
.2
71
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
16
.4
70
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-9
5.
56
0 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
65
.3
55
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
34
.0
79
 
27
.6
80
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
16
.4
70
 
 
-6
8.
69
0 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
1.
27
2 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-8
5.
16
0 
-7
2.
50
4 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
7.
46
3 
-1
58
.4
43
 
-6
6.
19
1 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
18
.3
71
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
21
.9
07
 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
72
.4
70
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
01
.6
45
 
-6
7.
53
0 
-8
3.
27
4 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-2
9.
00
0 
 
-1
14
.1
60
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
8.
33
4 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
11
8.
90
7 
4x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-8
5.
16
0 
-3
1.
68
9 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
34
.0
79
 
-1
6.
88
2 
15
.7
45
 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
.  
30
4 
 
Ta
bl
e 
18
c.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 R
ac
e 
/ H
is
pa
ni
c 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
W
hi
te
 
24
3.
50
0 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
W
hi
te
 
24
3.
50
0 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
1x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-4
8.
19
2 
57
6.
67
0 
19
5.
30
8 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
fr
A
m
 
31
1.
35
5 
14
63
.6
66
 
2x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
15
2.
47
4 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
17
.1
93
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
si
an
 
82
5.
28
0 
 
3x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
12
4.
05
1 
 
22
8.
88
7 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
th
R
ac
e 
14
7.
09
0 
 
4x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
10
4.
83
6 
11
5.
33
4 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
sp
nc
 
-6
3.
56
0 
29
2.
73
3 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-4
8.
19
2 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
fr
A
m
 
31
1.
35
5 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
24
.0
70
 
27
7.
18
5 
1x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
24
.0
70
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
43
8.
91
5 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
17
0.
07
9 
88
4.
90
7 
33
5.
42
6 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-8
5.
09
0 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
15
6.
56
5 
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
33
.5
66
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-5
2.
51
8 
55
.4
37
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
12
7.
54
0 
 
22
2.
83
7 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
15
2.
47
4 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
95
.2
97
 
14
7.
48
4 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
17
0.
07
9 
10
55
.9
23
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
si
an
 
82
5.
28
0 
  
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
67
7.
47
5 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
43
8.
91
5 
 
12
64
.1
95
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
10
0.
34
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
67
7.
47
5 
44
85
.5
23
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
25
.9
80
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-4
4.
44
6 
21
1.
18
5 
3x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
95
1.
21
5 
 
15
92
.6
38
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
12
4.
05
1 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
80
8.
53
9 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
15
6.
56
5 
13
03
.8
85
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
78
4.
09
9 
74
7.
58
7 
 
 
 
X
†   
   
  
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
th
R
ac
e 
14
7.
09
0 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
95
1.
21
5 
(4
) 
1x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-8
5.
09
0 
13
7.
28
6 
62
.0
00
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
72
.0
54
 
32
5.
97
1 
2x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
10
0.
34
0 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
33
6.
06
9 
 
4x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
10
4.
83
6 
 
X
† 
 
 
-1
46
.3
63
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
12
7.
54
0 
11
49
.6
04
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
57
.7
49
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
80
8.
53
9 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-8
2.
80
3 
27
.4
57
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
57
.7
49
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
sp
nc
 
-6
3.
56
0 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
50
.9
41
 
22
9.
92
1 
1x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-5
2.
51
8 
26
.0
39
 
-1
16
.0
78
 
 
 
X
 
  
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-4
4.
44
6 
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
19
8.
64
8 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
95
.2
97
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
72
.0
54
 
 
11
4.
50
9 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
78
4.
09
9 
86
0.
16
1 
4x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
50
.9
41
 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-8
2.
80
3 
(4
) 
5x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
63
.5
68
 
4.
34
0 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
63
.5
68
 
21
5.
04
0 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
30
5 
  
Ta
bl
e 
18
d.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
 S
iz
e 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z1
 
10
4.
90
3 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z1
 
10
4.
90
3 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
86
.1
44
 
25
5.
35
7 
19
1.
04
7 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z2
 
43
.9
56
 
27
1.
19
6 
14
8.
85
9 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
63
.6
46
 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
99
.6
53
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z3
 
83
.0
82
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
17
.8
17
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-2
3.
57
4 
 
0.
66
3 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z4
 
39
.2
55
 
67
.7
99
 
12
2.
33
7 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
24
.2
37
 
51
.0
71
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
86
.1
44
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
90
.9
74
 
49
0.
08
6 
17
7.
11
8 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z2
 
43
.9
56
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
12
9.
05
5 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
76
.7
01
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
90
.9
74
 
 
13
4.
92
9 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
18
3.
91
3 
12
2.
52
1 
31
2.
96
8 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
74
.4
06
 
46
0.
46
5 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
19
.7
87
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
63
.6
46
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
89
.5
01
 
 
16
1.
62
8 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
74
.4
06
 
34
3.
12
9 
13
8.
05
3 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
24
.7
61
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
91
.6
18
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
48
.5
50
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
13
6.
86
7 
76
.7
44
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
11
3.
45
9 
85
.7
82
 
20
5.
07
7 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z3
 
83
.0
82
 
  
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-2
3.
57
4 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
12
9.
05
5 
 
21
2.
13
7 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
89
.5
01
 
26
5.
18
1 
65
.9
27
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
91
.6
18
 
61
2.
21
6 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
7.
90
2 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
11
3.
08
7 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
20
2.
23
3 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
11
3.
08
7 
 
19
5.
37
4 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
86
.1
67
 
66
.2
95
 
19
9.
25
4 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
84
.0
09
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
24
.2
37
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
11
1.
36
6 
10
2.
03
6 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
24
.7
61
 
20
4.
55
8 
48
.9
99
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z4
 
39
.2
55
 
  
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
84
.0
09
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
21
7.
47
4 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
18
3.
91
3 
 
22
3.
16
7 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
71
.5
50
 
51
.1
39
 
15
5.
55
9 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
11
3.
45
9 
65
0.
87
0 
fla
t i
n 
In
c 
2.
20
0 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
86
.1
67
 
 
22
8.
07
6 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
13
6.
86
7 
40
4.
75
8 
24
8.
23
2 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
71
.5
50
 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
11
1.
36
6 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
7.
92
0 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
15
6.
52
6 
10
8.
47
8 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
15
6.
52
6 
13
4.
91
9 
26
7.
89
1 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
    
30
6 
  Ta
bl
e 
18
e.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
N
oK
id
s 
-3
7.
35
9 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
N
oK
id
s 
-3
7.
35
9 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-1
4.
03
3 
-3
86
.3
70
 
-5
1.
39
2 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
ne
K
id
s 
-1
58
.1
80
 
-4
80
.0
54
 
-1
95
.5
39
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-1
79
.7
26
 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
20
2.
09
9 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Tw
oK
id
s 
-2
06
.9
71
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
45
.5
03
 
3x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-6
3.
04
7 
 
-1
55
.2
53
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
3K
id
s 
-7
7.
54
4 
-1
20
.0
13
 
-2
84
.5
15
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-9
2.
20
6 
-7
7.
27
4 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-1
4.
03
3 
 
 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-8
8.
63
1 
-1
67
.7
90
 
-1
02
.6
64
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
ne
K
id
s 
-1
58
.1
80
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-1
02
.9
05
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
36
.5
64
 
1x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-8
8.
63
1 
 
-2
46
.8
11
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
37
.7
79
 
-4
1.
94
8 
-6
5.
12
6 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-2
83
.9
59
 
-9
73
.6
08
 
fla
t i
n 
In
c 
3.
46
7 
 
2x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-1
79
.7
26
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-1
87
.4
70
 
 
-2
55
.3
68
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-2
83
.9
59
 
-9
56
.7
74
 
-4
63
.6
85
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-1
95
.8
32
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-3
21
.3
83
 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
#K
id
s 
6.
34
2 
5x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-5
9.
53
6 
-1
62
.2
68
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-1
71
.7
06
 
-2
39
.1
94
 
-4
93
.0
89
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Tw
oK
id
s 
-2
06
.9
71
 
  
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-6
3.
04
7 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-1
02
.9
05
 
 
-3
09
.8
76
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-1
87
.4
70
 
-6
07
.7
82
 
-2
50
.5
17
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-3
21
.3
83
 
-1
37
7.
42
9 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
61
.8
27
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-2
44
.7
08
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
42
.6
11
 
3x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-2
44
.7
08
 
 
-5
01
.4
62
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-1
12
.5
57
 
-1
51
.9
46
 
-3
57
.2
65
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-3
08
.9
93
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
-9
2.
20
6 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-1
92
.4
69
 
-2
29
.5
71
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-1
95
.8
32
 
-6
93
.0
13
 
-2
88
.0
38
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
3K
id
s 
-7
7.
54
4 
  
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-3
08
.9
93
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
40
.5
98
 
1x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
37
.7
79
 
 
-3
9.
76
6 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-9
5.
98
2 
-1
73
.2
53
 
-4
04
.9
75
 
 
2x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-1
71
.7
06
 
-3
77
.2
31
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
33
.7
88
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-1
12
.5
57
 
 
-5
3.
20
1 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-5
9.
53
6 
-2
09
.2
24
 
-2
52
.0
04
 
 
4x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-9
5.
98
2 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-1
92
.4
69
 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
40
.6
01
 
5x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
42
.7
80
 
-6
2.
87
2 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
42
.7
80
 
-6
9.
74
1 
-1
49
.6
88
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
.     
30
7 
  
Ta
bl
e 
18
f. 
   
Su
b-
gr
ou
p 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 F
em
al
e 
A
ge
 L
ev
el
 o
f H
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
L3
0 
-3
8.
26
3 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
L3
0 
-3
8.
26
3 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
0.
92
5 
 
-4
9.
18
8 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
30
L4
0 
38
.4
13
 
14
6.
88
9 
0.
15
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-2
9.
99
8 
-1
31
.8
94
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
67
.4
89
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
40
L5
0 
13
0.
60
1 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
98
00
3.
24
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
29
.6
77
 
 
-8
2.
38
5 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
50
L6
5 
16
.1
39
 
36
.7
22
 
14
6.
74
0 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
04
.4
24
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
0.
92
5 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
22
.0
38
 
-2
1.
98
2 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-4
8.
75
6 
-1
20
.4
49
 
-5
9.
68
2 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
30
L4
0 
38
.4
13
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-8
3.
95
8 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
Fe
m
A
ge
 
1.
82
0 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-4
8.
75
6 
 
-1
0.
34
4 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
23
.1
90
 
-3
0.
11
2 
-6
0.
76
8 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
4.
75
6 
-4
7.
34
2 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
66
2.
55
5 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-2
9.
99
8 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
37
.1
21
 
 
-7
8.
87
6 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
4.
75
6 
11
3.
62
2 
-2
5.
24
2 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-9
1.
32
7 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
84
.2
77
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
65
0.
13
9 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
12
.4
51
 
-7
.8
90
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
54
.5
86
 
28
.4
05
 
13
8.
86
3 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
40
L5
0 
13
0.
60
1 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
29
.6
77
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-8
3.
95
8 
 
46
.6
43
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
37
.1
21
 
14
1.
33
6 
66
.7
99
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
84
.2
77
 
12
1.
18
2 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
17
5.
23
1 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
25
.3
52
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
11
.5
85
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
25
.3
52
 
 
-3
5.
09
0 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
49
.1
85
 
35
.3
34
 
74
.5
37
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-5
1.
91
6 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
04
.4
24
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
16
.8
26
 
20
.1
97
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-9
1.
32
7 
-2
62
.5
38
 
-1
95
.7
51
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
50
L6
5 
16
.1
39
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-5
1.
91
6 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
65
.8
82
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
23
.1
90
 
12
8.
23
0 
39
.3
29
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-1
4.
87
1 
-6
5.
63
4 
-6
6.
78
7 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
54
.5
86
 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
12
.7
51
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
22
.0
38
 
51
.3
16
 
34
.4
90
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
49
.1
85
 
 
34
.3
15
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
12
.4
51
 
(3
) 
fa
lls
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
15
.1
12
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-1
4.
87
1 
25
.6
46
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
16
.8
26
 
17
.1
05
 
29
.2
78
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
-
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
    
30
8 
  
Ta
bl
e 
18
g.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 M
al
e 
A
ge
 L
ev
el
 o
f H
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
L3
0 
47
.7
03
 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
L3
0 
47
.7
03
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
16
.5
61
 
 
64
.2
64
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
30
L4
0 
50
.6
53
 
14
6.
52
6 
98
.3
57
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
10
1.
16
1 
32
9.
71
8 
fla
t i
n 
In
c 
3.
86
3 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
40
L5
0 
56
.0
35
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
A
ge
 
51
.0
26
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
10
2.
51
2 
 
61
.7
82
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-7
.8
65
 
36
.6
32
 
48
.1
70
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
12
0.
02
0 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
16
.5
61
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-5
8.
23
8 
54
.9
53
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
66
.5
69
 
11
7.
71
7 
83
.1
29
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
30
L4
0 
50
.6
53
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-7
.1
47
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
A
ge
 
58
.3
93
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
66
.5
69
 
 
11
7.
22
2 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
41
.7
35
 
29
.4
29
 
34
.5
87
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
9.
73
0 
25
1.
99
4 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
14
.0
41
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
10
1.
16
1 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
24
.2
79
 
 
10
0.
76
3 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
9.
73
0 
84
.1
41
 
11
0.
89
1 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
99
.9
73
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-1
9.
92
1 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
A
ge
 
12
4.
12
3 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
0.
79
0 
41
.9
99
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-6
.8
29
 
21
.0
35
 
-2
6.
75
0 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
40
L5
0 
56
.0
35
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
10
2.
51
2 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-7
.1
47
 
 
48
.8
87
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
24
.2
79
 
16
4.
19
1 
12
6.
79
1 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-1
9.
92
1 
16
5.
65
6 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
12
3.
95
2 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
27
.2
04
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
A
ge
 
70
.5
03
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
27
.2
04
 
 
10
9.
48
5 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
10
.1
96
 
41
.0
48
 
37
.4
00
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
81
.1
64
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
12
0.
02
0 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
28
.3
20
 
27
.6
09
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
99
.9
73
 
36
1.
53
4 
21
9.
99
3 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-7
.8
65
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
81
.1
64
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
A
ge
 
35
.6
61
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
41
.7
35
 
97
.6
14
 
33
.8
70
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
60
.3
77
 
90
.3
84
 
14
1.
54
2 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-6
.8
29
 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
10
8.
36
7 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-5
8.
23
8 
-2
9.
12
8 
-5
7.
44
8 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
10
.1
96
 
 
70
.5
73
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
0.
79
0 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 M
A
ge
 
15
0.
67
3 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
60
.3
77
 
19
.5
23
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
28
.3
20
 
-9
.7
09
 
29
.1
10
 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
    
30
9 
   Ta
bl
e 
18
h.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
Le
ve
l o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
Fm
LH
SN
oK
id
s 
64
.7
19
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SN
oK
id
s 
64
.7
19
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SN
oK
id
s 
32
.3
80
 
69
.7
67
 
97
.0
99
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SO
ne
K
id
s 
18
2.
14
1 
66
1.
47
1 
24
6.
86
0 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-3
2.
92
2 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
12
8.
14
8 
 
Fm
LH
ST
w
oK
id
s 
29
7.
01
3 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
67
.9
54
 
Fm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
5.
59
1 
17
.4
42
 
-2
7.
33
1 
 
 
Fm
LH
S3
K
id
s 
11
7.
59
7 
16
5.
36
8 
41
4.
61
0 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SN
oK
id
s 
32
.3
80
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SO
ne
K
id
s 
18
2.
14
1 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SO
ne
K
id
s 
14
1.
07
0 
31
0.
73
7 
17
3.
45
0 
 
Fm
H
SO
ne
K
id
s 
14
1.
07
0 
54
0.
18
9 
32
3.
21
1 
 
 
Fm
H
ST
w
oK
id
s 
15
0.
73
9 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
20
.8
49
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
54
.2
37
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
49
.6
49
 
 
Fm
H
S3
K
id
s 
-1
3.
45
2 
77
.6
84
 
13
7.
28
7 
 
Fm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
78
.6
67
 
 
16
2.
74
1 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-3
2.
92
2 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
84
.0
74
 
10
8.
03
8 
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
54
.2
37
 
13
8.
38
8 
21
.3
14
 
 
Fm
LH
ST
w
oK
id
s 
29
7.
01
3 
 
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
12
4.
51
6 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
44
9.
27
4 
Fm
H
ST
w
oK
id
s 
15
0.
73
9 
88
6.
77
6 
44
7.
75
2 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-7
.4
42
 
34
.5
97
 
11
7.
07
4 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
12
4.
51
6 
  
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
29
.7
58
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
5.
59
1 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
16
0.
04
2 
 
31
4.
50
9 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
78
.6
67
 
26
0.
17
0 
84
.2
58
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
15
4.
46
7 
17
7.
35
5 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
16
0.
04
2 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
10
8.
77
9 
Fm
LH
S3
K
id
s 
11
7.
59
7 
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
15
.8
70
 
65
.0
42
 
17
5.
91
2 
 
Fm
H
S3
K
id
s 
-1
3.
45
2 
13
5.
21
9 
10
4.
14
5 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
84
.0
74
 
26
1.
18
7 
23
8.
54
1 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-7
.4
42
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
63
.0
17
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
15
4.
46
7 
(3
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
25
.7
52
 
Fm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
15
.8
70
 
  
38
.5
16
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
22
.6
46
 
87
.0
62
 
17
7.
11
2 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
22
.6
46
 
27
.0
44
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
      
31
0 
    Ta
bl
e 
18
i. 
   
Su
b-
gr
ou
p 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
Le
ve
l o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
M
LH
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
14
8.
68
5 
 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
14
8.
68
5 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
20
2.
10
6 
47
6.
93
5 
35
0.
79
1 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
20
2.
83
0 
66
3.
20
8 
35
1.
51
5 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
11
9.
79
6 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
40
.3
70
 
 
M
LH
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
22
7.
50
4 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
11
.3
29
 
M
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
6.
34
8 
11
9.
23
4 
20
9.
17
7 
 
 
M
LH
SE
d3
K
id
s 
84
.1
89
 
16
5.
80
2 
31
1.
69
2 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
20
2.
10
6 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
20
2.
83
0 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
22
9.
05
4 
84
5.
87
2 
43
1.
16
0 
 
M
H
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
22
9.
05
4 
61
8.
13
8 
43
1.
88
4 
 
 
M
H
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
21
1.
82
5 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
#K
id
s 
3.
81
5 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
94
.7
77
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
78
.8
19
 
 
M
H
SE
d3
K
id
s 
20
2.
88
8 
21
1.
46
8 
41
4.
71
2 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
18
.5
48
 
 
91
.4
77
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
11
9.
79
6 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
72
.9
29
 
12
3.
62
8 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
94
.7
77
 
41
8.
48
7 
21
4.
57
3 
 
M
LH
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
22
7.
50
4 
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
12
6.
39
7 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
#K
id
s 
4.
96
8 
M
H
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
21
1.
82
5 
65
5.
98
8 
43
9.
32
8 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
77
.5
17
 
10
4.
62
2 
20
3.
91
4 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
12
6.
39
7 
  
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
79
.4
54
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
6.
34
8 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
-3
.9
75
 
 
90
.2
63
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
18
.5
48
 
9.
36
2 
24
.8
95
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
94
.2
37
 
13
1.
19
8 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
-3
.9
75
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
16
2.
39
3 
M
LH
SE
d3
K
id
s 
84
.1
89
 
 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
-1
1.
55
8 
2.
34
1 
-1
5.
53
3 
 
M
H
SE
d3
K
id
s 
20
2.
88
8 
33
1.
29
5 
28
7.
07
6 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
77
.5
17
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
11
1.
59
9 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
72
.9
29
 
14
5.
42
6 
16
7.
16
6 
 
M
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
-1
1.
55
8 
  
-3
3.
29
9 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
94
.2
37
 
(3
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
56
.6
32
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
-2
1.
74
0 
66
.2
59
 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
-2
1.
74
0 
48
.4
75
 
72
.4
97
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 
va
ria
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
     
31
1 
   
Ta
bl
e 
18
j. 
   
Su
b-
gr
ou
p 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
Le
ve
l o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 R
ac
e 
/ H
is
pa
ni
c 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
Fm
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-8
8.
26
1 
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-8
8.
26
1 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
Fm
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
30
.4
10
 
-1
3.
04
5 
-5
7.
85
1 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
65
.4
23
 
-1
07
6.
06
1 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-8
.7
66
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
17
7.
45
1 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-8
19
.1
63
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
53
.5
73
 
-3
.2
61
 
44
.8
06
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
.2
14
 
-2
69
.0
15
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
30
.4
10
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
65
.4
23
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
6.
54
8 
-7
74
.7
98
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
6.
54
8 
-1
85
.4
72
 
-1
58
.8
75
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
-7
73
.2
20
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-3
1.
61
5 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
10
3.
15
9 
 
Fm
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
8.
53
6 
-1
93
.7
00
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
38
.9
85
 
 
5.
01
9 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-8
.7
66
 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-3
3.
96
7 
-3
7.
09
4 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-3
1.
61
5 
-7
97
.6
66
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-8
19
.1
63
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-7
21
.1
24
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
-7
73
.2
20
 
-3
55
8.
97
6 
-1
59
2.
38
3 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
6.
16
1 
-1
99
.4
16
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-7
21
.1
24
 
  
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
21
.7
86
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
53
.5
73
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-5
77
.4
02
 
 
-1
24
5.
46
9 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
38
.9
85
 
-4
75
.2
83
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-6
68
.0
67
 
-7
11
.7
95
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-5
77
.4
02
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
-2
6.
62
1 
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
9.
56
1 
-1
18
.8
21
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
.2
14
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
8.
53
6 
-1
06
.0
88
 
-4
1.
75
0 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-3
3.
96
7 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
6.
16
1 
  
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
32
.5
07
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-6
68
.0
67
 
-7
66
.3
94
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
9.
56
1 
 
-2
8.
17
8 
 
 
! F
m
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
-2
6.
62
1 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
7.
73
9 
-2
1.
21
8 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
7.
73
9 
-1
91
.5
98
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
-
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 
va
lu
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
      
31
2 
   
Ta
bl
e 
18
k.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 S
al
e 
– 
Le
ve
l o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 R
ac
e 
/ H
isp
an
ic
 
  
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 S
al
e 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
M
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
21
.9
78
 
 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
21
.9
78
 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
M
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-7
6.
32
4 
-2
28
.7
51
 
-1
98
.3
02
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-2
14
.3
53
 
-4
54
.1
54
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
6.
61
6 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
15
.0
70
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-4
3.
81
7 
(4
) 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
3.
83
3 
-5
7.
18
8 
-2
28
.1
86
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-7
4.
00
6 
-1
13
.5
39
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-7
6.
32
4 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-2
14
.3
53
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
50
.3
98
 
-8
9.
87
4 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
50
.3
98
 
-6
22
.3
07
 
-3
64
.7
51
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
14
5.
10
8 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-9
8.
07
5 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
56
.2
77
 
 
M
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-8
.2
60
 
-2
2.
46
8 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
45
.4
33
 
 
-1
59
.4
81
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
6.
61
6 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
4.
04
8 
-1
24
.4
61
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-9
8.
07
5 
-2
06
.7
37
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-4
3.
81
7 
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-9
3.
86
5 
(4
) 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
14
5.
10
8 
-1
80
.2
37
 
10
1.
29
1 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
1.
81
9 
-5
1.
68
4 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-9
3.
86
5 
  
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
28
5.
27
2 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-1
3.
83
3 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-1
04
.3
64
 
 
-1
87
.6
63
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
45
.4
33
 
-3
13
.2
51
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-8
3.
29
9 
-3
6.
04
7 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-1
04
.3
64
 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
-7
.9
88
 
 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-4
9.
62
1 
-7
8.
31
3 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-7
4.
00
6 
 
 
 
 
X
 
  
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-8
.2
60
 
-1
33
.3
10
 
-8
2.
26
6 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
4.
04
8 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
1.
81
9 
  
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
35
.7
41
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-8
3.
29
9 
-1
08
.5
77
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-4
9.
62
1 
 
-5
2.
86
3 
 
 
! M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
-7
.9
88
 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
.2
43
 
-2
6.
66
2 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
.2
43
 
-2
7.
14
4 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 S
al
e,
 a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r S
al
e.
 T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 S
al
eC
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
Sa
le
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
.      
31
3 
 
Ta
bl
e 
19
a.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 L
ev
el
 o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
LH
SE
d 
14
7.
85
4 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
LH
SE
d 
14
7.
85
4 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
27
2.
88
1 
 
42
0.
73
5 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
H
SE
d 
44
.8
36
 
-1
25
.1
76
 
19
2.
69
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
20
4.
20
8 
13
61
.0
23
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
15
.8
79
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-3
3.
37
3 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
24
7.
64
3 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
24
8.
53
6 
 
48
7.
54
4 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
04
.7
10
 
 
-2
84
.4
93
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
33
0.
98
7 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
79
.7
83
 
-2
5.
03
5 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
15
6.
55
7 
22
6.
83
7 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
27
2.
88
1 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
H
SE
d 
44
.8
36
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
15
8.
21
8 
84
2.
89
0 
43
1.
09
9 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
15
8.
21
8 
 
20
3.
05
4 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
16
7.
14
2 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
43
.2
50
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
75
.0
70
 
64
2.
29
8 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
31
.8
65
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
12
7.
22
0 
 
24
4.
64
9 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
96
.4
16
 
 
26
7.
75
8 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
11
7.
42
9 
16
8.
57
8 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
17
7.
97
2 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
20
4.
20
8 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
89
.7
86
 
10
7.
05
0 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
75
.0
70
 
41
4.
80
0 
27
9.
27
8 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-3
3.
37
3 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
84
.9
10
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
81
.8
77
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
16
7.
14
2 
 
13
3.
76
9 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
59
.0
63
 
 
50
.6
13
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
84
.9
10
 
68
6.
15
5 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
15
0.
76
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-8
.4
50
 
82
.9
60
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
13
2.
03
9 
 
33
5.
43
8 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
24
8.
53
6 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
22
4.
30
4 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
96
.4
16
 
63
3.
99
8 
34
4.
95
2 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
11
1.
13
4 
11
4.
35
9 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
13
2.
03
9 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
54
.4
85
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
04
.7
10
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
11
3.
74
0 
 
15
7.
00
6 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
12
7.
22
0 
 
22
.5
10
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
43
.2
66
 
12
6.
80
0 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
59
.0
63
 
39
0.
66
3 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
76
7.
84
1 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
33
0.
98
7 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
11
3.
74
0 
 
19
5.
35
0 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
17
7.
97
2 
10
25
.0
72
 
50
8.
95
8 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
16
8.
09
1 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
22
4.
30
4 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
42
.6
65
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
27
.2
59
 
65
.1
11
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
16
8.
09
1 
 
29
1.
81
0 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
79
.7
83
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
12
3.
71
8 
20
5.
01
4 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
11
7.
42
9 
96
.1
80
 
-6
2.
35
4 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
LH
SE
d 
15
6.
55
7 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-8
.4
50
 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
36
7.
80
0 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
H
SE
d 
89
.7
86
 
38
4.
73
6 
24
6.
34
3 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
43
.2
66
 
 
16
6.
98
4 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
11
1.
13
4 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
43
.8
21
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
12
3.
71
8 
19
.2
36
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
27
.2
59
 
96
.1
84
 
13
8.
39
3 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
31
4 
Ta
bl
e 
19
b.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 L
ev
el
 o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
LH
SE
d 
-2
6.
77
1 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
LH
SE
d 
-2
6.
77
1 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
45
.8
55
 
 
19
.0
84
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
H
SE
d 
-1
22
.4
10
 
-3
53
.0
49
 
-1
49
.1
81
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
75
.8
94
 
18
.0
68
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
17
8.
09
7 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
4.
65
7 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
6.
72
3 
3x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-6
2.
00
5 
 
-1
4.
90
4 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
16
.5
79
 
 
-1
59
.2
11
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-9
4.
65
4 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
2.
63
1 
-7
0.
61
0 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
79
.7
50
 
3.
01
1 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
45
.8
55
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
H
SE
d 
-1
22
.4
10
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-4
9.
36
0 
-1
50
.2
01
 
-3
.5
06
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-4
9.
36
0 
 
-1
71
.7
70
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
.5
41
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
38
69
.4
31
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-3
7.
14
3 
-3
94
.9
50
 
fla
t i
n 
In
c 
1.
91
8 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-9
8.
39
0 
 
-1
39
.1
54
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
7.
56
1 
 
-1
68
.4
76
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
0.
76
4 
-3
0.
04
0 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
23
.8
42
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
75
.8
94
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-4
4.
63
4 
-6
5.
82
5 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-3
7.
14
3 
-1
24
.0
63
 
38
.7
51
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
4.
65
7 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
14
.9
34
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
55
8.
69
1 
1x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
.5
41
 
 
-5
2.
19
8 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
07
.9
46
 
 
-1
77
.7
48
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
14
.9
34
 
-2
3.
28
2 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
73
.9
16
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
9.
80
2 
-2
4.
81
3 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
27
.5
97
 
 
-1
3.
61
5 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-6
2.
00
5 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
6.
19
9 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
7.
56
1 
-1
57
.1
32
 
-7
9.
56
6 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
42
.5
84
 
-3
.8
80
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
27
.5
97
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
32
.1
70
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
16
.5
79
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-8
5.
57
5 
 
-1
05
.1
62
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-9
8.
39
0 
 
-2
14
.9
69
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
9.
58
7 
-3
1.
42
6 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
07
.9
46
 
-6
45
.4
41
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
10
.2
25
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
-9
4.
65
4 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-8
5.
57
5 
 
-2
36
.9
51
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-1
23
.8
42
 
-5
60
.5
80
 
-2
18
.4
96
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
63
.8
29
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-5
6.
19
9 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
30
.8
42
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
3.
12
2 
-1
07
.5
74
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
63
.8
29
 
 
-2
85
.8
85
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
2.
63
1 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
22
.0
56
 
-1
12
.1
16
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-4
0.
76
4 
-2
94
.8
41
 
-8
3.
39
6 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
LH
SE
d 
79
.7
50
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-6
9.
80
2 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
69
.8
45
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
H
SE
d 
-4
4.
63
4 
4.
57
9 
35
.1
17
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
9.
58
7 
 
-1
41
.6
43
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
So
m
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
42
.5
84
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
18
6.
96
2 
4x
Pv
In
cM
Po
st
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-1
22
.0
56
 
-5
8.
96
8 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
C
ol
lg
Ed
 
-7
3.
12
2 
1.
14
5 
-3
0.
53
8 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
 
31
5 
Ta
bl
e 
19
c.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 R
ac
e 
/ H
is
pa
ni
c 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
W
hi
te
 
-9
4.
16
3 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
W
hi
te
 
-9
4.
16
3 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
1x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-2
12
.5
12
 
-2
89
.1
91
7 
-3
06
.6
75
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
fr
A
m
 
-8
5.
07
0 
-4
25
.5
08
 
2x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-4
3.
72
8 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
11
9.
96
0 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
si
an
 
21
.7
99
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
35
.1
37
 
 
61
.2
11
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
th
R
ac
e 
-2
22
.4
03
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
26
.0
75
 
-5
7.
83
8 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
sp
nc
 
-4
5.
67
2 
-8
5.
10
2 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-2
12
.5
12
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
fr
A
m
 
-8
5.
07
0 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-2
44
.1
20
 
-8
36
.6
32
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-2
44
.1
20
 
 
-3
29
.1
90
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
-4
1.
91
4 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-2
1.
36
1 
-3
23
.7
89
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
10
2.
05
2 
 
1x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-2
76
.9
79
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
20
.0
06
 
 
6.
75
6 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-6
1.
10
6 
-1
67
.3
26
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
6.
23
9 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
-4
3.
72
8 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
0.
51
7 
-5
3.
96
5 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
-2
1.
36
1 
-1
05
.7
51
 
H
fP
vI
nc
A
si
an
 
21
.7
99
 
  
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
11
3.
84
7 
 
1x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
-4
1.
91
4 
 
-2
0.
11
5 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-1
05
.9
51
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
11
3.
84
7 
11
33
.3
98
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
30
21
.9
44
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-4
8.
55
8 
-2
1.
15
0 
3x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
45
1.
90
8 
 
58
7.
75
9 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
35
.1
37
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
26
3.
90
9 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
20
.0
06
 
48
2.
22
3 
5x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
32
3.
85
0 
18
8.
90
0 
 
 
 
X
†   
   
  
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
th
R
ac
e 
-2
22
.4
03
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
45
1.
90
8 
(4
) 
1x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-2
76
.9
79
 
 
-4
99
.3
82
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-2
4.
82
8 
12
0.
55
6 
2x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-1
05
.9
51
 
-6
61
.2
56
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
78
.4
82
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cW
hi
te
 
26
.0
75
 
 
X
† 
 
 
-1
07
.4
57
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
6.
23
9 
24
8.
68
6 
4x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
5.
86
3 
(4
) 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
26
3.
90
9 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-6
1.
78
6 
-1
32
.2
51
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
5.
86
3 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
sp
nc
 
-4
5.
67
2 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-5
3.
39
9 
49
.7
37
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-6
1.
10
6 
  
-1
06
.7
78
 
 
 
X
 
  
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-4
8.
55
8 
-2
61
.6
81
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
23
.6
58
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
fr
A
m
 
0.
51
7 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-2
4.
82
8 
 
-8
1.
51
7 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cA
si
an
 
32
3.
85
0 
23
4.
46
4 
4x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-5
3.
39
9 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
th
R
ac
e 
-6
1.
78
6 
(4
) 
5x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-2
8.
11
7 
-4
3.
61
3 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
sp
nc
 
-2
8.
11
7 
58
.6
16
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
 
31
6 
 
Ta
bl
e 
19
d.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
 S
iz
e 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z1
 
-6
.3
80
 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z1
 
-6
.3
80
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
87
.8
60
 
33
.2
88
 
81
.4
79
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z2
 
46
.8
48
 
78
.9
79
 
40
.4
68
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
40
.7
81
 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
20
9.
19
5 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z3
 
18
.6
56
 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
H
H
si
ze
 
4.
83
4 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-4
4.
06
2 
 
-8
8.
97
2 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z4
 
19
.8
56
 
19
.7
45
 
38
.5
11
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-4
4.
91
0 
6.
65
8 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
87
.8
60
 
  
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
82
.7
57
 
45
1.
63
2 
17
0.
61
6 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z2
 
46
.8
48
 
 
12
9.
60
5 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
13
1.
53
7 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
64
.7
06
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
82
.7
57
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
6.
87
2 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
14
9.
47
8 
11
2.
90
8 
28
1.
01
6 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
81
.8
68
 
36
6.
22
9 
12
0.
69
9 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
40
.7
81
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
34
.0
58
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
81
.8
68
 
30
0.
67
2 
12
2.
64
8 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
-4
.0
69
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
83
.5
44
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
45
.1
50
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
12
4.
76
8 
61
.0
38
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
94
.4
80
 
75
.1
68
 
17
8.
02
4 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z3
 
18
.6
56
 
  
15
0.
19
3 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-4
4.
06
2 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
13
1.
53
7 
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
7.
45
7 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
34
.0
58
 
17
2.
90
4 
-1
0.
00
4 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
83
.5
44
 
45
0.
55
5 
16
1.
39
3 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
55
.4
25
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
19
28
.3
24
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
55
.4
25
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
12
7.
48
3 
43
.2
26
 
18
2.
90
8 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
39
.5
43
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z1
 
-4
4.
91
0 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
12
1.
85
0 
75
.0
92
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
-4
.0
69
 
34
.5
76
 
-4
8.
97
9 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
H
H
si
z4
 
19
.8
56
 
  
16
9.
33
4 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
39
.5
43
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
27
0.
59
4 
1x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
14
9.
47
8 
 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
7.
69
5 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
44
.0
12
 
8.
64
4 
83
.5
55
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
94
.4
80
 
57
3.
66
1 
18
2.
36
3 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
12
7.
48
3 
 
81
.4
79
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z2
 
12
4.
76
8 
38
4.
96
9 
24
6.
61
8 
 
4x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
44
.0
12
 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z3
 
12
1.
85
0 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 H
H
si
ze
 
5.
50
8 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
13
8.
35
1 
95
.6
10
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cH
H
si
z4
 
13
8.
35
1 
12
8.
32
3 
26
0.
20
1 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
.      
31
7 
  
Ta
bl
e 
19
e.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
N
oK
id
s 
20
6.
51
2 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
N
oK
id
s 
20
6.
51
2 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
10
4.
47
9 
 
31
0.
99
1 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
ne
K
id
s 
19
6.
37
9 
85
4.
50
5 
40
2.
89
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
3.
34
2 
35
5.
35
0 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
86
.8
11
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Tw
oK
id
s 
27
4.
95
9 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
12
.0
94
 
3x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
0.
57
2 
(5
) 
41
.0
17
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
3K
id
s 
17
6.
65
5 
21
3.
62
6 
45
1.
61
5 
 
4x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
40
.4
45
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
10
4.
47
9 
  
 
 
X
 
 
71
.0
70
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
64
.6
27
 
40
8.
10
6 
16
9.
10
6 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
O
ne
K
id
s 
19
6.
37
9 
  
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
11
5.
28
8 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
41
.3
31
 
1x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
64
.6
27
 
 
26
1.
00
6 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
12
3.
71
2 
10
2.
02
7 
23
9.
00
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-8
1.
82
2 
-1
3.
82
9 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
13
4.
13
4 
 
2x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
3.
34
2 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-1
03
.9
20
 
 
-8
9.
09
2 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-8
1.
82
2 
-1
46
.3
98
 
-7
8.
48
0 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-3
3.
95
7 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
23
.7
60
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
13
.4
58
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-5
5.
13
6 
-2
.3
05
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-9
1.
67
8 
-3
6.
60
0 
-6
7.
91
8 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Tw
oK
id
s 
27
4.
95
9 
  
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
0.
57
2 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
11
5.
28
8 
 
39
0.
24
7 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-1
03
.9
20
 
-3
03
.7
48
 
-1
03
.3
48
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
23
.7
60
 
33
3.
51
0 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
99
.8
15
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-8
1.
21
9 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
93
.9
09
 
3x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-8
1.
21
9 
 
0.
72
2 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-1
19
.1
81
 
-7
5.
93
7 
-2
00
.4
00
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
10
.6
59
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cN
oK
id
s 
40
.4
45
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-9
.9
37
 
55
.5
85
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-3
3.
95
7 
-5
2.
47
6 
6.
48
8 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
3K
id
s 
17
6.
65
5 
  
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
10
.6
59
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
10
08
.8
65
 
1x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
12
3.
71
2 
 
30
0.
36
7 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-6
9.
62
3 
-1
3.
11
9 
-5
8.
96
4 
 
2x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-9
1.
67
8 
-5
9.
60
9 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
14
9.
64
5 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-1
19
.1
81
 
 
-1
49
.1
17
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cO
ne
K
id
s 
-5
5.
13
6 
-1
44
.5
66
 
-6
5.
07
2 
 
4x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-6
9.
62
3 
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cT
w
oK
id
s 
-9
.9
37
 
(3
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
37
.4
33
 
5x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-7
9.
49
4 
-9
.9
35
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
c3
K
id
s 
-7
9.
49
4 
-4
8.
18
9 
-8
9.
43
1 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
.     
31
8 
  
Ta
bl
e 
19
f. 
   
Su
b-
gr
ou
p 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 F
em
al
e 
A
ge
 L
ev
el
 o
f H
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
L3
0 
24
.9
27
 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
L3
0 
24
.9
27
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
27
.8
40
 
 
52
.7
67
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
30
L4
0 
45
.2
10
 
26
4.
64
9 
70
.1
37
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
11
.6
86
 
-4
1.
31
0 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
28
1.
99
5 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
40
L5
0 
10
9.
33
3 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
17
7.
33
0 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-9
.7
29
 
 
-9
6.
03
4 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
50
L6
5 
85
.1
79
 
66
.1
62
 
19
4.
51
2 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
11
.0
18
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
27
.8
40
 
  
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
14
.9
85
 
-6
.8
85
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
8.
18
4 
43
.2
33
 
36
.0
24
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
30
L4
0 
45
.2
10
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-2
3.
54
7 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
79
.9
88
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
8.
18
4 
 
53
.3
94
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
30
.7
56
 
10
.8
08
 
7.
20
9 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
45
.9
70
 
-9
.6
85
 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
26
5.
27
8 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
11
.6
86
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-2
0.
80
1 
 
-8
8.
24
8 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
45
.9
70
 
18
2.
82
6 
57
.6
56
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-8
6.
79
9 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
72
.1
59
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
11
7.
09
6 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-1
.4
49
 
-1
.6
14
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
53
.0
11
 
45
.7
07
 
12
5.
17
0 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
40
L5
0 
10
9.
33
3 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-9
.7
29
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-2
3.
54
7 
 
85
.7
86
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-2
0.
80
1 
-3
8.
26
1 
-3
0.
53
0 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
72
.1
59
 
10
0.
03
6 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
16
1.
01
0 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-5
.5
70
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
74
.6
80
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-5
.5
70
 
 
-5
2.
33
8 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-2
.1
60
 
-9
.5
65
 
-7
.7
30
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-8
0.
16
4 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
11
.0
18
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
27
.8
26
 
16
.6
73
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-8
6.
79
9 
-3
12
.3
61
 
-1
97
.8
18
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
Fm
A
ge
50
L6
5 
85
.1
79
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
-8
0.
16
4 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
42
.0
96
 
1x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
30
.7
56
 
13
2.
40
7 
11
5.
93
5 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-3
4.
37
9 
-7
8.
09
0 
-1
14
.5
43
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
53
.0
11
 
(5
) 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
13
1.
51
7 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
L3
0 
14
.9
85
 
41
.3
61
 
13
.5
35
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-2
.1
60
 
 
-3
6.
53
9 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
30
L4
0 
-1
.4
49
 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 F
m
A
ge
 
94
.8
70
 
4x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-3
4.
37
9 
26
.4
81
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cF
m
A
ge
40
L5
0 
27
.8
26
 
13
.7
87
 
26
.3
77
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
.     
31
9 
  
Ta
bl
e 
19
g.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
In
co
m
e-
Le
ve
l, 
&
 M
al
e 
A
ge
 L
ev
el
 o
f H
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
L3
0 
12
5.
16
2 
 
 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
L3
0 
12
5.
16
2 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
8.
32
1 
 
10
6.
84
1 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
30
L4
0 
77
.0
05
 
24
6.
09
6 
20
2.
16
7 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
15
8.
13
0 
39
9.
05
9 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
37
.1
13
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
40
L5
0 
48
.7
83
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
A
ge
 
78
.2
71
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
2.
40
6 
 
14
6.
49
4 
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-4
.8
54
 
61
.5
24
 
43
.9
29
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
17
9.
36
8 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
8.
32
1 
  
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-3
2.
87
5 
66
.5
10
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
52
.5
74
 
14
0.
65
5 
34
.2
54
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
30
L4
0 
77
.0
05
 
 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
62
.0
40
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 M
A
ge
 
21
0.
62
9 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
52
.5
74
 
 
12
9.
57
9 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
44
.3
61
 
35
.1
64
 
10
6.
40
1 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
23
.9
80
 
27
3.
82
4 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
24
.1
03
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
15
8.
13
0 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
21
.9
18
 
 
98
.3
46
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
23
.9
80
 
24
1.
06
8 
18
2.
11
0 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
86
.9
02
 
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
45
.7
73
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
A
ge
 
67
.6
25
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
11
.4
44
 
45
.6
37
 
 
 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
13
.1
85
 
60
.2
67
 
58
.9
58
 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
40
L5
0 
48
.7
83
 
 
 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-1
2.
40
6 
 
 
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
62
.0
40
 
 
11
0.
82
3 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
21
.9
18
 
59
.4
87
 
9.
51
2 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
45
.7
73
 
28
5.
20
5 
fa
lls
 in
 In
c 
6.
20
3 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
24
.6
60
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 M
A
ge
 
42
5.
36
2 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
24
.6
60
 
 
10
3.
94
8 
 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
25
.3
15
 
14
.8
72
 
49
.9
74
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
93
.3
96
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
17
9.
36
8 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
10
.5
52
 
47
.5
34
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
86
.9
02
 
43
4.
79
7 
26
6.
27
1 
 
H
fP
vI
nc
M
A
ge
50
L6
5 
-4
.8
54
 
 
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
93
.3
96
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 M
A
ge
 
36
.7
08
 
1x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
44
.3
61
 
15
3.
13
7 
39
.5
07
 
 
 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
75
.1
31
 
10
8.
69
9 
16
8.
52
7 
 
2x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
13
.1
85
 
(5
) 
ris
es
 in
 In
c 
15
4.
24
5 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
L3
0 
-3
2.
87
5 
-1
0.
87
8 
-2
1.
43
1 
 
3x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
25
.3
15
 
 
10
0.
44
5 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
30
L4
0 
11
.4
44
 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 M
A
ge
 
20
2.
63
9 
4x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
50
L6
5 
75
.1
31
 
30
.6
27
 
 
 
 
5x
Pv
In
cM
A
ge
40
L5
0 
10
.5
52
 
-3
.6
26
 
21
.9
96
 
 
X
 
 
  
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
    
32
0 
   
Ta
bl
e 
19
h.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
Le
ve
l o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
. H
H
H
 &
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
Fm
LH
SN
oK
id
s 
-1
15
.3
81
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SN
oK
id
s 
-1
15
.3
81
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SN
oK
id
s 
-7
4.
56
4 
-3
91
.6
04
 
-1
89
.9
45
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SO
ne
K
id
s 
6.
00
9 
-1
21
.0
98
 
-1
09
.3
72
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-1
08
.9
08
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
6.
16
7 
 
Fm
LH
ST
w
oK
id
s 
-8
2.
57
7 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
89
.2
79
 
Fm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-9
2.
75
0 
-9
7.
90
1 
-2
01
.6
59
 
 
 
Fm
LH
S3
K
id
s 
70
.8
51
 
-3
0.
27
5 
-1
1.
72
6 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SN
oK
id
s 
-7
4.
56
4 
  
 
 
Fm
LH
SO
ne
K
id
s 
6.
00
9 
 
17
.3
28
 
 
 
Fm
H
SO
ne
K
id
s 
11
.3
19
 
-1
58
.5
49
 
-6
3.
24
5 
 
Fm
H
SO
ne
K
id
s 
11
.3
19
 
-1
4.
62
3 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
12
7.
00
4 
 
Fm
H
ST
w
oK
id
s 
-6
1.
65
0 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
50
.6
91
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
-2
7.
27
2 
 
-4
.6
79
 
 
 
Fm
H
S3
K
id
s 
-3
3.
65
4 
-3
9.
63
7 
-9
5.
30
4 
 
Fm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
-4
0.
44
5 
 
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-1
08
.9
08
 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
35
.7
66
 
-2
.9
25
 
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
-2
7.
27
2 
-2
54
.9
74
 
-1
36
.1
80
 
 
Fm
LH
ST
w
oK
id
s 
-8
2.
57
7 
 
-1
44
.2
27
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-9
3.
72
6 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
12
.7
68
 
Fm
H
ST
w
oK
id
s 
-6
1.
65
0 
-3
57
.8
44
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
16
.8
73
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-2
5.
06
7 
-6
3.
74
3 
-1
18
.7
93
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-9
3.
72
6 
 
-1
19
.8
91
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gN
oK
id
s 
-9
2.
75
0 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-9
0.
03
9 
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
-4
0.
44
5 
-2
31
.1
69
 
-1
33
.1
96
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-2
9.
85
2 
-7
1.
56
9 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-9
0.
03
9 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
26
.4
44
 
Fm
LH
S3
K
id
s 
70
.8
51
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-7
.9
35
 
-5
7.
79
2 
-9
7.
97
4 
 
Fm
H
S3
K
id
s 
-3
3.
65
4 
75
.1
31
 
37
.1
96
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gO
ne
K
id
s 
35
.7
66
 
76
.8
50
 
5.
91
4 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-2
5.
06
7 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
69
.3
76
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gT
w
oK
id
s 
-2
9.
85
2 
(3
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
59
4.
72
8 
Fm
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
-7
.9
35
 
 
63
.0
01
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
70
.9
37
 
25
.6
17
 
41
.0
84
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
g3
K
id
s 
70
.9
37
 
15
.0
26
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
.       
32
1 
 
Ta
bl
e 
19
i. 
  S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
Le
ve
l o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 N
um
be
r 
of
 K
id
s i
n 
H
H
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
M
LH
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
98
.9
37
 
 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
98
.9
37
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
13
8.
79
6 
46
1.
17
4 
23
7.
73
3 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
93
.5
59
 
41
6.
46
8 
19
2.
49
7 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
95
.9
39
 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
7.
01
3 
 
M
LH
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
19
8.
49
1 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
16
.3
51
 
M
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
12
7.
50
2 
11
5.
29
4 
22
1.
06
2 
 
 
M
LH
SE
d3
K
id
s 
25
.4
80
 
10
4.
11
7 
22
3.
97
1 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dN
oK
id
s 
13
8.
79
6 
  
 
 
M
LH
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
93
.5
59
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
16
0.
10
2 
56
4.
13
9 
29
8.
89
8 
 
M
H
SE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
16
0.
10
2 
52
2.
15
2 
25
3.
66
2 
 
 
M
H
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
16
1.
39
6 
(4
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
11
.2
61
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
72
.3
19
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
22
.6
65
 
 
M
H
SE
d3
K
id
s 
10
3.
84
4 
14
1.
03
5 
26
5.
24
0 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
13
5.
60
7 
 
19
6.
17
0 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
95
.9
39
 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
60
.5
64
 
10
4.
43
0 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
72
.3
19
 
33
0.
02
0 
16
8.
25
8 
 
M
LH
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
19
8.
49
1 
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
77
.8
12
 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
#K
id
s 
3.
86
1 
M
H
SE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
16
1.
39
6 
60
1.
98
5 
35
9.
88
8 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
83
.9
49
 
82
.5
05
 
16
1.
76
2 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
77
.8
12
 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
54
.3
51
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dN
oK
id
s 
12
7.
50
2 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
13
6.
97
9 
 
16
4.
28
5 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
13
5.
60
7 
54
6.
25
7 
26
3.
10
9 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
27
.3
07
 
12
0.
39
7 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
13
6.
97
9 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 #
K
id
s 
7.
61
6 
M
LH
SE
d3
K
id
s 
25
.4
80
 
 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
14
6.
16
9 
13
6.
56
4 
28
3.
14
8 
 
M
H
SE
d3
K
id
s 
10
3.
84
4 
39
8.
40
7 
12
9.
32
4 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
83
.9
49
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
43
.1
55
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
ne
K
id
s 
60
.5
64
 
12
6.
83
4 
87
.8
70
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
14
6.
16
9 
 
18
5.
13
3 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dT
w
oK
id
s 
27
.3
07
 
(3
) 
fa
lls
 in
 #
K
id
s 
24
.5
81
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
38
.9
64
 
79
.6
81
 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
d3
K
id
s 
38
.9
64
 
42
.2
78
 
66
.2
71
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
        
32
2 
  
Ta
bl
e 
19
j. 
   
Su
b-
gr
ou
p 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
Le
ve
l o
f F
em
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 R
ac
e 
/ H
isp
an
ic
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
Fm
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-2
0.
09
7 
 
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-2
0.
09
7 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
Fm
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
57
.9
66
 
11
5.
77
0 
37
.8
69
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
32
.8
49
 
-4
84
.7
22
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
20
.5
58
 
(4
) 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
10
5.
71
3 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-3
26
.2
76
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
57
.3
43
 
28
.9
42
 
77
.9
01
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-5
.5
00
 
-1
21
.1
81
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
57
.9
66
 
  
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
32
.8
49
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
46
.5
50
 
-2
69
.0
22
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
46
.5
50
 
18
.7
16
 
-8
6.
30
0 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
-3
89
.5
32
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
13
.9
77
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
20
5.
49
1 
 
Fm
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
15
.9
94
 
-6
7.
25
6 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
60
.2
84
 
 
91
.0
39
 
 
 
Fm
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
20
.5
58
 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
30
.7
55
 
3.
74
3 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
13
.9
77
 
-2
29
.6
22
 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-3
26
.2
76
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-3
05
.4
85
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
-3
89
.5
32
 
-1
56
5.
43
1 
-7
15
.8
08
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
41
.3
28
 
-5
7.
40
5 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-3
05
.4
85
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
23
.9
83
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
57
.3
43
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-2
34
.8
75
 
 
-5
44
.1
39
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
60
.2
84
 
-4
0.
09
3 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-3
09
.2
64
 
-3
13
.0
86
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-2
34
.8
75
 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
-3
0.
07
3 
 
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
77
.1
54
 
-1
0.
02
3 
 
 
Fm
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-5
.5
00
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
Fm
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
15
.9
94
 
13
5.
43
3 
10
.4
95
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
30
.7
55
 
 
 
 
Fm
So
m
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
41
.3
28
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
69
6.
70
5 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-3
09
.2
64
 
-3
02
.1
27
 
 
 
Fm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
77
.1
54
 
  
83
.6
10
43
 
  
 
! F
m
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
-3
0.
07
3 
(4
) 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
6.
45
6 
27
.0
87
 
 
 
 
Fm
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
6.
45
6 
-7
5.
53
2 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
      
32
3 
   
Ta
bl
e 
19
k.
   
 S
ub
-g
ro
up
 C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
 in
 A
dv
er
tis
in
g 
– 
Le
ve
l o
f M
al
e 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
H
H
H
 &
 R
ac
e 
/ H
isp
an
ic
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l 
Fi
rs
t 2
  
%
 
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
(R
e-
gr
ou
pi
ng
 
C
om
bi
ne
d 
To
ta
l 
vs
. l
as
t 2
 
C
ha
ng
e 
 
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
 E
du
c 
in
 2
2x
 
 
of
 sa
m
e)
 
M
ar
g.
 E
ff.
s*
 
Le
ve
l 
@
  I
nc
 
in
 2
2x
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
 
M
FX
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 A
dv
 
A
vg
**
 
Le
ve
l 
va
lu
es
 
M
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-9
8.
74
3 
 
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-9
8.
74
3 
 
In
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e 
fo
r 
R
ac
e 
M
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-5
8.
54
8 
-2
21
.1
72
 
-1
57
.2
91
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
45
.6
94
 
-2
91
.7
29
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-5
6.
71
6 
(4
) 
fla
t i
n 
Ed
 
2.
81
9 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-2
3.
21
6 
(4
) 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-7
.1
64
 
-5
5.
29
3 
-1
52
.8
58
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-2
4.
07
6 
-7
2.
93
2 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dW
hi
te
 
-5
8.
54
8 
  
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
45
.6
94
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-9
5.
88
5 
-5
9.
78
2 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-9
5.
88
5 
-4
33
.9
03
 
-2
41
.5
79
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
97
.5
65
 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
08
.5
97
 
 
ris
es
 in
 E
d 
65
.3
42
 
 
M
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-2
.9
13
 
-1
4.
94
5 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-7
0.
16
6 
 
-8
3.
72
6 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-5
6.
71
6 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
3.
56
0 
-8
6.
78
1 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
08
.5
97
 
-2
76
.4
27
 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dA
si
an
 
-2
3.
21
6 
 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-7
8.
75
8 
(4
) 
 
 
M
H
SE
dA
si
an
 
97
.5
65
 
-2
0.
42
5 
74
.3
49
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
2.
35
5 
-6
9.
10
7 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-7
8.
75
8 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
12
1.
54
1 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dW
hi
te
 
-7
.1
64
 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-7
3.
31
5 
 
-1
6.
01
6 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-7
0.
16
6 
-1
91
.1
79
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
57
.3
00
 
-4
.0
85
 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
-7
3.
31
5 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
10
.0
44
 
 
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-4
0.
53
3 
-4
7.
79
5 
 
 
M
LH
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-2
4.
07
6 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
M
H
SE
dH
sp
nc
 
-2
.9
13
 
-1
05
.0
76
 
-2
6.
98
9 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
fr
A
m
 
-1
3.
56
0 
 
 
 
M
Sm
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-3
2.
35
5 
 
fa
lls
 in
 E
d 
69
.4
46
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dA
si
an
 
57
.3
00
 
48
.5
85
 
 
 
M
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-4
0.
53
3 
  
-4
5.
73
16
 
  
 
! M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dO
th
R
ac
e 
10
.0
44
 
(4
) 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-5
.1
99
 
-2
1.
01
5 
 
 
 
M
Po
st
C
ol
gE
dH
sp
nc
 
-5
.1
99
 
12
.1
46
 
 
 
*"
C
om
bi
ne
d 
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
ts
" i
nc
lu
de
 tw
o 
va
lu
es
: t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
e's
 d
y/
dx
 (M
E)
 fr
om
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 c
or
re
ct
io
ns
 to
 H
ec
km
an
 O
LS
-s
id
e 
es
tim
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
E 
fr
om
 th
at
 
va
ria
bl
e's
 in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 A
dv
, a
s m
ul
tip
lie
d 
by
 th
e 
da
ta
-w
id
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fo
r A
dv
. T
og
et
he
r t
he
se
 y
ie
ld
 a
 st
an
da
rd
 li
ne
ar
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 e
st
im
at
or
s f
or
 a
ny
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
-d
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n:
 C
oe
ff
 +
 A
dv
C
oe
ff
*(
av
g)
A
dv
. 
**
Le
ve
l t
ot
al
 (b
ol
d)
 is
 to
ta
l o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft;
 L
ev
el
 A
ve
ra
ge
 is
 a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f a
ll 
va
lu
es
 a
t l
ev
el
 in
 b
lo
ck
 to
 le
ft.
 N
um
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fe
w
er
 v
al
ue
s a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
 th
an
 o
th
er
 le
ve
ls
, d
ue
 to
 a
 b
as
e–
gr
ou
p 
dr
op
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
du
m
m
y-
va
ria
bl
e 
tra
p.
 “
X
” 
de
no
te
s w
he
re
 th
e 
dr
op
pe
d 
ba
se
 g
ro
up
 w
ou
ld
 b
e,
 if
 it
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
. 
  
324 
 
 
Table 20a.    REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 427 369 252 459 273 226 12 277 
1xPvInc 329 234 227 474 242 158 54 360 
2xPvInc 370 329 236 402 292 262 73 296 
3xPvInc 326 252 458 288 260 196 307 194 
4xPvInc 291 201 249 237 238 160 110 157 
5xPvInc 362 297 405 355 270 216 227 235 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 410 230 373 628 333 160 357 353 
HS 329 234 227 474 291 201 249 237 
Sm Collg 217 132 51 404 249 170 143 237 
Collg 242 158 54 360 238 160 110 157 
Post Collg 167 158 90 289 135 131 118 58 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
 
 
 
 
Table 20b.    REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 402 388 68 389 229 237 35 271 
1xPvInc 196 145 -65 296 146 117 24 301 
2xPvInc 248 251 -44 235 197 222 44 239 
3xPvInc 142 112 116 59 125 116 238 96 
4xPvInc 216 170 15 117 177 154 116 133 
5xPvInc 265 244 149 212 173 174 197 175 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 191 53 50 341 247 114 165 198 
HS 196 145 -65 296 216 170 15 117 
Sm Collg 142 103 -15 299 194 160 97 152 
Collg 146 117 24 301 177 154 84 133 
Post Collg 121 125 -27 259 134 143 47 73 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of income. HH 
size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar tables to allow 
comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, columns, and half-columns. 
40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded 
totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 20c.    REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to PRICE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 301 257 563 367 320 264 356 303 
1xPvInc 199 118 533 378 162 70 272 259 
2xPvInc 216 189 519 282 189 151 267 172 
3xPvInc 180 120 749 176 131 60 476 44 
4xPvInc 193 118 588 173 179 93 349 76 
5xPvInc 228 176 707 254 227 165 482 171 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 285 206 565 486 205 132 546 208 
HS 199 118 533 378 193 118 588 173 
Sm Collg 141 59 307 305 173 97 400 138 
Collg 162 70 272 259 179 93 349 76 
Post Collg 112 62 358 230 119 75 425 38 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of income. HH 
size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar tables to allow 
comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, columns, and half-columns. 
40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded 
totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 20d.   REFINED CMEs in Price Analysis – Half-Column Totals in Race, by 
Table Levels of Education and Income 
 
Male & Fem 
HHHs: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian 
HS ED:  
Order within Row, HiLo 
2215 2105 1683 1827 Hisp, White, Asian, AfrAm 
Collg Ed: 1518 1574 1218 784 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian 
1xPvInc 2155 1365 913 795 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
4xPvInc 1041 1245 822 977 White, Hisp, Asian, AfrAm 
 6929 6290 4635 4384 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
differences  639 1654 252  
total purchase 
rank 1 2 3 4  
      
Fem HHH ONLY: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian 
HS ED:  
Order within Row, HiLo 
1308 1470 1310 240 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
Collg Ed: 1216 1048 1020 653 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
1xPvInc 1496 797 542 -33 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
4xPvInc 672 967 741 408 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian 
 4691 4282 3613 1268 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
differences  409 669 2345  
total purchase 
rank 1 2 3 4  
      
Male HHH ONLY: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian 
HS ED:  
Order within Row, HiLo 
1630 1317 979 3658 Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm 
Collg Ed: 1025 1208 803 2202 Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm 
1xPvInc 1658 900 516 2035 Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm 
4xPvInc 634 869 515 2308 Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm 
 4946 4295 2811 10203 Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm 
differences 5257 652 1483   
total purchase 
rank 2 3 4 1  
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Table 21a.    REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to SALE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 402 372 401 94 385 307 246 -2 
1xPvInc 279 253 184 274 286 212 51 202 
2xPvInc 359 278 302 161 343 214 146 66 
3xPvInc 271 206 516 218 245 131 351 113 
4xPvInc 275 200 397 221 252 128 234 118 
5xPvInc 330 327 532 392 245 194 308 229 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 513 416 348 642 389 242 440 468 
HS 279 253 184 274 275 200 397 221 
Sm Collg 291 259 -11 278 303 221 217 240 
Collg 286 212 51 202 252 128 234 118 
Post Collg 242 267 -22 197 271 246 224 176 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of income. HH 
size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar tables to allow 
comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, columns, and half-columns. 
40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded 
totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
 
 
 
 
Table 21b.    REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to SALE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 445 489 223 69 415 468 365 64 
1xPvInc 184 232 -133 110 212 270 69 164 
2xPvInc 274 268 -5 8 290 293 184 49 
3xPvInc 218 227 242 97 236 254 432 140 
4xPvInc 210 209 110 87 184 192 257 86 
5xPvInc 222 294 203 217 155 236 308 175 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 260 255 17 341 274 219 246 305 
HS 184 232 -133 110 210 209 110 87 
Sm Collg 191 240 -35 159 220 220 211 139 
Collg 212 270 69 164 184 192 223 86 
Post Collg 168 206 -13 126 193 182 229 102 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of income. HH 
size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar tables to allow 
comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, columns, and half-columns. 
40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded 
totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 21c.    REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to SALE, by  
Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 170 164 973 -69 184 120 675 -159 
1xPvInc 68 66 776 132 46 -13 443 6 
2xPvInc 36 -21 782 -93 4 -110 438 -229 
3xPvInc 122 81 1171 138 78 -21 815 -9 
4xPvInc 7 -44 932 21 10 -99 623 -80 
5xPvInc 31 52 1036 163 13 -23 707 41 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 226 206 791 269 57 -13 839 51 
HS 68 66 776 132 7 -44 932 21 
Sm Collg 73 64 483 88 25 -34 652 -10 
Collg 46 -13 443 6 10 -99 623 -80 
Post Collg 47 106 451 40 20 29 640 -37 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 21d.   REFINED CMEs in Sale Analysis – Half-Column Totals in Race, by Table 
Levels of Education and Income 
 
Male & Fem 
HHHs: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian 
HS ED:  
Order within Row, HiLo 
1360 1916 1636 2331 Asian, White, AfrAm, Hisp 
Collg Ed: 726 1756 1187 1336 White, Asian, AfrAm, Hisp 
1xPvInc 1592 1611 1406 549 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian 
4xPvInc 1223 1490 1038 1511 Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm 
 4901 6773 5267 5727 White, Asian, AfrAm, Hisp 
differences 366  460 1045  
total purchase 
rank 4 1 3 2  
 
 
 
     
Fem HHH ONLY: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian  
HS ED:  589 1553 1718 640 AfrAm, White, Asian, Hisp 
Collg Ed: 678 1492 1713 1615 AfrAm, Asian, White, Hisp 
1xPvInc 900 1015 1204 -95 AfrAm, White, Hisp, Asian 
4xPvInc 719 1082 1023 1020 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian 
 2886 5143 5658 3181 AfrAm, White, Asian, Hisp 
differences 294 516  1962  
total purchase 
rank 4 2 1 3  
      
Male HHH ONLY: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian  
HS ED:  292 434 298 5672 Asian, White, Afr Am, Hisp 
Collg Ed: -430 335 -146 3701 Asian, White, Afr Am, Hisp 
1xPvInc 534 461 428 2945 Asian, White, Hisp, Afr Am 
4xPvInc -55 119 -161 3686 Asian, White, Hisp, Afr Am 
 341 1349 419 16003 Asian, White, Afr Am, Hisp 
differences 78 14654 930   
total purchase 
rank 4 2 3 1  
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Table 22a.  REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to ADVERTISING, 
by Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=4, Male & Female HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 430 391 255 492 284 233 42 319 
1xPvInc 349 268 228 514 267 175 79 404 
2xPvInc 379 353 246 388 291 253 90 272 
3xPvInc 328 264 454 282 276 200 334 202 
4xPvInc 297 229 244 231 245 165 125 152 
5xPvInc 361 313 393 346 268 208 233 226 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 456 265 396 697 377 198 384 387 
HS 349 268 228 514 297 229 244 231 
Sm Collg 248 158 71 445 260 182 150 225 
Collg 267 175 79 404 245 165 125 152 
Post Collg 215 200 133 367 143 140 129 65 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
 
 
 
 
Table 22b.  REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to ADVERTISING,  
by Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Female ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 400 397 68 406 221 233 45 290 
1xPvInc 215 172 -62 325 155 126 33 326 
2xPvInc 257 268 -33 210 212 237 77 227 
3xPvInc 146 120 116 44 135 122 259 94 
4xPvInc 220 189 11 99 181 164 127 122 
5xPvInc 276 265 152 206 184 188 216 176 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 231 86 95 397 274 142 206 209 
HS 215 172 -62 325 220 189 11 99 
Sm Collg 155 116 -1 327 197 171 109 138 
Collg 155 126 33 326 181 164 117 122 
Post Collg 148 147 9 306 140 151 68 67 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 22c.  REFINED Model Prediction of HH Purchase Reaction to ADVERTISING,  
by Demog. Sub-Group:  HHsize=3, Male ONLY HHHs, Two Kids^ 
cell units =  White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic White* Afr Am* Asian* Hispanic 
oz./purchase HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed HS Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed Collg Ed 
HfPvInc 278 250 551 383 311 257 361 326 
1xPvInc 200 131 526 407 178 83 282 296 
2xPvInc 225 210 539 276 181 140 272 143 
3xPvInc 169 117 742 165 128 50 479 35 
4xPvInc 199 141 592 175 185 103 357 73 
5xPvInc 231 194 710 258 229 166 487 167 
 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 1xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 4xPvInc 
Less HS 292 213 538 518 225 158 538 220 
HS 200 131 526 407 199 141 592 175 
Sm Collg 160 76 308 335 184 113 400 129 
Collg 178 83 282 296 185 103 357 73 
Post Collg 133 88 361 279 125 91 420 40 
^ Column cells vary by Race/Hispanic, upper columns by level of education, lower columns by level of 
income. HH size, number of Kids, and HHH Age(s) 40–50 yrs are held fixed for every cell and for all similar 
tables to allow comparison across levels of the estimation model in the variables designated by rows, 
columns, and half-columns. 40%-shaded totals are 550+ ounces at positive weekly purchase, 25%-shaded 
totals are 350+ ounces, 10%-shaded totals are under 100 ounces, bold totals are negative. 
* Races are non-Hispanic, base for est. was White; for Hispanic, base was non-Hispanic. 
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Table 22d.   REFINED CMEs in Advertising Analysis – Half-Column Totals in Race, 
by Table Levels of Education and Income 
 
Male & Fem 
HHHs: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian 
HS ED:  
Order within Row, HiLo 
2254 2144 1817 1819 Hisp, White, Asian, AfrAm 
Collg Ed: 1576 1630 1235 902 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian 
1xPvInc 2427 1534 1066 907 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
4xPvInc 1061 1322 913 1031 White, Hisp,  Asian, AfrAm 
 7318 6631 5032 4659 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
differences  687 1599 373  
total purchase 
rank 1 2 3 4  
      
Fem HHH ONLY: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian  
HS ED:  1290 1514 1411 252 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
Collg Ed: 1235 1088 1071 758 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
1xPvInc 1680 904 649 76 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
4xPvInc 635 1013 816 511 White, Hisp, AfrAm, Asian 
 4840 4519 3947 1596 Hisp, White, AfrAm, Asian 
differences  321 571 2352  
total purchase 
rank 1 2 3 4  
      
Male HHH ONLY: Hispnc White AfrAm Asian  
HS ED:  1662 1301 1043 3660 Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm 
Collg Ed: 1040 1212 800 2238 Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm 
1xPvInc 1835 961 591 2015 Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm 
4xPvInc 636 918 606 2308 Asian, White, Hisp, AfrAm 
 5173 4393 3039 10221 Asian, Hisp, White, AfrAm 
differences 5048 780 1354   
total purchase 
rank 2 3 4 1  
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Table A-1b.    Number of Observations, Percent of Households, and 
Cumulative Percentage of Households With Children 
ONLY, By Nielsen FEMALE Age Grouping†* 
 Number Percent  
Female Age of obs. of HHs 
No Female Head 
Cum. % 
14,420 2.11 2.11 
Under 25 Years 2,572 0.38 2.49 
25-29 Years 28,368 4.15 6.64 
30-34 Years 81,060 11.86 18.5 
35-39 Years 141,016 20.64 39.14 
40-44 Years 164,064 24.01 63.14 
45-49 Years 138,564 20.28 83.42 
50-54 Years 66,144 9.68 93.1 
55-64 Years 37,872 5.54 98.64 
65+ Years 9,276 1.36 100 
    Total 683,356 100  
† Table units are number of observations in total sCSD dataset. 
Dividing by 152 will give number of HHs in the sub-group. 
Highest number of observations by HH Size for Female Age 
grouping with Female HHH are shaded for boxes with 
relatively large break to next highest level, and with the 
highest two values in bold (highest three if the third is more 
than one-third higher than the fourth value). 
* Any positive number of children under 18 years. 
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Table A-1d.    Number of Observations, Percent of Households, and 
Cumulative Percentage of Households With Children 
ONLY, By Nielsen MALE Age Grouping†* 
 Number Percent  
Male Age of obs. of HHs 
No Male Head 
Cum. % 
93,152 13.63 13.63 
Under 25 
Years 1,412 0.21 13.84 
25-29 Years 14,652 2.14 15.98 
30-34 Years 53,208 7.79 23.77 
35-39 Years 108,956 15.94 39.71 
40-44 Years 141,568 20.72 60.43 
45-49 Years 125,512 18.37 78.8 
50-54 Years 84,988 12.44 91.23 
55-64 Years 49,164 7.19 98.43 
65+ Years 10,744 1.57 100 
    Total 683,356 100  
† Table units are number of observations in total sCSD 
dataset. Highest number of observations by HH Size for 
Male Age grouping with Female HHH are shaded for 
boxes with relatively large break to next highest level, 
and with the highest two values in bold (highest three if 
the third is more than one-third higher than the fourth 
value). 
* Any positive number of children under 18 years. 
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Table A-2.    Top Soft-Drink Brands, Sugared and Diet,  By 2006–2009 U.S. 
Purchase By Nielsen HomeScan Participants across 16 DMAs 
 
 
Freq. of  
purchase     Percent    Cumul.%      (R=Regular, DT=Diet) BRAND 
 94,369              8.29         8.29 COCA-COLA CLASSIC R 
 88,954              7.81       16.10 CTL BR R  (CTL BR = Private Label) 
 87,575              7.69       23.79 COCA-COLA DT  
 83,101              7.30       31.09 CTL BR DT (CTL BR = Private Label) 
 78,882              6.93       38.01 PEPSI R   
 57,555              5.05       43.07 PEPSI DT   
 30,224              2.65       45.72 COCA-COLA CAFFEINE FREE DT 
 29,132              2.56       48.28 SPRITE R   
 29,123              2.56       50.84 DR PEPPER R  
 24,049              2.11       52.95 MOUNTAIN DEW R  
 22,747              2.00       54.94 PEPSI CAFFEINE FREE DT 
 21,177              1.86       56.80 DR PEPPER DT  
 18,260              1.60       58.41 CANADA DRY R  
 16,590              1.46       59.86 COCA-COLA ZERO DT 
 15,593              1.37       61.23 A & W R   
 15,548              1.37       62.60 SEVEN UP R  
 13,943              1.22       63.82 SPRITE ZERO DT  
 13,377              1.17       65.00 SIERRA MIST R  
 13,230              1.16       66.16 A & W DT   
 13,154              1.16       67.31 SCHWEPPES R  
 12,981              1.14       68.45 MOUNTAIN DEW DT  
 12,640              1.11       69.56 SEVEN UP DT  
 12,468              1.09       70.66 SUNKIST R  
 10,990              0.97       71.62 PEPSI CAFFEINE FREE R 
 9,753                0.86       72.48 FRESCA DT  
 9,018                0.79       73.27 COCA-COLA CHERRY R 
 8,421                0.74       74.01 PEPSI WILD CHERRY DT 
 8,211                0.72       74.73 VINTAGE R  
 7,862                0.69       75.42 SHASTA R  
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Table A-3.    REFINED Model (Demographic Variables Decomposed into Distinct 
Levels, Each Interacted with Income Level, and Some Groups Also with 
Education Level), With Marketing Variable Interactions‡ 
Number of obs.: 2,666,124 
Censored obs = 2,206,732 
Uncensored obs = 459,392 
Variable Coeff. Std.Err. z P>z      δy/δx* P>|z|      X^ 
Wkly Price (DMA) -1590.242 128.786 -12.35 0 -82.331 0.523 0.007 
Disc/Sale 12.424 7.283 1.71 0.088 12.424 0.088 - 
Wkly Advert 0.015 0.003 4.55 0 0.017 0 374.631 
Variable Coeff. Std.Err. z P>z      δy/δx* P>|z|       
HfPvIncFmLHS 209.058 48.740 4.29 0 153.020 0.002  
1xPvIncFmLHS 347.027 44.768 7.75 0 291.635 0  
2xPvIncFmLHS 280.177 44.023 6.36 0 217.992 0  
3xPvIncFmLHS 320.569 44.474 7.21 0 262.024 0  
4xPvIncFmLHS 418.484 47.386 8.83 0 346.961 0  
5xPvIncFmLHS 208.379 47.609 4.38 0 172.813 0  
HfPvIncFmHS 33.638 36.835 0.91 0.361 33.638 0.361  
1xPvIncFmHS 211.179 31.509 6.7 0 162.653 0  
2xPvIncFmHS 125.551 31.046 4.04 0 71.252 0.022  
3xPvIncFmHS 142.945 30.496 4.69 0 91.365 0.003  
4xPvIncFmHS 249.660 32.809 7.61 0 185.511 0  
5xPvIncFmHS 106.916 29.339 3.64 0 83.762 0.004  
HfPvIncFmSomCollg 5.437 37.516 0.14 0.885 -38.850 0.3  
1xPvIncFmSomCollg 223.277 32.271 6.92 0 183.192 0  
2xPvIncFmSomCollg 137.671 31.619 4.35 0 89.727 0.005  
3xPvIncFmSomCollg 177.690 30.899 5.75 0 135.912 0  
4xPvIncFmSomCollg 297.739 33.357 8.93 0 242.383 0  
5xPvIncFmSomCollg 127.387 29.483 4.32 0 112.505 0  
HfPvIncFmCollg -74.187 39.887 -1.86 0.063 -107.316 0.007  
1xPvIncFmCollg 179.972 34.354 5.24 0 147.397 0  
2xPvIncFmCollg 105.878 33.236 3.19 0.001 64.529 0.052  
3xPvIncFmCollg 151.790 32.131 4.72 0 117.943 0  
4xPvIncFmCollg 233.320 34.529 6.76 0 187.366 0  
5xPvIncFmCollg 37.600 30.645 1.23 0.22 29.774 0.331  
HfPvIncFmPostCollg -124.317 47.766 -2.6 0.009 -171.019 0  
1xPvIncFmPostCollg 166.237 26.489 6.28 0 126.020 0  
2xPvIncFmPostCollg 44.594 19.632 2.27 0.023 -6.292 0.749  
3xPvIncFmPostCollg 86.293 17.904 4.82 0 42.671 0.017  
4xPvIncFmPostCollg 195.401 18.977 10.3 0 141.715 0  
HfPvIncMLHS -12.759 38.122 -0.33 0.738 -51.206 0.179  
1xPvIncMLHS 81.607 33.982 2.4 0.016 50.421 0.138  
2xPvIncMLHS 100.255 33.283 3.01 0.003 66.857 0.045  
3xPvIncMLHS -9.352 33.555 -0.28 0.78 -67.896 0.043  
4xPvIncMLHS -87.406 36.011 -2.43 0.015 -116.486 0.001  
5xPvIncMLHS 95.792 34.620 2.77 0.006 77.900 0.024  
HfPvIncMHS -159.435 29.578 -5.39 0 -159.435 0  
1xPvIncMHS -45.505 25.736 -1.77 0.077 -72.816 0.005  
2xPvIncMHS -33.586 25.021 -1.34 0.179 -66.325 0.008  
3xPvIncMHS -14.906 24.808 -0.6 0.548 -43.967 0.076  
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4xPvIncMHS -133.132 26.664 -4.99 0 -158.744 0  
5xPvIncMHS -55.351 23.578 -2.35 0.019 -75.375 0.001  
HfPvIncMSomCollg -18.958 31.251 -0.61 0.544 -60.669 0.052  
1xPvIncMSomCollg 23.098 26.133 0.88 0.377 -3.655 0.889  
2xPvIncMSomCollg 46.016 24.995 1.84 0.066 13.145 0.599  
3xPvIncMSomCollg 53.926 24.534 2.2 0.028 24.349 0.321  
4xPvIncMSomCollg -30.474 26.221 -1.16 0.245 -58.397 0.026  
5xPvIncMSomCollg 65.332 23.185 2.82 0.005 41.869 0.071  
HfPvIncMCollg -88.109 36.669 -2.4 0.016 -117.184 0.001  
1xPvIncMCollg -67.858 30.637 -2.21 0.027 -87.505 0.004  
2xPvIncMCollg -72.211 28.863 -2.5 0.012 -96.386 0.001  
3xPvIncMCollg -55.643 28.403 -1.96 0.05 -81.085 0.004  
4xPvIncMCollg -144.100 29.629 -4.86 0 -165.078 0  
5xPvIncMCollg -49.779 26.198 -1.9 0.057 -66.166 0.012  
HfPvIncMPostCollg -34.156 47.711 -0.72 0.474 -57.400 0.229  
1xPvIncMPostCollg -13.706 29.114 -0.47 0.638 -38.726 0.183  
2xPvIncMPostCollg -39.337 22.111 -1.78 0.075 -65.765 0.003  
3xPvIncMPostCollg -0.099 15.735 -0.01 0.995 -20.330 0.196  
4xPvIncMPostCollg -109.299 16.498 -6.63 0 -126.470 0  
HfPvIncWhite -102.154 38.189 -2.67 0.007 -67.151 0.079  
1xPvIncWhite -251.832 33.615 -7.49 0 -206.988 0  
2xPvIncWhite -95.660 26.533 -3.61 0 -53.541 0.044  
3xPvIncWhite 5.874 17.338 0.34 0.735 39.734 0.022  
4xPvIncWhite -12.647 25.135 -0.5 0.615 26.505 0.292  
HfPvIncAfrAm -106.356 38.370 -2.77 0.006 -63.173 0.1  
1xPvIncAfrAm -288.638 35.148 -8.21 0 -241.733 0  
2xPvIncAfrAm -77.690 27.891 -2.79 0.005 -31.116 0.265  
3xPvIncAfrAm -13.250 20.203 -0.66 0.512 27.011 0.181  
4xPvIncAfrAm -45.408 27.525 -1.65 0.099 0.175 0.995  
5xPvIncAfrAm -6.568 14.611 -0.45 0.653 -1.308 0.929  
HfPvIncAsian 21.818 65.964 0.33 0.741 61.088 0.354  
1xPvIncAsian -70.690 46.919 -1.51 0.132 -22.001 0.639  
2xPvIncAsian 58.046 39.336 1.48 0.14 104.754 0.008  
3xPvIncAsian 435.889 31.172 13.98 0 477.766 0  
4xPvIncAsian 227.507 38.295 5.94 0 274.473 0  
5xPvIncAsian 322.981 27.226 11.86 0 336.397 0  
HfPvIncOthRace -199.455 40.360 -4.94 0 -199.139 0  
1xPvIncOthRace -289.414 34.173 -8.47 0 -274.063 0  
2xPvIncOthRace -133.585 26.567 -5.03 0 -123.619 0  
4xPvIncOthRace 0.316 26.672 0.01 0.991 3.084 0.908  
5xPvIncOthRace -21.228 20.522 -1.03 0.301 -66.633 0.001  
HfPvIncHspnc -40.588 16.589 -2.45 0.014 -41.371 0.013  
1xPvIncHspnc -69.733 15.682 -4.45 0 -67.722 0  
2xPvIncHspnc -49.640 14.065 -3.53 0 -46.498 0.001  
3xPvIncHspnc -20.120 14.082 -1.43 0.153 -19.088 0.175  
4xPvIncHspnc -60.174 15.743 -3.82 0 -50.640 0.001  
5xPvIncHspnc -29.926 16.707 -1.79 0.073 -21.496 0.198  
HfPvIncHHsiz1 35.501 27.803 1.28 0.202 -15.262 0.583  
1xPvIncHHsiz1 141.229 18.157 7.78 0 95.642 0  
2xPvIncHHsiz1 106.578 15.100 7.06 0 49.214 0.001  
3xPvIncHHsiz1 21.934 14.156 1.55 0.121 -40.721 0.004  
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4xPvIncHHsiz1 23.022 15.436 1.49 0.136 -36.420 0.018  
HfPvIncHHsiz2 89.456 25.863 3.46 0.001 37.992 0.142  
1xPvIncHHsiz2 134.730 16.649 8.09 0 86.047 0  
2xPvIncHHsiz2 137.307 13.401 10.25 0 87.079 0  
3xPvIncHHsiz2 94.546 11.870 7.96 0 37.683 0.002  
4xPvIncHHsiz2 51.136 12.629 4.05 0 0.998 0.937  
5xPvIncHHsiz2 171.677 6.545 26.23 0 128.166 0  
HfPvIncHHsiz3 60.701 24.917 2.44 0.015 7.873 0.752  
1xPvIncHHsiz3 176.825 15.800 11.19 0 129.857 0  
2xPvIncHHsiz3 137.164 12.472 11 0 89.539 0  
3xPvIncHHsiz3 109.757 11.033 9.95 0 59.483 0  
4xPvIncHHsiz3 95.643 11.534 8.29 0 47.186 0  
5xPvIncHHsiz3 168.263 7.587 22.18 0 121.483 0  
HfPvIncHHsiz4 44.763 24.257 1.85 0.065 1.839 0.94  
1xPvIncHHsiz4 203.970 15.611 13.07 0 150.800 0  
2xPvIncHHsiz4 146.358 11.646 12.57 0 98.164 0  
3xPvIncHHsiz4 180.519 10.171 17.75 0 130.120 0  
4xPvIncHHsiz4 91.495 10.779 8.49 0 46.122 0  
5xPvIncHHsiz4 187.893 8.249 22.78 0 141.882 0  
HfPvIncNoKids 191.009 38.242 4.99 0 202.723 0  
1xPvIncNoKids 98.138 34.596 2.84 0.005 90.984 0.009  
2xPvIncNoKids 2.423 26.445 0.09 0.927 7.479 0.777  
3xPvIncNoKids -19.085 19.383 -0.98 0.325 -4.574 0.813  
4xPvIncNoKids 24.261 23.983 1.01 0.312 30.683 0.201  
HfPvIncOneKids 187.651 37.804 4.96 0 195.285 0  
1xPvIncOneKids 65.188 35.659 1.83 0.068 59.130 0.097  
2xPvIncOneKids -79.328 27.892 -2.84 0.004 -73.501 0.008  
3xPvIncOneKids -116.255 21.121 -5.5 0 -102.381 0  
4xPvIncOneKids -48.081 26.229 -1.83 0.067 -37.160 0.157  
5xPvIncOneKids -51.591 15.770 -3.27 0.001 -44.242 0.005  
HfPvIncTwoKids 266.678 38.423 6.94 0 273.525 0  
1xPvIncTwoKids 114.884 35.991 3.19 0.001 110.371 0.002  
2xPvIncTwoKids 23.378 29.177 0.8 0.423 31.344 0.283  
3xPvIncTwoKids -91.535 23.078 -3.97 0 -80.853 0  
4xPvIncTwoKids -2.890 27.375 -0.11 0.916 7.153 0.794  
5xPvIncTwoKids -6.840 18.897 -0.36 0.717 0.764 0.968  
HfPvInc3Kids 192.375 43.759 4.4 0 191.238 0  
1xPvInc3Kids 153.689 40.727 3.77 0 154.276 0  
2xPvInc3Kids -76.979 34.659 -2.22 0.026 -71.166 0.04  
3xPvInc3Kids -106.249 30.115 -3.53 0 -96.977 0.001  
4xPvInc3Kids -58.675 33.173 -1.77 0.077 -49.099 0.139  
5xPvInc3Kids -62.252 28.543 -2.18 0.029 -52.799 0.064  
HfPvIncFmAgeL30 5.509 25.039 0.22 0.826 7.728 0.758  
1xPvIncFmAgeL30 9.376 16.104 0.58 0.56 7.226 0.654  
2xPvIncFmAgeL30 14.073 12.857 1.09 0.274 15.701 0.222  
3xPvIncFmAgeL30 -12.068 14.326 -0.84 0.4 -9.070 0.527  
4xPvIncFmAgeL30 -129.242 18.769 -6.89 0 -123.631 0  
5xPvIncFmAgeL30 25.159 16.133 1.56 0.119 20.060 0.214  
HfPvIncFmAge30L40 36.395 19.254 1.89 0.059 36.395 0.059  
1xPvIncFmAge30L40 -2.631 12.737 -0.21 0.836 2.989 0.814  
2xPvIncFmAge30L40 45.286 11.242 4.03 0 49.816 0  
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3xPvIncFmAge30L40 -26.346 12.108 -2.18 0.03 -22.245 0.066  
4xPvIncFmAge30L40 -111.639 15.272 -7.31 0 -103.637 0  
5xPvIncFmAge30L40 7.401 8.854 0.84 0.403 -1.456 0.869  
HfPvIncFmAge40L50 116.573 16.720 6.97 0 115.313 0  
1xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.035 11.730 0 0.998 -32.551 0.006  
2xPvIncFmAge40L50 67.443 10.657 6.33 0 76.231 0  
3xPvIncFmAge40L50 -17.963 11.594 -1.55 0.121 -11.007 0.342  
4xPvIncFmAge40L50 -98.951 14.646 -6.76 0 -87.702 0  
5xPvIncFmAge40L50 32.960 6.502 5.07 0 27.741 0  
HfPvIncFmAge50L65 80.064 16.003 5 0 78.334 0  
1xPvIncFmAge50L65 21.403 10.547 2.03 0.042 26.385 0.012  
2xPvIncFmAge50L65 46.254 10.120 4.57 0 54.290 0  
3xPvIncFmAge50L65 -9.733 11.045 -0.88 0.378 -5.767 0.602  
4xPvIncFmAge50L65 -47.155 13.920 -3.39 0.001 -40.057 0.004  
HfPvIncMAgeL30 148.001 30.743 4.81 0 143.865 0  
1xPvIncMAgeL30 0.304 19.226 0.02 0.987 -8.733 0.65  
2xPvIncMAgeL30 179.723 14.301 12.57 0 167.784 0  
3xPvIncMAgeL30 -16.423 15.957 -1.03 0.303 -13.426 0.4  
4xPvIncMAgeL30 205.749 20.717 9.93 0 192.129 0  
5xPvIncMAgeL30 -7.087 20.293 -0.35 0.727 -22.669 0.264  
HfPvIncMAge30L40 98.804 24.224 4.08 0 98.804 0  
1xPvIncMAge30L40 72.272 15.084 4.79 0 52.562 0  
2xPvIncMAge30L40 44.060 11.653 3.78 0 30.014 0.01  
3xPvIncMAge30L40 34.821 11.659 2.99 0.003 24.282 0.037  
4xPvIncMAge30L40 118.288 14.462 8.18 0 100.140 0  
5xPvIncMAge30L40 12.335 8.553 1.44 0.149 9.994 0.243  
HfPvIncMAge40L50 62.300 20.162 3.09 0.002 57.821 0.004  
1xPvIncMAge40L50 76.653 12.900 5.94 0 58.788 0  
2xPvIncMAge40L50 53.829 11.143 4.83 0 46.884 0  
3xPvIncMAge40L50 34.496 11.132 3.1 0.002 27.991 0.012  
4xPvIncMAge40L50 118.043 13.569 8.7 0 103.255 0  
5xPvIncMAge40L50 14.814 6.002 2.47 0.014 12.609 0.036  
HfPvIncMAge50L65 11.329 19.345 0.59 0.558 3.825 0.843  
1xPvIncMAge50L65 64.194 12.370 5.19 0 49.633 0  
2xPvIncMAge50L65 24.410 10.636 2.3 0.022 15.818 0.137  
3xPvIncMAge50L65 33.384 10.670 3.13 0.002 26.567 0.013  
4xPvIncMAge50L65 96.308 13.087 7.36 0 83.844 0  
FmLHSNoKids -130.018 41.378 -3.14 0.002 -129.364 0.002  
FmHSNoKids -63.749 27.530 -2.32 0.021 -66.928 0.015  
FmSmColgNoKids -100.028 27.647 -3.62 0 -109.555 0  
FmColgNoKids -77.914 28.312 -2.75 0.006 -92.665 0.001  
FmLHSOneKids -7.142 43.216 -0.17 0.869 -10.915 0.801  
FmHSOneKids 20.138 29.211 0.69 0.491 14.349 0.623  
FmSmColgOneKids -23.540 29.276 -0.8 0.421 -32.039 0.274  
FmColgOneKids -39.099 30.057 -1.3 0.193 -46.465 0.122  
FmPostColgOneKids 32.108 14.098 2.28 0.023 29.165 0.039  
FmLHSTwoKids -103.590 43.985 -2.36 0.019 -105.459 0.017  
FmHSTwoKids -49.252 30.661 -1.61 0.108 -57.933 0.059  
FmSmColgTwoKids -84.434 30.678 -2.75 0.006 -96.119 0.002  
FmColgTwoKids -85.326 31.478 -2.71 0.007 -96.559 0.002  
FmPostColgTwoKids -33.619 17.500 -1.92 0.055 -42.693 0.015  
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FmLHS3Kids 31.171 49.160 0.63 0.526 31.416 0.523  
FmHS3Kids -47.782 35.403 -1.35 0.177 -50.145 0.157  
FmSmColg3Kids -44.464 35.428 -1.26 0.209 -51.977 0.142  
FmColg3Kids -20.888 36.405 -0.57 0.566 -30.482 0.402  
FmPostColg3Kids 65.844 27.871 2.36 0.018 55.498 0.046  
MLHSNoKids 100.437 28.580 3.51 0 103.288 0  
MHSNoKids 166.260 20.256 8.21 0 165.855 0  
MSmColgNoKids 91.723 19.483 4.71 0 98.608 0  
MColgNoKids 131.749 22.188 5.94 0 127.087 0  
MLHSOneKids 99.649 29.638 3.36 0.001 92.698 0.002  
MHSOneKids 195.803 20.955 9.34 0 186.453 0  
MSmColgOneKids 68.922 20.341 3.39 0.001 70.502 0.001  
MColgOneKids 142.593 23.299 6.12 0 134.534 0  
MPostColgOneKids 74.827 13.018 5.75 0 58.881 0  
MLHSTwoKids 203.343 29.588 6.87 0 203.328 0  
MHSTwoKids 194.119 21.268 9.13 0 188.378 0  
MSmColgTwoKids 70.135 20.602 3.4 0.001 72.429 0  
MColgTwoKids 141.152 23.690 5.96 0 136.503 0  
MPostColgTwoKids 37.493 13.954 2.69 0.007 24.522 0.079  
MLHS3Kids 29.642 32.560 0.91 0.363 21.438 0.51  
MHS3Kids 131.199 24.025 5.46 0 126.586 0  
MSmColg3Kids 79.220 23.558 3.36 0.001 79.348 0.001  
MColg3Kids 142.962 26.982 5.3 0 142.821 0  
MPostColg3Kids 44.667 23.596 1.89 0.058 34.748 0.141  
FmLHSWhite -24.662 17.013 -1.45 0.147 -15.755 0.354  
FmHSWhite 50.721 13.349 3.8 0 57.931 0  
FmSmColgWhite 10.229 13.398 0.76 0.445 17.806 0.184  
FmColgWhite 52.324 14.625 3.58 0 54.547 0  
FmLHSAfrAm -135.099 22.616 -5.97 0 -128.627 0  
FmHSAfrAm 38.832 15.985 2.43 0.015 44.003 0.006  
FmSomColgAfrAm 5.832 15.669 0.37 0.71 11.538 0.461  
FmColgAfrAm 56.322 17.365 3.24 0.001 59.051 0.001  
FmPostColgAfrAm 45.394 14.161 3.21 0.001 38.217 0.007  
FmLHSAsian -361.868 38.317 -9.44 0 -351.455 0  
FmHSAsian -407.953 26.736 -15.26 0 -408.734 0  
FmSomColgAsian -330.665 25.946 -12.74 0 -331.524 0  
FmColgAsian -252.371 25.329 -9.96 0 -257.818 0  
FmPostColgAsian -321.835 24.663 -13.05 0 -337.795 0  
FmPostColgOthRace -21.376 19.238 -1.11 0.267 -30.666 0.111  
FmLHSHspnc 3.753 15.584 0.24 0.81 -0.767 0.961  
FmHSHspnc 22.850 11.808 1.94 0.053 18.172 0.124  
FmSomColgHspnc 48.439 11.927 4.06 0 41.691 0  
FmColgHspnc 84.897 13.160 6.45 0 77.390 0  
FmPostColgHspnc 15.761 15.881 0.99 0.321 3.755 0.813  
MLHSWhite -98.074 16.035 -6.12 0 -97.134 0  
MHSWhite -60.686 11.453 -5.3 0 -57.742 0  
MSmColgWhite -59.131 12.015 -4.92 0 -58.532 0  
MColgWhite -16.758 13.696 -1.22 0.221 -12.266 0.37  
MLHSAfrAm -142.510 20.002 -7.12 0 -142.041 0  
MHSAfrAm -98.028 13.348 -7.34 0 -101.403 0  
MSmColgAfrAm -108.532 14.137 -7.68 0 -110.054 0  
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MColgAfrAm -75.237 16.380 -4.59 0 -77.478 0  
MPostColgAfrAm -4.163 16.341 -0.25 0.799 -15.421 0.345  
MLHSAsian -2.314 43.964 -0.05 0.958 -7.006 0.873  
MHSAsian 116.758 23.944 4.88 0 110.756 0  
MSmColgAsian -62.811 22.816 -2.75 0.006 -69.054 0.002  
MColgAsian -72.579 23.074 -3.15 0.002 -78.597 0.001  
MPostColgAsian 96.476 23.387 4.13 0 72.101 0.002  
MPostColgOthRace 24.811 20.025 1.24 0.215 17.484 0.383  
MLHSHspnc -15.043 14.704 -1.02 0.306 -18.397 0.211  
MHSHspnc 2.853 10.415 0.27 0.784 -2.207 0.832  
MSmColgHspnc -23.840 10.940 -2.18 0.029 -28.349 0.01  
MColgHspnc -46.602 12.103 -3.85 0 -49.281 0  
MPostColgHspnc -5.578 16.905 -0.33 0.741 -11.644 0.491  
NoManHd 92.108 4.826 19.09 0 41.066 0  
NoFemHd 138.110 4.769 28.96 0 84.123 0  
_4KidsPlus 10.594 19.642 0.54 0.59 10.825 0.582  
FemAge65plus 17.796 5.485 3.24 0.001 19.804 0  
MaleAge65plus 25.874 5.159 5.02 0 9.314 0.071  
OtherRace 6.135 14.911 0.41 0.681 46.809 0.002  
HHsiz5plus 197.405 5.765 34.24 0 145.970 0  
     
OLS coeff/ME, in oz, by 
multiplying avg value ‘X’ 
P2HfPvIncFmLHS -4180.648 1084.196 -3.86 0 -30.966   
P21xPvIncFmLHS -4761.465 982.171 -4.85 0 -35.268   
P22xPvIncFmLHS -3426.944 974.442 -3.52 0 -25.383   
P23xPvIncFmLHS -1987.048 954.352 -2.08 0.037 -14.718   
P24xPvIncFmLHS -4212.343 1025.066 -4.11 0 -31.201   
P25xPvIncFmLHS -2662.957 1047.597 -2.54 0.011 -19.725   
P2HfPvIncFmHS -4480.407 769.427 -5.82 0 -33.186   
P21xPvIncFmHS -6198.597 612.867 -10.11 0 -45.913   
P22xPvIncFmHS -4039.567 590.915 -6.84 0 -29.921   
P23xPvIncFmHS -3907.662 573.940 -6.81 0 -28.944   
P24xPvIncFmHS -6093.031 639.665 -9.53 0 -45.131   
P25xPvIncFmHS -4311.087 566.262 -7.61 0 -31.932   
P2HfPvIncFmSomCollg -3251.096 768.806 -4.23 0 -24.081   
P21xPvIncFmSomCollg -5542.659 630.144 -8.8 0 -41.054   
P22xPvIncFmSomCollg -3697.118 600.717 -6.15 0 -27.385   
P23xPvIncFmSomCollg -3630.159 585.121 -6.2 0 -26.889   
P24xPvIncFmSomCollg -5998.180 650.444 -9.22 0 -44.429   
P25xPvIncFmSomCollg -4055.494 569.215 -7.12 0 -30.039   
P2HfPvIncFmCollg -2505.782 768.674 -3.26 0.001 -18.560   
P21xPvIncFmCollg -4601.347 612.409 -7.51 0 -34.082   
P22xPvIncFmCollg -3688.285 577.080 -6.39 0 -27.319   
P23xPvIncFmCollg -3574.781 547.639 -6.53 0 -26.478   
P24xPvIncFmCollg -5245.536 619.588 -8.47 0 -38.854   
P25xPvIncFmCollg -3141.785 531.916 -5.91 0 -23.271   
P2HfPvIncFmPostCollg 2652.199 1084.002 2.45 0.014 19.645   
P21xPvIncFmPostCollg -2197.853 528.704 -4.16 0 -16.279   
P22xPvIncFmPostCollg 45.095 360.871 0.12 0.901 0.334   
P23xPvIncFmPostCollg -200.903 324.807 -0.62 0.536 -1.488   
P24xPvIncFmPostCollg -2019.743 378.389 -5.34 0 -14.960   
P2HfPvIncMLHS 4101.857 895.057 4.58 0 30.382   
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P21xPvIncMLHS 1749.742 841.855 2.08 0.038 12.960   
P22xPvIncMLHS 924.578 823.030 1.12 0.261 6.848   
P23xPvIncMLHS 2572.051 819.012 3.14 0.002 19.051   
P24xPvIncMLHS 2140.885 857.028 2.5 0.012 15.858   
P25xPvIncMLHS 1999.129 863.807 2.31 0.021 14.808   
P2HfPvIncMHS 4632.977 714.924 6.48 0 34.316   
P21xPvIncMHS 2728.957 617.125 4.42 0 20.213   
P22xPvIncMHS 1462.837 591.113 2.47 0.013 10.835   
P23xPvIncMHS 1976.577 582.308 3.39 0.001 14.641   
P24xPvIncMHS 2145.377 620.740 3.46 0.001 15.891   
P25xPvIncMHS 2332.392 565.968 4.12 0 17.276   
P2HfPvIncMSomCollg 3219.425 718.053 4.48 0 23.846   
P21xPvIncMSomCollg 2418.256 604.795 4 0 17.912   
P22xPvIncMSomCollg 2103.039 572.235 3.68 0 15.577   
P23xPvIncMSomCollg 2087.436 554.597 3.76 0 15.462   
P24xPvIncMSomCollg 2760.221 587.531 4.7 0 20.445   
P25xPvIncMSomCollg 2183.760 538.945 4.05 0 16.175   
P2HfPvIncMCollg 2454.311 799.051 3.07 0.002 18.179   
P21xPvIncMCollg 779.079 656.405 1.19 0.235 5.771   
P22xPvIncMCollg 2861.371 611.771 4.68 0 21.194   
P23xPvIncMCollg 1474.383 602.293 2.45 0.014 10.921   
P24xPvIncMCollg 2127.006 632.925 3.36 0.001 15.755   
P25xPvIncMCollg 2075.859 569.947 3.64 0 15.376   
P2HfPvIncMPostCollg 735.688 1080.014 0.68 0.496 5.449   
P21xPvIncMPostCollg -678.255 621.075 -1.09 0.275 -5.024   
P22xPvIncMPostCollg 1085.838 353.226 3.07 0.002 8.043   
P23xPvIncMPostCollg 352.926 273.804 1.29 0.197 2.614   
P24xPvIncMPostCollg 713.694 333.995 2.14 0.033 5.286   
P2HfPvIncWhite 1120.011 909.002 1.23 0.218 8.296   
P21xPvIncWhite 1975.311 892.029 2.21 0.027 14.631   
P22xPvIncWhite -1207.735 604.491 -2 0.046 -8.946   
P23xPvIncWhite -411.912 272.247 -1.51 0.13 -3.051   
P24xPvIncWhite -832.031 494.692 -1.68 0.093 -6.163   
P2HfPvIncAfrAm 525.544 891.560 0.59 0.556 3.893   
P21xPvIncAfrAm 1625.311 918.920 1.77 0.077 12.039   
P22xPvIncAfrAm -1962.262 627.898 -3.13 0.002 -14.534   
P23xPvIncAfrAm -941.477 332.996 -2.83 0.005 -6.974   
P24xPvIncAfrAm -1528.489 547.409 -2.79 0.005 -11.322   
P25xPvIncAfrAm -845.597 293.186 -2.88 0.004 -6.263   
P2HfPvIncAsian -2322.450 1505.026 -1.54 0.123 -17.202   
P21xPvIncAsian 656.107 1050.295 0.62 0.532 4.860   
P22xPvIncAsian -3102.271 782.821 -3.96 0 -22.979   
P23xPvIncAsian -4175.245 534.856 -7.81 0 -30.926   
P24xPvIncAsian -2476.629 687.718 -3.6 0 -18.344   
P25xPvIncAsian -2132.549 510.602 -4.18 0 -15.796   
P2HfPvIncOthRace 3264.434 944.393 3.46 0.001 24.180   
P21xPvIncOthRace 1965.416 911.065 2.16 0.031 14.558   
P22xPvIncOthRace -1208.964 615.126 -1.97 0.049 -8.955   
P24xPvIncOthRace -1497.447 538.273 -2.78 0.005 -11.092   
P25xPvIncOthRace 32.334 362.696 0.09 0.929 0.239   
P2HfPvIncHspnc 385.228 372.726 1.03 0.301 2.853   
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P21xPvIncHspnc 1195.629 292.596 4.09 0 8.856   
P22xPvIncHspnc 630.663 260.165 2.42 0.015 4.671   
P23xPvIncHspnc 826.068 255.390 3.23 0.001 6.119   
P24xPvIncHspnc 774.765 289.369 2.68 0.007 5.739   
P25xPvIncHspnc 287.366 321.436 0.89 0.371 2.129   
P2HfPvIncHHsiz1 1723.434 721.477 2.39 0.017 12.765   
P21xPvIncHHsiz1 1140.323 404.924 2.82 0.005 8.446   
P22xPvIncHHsiz1 1189.262 318.274 3.74 0 8.809   
P23xPvIncHHsiz1 2082.830 251.485 8.28 0 15.428   
P24xPvIncHHsiz1 690.712 302.410 2.28 0.022 5.116   
P2HfPvIncHHsiz2 692.185 681.140 1.02 0.31 5.127   
P21xPvIncHHsiz2 1833.721 374.086 4.9 0 13.582   
P22xPvIncHHsiz2 1281.281 287.300 4.46 0 9.490   
P23xPvIncHHsiz2 1198.308 210.514 5.69 0 8.876   
P24xPvIncHHsiz2 631.859 259.729 2.43 0.015 4.680   
P25xPvIncHHsiz2 -1028.901 137.271 -7.5 0 -7.621   
P2HfPvIncHHsiz3 2193.310 640.807 3.42 0.001 16.246   
P21xPvIncHHsiz3 1025.831 350.136 2.93 0.003 7.598   
P22xPvIncHHsiz3 1250.063 262.780 4.76 0 9.259   
P23xPvIncHHsiz3 1090.213 187.324 5.82 0 8.075   
P24xPvIncHHsiz3 362.347 228.493 1.59 0.113 2.684   
P25xPvIncHHsiz3 -758.473 153.325 -4.95 0 -5.618   
P2HfPvIncHHsiz4 550.250 573.045 0.96 0.337 4.076   
P21xPvIncHHsiz4 -386.244 351.488 -1.1 0.272 -2.861   
P22xPvIncHHsiz4 1418.532 248.792 5.7 0 10.507   
P23xPvIncHHsiz4 487.357 167.035 2.92 0.004 3.610   
P24xPvIncHHsiz4 571.152 211.273 2.7 0.007 4.231   
P25xPvIncHHsiz4 -159.441 148.809 -1.07 0.284 -1.181   
P2HfPvIncNoKids -3829.116 856.574 -4.47 0 -28.362   
P21xPvIncNoKids -2616.043 928.837 -2.82 0.005 -19.377   
P22xPvIncNoKids -651.044 623.997 -1.04 0.297 -4.822   
P23xPvIncNoKids -1917.441 361.201 -5.31 0 -14.202   
P24xPvIncNoKids -361.488 516.943 -0.7 0.484 -2.678   
P2HfPvIncOneKids -3790.538 834.782 -4.54 0 -28.077   
P21xPvIncOneKids -2654.865 935.366 -2.84 0.005 -19.665   
P22xPvIncOneKids 327.080 634.653 0.52 0.606 2.423   
P23xPvIncOneKids -441.626 368.914 -1.2 0.231 -3.271   
P24xPvIncOneKids 214.298 537.586 0.4 0.69 1.587   
P25xPvIncOneKids 511.529 295.894 1.73 0.084 3.789   
P2HfPvIncTwoKids -4176.223 782.320 -5.34 0 -30.933   
P21xPvIncTwoKids -3852.239 935.493 -4.12 0 -28.534   
P22xPvIncTwoKids -1781.137 658.256 -2.71 0.007 -13.193   
P23xPvIncTwoKids -1420.099 435.423 -3.26 0.001 -10.519   
P24xPvIncTwoKids -1131.832 566.079 -2 0.046 -8.383   
P25xPvIncTwoKids -1494.185 378.493 -3.95 0 -11.067   
P2HfPvInc3Kids -2671.341 942.284 -2.83 0.005 -19.787   
P21xPvInc3Kids -1769.256 981.303 -1.8 0.071 -13.105   
P22xPvInc3Kids 264.735 726.162 0.36 0.715 1.961   
P23xPvInc3Kids 181.470 553.724 0.33 0.743 1.344   
P24xPvInc3Kids 244.466 626.967 0.39 0.697 1.811   
P25xPvInc3Kids 2.625 540.853 0 0.996 0.019   
346 
P2HfPvIncFmAgeL30 -674.553 469.145 -1.44 0.15 -4.996   
P21xPvIncFmAgeL30 -99.117 290.073 -0.34 0.733 -0.734   
P22xPvIncFmAgeL30 577.853 232.108 2.49 0.013 4.280   
P23xPvIncFmAgeL30 178.031 256.420 0.69 0.487 1.319   
P24xPvIncFmAgeL30 2417.120 373.019 6.48 0 17.904   
P25xPvIncFmAgeL30 35.896 265.263 0.14 0.892 0.266   
P2HfPvIncFmAge30L40 -531.259 407.814 -1.3 0.193 -3.935   
P21xPvIncFmAge30L40 915.210 252.175 3.63 0 6.779   
P22xPvIncFmAge30L40 359.948 208.462 1.73 0.084 2.666   
P23xPvIncFmAge30L40 -219.161 225.175 -0.97 0.33 -1.623   
P24xPvIncFmAge30L40 2000.701 319.789 6.26 0 14.819   
P25xPvIncFmAge30L40 730.359 163.640 4.46 0 5.410   
P2HfPvIncFmAge40L50 -393.838 355.340 -1.11 0.268 -2.917   
P21xPvIncFmAge40L50 496.567 241.757 2.05 0.04 3.678   
P22xPvIncFmAge40L50 -721.568 194.590 -3.71 0 -5.345   
P23xPvIncFmAge40L50 -451.642 218.658 -2.07 0.039 -3.345   
P24xPvIncFmAge40L50 1699.113 310.679 5.47 0 12.585   
P25xPvIncFmAge40L50 -177.743 120.558 -1.47 0.14 -1.317   
P2HfPvIncFmAge50L65 -436.689 356.455 -1.23 0.221 -3.235   
P21xPvIncFmAge50L65 -167.128 229.193 -0.73 0.466 -1.238   
P22xPvIncFmAge50L65 -354.153 189.266 -1.87 0.061 -2.623   
P23xPvIncFmAge50L65 -462.949 209.679 -2.21 0.027 -3.429   
P24xPvIncFmAge50L65 953.162 297.606 3.2 0.001 7.060   
P2HfPvIncMAgeL30 -1703.535 636.152 -2.68 0.007 -12.618   
P21xPvIncMAgeL30 739.806 307.696 2.4 0.016 5.480   
P22xPvIncMAgeL30 -1895.485 287.565 -6.59 0 -14.040   
P23xPvIncMAgeL30 256.683 264.310 0.97 0.331 1.901   
P24xPvIncMAgeL30 -1077.287 400.335 -2.69 0.007 -7.979   
P25xPvIncMAgeL30 1201.482 340.653 3.53 0 8.899   
P2HfPvIncMAge30L40 -362.009 533.819 -0.68 0.498 -2.681   
P21xPvIncMAge30L40 -503.066 325.819 -1.54 0.123 -3.726   
P22xPvIncMAge30L40 450.585 232.209 1.94 0.052 3.337   
P23xPvIncMAge30L40 232.262 222.310 1.04 0.296 1.720   
P24xPvIncMAge30L40 -348.062 288.953 -1.2 0.228 -2.578   
P25xPvIncMAge30L40 -554.975 156.480 -3.55 0 -4.111   
P2HfPvIncMAge40L50 -1086.948 456.827 -2.38 0.017 -8.051   
P21xPvIncMAge40L50 -349.488 288.422 -1.21 0.226 -2.589   
P22xPvIncMAge40L50 220.568 229.494 0.96 0.336 1.634   
P23xPvIncMAge40L50 -32.224 218.455 -0.15 0.883 -0.239   
P24xPvIncMAge40L50 -654.596 272.527 -2.4 0.016 -4.849   
P25xPvIncMAge40L50 -136.235 107.395 -1.27 0.205 -1.009   
P2HfPvIncMAge50L65 -922.124 440.464 -2.09 0.036 -6.830   
P21xPvIncMAge50L65 218.145 277.592 0.79 0.432 1.616   
P22xPvIncMAge50L65 181.153 219.576 0.83 0.409 1.342   
P23xPvIncMAge50L65 -110.251 208.432 -0.53 0.597 -0.817   
P24xPvIncMAge50L65 73.558 260.532 0.28 0.778 0.545   
P2FmLHSNoKids 1872.274 919.516 2.04 0.042 13.868   
P2FmHSNoKids 4232.920 530.462 7.98 0 31.353   
P2FmSmColgNoKids 4171.573 533.091 7.83 0 30.899   
P2FmColgNoKids 3685.246 487.047 7.57 0 27.297   
P2FmLHSOneKids 1043.483 955.294 1.09 0.275 7.729   
347 
P2FmHSOneKids 3399.675 553.426 6.14 0 25.181   
P2FmSmColgOneKids 3007.247 553.112 5.44 0 22.275   
P2FmColgOneKids 2673.239 513.251 5.21 0 19.801   
P2FmPostColgOneKids -267.580 249.899 -1.07 0.284 -1.982   
P2FmLHSTwoKids 804.519 967.657 0.83 0.406 5.959   
P2FmHSTwoKids 4760.356 585.367 8.13 0 35.260   
P2FmSmColgTwoKids 4091.501 585.122 6.99 0 30.306   
P2FmColgTwoKids 4080.356 552.736 7.38 0 30.223   
P2FmPostColgTwoKids 840.712 335.792 2.5 0.012 6.227   
P2FmLHS3Kids -755.101 1062.541 -0.71 0.477 -5.593   
P2FmHS3Kids 2664.614 665.268 4.01 0 19.737   
P2FmSmColg3Kids 2337.782 655.194 3.57 0 17.316   
P2FmColg3Kids 2055.240 638.834 3.22 0.001 15.223   
P2FmPostColg3Kids -1312.565 523.632 -2.51 0.012 -9.722   
P2MLHSNoKids -2993.870 729.409 -4.1 0 -22.176   
P2MHSNoKids -2923.832 505.556 -5.78 0 -21.657   
P2MSmColgNoKids -2864.257 488.610 -5.86 0 -21.216   
P2MColgNoKids -2311.321 502.104 -4.6 0 -17.120   
P2MLHSOneKids -2909.542 745.514 -3.9 0 -21.551   
P2MHSOneKids -3014.995 517.069 -5.83 0 -22.332   
P2MSmColgOneKids -2399.726 499.558 -4.8 0 -17.775   
P2MColgOneKids -2151.283 520.592 -4.13 0 -15.935   
P2MPostColgOneKids -925.071 254.248 -3.64 0 -6.852   
P2MLHSTwoKids -3471.735 748.784 -4.64 0 -25.715   
P2MHSTwoKids -2396.918 526.458 -4.55 0 -17.754   
P2MSmColgTwoKids -2509.461 507.892 -4.94 0 -18.588   
P2MColgTwoKids -1590.273 532.837 -2.98 0.003 -11.779   
P2MPostColgTwoKids -221.935 281.694 -0.79 0.431 -1.644   
P2MLHS3Kids -1939.023 808.907 -2.4 0.017 -14.362   
P2MHS3Kids -1703.585 578.091 -2.95 0.003 -12.618   
P2MSmColg3Kids -2053.144 556.903 -3.69 0 -15.208   
P2MColg3Kids -1802.362 598.410 -3.01 0.003 -13.350   
P2MPostColg3Kids -396.389 481.830 -0.82 0.411 -2.936   
P2FmLHSWhite 324.167 330.618 0.98 0.327 2.401   
P2FmHSWhite -494.124 247.456 -2 0.046 -3.660   
P2FmSmColgWhite 23.116 247.821 0.09 0.926 0.171   
P2FmColgWhite -439.400 269.475 -1.63 0.103 -3.255   
P2FmLHSAfrAm 1920.406 452.962 4.24 0 14.224   
P2FmHSAfrAm -492.353 310.260 -1.59 0.113 -3.647   
P2FmSomColgAfrAm 558.756 294.204 1.9 0.058 4.139   
P2FmColgAfrAm 56.561 325.805 0.17 0.862 0.419   
P2FmPostColgAfrAm 333.586 271.977 1.23 0.22 2.471   
P2FmLHSAsian 2833.867 678.927 4.17 0 20.990   
P2FmHSAsian 3591.092 481.601 7.46 0 26.599   
P2FmSomColgAsian 2307.969 457.639 5.04 0 17.095   
P2FmColgAsian 1597.106 452.949 3.53 0 11.830   
P2FmPostColgAsian 2007.504 434.119 4.62 0 14.870   
P2FmPostColgOthRace 188.939 344.460 0.55 0.583 1.399   
P2FmLHSHspnc 540.147 308.463 1.75 0.08 4.001   
P2FmHSHspnc 320.588 215.613 1.49 0.137 2.375   
P2FmSomColgHspnc -94.670 218.270 -0.43 0.664 -0.701   
348 
P2FmColgHspnc -646.994 247.900 -2.61 0.009 -4.792   
P2FmPostColgHspnc 14.669 318.675 0.05 0.963 0.109   
P2MLHSWhite 1093.711 346.068 3.16 0.002 8.101   
P2MHSWhite 803.603 235.477 3.41 0.001 5.952   
P2MSmColgWhite -186.491 230.934 -0.81 0.419 -1.381   
P2MColgWhite -185.869 264.323 -0.7 0.482 -1.377   
P2MLHSAfrAm 1572.267 431.762 3.64 0 11.646   
P2MHSAfrAm 797.653 277.793 2.87 0.004 5.908   
P2MSmColgAfrAm 687.639 277.119 2.48 0.013 5.093   
P2MColgAfrAm 1221.805 315.171 3.88 0 9.050   
P2MPostColgAfrAm 394.118 305.082 1.29 0.196 2.919   
P2MLHSAsian 3122.033 774.599 4.03 0 23.125   
P2MHSAsian -527.261 487.306 -1.08 0.279 -3.905   
P2MSmColgAsian -4.696 418.949 -0.01 0.991 -0.035   
P2MColgAsian -120.878 442.600 -0.27 0.785 -0.895   
P2MPostColgAsian -177.609 424.762 -0.42 0.676 -1.316   
P2MPostColgOthRace 624.786 365.454 1.71 0.087 4.628   
P2MLHSHspnc -363.809 317.454 -1.15 0.252 -2.695   
P2MHSHspnc -568.801 212.986 -2.67 0.008 -4.213   
P2MSmColgHspnc -189.736 215.559 -0.88 0.379 -1.405   
P2MColgHspnc -220.194 237.347 -0.93 0.354 -1.631   
P2MPostColgHspnc -519.088 310.248 -1.67 0.094 -3.845   
SaleHfPvIncFmLHS -187.121 49.267 -3.8 0 -187.121   
Sale1xPvIncFmLHS -183.868 45.997 -4 0 -183.868   
Sale2xPvIncFmLHS -41.937 44.932 -0.93 0.351 -41.937   
Sale3xPvIncFmLHS -278.560 45.576 -6.11 0 -278.560   
Sale4xPvIncFmLHS -159.819 48.391 -3.3 0.001 -159.819   
Sale5xPvIncFmLHS -227.326 48.404 -4.7 0 -227.326   
SaleHfPvIncFmHS -69.846 34.227 -2.04 0.041 -69.846   
Sale1xPvIncFmHS -103.880 29.570 -3.51 0 -103.880   
Sale2xPvIncFmHS -35.398 29.116 -1.22 0.224 -35.398   
Sale3xPvIncFmHS -122.010 27.849 -4.38 0 -122.010   
Sale4xPvIncFmHS -34.175 30.774 -1.11 0.267 -34.175   
Sale5xPvIncFmHS -28.006 28.101 -1 0.319 -28.006   
SaleHfPvIncFmSomCollg -24.298 35.235 -0.69 0.49 -24.298   
Sale1xPvIncFmSomCollg -52.058 30.183 -1.72 0.085 -52.058   
Sale2xPvIncFmSomCollg -2.938 29.584 -0.1 0.921 -2.938   
Sale3xPvIncFmSomCollg -84.667 27.982 -3.03 0.002 -84.667   
Sale4xPvIncFmSomCollg -15.792 31.035 -0.51 0.611 -15.792   
Sale5xPvIncFmSomCollg -6.618 28.055 -0.24 0.814 -6.618   
SaleHfPvIncFmCollg 8.264 37.268 0.22 0.825 8.264   
Sale1xPvIncFmCollg -92.384 31.813 -2.9 0.004 -92.384   
Sale2xPvIncFmCollg -45.207 30.475 -1.48 0.138 -45.207   
Sale3xPvIncFmCollg -163.235 28.987 -5.63 0 -163.235   
Sale4xPvIncFmCollg -94.401 31.460 -3 0.003 -94.401   
Sale5xPvIncFmCollg -73.645 28.429 -2.59 0.01 -73.645   
SaleHfPvIncFmPostCollg 43.258 43.471 1 0.32 43.258   
Sale1xPvIncFmPostCollg -56.470 30.804 -1.83 0.067 -56.470   
Sale2xPvIncFmPostCollg 39.563 18.030 2.19 0.028 39.563   
Sale3xPvIncFmPostCollg 16.053 17.260 0.93 0.352 16.053   
Sale4xPvIncFmPostCollg 19.447 17.561 1.11 0.268 19.447   
349 
SaleHfPvIncMLHS -3.715 42.520 -0.09 0.93 -3.715   
Sale1xPvIncMLHS 49.143 37.362 1.32 0.188 49.143   
Sale2xPvIncMLHS -1.570 36.034 -0.04 0.965 -1.570   
Sale3xPvIncMLHS 7.007 36.734 0.19 0.849 7.007   
Sale4xPvIncMLHS 57.235 38.276 1.5 0.135 57.235   
Sale5xPvIncMLHS -59.529 37.828 -1.57 0.116 -59.529   
SaleHfPvIncMHS -31.499 29.886 -1.05 0.292 -31.499   
Sale1xPvIncMHS -15.416 27.498 -0.56 0.575 -15.416   
Sale2xPvIncMHS 13.909 26.488 0.53 0.6 13.909   
Sale3xPvIncMHS -38.667 26.562 -1.46 0.145 -38.667   
Sale4xPvIncMHS 19.724 28.049 0.7 0.482 19.724   
Sale5xPvIncMHS -26.270 26.154 -1 0.315 -26.270   
SaleHfPvIncMSomCollg -155.696 32.758 -4.75 0 -155.696   
Sale1xPvIncMSomCollg -53.361 27.879 -1.91 0.056 -53.361   
Sale2xPvIncMSomCollg -19.873 26.320 -0.76 0.45 -19.873   
Sale3xPvIncMSomCollg -94.958 26.328 -3.61 0 -94.958   
Sale4xPvIncMSomCollg -37.163 27.682 -1.34 0.179 -37.163   
Sale5xPvIncMSomCollg -60.203 25.651 -2.35 0.019 -60.203   
SaleHfPvIncMCollg 93.533 38.986 2.4 0.016 93.533   
Sale1xPvIncMCollg 130.904 33.841 3.87 0 130.904   
Sale2xPvIncMCollg 165.525 32.045 5.17 0 165.525   
Sale3xPvIncMCollg 107.731 31.550 3.41 0.001 107.731   
Sale4xPvIncMCollg 181.548 32.521 5.58 0 181.548   
Sale5xPvIncMCollg 100.244 30.320 3.31 0.001 100.244   
SaleHfPvIncMPostCollg 58.672 38.968 1.51 0.132 58.672   
Sale1xPvIncMPostCollg -28.737 26.226 -1.1 0.273 -28.737   
Sale2xPvIncMPostCollg 87.673 22.619 3.88 0 87.673   
Sale3xPvIncMPostCollg -8.670 15.114 -0.57 0.566 -8.670   
Sale4xPvIncMPostCollg 41.310 14.577 2.83 0.005 41.310   
SaleHfPvIncWhite 310.651 49.912 6.22 0 310.651   
Sale1xPvIncWhite 158.796 38.936 4.08 0 158.796   
Sale2xPvIncWhite 206.015 26.508 7.77 0 206.015   
Sale3xPvIncWhite 84.317 15.639 5.39 0 84.317   
Sale4xPvIncWhite 78.331 26.620 2.94 0.003 78.331   
SaleHfPvIncAfrAm 374.529 50.117 7.47 0 374.529   
Sale1xPvIncAfrAm 265.804 40.396 6.58 0 265.804   
Sale2xPvIncAfrAm 201.195 28.124 7.15 0 201.195   
Sale3xPvIncAfrAm 129.554 19.209 6.74 0 129.554   
Sale4xPvIncAfrAm 127.365 29.035 4.39 0 127.365   
Sale5xPvIncAfrAm 96.605 15.939 6.06 0 96.605   
SaleHfPvIncAsian 764.192 72.443 10.55 0 764.192   
Sale1xPvIncAsian 460.916 51.638 8.93 0 460.916   
Sale2xPvIncAsian 572.720 38.124 15.02 0 572.720   
Sale3xPvIncAsian 473.449 27.398 17.28 0 473.449   
Sale4xPvIncAsian 534.066 37.727 14.16 0 534.066   
Sale5xPvIncAsian 447.702 25.079 17.85 0 447.702   
SaleHfPvIncOthRace 346.229 53.072 6.52 0 346.229   
Sale1xPvIncOthRace 188.973 40.166 4.7 0 188.973   
Sale2xPvIncOthRace 223.959 27.330 8.19 0 223.959   
Sale4xPvIncOthRace 54.665 28.917 1.89 0.059 54.665   
Sale5xPvIncOthRace -16.170 18.661 -0.87 0.386 -16.170   
350 
SaleHfPvIncHspnc -22.189 19.476 -1.14 0.255 -22.189   
Sale1xPvIncHspnc 15.204 17.382 0.87 0.382 15.204   
Sale2xPvIncHspnc 2.052 16.255 0.13 0.9 2.052   
Sale3xPvIncHspnc 91.142 16.909 5.39 0 91.142   
Sale4xPvIncHspnc 101.581 17.629 5.76 0 101.581   
Sale5xPvIncHspnc 85.064 18.618 4.57 0 85.064   
SaleHfPvIncHHsiz1 120.165 117.986 1.02 0.308 120.165   
Sale1xPvIncHHsiz1 -9.498 17.881 -0.53 0.595 -9.498   
Sale2xPvIncHHsiz1 14.432 13.616 1.06 0.289 14.432   
Sale3xPvIncHHsiz1 17.147 13.202 1.3 0.194 17.147   
Sale4xPvIncHHsiz1 60.658 13.716 4.42 0 60.658   
SaleHfPvIncHHsiz2 5.964 42.982 0.14 0.89 5.964   
Sale1xPvIncHHsiz2 4.926 16.227 0.3 0.761 4.926   
Sale2xPvIncHHsiz2 -12.672 11.887 -1.07 0.286 -12.672   
Sale3xPvIncHHsiz2 51.818 10.573 4.9 0 51.818   
Sale4xPvIncHHsiz2 23.763 10.463 2.27 0.023 23.763   
Sale5xPvIncHHsiz2 8.701 7.321 1.19 0.235 8.701   
SaleHfPvIncHHsiz3 75.209 15.977 4.71 0 75.209   
Sale1xPvIncHHsiz3 -0.802 15.880 -0.05 0.96 -0.802   
Sale2xPvIncHHsiz3 2.079 10.998 0.19 0.85 2.079   
Sale3xPvIncHHsiz3 53.604 9.830 5.45 0 53.604   
Sale4xPvIncHHsiz3 36.823 9.515 3.87 0 36.823   
Sale5xPvIncHHsiz3 -10.117 7.438 -1.36 0.174 -10.117   
SaleHfPvIncHHsiz4 37.415 17.873 2.09 0.036 37.415   
Sale1xPvIncHHsiz4 33.113 15.344 2.16 0.031 33.113   
Sale2xPvIncHHsiz4 15.295 10.118 1.51 0.131 15.295   
Sale3xPvIncHHsiz4 -43.953 8.719 -5.04 0 -43.953   
Sale4xPvIncHHsiz4 25.428 8.801 2.89 0.004 25.428   
Sale5xPvIncHHsiz4 14.644 7.292 2.01 0.045 14.644   
SaleHfPvIncNoKids -240.082 44.867 -5.35 0 -240.082   
Sale1xPvIncNoKids -105.017 39.791 -2.64 0.008 -105.017   
Sale2xPvIncNoKids -187.205 26.970 -6.94 0 -187.205   
Sale3xPvIncNoKids -58.473 19.946 -2.93 0.003 -58.473   
Sale4xPvIncNoKids -122.890 25.451 -4.83 0 -122.890   
SaleHfPvIncOneKids -353.464 47.226 -7.48 0 -353.464   
Sale1xPvIncOneKids -147.761 41.238 -3.58 0 -147.761   
Sale2xPvIncOneKids -210.459 29.274 -7.19 0 -210.459   
Sale3xPvIncOneKids -85.089 23.166 -3.67 0 -85.089   
Sale4xPvIncOneKids -158.672 28.706 -5.53 0 -158.672   
Sale5xPvIncOneKids -15.294 17.307 -0.88 0.377 -15.294   
SaleHfPvIncTwoKids -480.496 50.302 -9.55 0 -480.496   
Sale1xPvIncTwoKids -213.276 41.433 -5.15 0 -213.276   
Sale2xPvIncTwoKids -352.727 30.104 -11.72 0 -352.727   
Sale3xPvIncTwoKids -163.855 24.394 -6.72 0 -163.855   
Sale4xPvIncTwoKids -316.146 29.518 -10.71 0 -316.146   
Sale5xPvIncTwoKids -193.232 19.785 -9.77 0 -193.232   
SaleHfPvInc3Kids -268.782 53.843 -4.99 0 -268.782   
Sale1xPvInc3Kids -116.498 46.800 -2.49 0.013 -116.498   
Sale2xPvInc3Kids -100.541 35.942 -2.8 0.005 -100.541   
Sale3xPvInc3Kids -15.581 30.918 -0.5 0.614 -15.581   
Sale4xPvInc3Kids -46.883 36.639 -1.28 0.201 -46.883   
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Sale5xPvInc3Kids 95.580 30.893 3.09 0.002 95.580   
SaleHfPvIncFmAgeL30 -45.991 25.041 -1.84 0.066 -45.991   
Sale1xPvIncFmAgeL30 -18.152 18.555 -0.98 0.328 -18.152   
Sale2xPvIncFmAgeL30 -45.699 12.727 -3.59 0 -45.699   
Sale3xPvIncFmAgeL30 38.747 13.977 2.77 0.006 38.747   
Sale4xPvIncFmAgeL30 19.207 19.041 1.01 0.313 19.207   
Sale5xPvIncFmAgeL30 1.978 17.532 0.11 0.91 1.978   
SaleHfPvIncFmLAge30L40 2.018 19.417 0.1 0.917 2.018   
Sale1xPvIncFmAge30L40 -51.745 12.825 -4.03 0 -51.745   
Sale2xPvIncFmAge30L40 -45.060 9.863 -4.57 0 -45.060   
Sale3xPvIncFmAge30L40 59.367 10.586 5.61 0 59.367   
Sale4xPvIncFmAge30L40 12.310 13.725 0.9 0.37 12.310   
Sale5xPvIncFmAge30L40 13.907 8.873 1.57 0.117 13.907   
SaleHfPvIncFmLAge40L50 15.288 15.146 1.01 0.313 15.288   
Sale1xPvIncFmAge40L50 -51.408 10.195 -5.04 0 -51.408   
Sale2xPvIncFmAge40L50 8.046 8.818 0.91 0.362 8.046   
Sale3xPvIncFmAge40L50 36.359 9.872 3.68 0 36.359   
Sale4xPvIncFmAge40L50 35.786 12.765 2.8 0.005 35.786   
Sale5xPvIncFmAge40L50 -10.915 6.356 -1.72 0.086 -10.915   
SaleHfPvIncFmAge50L65 -62.195 13.757 -4.52 0 -62.195   
Sale1xPvIncFmAge50L65 -3.195 8.340 -0.38 0.702 -3.195   
Sale2xPvIncFmAge50L65 0.296 7.793 0.04 0.97 0.296   
Sale3xPvIncFmAge50L65 54.952 8.988 6.11 0 54.952   
Sale4xPvIncFmAge50L65 25.186 11.798 2.13 0.033 25.186   
SaleHfPvIncMAgeL30 -96.162 43.058 -2.23 0.026 -96.162   
Sale1xPvIncMAgeL30 25.294 23.182 1.09 0.275 25.294   
Sale2xPvIncMAgeL30 -66.623 15.202 -4.38 0 -66.623   
Sale3xPvIncMAgeL30 115.937 16.545 7.01 0 115.937   
Sale4xPvIncMAgeL30 -72.109 22.571 -3.19 0.001 -72.109   
Sale5xPvIncMAgeL30 -35.569 19.683 -1.81 0.071 -35.569   
SaleHfPvIncMLAge30L40 -48.151 24.931 -1.93 0.053 -48.151   
Sale1xPvIncMAge30L40 14.006 15.411 0.91 0.363 14.006   
Sale2xPvIncMAge30L40 -20.284 10.648 -1.9 0.057 -20.284   
Sale3xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.003 10.874 0 1 -0.003   
Sale4xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.167 13.095 -0.01 0.99 -0.167   
Sale5xPvIncMAge30L40 -9.204 8.609 -1.07 0.285 -9.204   
SaleHfPvIncMAge40L50 -1.786 19.498 -0.09 0.927 -1.786   
Sale1xPvIncMAge40L50 -65.935 11.607 -5.68 0 -65.935   
Sale2xPvIncMAge40L50 -66.804 9.348 -7.15 0 -66.804   
Sale3xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.787 10.070 -0.08 0.938 -0.787   
Sale4xPvIncMAge40L50 -22.091 11.855 -1.86 0.062 -22.091   
Sale5xPvIncMAge40L50 15.712 6.025 2.61 0.009 15.712   
SaleHfPvIncMAge50L65 -11.690 19.497 -0.6 0.549 -11.690   
Sale1xPvIncMAge50L65 -7.898 10.967 -0.72 0.471 -7.898   
Sale2xPvIncMAge50L65 -22.648 8.635 -2.62 0.009 -22.648   
Sale3xPvIncMAge50L65 -16.372 9.291 -1.76 0.078 -16.372   
Sale4xPvIncMAge50L65 -23.467 11.047 -2.12 0.034 -23.467   
SalexFmLHSNoKids 194.083 42.990 4.51 0 194.083   
SalexFmHSNoKids 99.308 26.005 3.82 0 99.308   
SalexFmSmColgNoKids 76.633 26.151 2.93 0.003 76.633   
SalexFmColgNoKids 98.256 25.373 3.87 0 98.256   
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SalexFmLHSOneKids 193.056 45.723 4.22 0 193.056   
SalexFmHSOneKids 126.722 28.751 4.41 0 126.722   
SalexFmSmColgOneKids 86.275 28.862 2.99 0.003 86.275   
SalexFmColgOneKids 125.132 28.362 4.41 0 125.132   
SalexFmPostColgOneKids 54.909 16.080 3.41 0.001 54.909   
SalexFmLHSTwoKids 402.472 46.075 8.74 0 402.472   
SalexFmHSTwoKids 208.672 29.883 6.98 0 208.672   
SalexFmSmColgTwoKids 220.634 29.855 7.39 0 220.634   
SalexFmColgTwoKids 256.601 29.297 8.76 0 256.601   
SalexFmPostColgTwoKids 197.160 17.962 10.98 0 197.160   
SalexFmLHS3Kids 86.181 50.440 1.71 0.088 86.181   
SalexFmHS3Kids 36.693 35.058 1.05 0.295 36.693   
SalexFmSmColg3Kids 44.535 35.191 1.27 0.206 44.535   
SalexFmColg3Kids 46.352 35.206 1.32 0.188 46.352   
SalexFmPostColg3Kids -32.852 29.565 -1.11 0.266 -32.852   
SalexMLHSNoKids 45.397 32.846 1.38 0.167 45.397   
SalexMHSNoKids 36.250 23.216 1.56 0.118 36.250   
SalexMSmColgNoKids 21.188 22.014 0.96 0.336 21.188   
SalexMColgNoKids -120.740 27.019 -4.47 0 -120.740   
SalexMLHSOneKids 110.132 34.420 3.2 0.001 110.132   
SalexMHSOneKids 42.602 23.825 1.79 0.074 42.602   
SalexMSmColgOneKids 24.275 22.821 1.06 0.287 24.275   
SalexMColgOneKids -115.986 28.037 -4.14 0 -115.986   
SalexMPostColgOneKids 14.048 12.932 1.09 0.277 14.048   
SalexMLHSTwoKids 24.176 34.163 0.71 0.479 24.176   
SalexMHSTwoKids 23.446 24.178 0.97 0.332 23.446   
SalexMSmColgTwoKids 53.968 23.272 2.32 0.02 53.968   
SalexMColgTwoKids -140.478 28.433 -4.94 0 -140.478   
SalexMPostColgTwoKids 69.716 13.861 5.03 0 69.716   
SalexMLHS3Kids 62.750 36.238 1.73 0.083 62.750   
SalexMHS3Kids 76.301 27.016 2.82 0.005 76.301   
SalexMSmColg3Kids -1.830 26.297 -0.07 0.945 -1.830   
SalexMColg3Kids -154.380 31.785 -4.86 0 -154.380   
SalexMPostColg3Kids -56.488 23.105 -2.44 0.014 -56.488   
SalexFmLHSWhite -72.506 18.023 -4.02 0 -72.506   
SalexFmHSWhite -27.521 13.890 -1.98 0.048 -27.521   
SalexFmSmColgWhite -26.572 13.903 -1.91 0.056 -26.572   
SalexFmColgWhite -0.974 15.333 -0.06 0.949 -0.974   
SalexFmLHSAfrAm -36.796 23.797 -1.55 0.122 -36.796   
SalexFmHSAfrAm -37.455 17.092 -2.19 0.028 -37.455   
SalexFmSmColgAfrAm -43.153 16.800 -2.57 0.01 -43.153   
SalexFmColgAfrAm -20.066 18.615 -1.08 0.281 -20.066   
SalexFmPostColgAfrAm -72.184 15.644 -4.61 0 -72.184   
SalexFmLHSAsian -467.709 38.815 -12.05 0 -467.709   
SalexFmHSAsian -364.486 25.578 -14.25 0 -364.486   
SalexFmSmColgAsian -389.600 25.663 -15.18 0 -389.600   
SalexFmColgAsian -319.584 24.744 -12.92 0 -319.584   
SalexFmPostColgAsian -330.272 23.852 -13.85 0 -330.272   
SalexFmPostColgOthRace 4.045 21.635 0.19 0.852 4.045   
SalexFmLHSHspnc -2.447 17.326 -0.14 0.888 -2.447   
SalexFmHSHspnc -56.707 13.832 -4.1 0 -56.707   
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SalexFmSmColgHspnc -77.852 13.977 -5.57 0 -77.852   
SalexFmColgHspnc -67.829 15.160 -4.47 0 -67.829   
SalexFmPostColgHspnc -41.493 19.558 -2.12 0.034 -41.493   
SalexMLHSWhite -24.845 16.346 -1.52 0.129 -24.845   
SalexMHSWhite -18.582 12.048 -1.54 0.123 -18.582   
SalexMSmColgWhite 41.916 12.665 3.31 0.001 41.916   
SalexMColgWhite -1.567 14.384 -0.11 0.913 -1.567   
SalexMLHSAfrAm -72.312 20.984 -3.45 0.001 -72.312   
SalexMHSAfrAm -48.995 14.317 -3.42 0.001 -48.995   
SalexMSmColgAfrAm 11.979 14.972 0.8 0.424 11.979   
SalexMColgAfrAm -67.955 17.477 -3.89 0 -67.955   
SalexMPostColgAfrAm 1.374 17.253 0.08 0.937 1.374   
SalexMLHSAsian -36.811 44.673 -0.82 0.41 -36.811   
SalexMHSAsian 34.352 22.568 1.52 0.128 34.352   
SalexMSmColgAsian -24.811 21.619 -1.15 0.251 -24.811   
SalexMColgAsian -25.767 21.941 -1.17 0.24 -25.767   
SalexMPostColgAsian -155.400 21.487 -7.23 0 -155.400   
SalexMPostColgOthRace -25.472 21.602 -1.18 0.238 -25.472   
SalexMLHSHspnc -55.609 14.774 -3.76 0 -55.609   
SalexMHSHspnc -6.053 11.045 -0.55 0.584 -6.053   
SalexMSmColgHspnc 30.168 11.834 2.55 0.011 30.168   
SalexMColgHspnc -0.339 13.100 -0.03 0.979 -0.339   
SalexMPostColgHspnc 8.401 18.836 0.45 0.656 8.401   
AdvHfPvIncFmLHS -0.014 0.022 -0.62 0.532 -5.166   
Adv1xPvIncFmLHS -0.050 0.020 -2.5 0.012 -18.754   
Adv2xPvIncFmLHS -0.037 0.019 -1.9 0.058 -13.785   
Adv3xPvIncFmLHS -0.036 0.020 -1.83 0.067 -13.488   
Adv4xPvIncFmLHS -0.043 0.021 -2.02 0.044 -15.974   
Adv5xPvIncFmLHS -0.043 0.021 -2.04 0.041 -16.255   
AdvHfPvIncFmHS 0.030 0.017 1.79 0.073 11.199   
Adv1xPvIncFmHS -0.012 0.014 -0.85 0.396 -4.436   
Adv2xPvIncFmHS 0.010 0.014 0.75 0.452 3.818   
Adv3xPvIncFmHS 0.013 0.013 1.04 0.297 5.051   
Adv4xPvIncFmHS -0.020 0.015 -1.38 0.166 -7.539   
Adv5xPvIncFmHS 0.016 0.013 1.23 0.22 6.024   
AdvHfPvIncFmSomCollg 0.015 0.017 0.86 0.387 5.476   
Adv1xPvIncFmSomCollg -0.043 0.014 -3.05 0.002 -16.051   
Adv2xPvIncFmSomCollg -0.013 0.014 -0.94 0.346 -4.817   
Adv3xPvIncFmSomCollg -0.010 0.013 -0.8 0.424 -3.872   
Adv4xPvIncFmSomCollg -0.048 0.015 -3.31 0.001 -18.079   
Adv5xPvIncFmSomCollg -0.004 0.013 -0.28 0.776 -1.371   
AdvHfPvIncFmCollg 0.007 0.019 0.37 0.713 2.605   
Adv1xPvIncFmCollg -0.054 0.016 -3.4 0.001 -20.177   
Adv2xPvIncFmCollg -0.015 0.015 -0.96 0.335 -5.467   
Adv3xPvIncFmCollg -0.011 0.014 -0.78 0.436 -4.203   
Adv4xPvIncFmCollg -0.051 0.016 -3.25 0.001 -19.274   
Adv5xPvIncFmCollg -0.007 0.014 -0.48 0.634 -2.516   
AdvHfPvIncFmPostCollg -0.023 0.022 -1.05 0.294 -8.764   
Adv1xPvIncFmPostCollg -0.023 0.013 -1.81 0.071 -8.591   
Adv2xPvIncFmPostCollg -0.006 0.009 -0.64 0.524 -2.158   
Adv3xPvIncFmPostCollg 0.002 0.008 0.19 0.851 0.594   
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Adv4xPvIncFmPostCollg -0.048 0.009 -5.42 0 -17.997   
AdvHfPvIncMLHS 0.065 0.020 3.25 0.001 24.435   
Adv1xPvIncMLHS -0.012 0.018 -0.68 0.494 -4.566   
Adv2xPvIncMLHS 0.024 0.017 1.39 0.164 9.037   
Adv3xPvIncMLHS 0.016 0.018 0.89 0.374 5.891   
Adv4xPvIncMLHS 0.058 0.019 3.13 0.002 21.832   
Adv5xPvIncMLHS 0.005 0.018 0.27 0.786 1.850   
AdvHfPvIncMHS 0.099 0.016 6.33 0 37.025   
Adv1xPvIncMHS 0.063 0.014 4.53 0 23.455   
Adv2xPvIncMHS 0.078 0.013 5.8 0 29.182   
Adv3xPvIncMHS 0.070 0.013 5.24 0 26.406   
Adv4xPvIncMHS 0.093 0.014 6.55 0 34.902   
Adv5xPvIncMHS 0.082 0.013 6.18 0 30.742   
AdvHfPvIncMSomCollg 0.043 0.017 2.58 0.01 16.012   
Adv1xPvIncMSomCollg -0.010 0.014 -0.76 0.449 -3.886   
Adv2xPvIncMSomCollg 0.005 0.013 0.36 0.716 1.789   
Adv3xPvIncMSomCollg 0.009 0.013 0.67 0.503 3.248   
Adv4xPvIncMSomCollg 0.006 0.014 0.43 0.669 2.198   
Adv5xPvIncMSomCollg 0.002 0.013 0.15 0.881 0.715   
AdvHfPvIncMCollg 0.002 0.020 0.08 0.934 0.605   
Adv1xPvIncMCollg -0.029 0.016 -1.77 0.078 -10.885   
Adv2xPvIncMCollg -0.031 0.016 -1.98 0.048 -11.560   
Adv3xPvIncMCollg -0.012 0.016 -0.77 0.441 -4.490   
Adv4xPvIncMCollg 0.003 0.016 0.21 0.835 1.250   
Adv5xPvIncMCollg -0.019 0.015 -1.26 0.208 -6.956   
AdvHfPvIncMPostCollg 0.039 0.021 1.88 0.06 14.768   
Adv1xPvIncMPostCollg -0.005 0.013 -0.43 0.669 -2.038   
Adv2xPvIncMPostCollg -0.011 0.011 -1 0.319 -4.037   
Adv3xPvIncMPostCollg 0.002 0.008 0.25 0.805 0.743   
Adv4xPvIncMPostCollg 0.012 0.008 1.55 0.121 4.414   
AdvHfPvIncWhite -0.072 0.020 -3.55 0 -27.012   
Adv1xPvIncWhite -0.015 0.018 -0.82 0.415 -5.524   
Adv2xPvIncWhite 0.026 0.014 1.88 0.061 9.813   
Adv3xPvIncWhite -0.012 0.007 -1.64 0.101 -4.597   
Adv4xPvIncWhite -0.001 0.014 -0.08 0.935 -0.431   
AdvHfPvIncAfrAm -0.058 0.020 -2.86 0.004 -21.897   
Adv1xPvIncAfrAm -0.006 0.019 -0.34 0.733 -2.387   
Adv2xPvIncAfrAm 0.026 0.015 1.79 0.073 9.755   
Adv3xPvIncAfrAm -0.019 0.009 -2.06 0.039 -7.005   
Adv4xPvIncAfrAm 0.016 0.015 1.08 0.281 6.064   
Adv5xPvIncAfrAm 0.005 0.007 0.66 0.507 1.825   
AdvHfPvIncAsian -0.105 0.035 -2.98 0.003 -39.289   
Adv1xPvIncAsian -0.053 0.024 -2.18 0.029 -19.914   
Adv2xPvIncAsian 0.024 0.020 1.23 0.22 9.093   
Adv3xPvIncAsian -0.069 0.014 -4.88 0 -25.858   
Adv4xPvIncAsian -0.028 0.020 -1.38 0.166 -10.564   
Adv5xPvIncAsian -0.033 0.014 -2.47 0.014 -12.547   
AdvHfPvIncOthRace -0.062 0.022 -2.85 0.004 -23.264   
Adv1xPvIncOthRace -0.008 0.018 -0.42 0.671 -2.916   
Adv2xPvIncOthRace 0.047 0.014 3.37 0.001 17.668   
Adv4xPvIncOthRace 0.007 0.015 0.5 0.618 2.779   
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Adv5xPvIncOthRace 0.013 0.009 1.42 0.157 4.847   
AdvHfPvIncHspnc -0.011 0.008 -1.43 0.151 -4.301   
Adv1xPvIncHspnc 0.018 0.007 2.36 0.018 6.616   
Adv2xPvIncHspnc -0.005 0.007 -0.82 0.413 -2.060   
Adv3xPvIncHspnc -0.015 0.007 -2.25 0.025 -5.740   
Adv4xPvIncHspnc -0.007 0.007 -1 0.318 -2.759   
Adv5xPvIncHspnc -0.018 0.008 -2.22 0.026 -6.622   
AdvHfPvIncHHsiz1 0.024 0.014 1.75 0.081 8.881   
Adv1xPvIncHHsiz1 -0.021 0.008 -2.52 0.012 -7.783   
Adv2xPvIncHHsiz1 -0.023 0.007 -3.36 0.001 -8.434   
Adv3xPvIncHHsiz1 -0.009 0.007 -1.35 0.177 -3.340   
Adv4xPvIncHHsiz1 -0.023 0.007 -3.31 0.001 -8.490   
AdvHfPvIncHHsiz2 0.024 0.012 1.93 0.054 8.856   
Adv1xPvIncHHsiz2 -0.009 0.007 -1.19 0.234 -3.290   
Adv2xPvIncHHsiz2 -0.014 0.006 -2.41 0.016 -5.211   
Adv3xPvIncHHsiz2 -0.010 0.005 -1.83 0.067 -3.625   
Adv4xPvIncHHsiz2 -0.014 0.005 -2.55 0.011 -5.068   
Adv5xPvIncHHsiz2 -0.009 0.004 -2.54 0.011 -3.398   
AdvHfPvIncHHsiz3 0.029 0.012 2.43 0.015 10.783   
Adv1xPvIncHHsiz3 0.004 0.007 0.64 0.522 1.680   
Adv2xPvIncHHsiz3 -0.016 0.005 -3.03 0.002 -5.995   
Adv3xPvIncHHsiz3 -0.011 0.005 -2.24 0.025 -4.058   
Adv4xPvIncHHsiz3 -0.020 0.005 -4.24 0 -7.643   
Adv5xPvIncHHsiz3 0.001 0.004 0.26 0.795 0.368   
AdvHfPvIncHHsiz4 0.048 0.012 4.12 0 18.017   
Adv1xPvIncHHsiz4 -0.004 0.007 -0.52 0.602 -1.321   
Adv2xPvIncHHsiz4 -0.010 0.005 -2.04 0.041 -3.684   
Adv3xPvIncHHsiz4 -0.007 0.004 -1.6 0.109 -2.637   
Adv4xPvIncHHsiz4 -0.006 0.004 -1.27 0.206 -2.110   
Adv5xPvIncHHsiz4 -0.009 0.004 -2.55 0.011 -3.531   
AdvHfPvIncNoKids 0.010 0.021 0.48 0.632 3.788   
Adv1xPvIncNoKids 0.036 0.019 1.94 0.053 13.495   
Adv2xPvIncNoKids -0.011 0.014 -0.78 0.434 -4.137   
Adv3xPvIncNoKids 0.014 0.010 1.4 0.163 5.146   
Adv4xPvIncNoKids 0.026 0.014 1.91 0.056 9.761   
AdvHfPvIncOneKids 0.003 0.021 0.14 0.888 1.094   
Adv1xPvIncOneKids 0.015 0.019 0.77 0.44 5.498   
Adv2xPvIncOneKids -0.022 0.015 -1.5 0.134 -8.322   
Adv3xPvIncOneKids -0.004 0.011 -0.39 0.7 -1.539   
Adv4xPvIncOneKids 0.009 0.015 0.58 0.56 3.204   
Adv5xPvIncOneKids -0.029 0.008 -3.67 0 -10.894   
AdvHfPvIncTwoKids 0.004 0.021 0.18 0.857 1.435   
Adv1xPvIncTwoKids 0.013 0.019 0.68 0.493 4.917   
Adv2xPvIncTwoKids -0.020 0.015 -1.32 0.185 -7.583   
Adv3xPvIncTwoKids -0.001 0.012 -0.08 0.933 -0.366   
Adv4xPvIncTwoKids 0.009 0.015 0.61 0.539 3.506   
Adv5xPvIncTwoKids -0.029 0.010 -2.99 0.003 -10.700   
AdvHfPvInc3Kids -0.039 0.023 -1.67 0.095 -14.582   
Adv1xPvInc3Kids -0.082 0.021 -3.88 0 -30.564   
Adv2xPvInc3Kids -0.055 0.018 -3.11 0.002 -20.513   
Adv3xPvInc3Kids -0.059 0.014 -4.12 0 -22.204   
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Adv4xPvInc3Kids -0.055 0.018 -3.08 0.002 -20.524   
Adv5xPvInc3Kids -0.071 0.014 -5.01 0 -26.695   
AdvHfPvIncFmAgeL30 0.046 0.012 3.75 0 17.198   
Adv1xPvIncFmAgeL30 0.055 0.008 7.12 0 20.614   
Adv2xPvIncFmAgeL30 -0.011 0.006 -1.76 0.078 -4.015   
Adv3xPvIncFmAgeL30 -0.002 0.007 -0.26 0.794 -0.659   
Adv4xPvIncFmAgeL30 0.034 0.009 3.59 0 12.612   
Adv5xPvIncFmAgeL30 -0.014 0.008 -1.61 0.108 -5.075   
AdvHfPvIncFmLAge30L40 0.024 0.009 2.61 0.009 8.816   
Adv1xPvIncFmAge30L40 0.014 0.006 2.43 0.015 5.194   
Adv2xPvIncFmAge30L40 -0.010 0.005 -2.11 0.035 -3.846   
Adv3xPvIncFmAge30L40 0.004 0.005 0.73 0.468 1.444   
Adv4xPvIncFmAge30L40 0.045 0.007 6.45 0 16.838   
Adv5xPvIncFmAge30L40 0.000 0.005 0 0.997 0.006   
AdvHfPvIncFmLAge40L50 -0.016 0.008 -2.03 0.043 -5.980   
Adv1xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.024 0.005 4.9 0 9.004   
Adv2xPvIncFmAge40L50 -0.011 0.004 -2.47 0.014 -4.072   
Adv3xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.015 0.005 2.91 0.004 5.437   
Adv4xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.020 0.007 3.07 0.002 7.538   
Adv5xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.000 0.003 0.07 0.943 0.085   
AdvHfPvIncFmAge50L65 0.018 0.007 2.55 0.011 6.845   
Adv1xPvIncFmAge50L65 0.012 0.004 2.78 0.005 4.371   
Adv2xPvIncFmAge50L65 -0.003 0.004 -0.84 0.401 -1.279   
Adv3xPvIncFmAge50L65 0.010 0.005 2.06 0.039 3.607   
Adv4xPvIncFmAge50L65 0.015 0.006 2.49 0.013 5.677   
AdvHfPvIncMAgeL30 -0.050 0.014 -3.51 0 -18.703   
Adv1xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.026 0.010 -2.69 0.007 -9.588   
Adv2xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.026 0.007 -3.8 0 -9.653   
Adv3xPvIncMAgeL30 0.003 0.008 0.35 0.727 1.019   
Adv4xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.034 0.011 -3.18 0.001 -12.761   
Adv5xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.027 0.010 -2.61 0.009 -10.205   
AdvHfPvIncMLAge30L40 -0.058 0.013 -4.57 0 -21.799   
Adv1xPvIncMAge30L40 0.000 0.007 0 0.996 0.012   
Adv2xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.016 0.005 -3.18 0.001 -6.034   
Adv3xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.006 0.005 -1.18 0.239 -2.363   
Adv4xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.035 0.007 -5.31 0 -13.238   
Adv5xPvIncMAge30L40 0.004 0.004 0.9 0.37 1.450   
AdvHfPvIncMAge40L50 -0.024 0.010 -2.49 0.013 -9.037   
Adv1xPvIncMAge40L50 0.009 0.006 1.52 0.128 3.252   
Adv2xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.003 0.005 -0.64 0.525 -1.110   
Adv3xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.009 0.005 -1.77 0.077 -3.331   
Adv4xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.026 0.006 -4.31 0 -9.859   
Adv5xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.005 0.003 -1.82 0.069 -2.056   
AdvHfPvIncMAge50L65 -0.023 0.009 -2.49 0.013 -8.679   
Adv1xPvIncMAge50L65 -0.014 0.005 -2.62 0.009 -5.271   
Adv2xPvIncMAge50L65 -0.007 0.004 -1.62 0.106 -2.634   
Adv3xPvIncMAge50L65 -0.003 0.005 -0.7 0.482 -1.253   
Adv4xPvIncMAge50L65 -0.023 0.006 -4 0 -8.713   
AdvxFmLHSNoKids 0.037 0.018 2.02 0.043 13.983   
AdvxFmHSNoKids -0.020 0.012 -1.65 0.1 -7.635   
AdvxFmSmColgNoKids 0.002 0.012 0.14 0.887 0.647   
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AdvxFmColgNoKids 0.000 0.013 -0.02 0.986 -0.085   
AdvxFmLHSOneKids 0.045 0.019 2.32 0.02 16.924   
AdvxFmHSOneKids -0.008 0.013 -0.61 0.545 -3.030   
AdvxFmSmColgOneKids 0.013 0.013 0.97 0.331 4.767   
AdvxFmColgOneKids 0.016 0.014 1.14 0.252 6.020   
AdvxFmPostColgOneKids 0.018 0.007 2.4 0.016 6.601   
AdvxFmLHSTwoKids 0.061 0.020 3.09 0.002 22.882   
AdvxFmHSTwoKids -0.010 0.014 -0.71 0.48 -3.717   
AdvxFmSmColgTwoKids 0.006 0.014 0.47 0.642 2.392   
AdvxFmColgTwoKids 0.017 0.015 1.19 0.236 6.521   
AdvxFmPostColgTwoKids 0.034 0.009 3.86 0 12.841   
AdvxFmLHS3Kids 0.105 0.023 4.66 0 39.434   
AdvxFmHS3Kids 0.044 0.016 2.74 0.006 16.490   
AdvxFmSmColg3Kids 0.072 0.016 4.51 0 26.910   
AdvxFmColg3Kids 0.060 0.017 3.55 0 22.547   
AdvxFmPostColg3Kids 0.041 0.014 2.89 0.004 15.439   
AdvxMLHSNoKids -0.012 0.016 -0.74 0.457 -4.351   
AdvxMHSNoKids -0.072 0.012 -6.09 0 -27.059   
AdvxMSmColgNoKids -0.007 0.011 -0.65 0.518 -2.670   
AdvxMColgNoKids 0.001 0.013 0.09 0.932 0.415   
AdvxMLHSOneKids 0.002 0.016 0.14 0.887 0.861   
AdvxMHSOneKids -0.070 0.012 -5.79 0 -26.350   
AdvxMSmColgOneKids 0.005 0.011 0.43 0.67 1.817   
AdvxMColgOneKids 0.003 0.013 0.21 0.831 1.073   
AdvxMPostColgOneKids 0.004 0.006 0.7 0.486 1.682   
AdvxMLHSTwoKids -0.013 0.016 -0.8 0.423 -4.836   
AdvxMHSTwoKids -0.072 0.012 -5.84 0 -26.982   
AdvxMSmColgTwoKids 0.014 0.012 1.24 0.215 5.383   
AdvxMColgTwoKids 0.001 0.014 0.09 0.926 0.475   
AdvxMPostColgTwoKids 0.007 0.007 1.05 0.293 2.785   
AdvxMLHS3Kids 0.011 0.018 0.61 0.542 4.041   
AdvxMHS3Kids -0.061 0.014 -4.47 0 -22.742   
AdvxMSmColg3Kids 0.012 0.013 0.94 0.346 4.602   
AdvxMColg3Kids 0.009 0.015 0.58 0.56 3.348   
AdvxMPostColg3Kids 0.011 0.012 0.91 0.362 4.216   
AdvxFmLHSWhite -0.012 0.009 -1.35 0.176 -4.342   
AdvxFmHSWhite 0.000 0.007 0.01 0.989 0.035   
AdvxFmSmColgWhite 0.007 0.007 1.1 0.27 2.752   
AdvxFmColgWhite 0.007 0.007 1.02 0.306 2.796   
AdvxFmLHSAfrAm -0.011 0.011 -1.01 0.312 -4.223   
AdvxFmHSAfrAm 0.007 0.008 0.85 0.396 2.547   
AdvxFmSmColgAfrAm 0.007 0.008 0.82 0.411 2.439   
AdvxFmColgAfrAm 0.003 0.009 0.38 0.707 1.233   
AdvxFmPostColgAfrAm -0.020 0.007 -2.77 0.006 -7.462   
AdvxFmLHSAsian 0.067 0.020 3.38 0.001 25.178   
AdvxFmHSAsian 0.051 0.013 3.89 0 19.203   
AdvxFmSmColgAsian 0.070 0.013 5.38 0 26.039   
AdvxFmColgAsian 0.061 0.013 4.86 0 22.943   
AdvxFmPostColgAsian 0.076 0.013 6.01 0 28.531   
AdvxFmPostColgOthRace 0.002 0.010 0.16 0.871 0.592   
AdvxFmLHSHspnc -0.013 0.007 -1.69 0.092 -4.733   
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AdvxFmHSHspnc -0.006 0.006 -1.04 0.299 -2.177   
AdvxFmSmColgHspnc -0.001 0.006 -0.17 0.864 -0.363   
AdvxFmColgHspnc -0.001 0.006 -0.1 0.92 -0.235   
AdvxFmPostColgHspnc 0.007 0.010 0.69 0.491 2.702   
AdvxMLHSWhite -0.004 0.008 -0.55 0.583 -1.609   
AdvxMHSWhite -0.002 0.006 -0.37 0.709 -0.806   
AdvxMSmColgWhite 0.005 0.006 0.79 0.429 1.816   
AdvxMColgWhite 0.014 0.007 1.99 0.046 5.102   
AdvxMLHSAfrAm -0.010 0.010 -0.98 0.328 -3.653   
AdvxMHSAfrAm 0.015 0.007 2.18 0.029 5.518   
AdvxMSmColgAfrAm 0.004 0.007 0.53 0.593 1.457   
AdvxMColgAfrAm 0.020 0.008 2.35 0.019 7.312   
AdvxMPostColgAfrAm 0.005 0.008 0.6 0.55 1.862   
AdvxMLHSAsian -0.043 0.026 -1.67 0.094 -16.210   
AdvxMHSAsian -0.035 0.012 -2.99 0.003 -13.191   
AdvxMSmColgAsian -0.026 0.012 -2.24 0.025 -9.705   
AdvxMColgAsian 0.014 0.012 1.21 0.226 5.282   
AdvxMPostColgAsian -0.040 0.012 -3.3 0.001 -14.802   
AdvxMPostColgOthRace -0.020 0.010 -1.91 0.057 -7.441   
AdvxMLHSHspnc -0.015 0.007 -2.15 0.031 -5.679   
AdvxMHSHspnc -0.002 0.005 -0.37 0.709 -0.706   
AdvxMSmColgHspnc -0.011 0.005 -2 0.046 -4.006   
AdvxMColgHspnc 0.023 0.006 3.95 0 8.748   
AdvxMPostColgHspnc 0.017 0.008 2.06 0.04 6.445   
Ssn2 26.791 1.246 21.49 0 26.791   
Ssn3 18.524 1.243 14.91 0 18.524   
Ssn4 9.776 1.325 7.38 0 9.776   
_cons 49.824 0.713 69.9 0    
        
Probity        
Wkly P DMA 55.198 0.289 191.3 0    
Wkly Advert 0.000 0.000 22.66 0    
HfPvIncFmLHS -1.931 0.180 -10.72 0    
1xPvIncFmLHS -1.910 0.172 -11.1 0    
2xPvIncFmLHS -2.134 0.169 -12.6 0    
3xPvIncFmLHS -2.014 0.172 -11.71 0    
4xPvIncFmLHS -2.441 0.176 -13.84 0    
5xPvIncFmLHS -1.245 0.173 -7.22 0    
HfPvIncFmHS -1.576 0.135 -11.7 0    
1xPvIncFmHS -1.683 0.125 -13.5 0    
2xPvIncFmHS -1.876 0.123 -15.24 0    
3xPvIncFmHS -1.786 0.124 -14.43 0    
4xPvIncFmHS -2.201 0.126 -17.46 0    
5xPvIncFmHS -0.821 0.115 -7.16 0    
HfPvIncFmSomCollg -1.539 0.135 -11.43 0    
1xPvIncFmSomCollg -1.399 0.124 -11.28 0    
2xPvIncFmSomCollg -1.664 0.122 -13.58 0    
3xPvIncFmSomCollg -1.457 0.123 -11.85 0    
4xPvIncFmSomCollg -1.911 0.125 -15.25 0    
5xPvIncFmSomCollg -0.533 0.113 -4.73 0    
HfPvIncFmCollg -1.162 0.139 -8.33 0    
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1xPvIncFmCollg -1.144 0.127 -8.98 0    
2xPvIncFmCollg -1.441 0.125 -11.56 0    
3xPvIncFmCollg -1.188 0.124 -9.55 0    
4xPvIncFmCollg -1.597 0.127 -12.6 0    
5xPvIncFmCollg -0.283 0.114 -2.48 0.013    
HfPvIncFmPostCollg -1.620 0.125 -12.98 0    
1xPvIncFmPostCollg -1.402 0.079 -17.82 0    
2xPvIncFmPostCollg -1.760 0.061 -28.81 0    
3xPvIncFmPostCollg -1.517 0.058 -26.25 0    
4xPvIncFmPostCollg -1.854 0.060 -31.15 0    
HfPvIncMLHS -1.343 0.123 -10.91 0    
1xPvIncMLHS -1.096 0.108 -10.17 0    
2xPvIncMLHS -1.172 0.105 -11.18 0    
3xPvIncMLHS -1.124 0.106 -10.59 0    
4xPvIncMLHS -1.024 0.112 -9.17 0    
5xPvIncMLHS -0.638 0.103 -6.17 0    
HfPvIncMHS -1.325 0.098 -13.48 0    
1xPvIncMHS -0.964 0.085 -11.29 0    
2xPvIncMHS -1.150 0.083 -13.8 0    
3xPvIncMHS -1.025 0.084 -12.25 0    
4xPvIncMHS -0.923 0.087 -10.61 0    
5xPvIncMHS -0.713 0.075 -9.53 0    
HfPvIncMSomCollg -1.453 0.102 -14.22 0    
1xPvIncMSomCollg -0.937 0.086 -10.88 0    
2xPvIncMSomCollg -1.155 0.083 -13.93 0    
3xPvIncMSomCollg -1.042 0.083 -12.6 0    
4xPvIncMSomCollg -0.972 0.085 -11.39 0    
5xPvIncMSomCollg -0.832 0.073 -11.39 0    
HfPvIncMCollg -1.024 0.115 -8.94 0    
1xPvIncMCollg -0.699 0.097 -7.18 0    
2xPvIncMCollg -0.856 0.092 -9.3 0    
3xPvIncMCollg -0.900 0.091 -9.89 0    
4xPvIncMCollg -0.746 0.093 -8 0    
5xPvIncMCollg -0.593 0.080 -7.4 0    
HfPvIncMPostCollg -0.824 0.108 -7.62 0    
1xPvIncMPostCollg -0.885 0.078 -11.29 0    
2xPvIncMPostCollg -0.934 0.065 -14.39 0    
3xPvIncMPostCollg -0.720 0.053 -13.6 0    
4xPvIncMPostCollg -0.601 0.052 -11.49 0    
HfPvIncWhite 1.411 0.127 11.12 0    
1xPvIncWhite 1.897 0.104 18.15 0    
2xPvIncWhite 1.740 0.087 19.96 0    
3xPvIncWhite 1.345 0.080 16.83 0    
4xPvIncWhite 1.611 0.084 19.07 0    
HfPvIncAfrAm 1.828 0.128 14.26 0    
1xPvIncAfrAm 2.040 0.109 18.75 0    
2xPvIncAfrAm 2.017 0.092 22.01 0    
3xPvIncAfrAm 1.668 0.085 19.51 0    
4xPvIncAfrAm 1.979 0.091 21.74 0    
5xPvIncAfrAm 0.194 0.042 4.58 0    
HfPvIncAsian 1.624 0.183 8.88 0    
1xPvIncAsian 2.160 0.136 15.92 0    
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2xPvIncAsian 2.035 0.112 18.18 0    
3xPvIncAsian 1.758 0.103 17 0    
4xPvIncAsian 2.068 0.111 18.65 0    
5xPvIncAsian 0.505 0.067 7.54 0    
HfPvIncOthRace 0.012 0.132 0.09 0.93    
1xPvIncOthRace 0.579 0.105 5.52 0    
2xPvIncOthRace 0.374 0.085 4.42 0    
4xPvIncOthRace 0.115 0.086 1.34 0.18    
5xPvIncOthRace -1.577 0.087 -18.2 0    
HfPvIncHspnc -0.029 0.053 -0.54 0.59    
1xPvIncHspnc 0.075 0.050 1.5 0.133    
2xPvIncHspnc 0.118 0.046 2.56 0.011    
3xPvIncHspnc 0.038 0.047 0.8 0.421    
4xPvIncHspnc 0.369 0.049 7.52 0    
5xPvIncHspnc 0.314 0.053 5.92 0    
HfPvIncHHsiz1 -1.757 0.089 -19.74 0    
1xPvIncHHsiz1 -1.584 0.064 -24.72 0    
2xPvIncHHsiz1 -1.977 0.052 -37.78 0    
3xPvIncHHsiz1 -2.153 0.052 -41.62 0    
4xPvIncHHsiz1 -2.033 0.053 -38.53 0    
HfPvIncHHsiz2 -1.779 0.083 -21.47 0    
1xPvIncHHsiz2 -1.687 0.061 -27.8 0    
2xPvIncHHsiz2 -1.739 0.048 -35.99 0    
3xPvIncHHsiz2 -1.963 0.047 -41.86 0    
4xPvIncHHsiz2 -1.726 0.047 -36.67 0    
5xPvIncHHsiz2 -1.516 0.020 -74.69 0    
HfPvIncHHsiz3 -1.824 0.082 -22.18 0    
1xPvIncHHsiz3 -1.628 0.059 -27.65 0    
2xPvIncHHsiz3 -1.650 0.047 -35.31 0    
3xPvIncHHsiz3 -1.741 0.045 -38.44 0    
4xPvIncHHsiz3 -1.668 0.045 -37.1 0    
5xPvIncHHsiz3 -1.624 0.026 -63.57 0    
HfPvIncHHsiz4 -1.493 0.078 -19.12 0    
1xPvIncHHsiz4 -1.835 0.057 -31.97 0    
2xPvIncHHsiz4 -1.669 0.045 -37.31 0    
3xPvIncHHsiz4 -1.745 0.043 -40.32 0    
4xPvIncHHsiz4 -1.579 0.043 -36.58 0    
5xPvIncHHsiz4 -1.599 0.030 -53.71 0    
HfPvIncNoKids 0.439 0.128 3.41 0.001    
1xPvIncNoKids -0.258 0.107 -2.42 0.016    
2xPvIncNoKids 0.189 0.085 2.21 0.027    
3xPvIncNoKids 0.546 0.077 7.08 0    
4xPvIncNoKids 0.251 0.080 3.12 0.002    
HfPvIncOneKids 0.284 0.128 2.21 0.027    
1xPvIncOneKids -0.219 0.112 -1.96 0.051    
2xPvIncOneKids 0.217 0.092 2.37 0.018    
3xPvIncOneKids 0.522 0.085 6.15 0    
4xPvIncOneKids 0.422 0.089 4.75 0    
5xPvIncOneKids 0.273 0.049 5.52 0    
HfPvIncTwoKids 0.254 0.131 1.93 0.053    
1xPvIncTwoKids -0.163 0.112 -1.46 0.144    
2xPvIncTwoKids 0.298 0.095 3.14 0.002    
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3xPvIncTwoKids 0.399 0.088 4.51 0    
4xPvIncTwoKids 0.392 0.092 4.26 0    
5xPvIncTwoKids 0.282 0.060 4.71 0    
HfPvInc3Kids -0.042 0.146 -0.29 0.776    
1xPvInc3Kids 0.022 0.130 0.17 0.863    
2xPvInc3Kids 0.217 0.115 1.88 0.06    
3xPvInc3Kids 0.346 0.110 3.13 0.002    
4xPvInc3Kids 0.371 0.114 3.26 0.001    
5xPvInc3Kids 0.352 0.096 3.68 0    
HfPvIncFmAgeL30 0.082 0.078 1.04 0.296    
1xPvIncFmAgeL30 -0.078 0.057 -1.37 0.172    
2xPvIncFmAgeL30 0.060 0.049 1.22 0.221    
3xPvIncFmAgeL30 0.110 0.050 2.19 0.029    
4xPvIncFmAgeL30 0.208 0.061 3.42 0.001    
5xPvIncFmAgeL30 -0.185 0.044 -4.24 0    
HfPvIncFmAge30L40 0.164 0.061 2.67 0.008    
1xPvIncFmAge30L40 0.206 0.048 4.3 0    
2xPvIncFmAge30L40 0.172 0.044 3.94 0    
3xPvIncFmAge30L40 0.151 0.045 3.38 0.001    
4xPvIncFmAge30L40 0.297 0.051 5.84 0    
5xPvIncFmAge30L40 -0.320 0.025 -12.9 0    
HfPvIncFmAge40L50 -0.046 0.055 -0.83 0.406    
1xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.093 0.045 2.08 0.037    
2xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.327 0.042 7.83 0    
3xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.258 0.044 5.93 0    
4xPvIncFmAge40L50 0.421 0.049 8.62 0    
5xPvIncFmAge40L50 -0.189 0.019 -10.17 0    
HfPvIncFmAge50L65 -0.062 0.052 -1.2 0.23    
1xPvIncFmAge50L65 0.189 0.041 4.61 0    
2xPvIncFmAge50L65 0.299 0.040 7.47 0    
3xPvIncFmAge50L65 0.146 0.042 3.49 0    
4xPvIncFmAge50L65 0.263 0.047 5.61 0    
HfPvIncMAgeL30 -0.150 0.100 -1.51 0.131    
1xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.326 0.068 -4.8 0    
2xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.429 0.049 -8.68 0    
3xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.389 0.054 -7.16 0    
4xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.488 0.064 -7.6 0    
5xPvIncMAgeL30 -0.557 0.056 -9.98 0    
HfPvIncMAge30L40 -0.110 0.077 -1.42 0.156    
1xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.701 0.052 -13.43 0    
2xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.503 0.042 -11.85 0    
3xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.380 0.042 -8.97 0    
4xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.637 0.046 -13.74 0    
5xPvIncMAge30L40 -0.085 0.024 -3.55 0    
HfPvIncMAge40L50 -0.163 0.066 -2.45 0.014    
1xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.637 0.046 -13.83 0    
2xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.251 0.040 -6.23 0    
3xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.229 0.041 -5.61 0    
4xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.530 0.044 -12.02 0    
5xPvIncMAge40L50 -0.080 0.018 -4.56 0    
HfPvIncMAge50L65 -0.271 0.064 -4.27 0    
1xPvIncMAge50L65 -0.522 0.043 -12.12 0    
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2xPvIncMAge50L65 -0.310 0.039 -8.01 0    
3xPvIncMAge50L65 -0.247 0.039 -6.27 0    
4xPvIncMAge50L65 -0.432 0.042 -10.19 0    
FmLHSNoKids 0.025 0.156 0.16 0.874    
FmHSNoKids -0.114 0.107 -1.07 0.287    
FmSmColgNoKids -0.344 0.106 -3.26 0.001    
FmColgNoKids -0.516 0.106 -4.86 0    
FmLHSOneKids -0.137 0.162 -0.85 0.396    
FmHSOneKids -0.209 0.113 -1.86 0.063    
FmSmColgOneKids -0.305 0.111 -2.75 0.006    
FmColgOneKids -0.267 0.112 -2.38 0.017    
FmPostColgOneKids -0.094 0.043 -2.21 0.027    
FmLHSTwoKids -0.068 0.164 -0.42 0.677    
FmHSTwoKids -0.313 0.115 -2.71 0.007    
FmSmColgTwoKids -0.418 0.114 -3.68 0    
FmColgTwoKids -0.404 0.115 -3.53 0    
FmPostColgTwoKids -0.315 0.051 -6.15 0    
FmLHS3Kids 0.009 0.181 0.05 0.96    
FmHS3Kids -0.085 0.132 -0.65 0.517    
FmSmColg3Kids -0.270 0.130 -2.07 0.038    
FmColg3Kids -0.346 0.132 -2.63 0.009    
FmPostColg3Kids -0.360 0.088 -4.09 0    
MLHSNoKids 0.106 0.088 1.2 0.229    
MHSNoKids -0.013 0.064 -0.2 0.84    
MSmColgNoKids 0.255 0.061 4.16 0    
MColgNoKids -0.157 0.069 -2.27 0.023    
MLHSOneKids -0.252 0.092 -2.72 0.007    
MHSOneKids -0.337 0.067 -5.04 0    
MSmColgOneKids 0.060 0.064 0.93 0.351    
MColgOneKids -0.291 0.072 -4.03 0    
MPostColgOneKids -0.558 0.037 -15.2 0    
MLHSTwoKids -0.323 0.092 -3.5 0    
MHSTwoKids -0.207 0.068 -3.05 0.002    
MSmColgTwoKids 0.086 0.066 1.31 0.189    
MColgTwoKids -0.169 0.074 -2.29 0.022    
MPostColgTwoKids -0.453 0.040 -11.34 0    
MLHS3Kids -0.296 0.101 -2.92 0.003    
MHS3Kids -0.167 0.076 -2.2 0.028    
MSmColg3Kids 0.007 0.074 0.09 0.93    
MColg3Kids -0.005 0.082 -0.06 0.95    
MPostColg3Kids -0.345 0.063 -5.43 0    
FmLHSWhite 0.332 0.057 5.88 0    
FmHSWhite 0.269 0.042 6.33 0    
FmSmColgWhite 0.281 0.042 6.75 0    
FmColgWhite 0.095 0.044 2.14 0.033    
FmLHSAfrAm 0.240 0.071 3.35 0.001    
FmHSAfrAm 0.192 0.050 3.85 0    
FmSomColgAfrAm 0.213 0.048 4.43 0    
FmColgAfrAm 0.100 0.052 1.93 0.053    
FmPostColgAfrAm -0.247 0.039 -6.28 0    
FmLHSAsian 0.389 0.102 3.83 0    
FmHSAsian -0.028 0.073 -0.38 0.702    
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FmSomColgAsian -0.030 0.069 -0.43 0.67    
FmColgAsian -0.198 0.066 -3.02 0.003    
FmPostColgAsian -0.558 0.058 -9.66 0    
FmPostColgOthRace -0.322 0.058 -5.58 0    
FmLHSHspnc -0.164 0.052 -3.18 0.001    
FmHSHspnc -0.168 0.039 -4.36 0    
FmSomColgHspnc -0.243 0.038 -6.4 0    
FmColgHspnc -0.272 0.041 -6.7 0    
FmPostColgHspnc -0.419 0.050 -8.37 0    
MLHSWhite 0.035 0.049 0.72 0.47    
MHSWhite 0.116 0.036 3.19 0.001    
MSmColgWhite 0.022 0.038 0.58 0.561    
MColgWhite 0.179 0.042 4.24 0    
MLHSAfrAm 0.017 0.060 0.28 0.78    
MHSAfrAm -0.122 0.042 -2.93 0.003    
MSmColgAfrAm -0.057 0.043 -1.33 0.184    
MColgAfrAm -0.083 0.049 -1.69 0.091    
MPostColgAfrAm -0.392 0.045 -8.72 0    
MLHSAsian -0.171 0.112 -1.53 0.126    
MHSAsian -0.217 0.067 -3.23 0.001    
MSmColgAsian -0.224 0.061 -3.67 0    
MColgAsian -0.218 0.061 -3.55 0    
MPostColgAsian -0.852 0.055 -15.53 0    
MPostColgOthRace -0.252 0.056 -4.49 0    
MLHSHspnc -0.122 0.045 -2.73 0.006    
MHSHspnc -0.183 0.033 -5.6 0    
MSmColgHspnc -0.162 0.034 -4.78 0    
MColgHspnc -0.098 0.037 -2.65 0.008    
MPostColgHspnc -0.207 0.048 -4.32 0    
NoManHd -1.780 0.025 -70.6 0    
NoFemHd -1.871 0.022 -85.15 0    
_4KidsPlus 0.009 0.102 0.09 0.927    
FemAge65plus 0.075 0.033 2.26 0.024    
MaleAge65plus -0.592 0.029 -20.18 0    
OtherRace 1.680 0.093 18.02 0    
HHsiz5plus -1.782 0.033 -53.79 0    
WksHHTotOzGrtr67 0.181 0.000 484.2 0    
MovgAvgHHStock6 0.000 0.000 -39.65 0    
_cons -1.018 0.002 -407.4 0    
        
mills        
lambda -32.014 0.387 -82.82 0    
        
rho -0.274       
sigma 116.639       
lambda -32.014 0.387      
‡ Reference Groups: 5xPvIncxFmPostCollg (5xPvIncxMalePostCollg), 5xPvIncxWhite, Non-Hispanic, 
5xPvIncxHHsiz1, 5xPvIncxNoKids, 5xPvIncxFemAge50-65 (5xPvIncxMaleAge50-65), 
FmPostCollgxNoKids (MalePostCollgxNoKids), FmPostCollgxWhite (MalePostCollgxWhite), 
* δy/δx is the marginal effect of the variable, for inference.  Lighter-shaded cells are values in δy/δx column 
for variables regressed on either the OLS-side or the Probit-side equation only, and are therefore unadjusted 
from the first numeric column. 
^ “X” is the average value at which marketing variables are calculated. 
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Essay Two 
When Regular Soft-Drink Consumption Fails to Maximize Utility: 
A Dynamic Theoretical Model Flexible to Failures of Rationality 
 
Chapter 6 
Cross-Disciplinary Science and A Dynamic Theoretical Model 
Flexible to Failures of Rationality 
 
Abstract 
Sweetened carbonated soft drinks (sCSDs) are an exceptional product type, given the 
degree to which they are accepted, cheap, ubiquitous, marketed, and yet unhealthful in 
commonly packaged quantities. Aspects of this exceptionalism make the regular consumption of 
sCSDs a poor fit for the neoclassical theory of utility maximization as it characterizes individual 
choice. I respect findings and insights from medical/nutrition literature, behavioral economics, 
neuroeconomics, psychology, and social psychology in my analysis. From this analysis I 
construct a dynamic graphic and a dynamic theoretical model that accommodate both rational 
choice and choice that fails to maximize lifetime utility. 
 
6.1    Overview 
 In section 1.2, I assert that contributions from the medical, psychological, 
neuroeconomic, and behavioral economic literatures expose mechanisms by which the individual 
choice to regularly consume sugar-sweetened beverages may be influenced by factors preceding 
and following the decision to consume. Thus as these literatures apply, the choice to regularly 
consume sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) may not be as discrete, rational, or utility 
maximizing as economic theory ascribes to products such as steel, refrigerators, or reusable food 
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containers, whose uses are not reputed to have explicit negative biological effects. This chapter 
questions the assumptions and limitations of rational choice theory, supporting these arguments 
with theoretical constructs and empirical evidence from these other fields, and providing deeper 
context for the original empirical work in Essay One and for the policy analysis in Essay Three. 
References include works by Herbert Simon (bounded rationality and satisficing), Kahneman 
and Tversky (decision heuristics, prospect theory, inconsistent time preferences), as well as other 
contributors to consumer psychology (Baumeister et al.) and decision theory (Loewenstein, 
Ellsberg, Peters), including evidence particular to decisions to consume food (Wansink et al.). 
Neuroeconomics “seeks to ground microeconomic theory in details about how the brain works 
(Camerer 2007, p C26). Insights from the neuroeconomics literature will largely be embedded in 
other primary literature sections, but will weigh in on policy recommendations. “Neuroscientists 
have gained considerable insight into the specific processes that appear responsible for decision-
making malfunctions involving addictive substances, and into the conditions under which these 
malfunctions occur” (Bernheim and Rangel 2005, p 99), and this insight informs the economic 
debate concerning individual preference, choice, and consumption patterns. 
I will refer to the rational choice theory literature only enough to help establish the 
theoretical constructs (sections 6.4 – 6.6), then turn to empirical evidence from 
medicine/nutrition (6.7), as it appears that Americans overdose themselves with sugar out of 
some ignorance of strongly correlated health effects, and perhaps due to sugar’s effect on 
dopamine reward pathways in the brain. Before returning to my theoretical models in 6.9, I offer 
evidence from psychology, decision theory, and behavioral economics in section 6.8. In brief, the 
ways in which rationality is bounded and the stress of modern environments support with 
medical evidence, all suggesting that habitual drinkers of sCSDs may not gather relevant health 
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information and (with full decision-making resources) rationally decide their sCSD consumption 
habits. This divergence of actual behavior from assumptions implicit in neoclassical theory and 
in much quantitative modeling challenges the validity of structural model estimations to some 
degree, while more firmly bringing to doubt any policy analysis that assumes that all sCSD 
consumers are rational, utility maximizing, and that their purchases reflect a consistent long-term 
utility maximizing preference set. 6.10 summarizes the logic and arguments. 
 
6.2    Research Objectives for Theoretical Essay 
The cultural context of the sCSD product category including national consumption and 
health trends is presented in Chapter 1. Essay One focuses on who buys sCSDs (in grocery 
markets or general merchandisers, and brings them home to stock for in-home consumption or 
possibly outside the home). The theoretical work in Essay Two attempts to understand and 
model why habitual drinkers of this profoundly unhealthful product (section 6.7) continue to 
drink sCSDs habitually. There is an implicit conflict between current thirst and affinity for sweet 
taste versus long-term health. Medical experts, public health specialists, and economists are all 
confused as to why this conflict continues: “Poor diets and rising obesity rates among Americans 
have persisted despite increased awareness and publicity regarding the benefits of a healthy 
lifestyle” (Mancino and Kinsey 2008, p i). What are the mechanisms by which individuals 
choose or reject regular consumption of SSBs? Why do so many laypeople ignore in their 
behavior the dietary information that experts have generated and distributed, information that 
provides overwhelming evidence that consistently poor dietary choices are strongly associated 
with poor health outcomes? 
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Formally: if habitual sCSD consumption breaks from economic assumptions of rational 
utility maximization, in what ways would it, for what reasons would it, and can such “failures” 
be modeled without completely abandoning the neoclassical framework upon which most 
modern empirical economic analysis is grounded? 
The theoretical work in Essay Two draws on psychology (especially consumer decision 
theory) literature, nutrition/medical literature, behavioral economic, and neuroeconomic 
literature. As with the empirical work here, I answer provocative ancillary questions. Is there a 
point at which ignorance of the effects of consuming a product becomes large enough to bring 
into question whether regular consumption of the product can be a rational choice for a typical 
individual? Should economists ignore data from clinical trials in other academic fields if this data 
challenges assumptions about rational decision theory and utility maximization that economists 
are trained to accept almost axiomatically? If neoclassical economic assumptions do not stand up 
to empirical testing in a way that strongly associates with a particular product (say, SSBs), how 
will this affect the models economists use to approximate purchase/consumption behavior?  
  
6.3    Overview of Research Design and Results 
Essay Two (here) briefly summarizes conventional economic rational choice theory 
(section 6.4) before exploring limitations to that theory suggested theoretically and empirically 
(6.5 on). I model rational choice using conventional assumptions, then expand the model to 
accommodate viable criticisms. The resulting model and equations are dynamic, and apply to 
conventional theory while being flexible to primary criticisms of that theory. A substantial 
review of literature exogenous to standard economic assumptions and analysis is presented. I 
conclude that habitual consumption of SSBs or sCSDs over time is unlikely to be utility 
maximizing or even rational for a typical consumer, without rejecting the possibility that a 
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particular individual’s behavior may be both. The final version of the dynamic model reflects 
conclusions drawn in related academic fields. 
 
6.4    Classical Rational Choice Theory 
 Economic theory posits that rational choice, the foundation of consumer theory, is built 
from preference relations internal to the decision maker, or by consistently revealed preferences. 
By preference relations, economists mean that a decision maker strictly prefers one choice to 
another, symbolically x   y, or is indifferent to choice between the two, x ~ y. Both conditions 
together can be characterized as x ~  y, where the choice of x is at least as good as y to this 
decision maker. Preference relations are rational if they manifest completeness and transitivity. 
Thus for all x or y in a given choice set, x ~  y, or y ~  x, or both. In this way, completeness 
means that all preference relations are known, and not only capable of being ranked, but are 
ranked. Completeness holds that an individual must have a well-defined preference between any 
two choices in a given set. Transitivity holds that for all x or y in a given choice set, if x ~  y, 
and y ~  z, then it must also hold that x ~  z. In the language of game theory, the “dominance” of 
choice x over y and of y over z must strictly imply dominance of x over z, or the transitivity 
property fails. “As compared to the completeness property…(transitivity is) more fundamental in 
the sense that substantial portions of economic theory would not survive if economic agents 
could not be assumed to have transitive preferences” (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, 6-
7).1
                                                 
1 Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green note particular exceptions that can lead to failure of the transitivity property: 1) 
the inability to distinguish between “just perceptible differences”; 2) problems in which the presentation of the 
choice affects preference, citing Kahneman and Tversky’s classic “framing” problem in which how a choice of 
trade-off is worded leads to different choices in an explicit experimental setting; 3) the Condorcet paradox of group 
decision making where majority rule or the sequence of preference disqualification within a majority-rule setting can 
lead to a transitivity violation; and 4) “change of tastes” discussed in the main text. At least three of these come to 
bear in some form in the following discussion (leaving aside the Condorcet paradox).  
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 Consistency of choice is one of the assumptions that allows revealed preferences 
(observable from actual individual choices) to serve as a proxy foundation from the theoretic and 
unobservable full preference relation set. If given any conceivable budget set from which to 
purchase choices x or y, and x is ever chosen over y (that is, y was not chosen when both were 
affordable), then there is no possible budget set that contains x and y from which y will be 
chosen when x is not (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 10).2
 A violation of consistency of choice equivalently reduces in consequence to a violation of 
transitivity. Because the individual is not consistent in their choices, monotonicity of preference 
relations cannot be assumed. Without monotonicity of preferences, the existence of a stable 
utility function cannot be proved from rational preference relations, in the manner that it 
routinely is (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 47). Utility theory and the consumer theory 
derived from utility theory in the textbook manner can no longer be constructed and trusted, if 
transitivity and/or consistency of revealed preferences are violated.
 Having demonstrated a choice 
structure that prefers x if only one choice can be made, there is no budget set where y will be 
chosen and x will not be. Thus the marginal preference for x will be consistently maintained. 
3
                                                 
2 Citing chapter 5, in Samuelson, P. (1947). Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
 Without violating the law of 
diminishing marginal returns, if utility and consumer demand theory are not descriptive of 
decision making in an economic situation, then a structural model derived from these theories 
cannot be assumed to effectively describe decision making. It is plausible that the degree to 
which reality deviates from theoretical assumptions may influence the degree to which actual 
consumer behavior deviates from textbook predictions of consumer behavior where consumers 
maximize utility in a (socially) Pareto optimal fashion. If these deviations exist in practice, and 
3 I do not endeavor to prove the possibility or impossibility of a valid alternative theoretic construction here, nor do I 
attempt to find either proof from another’s work. I have simply demonstrated the conditions under which classical 
utility and consumer theory based on utility maximization do not necessarily hold. 
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market outcomes are therefore not efficient, policy intervention may result in a second-best 
improvement in social welfare. 
 Less rigorously and more stylistically, Becker and Murphy (1988) operationally define 
rationality: (1)“rational consumers maximize utility from stable preferences as they try to 
anticipate the future consequences of their choices” (p 675); (2) “A rational person recognizes 
that consumption of a harmful good…has adverse effects on future utility and earnings” (p 678). 
From these definitions, they claim that even strongly addicted people employ forward-looking 
maximization with stable preferences: “much behavior would be excluded from the rational 
choice framework if addictions have to be explained another way” (p 676). I do not dispute 
Becker and Murphy’s definitions, but contest through evidence provided in this essay that the 
habitual consumption of sCSDs can at least mimic addiction, and that whether or not habitual 
consumption of sCSDs meets a rigorous definition of addiction, that such use is unlikely to prove 
rational in any dynamic long-term framework by either the textbook or Becker and Murphy 
definitions provided here. While Becker and Murphy assume time-consistent, stable preferences, 
and explain rational behavior as arising from unstable equilibria, I cite evidence from 
experimental studies across a range of fields, but especially behavioral economics, psychology, 
and decision theory that indicate time inconsistency, and preferences changing within a short 
enough period to violate one of the rational properties described by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green.  I further support that the decision to consume sCSDs is typically low enough on the 
personal hierarchy of priorities that it is likely to recur without implementation of full rational 
decision-making resources. Habits arising without full consideration of their effects may then 
demonstrate behavior that the individual would not discretely choose if consciously and carefully 
deciding. 
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 The simplest textbook model of economic choice or consumer choice involves the 
maximization of utility given individual preferences that are either fully known to the consumer 
or fully inferable by actual choice, when the consumer has a choice set with options that fit the 
consumer’s budget and information set, as in Figure 2: 
Figure 2.    Neoclassical Economic Model of Rational Utility-Maximizing Choice 
 
 
From computer flowchart symbology, preferences are “direct access storage”; information, 
choice, and budget sets are “data”; economically rational decision criteria are a “process”; and 
the utility-maximizing discrete choice is the “decision.” This is straightforward, and the logical 
axioms and proofs of the posits involved ensure a mathematically tractable structure from which 
economists build structural models of consumer demand. The resulting choice occurs as if the 
individual knows and has discretely weighed all the costs of the decision, and maximized his or 
economically  
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decision criteria 
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her utility by exercising the choice. This maximization appreciates all future states, assuming a 
stable internal preference structure (exactly the precept Becker and Murphy 1988 defend). 
 
6.5    Assumptions and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory 
As with Socratic logic, wherein agreeing with seemingly true premises can lead to valid 
conclusions that are nonetheless absurd (due to overgeneralizations within the premises),4
 
 much 
is invisible in this model of utility maximizing choice. The orthodox economic model of rational 
choice is straightforward to the point of being mechanistic – “actions are predetermined by the 
characteristics of the environment and by the given structure of preferences. …(I)n fact choices 
do not really exist as such; all that remains is a stimulus and response” (Fernandez-Huerga 2008, 
p 720). This rational choice model stresses the role of exogenous factors in decision making and 
tends to ignore that internal processes may not be mechanistically uniform. In essence the 
idiosyncrasies of human psychology have been removed. Of course exogenous factors are easier 
to measure, so this assumption structure facilitates quantitative modeling derived from decision 
theory. There is certainly a problem with the stable preferences assumption if preferences are 
contextually formed, and particularly if they are formed under the influence of advertising or 
false or incomplete information. Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1982) claim that empirical evidence 
from psychology and sociology and their own work in economics provides “unambiguous” 
evidence for the theory of preference formation (p 151). Trenton Smith (2004) argues 
specifically that dietary preferences are endogenously determined through culture, taste, and 
aftereffects (experience) of consumption, in contrast to the “given preference structures” that 
Fernandez-Huerga criticizes as the “mechanistic” standard economic decision model. 
                                                 
4 Plato’s Republic demonstrates a number of such conundrums. 
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6.5.1    Neurobiology Shines Light into the Neoclassical Black Box of Decision-Making 
Arguing for the validity and implications of the emerging field of neuroeconomics, 
Camerer (2007) hits a bit harder. Camerer cites evidence that around a century ago, people we 
now consider to be titans of neoclassical economics after much frustration gave up on learning 
how the mind works and gave in to the pessimism that man would ever learn how the mind 
works. He cites Pareto explicitly giving up on psychology, and Pareto and others turning to the 
“as if” model of rational choice, by which it is assumed that people behave as if they are 
maximizing utility, or at least conforming precisely to their inherent preference structure. 
“Models of this sort posit individual behaviour which is consistent with logical principles, but do 
not put any evidentiary weight on direct tests of whether those principles are followed” (p C27). 
The frustration of a century ago should not direct us, implicitly or explicitly, to ignore scientific 
evidence that has accumulated in the interim. 
Camerer points out, for example, that Milton Friedman’s ‘positive economics’ judges the 
quality of assumptions by the accuracy of predictions that they make (which is a reasonable 
standard), but also judges false assumptions to be acceptable if they lead to accurate predictions. 
Camerer explains that a false assumption can only predict well if it includes a hidden “repair 
condition,” and isolating this should be the goal of the researcher, not defending a false premise. 
Where psychological and neuroscientific facts can help us to predict better, they should be 
employed, especially if this means overturning false or provisionally binding assumptions. While 
we may never reach Edgeworth’s, Ramsey’s, or Fisher’s dream of inventing devices capable of 
direct measure of utility on a cardinal scale rooted in human biology (p C40), evidence now 
available from active brain imaging devices can inform our understanding of decision theory and 
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choice such that we are not constrained to dogmatically follow the assumptions creatively borne 
from the frustration of economists five generations ago (and Milton Friedman).  
Camerer argues that neuroscience technology allows us to open a black box to gain more 
economic insight, just as happened when the field of organizational economics evolved to 
supplant a simplistic and poorly understood mixing of labor and capital as the ‘theory of the 
firm’ – now we have components of firms in hierarchies and networks, some subject to principal-
agent problems. “The neuroeconomic theory of the individual replaces the (perennially useful) 
fiction of a utility-maximizing individual which has a single goal, with a more detailed account of 
how components of the individual – brain regions, cognitive control,  and neural circuits – 
interact and communicate to determine individual behaviour” (p C28, his emphasis). 
This endeavor can prove useful without veering into the fully biologically deterministic 
framework criticized by Gul and Pesendorfer as “mindless economics” (p C40). Camerer 
dismisses Gul and Pesendorfer’s characterization by quoting them: “Populating economicTM 
models with ‘flesh-and-blood human beings’ was never the objective of economistsTM” (p C40). 
As the concern here is with the behavior of human beings who eat, drink, and endure health 
effects from choices, I will not be so quickly dismissing neuroeconomics as Gul and Pesendorfer 
do. When Camerer shows brain images depicting different active areas when a subject in a 
strategic economic game has reached a belief, versus when the same subject is making a choice – 
“being in equilibrium is not merely a mathematical restriction on equality of choices and beliefs, 
it is also a ‘state of mind’ identifiable by brain imaging” (p C35) – there seems no way to dispute 
that this brain-imaging technique may assist the accuracy of decision theory, and by implication 
the theory of consumer choice and consumer behavior. 
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6.5.2    Bounded Decision-Making Resources – The Small Economic Scale and Biological 
Effects of Banal Food Choices May Resist Rational Decision Processing  
For the economic choice whether to consume a food item, most items are a small enough 
portion of the overall individual budget so that price-comparison/budget considerations may not 
enter one’s calculus in the foreground, unlike decisions to buy or rent a house or car, or for a 
financial investment. Large discrete choices also tend not to be “secondary behaviors” done more 
passively while performing primary behaviors, the way eating can be when working or watching 
television (Bertrand and Schanzenbach 2009). Each incident of food consumption also has an 
unavoidable aspect of biological internalization that renting or investing does not, which 
manifests consequences in later periods that may affect future utility. There is a biofeedback to 
the decision, given the organic nature of the choice commodity. The model in Figure 2 
necessarily assumes that the decision-maker is human. Economically active humans must at least 
have working brains capable of rational thought, be conscious, and for neoclassical consumer 
theory, on a relevant level must understand what the costs associated with each choice are, and 
be capable not only of a utility maximizing decision process, but must actively employ one.  
Figure 3 proposes elements precedent to or required for the capacity to make an 
economic decision, and for the rational execution of this utility-maximizing decision capacity 
(for now ignoring the other elements of Figure 2): 
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Figure 3.    Model of Internal and External Influences Affecting Choice Behavior 
 
 
 
The dashed boxes depicting three biological stages precedent to the current capacity to make a 
choice may now seem pointless in their detail, but using sugar-sweetened beverages as our case, 
literature relevant to SSB consumption will redeem their placement here.  
 Decision criteria for SSB consumption are not in-born, because humans evolved without 
the option. These decision criteria are constructed, as a subset of our general critical abilities. 
This subset draws on our cultural and familial upbringing, our nutrition and medical knowledge, 
our experiences with the same or similar products, and our beliefs about these factors – beliefs 
that will shape probability weighting in any formal calculation of expected utility under 
conditions of uncertainty. 
 External influences include the social context of SSB consumption, including whether 
drinking them is considered socially acceptable (heroin consumption is generally not), whether 
they are easy to find, whether the individual has been familiar with their existence and 
consumption and for how long, and whether the individual knows and respects others who 
partake of SSBs. The role of advertising and product availability in their potential to shape these 
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perceptions must not be overlooked. The context of the consumption environment includes who 
else may or may not be drinking, the ambient temperature, ease of purchase and use, length of 
time since last consumption, etc. These contextual factors extend well past the advertising, price, 
and any discounting we conventionally measure as the standard economic factors affecting the 
decision to consume sCSDs, at home or away from home.  
Understanding the costs and benefits of a choice and weighting one’s expected utility 
under uncertainty is assumed in the neoclassical model. Individuals are objective utility 
maximizers. But understanding all relevant costs and benefits of a choice and properly weighting 
one’s expected utility under uncertainty cannot be taken for granted, given decades of 
psychological literature exposing and modeling how people do not do this. People with imperfect 
information, limited time or attention to devote to decisions, and whose choices may make trade-
offs with later periods, trade-offs whose full costs may not be apparent ex ante or at the time of 
choice, are susceptible to failures to maximize their utility. As far back as 1955, Herbert Simon 
proposed that economists consider replacing “the global rationality of economic man with a kind 
of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and the computational 
capacities that are actually possessed by organisms” (p 99), giving us the concept of bounded 
rationality.5
                                                 
5 From a 1993 speech by Simon: “Maximizing utility bears no resemblance whatsoever to what we human beings 
actually do. The idea that we even have a conception of what would be optimal behavior in the complex situations of 
life is unbelievable from the beginning” (Simon 1993, p 396). 
 A year later he coined the term satisfice to proxy for something adequately optimal 
given the conditions and objectives of the decision, arguing that this organic adaptation would 
favor decisions whose efficiency would be compromised by the cost of gathering information to 
accumulate a perfect information set. When optimality may not be an achievable goal, then 
satisfaction to a target level is enough. 
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We expect trained professionals to make more informed decisions than laypeople. 
Surgeons and lawyers need licenses to practice, as do dieticians. Is there a realm where the gap 
between the specialist and the layperson is so large that laypeople may not have the information 
or critical skills to responsibly evaluate their own utility when making a private choice – which is 
to argue, are so ignorant of the full costs and benefits of their options and how to evaluate them 
accurately, that the maximization of their utility over time cannot be assumed? 
The rational decision a fully informed individual trained in nutrition might routinely 
make may deviate from the decision an individual who does not know much about consequences 
of unhealthful eating might routinely make. Both the information set and the decision criteria 
would then fail to be uniform. Indeed the nutrition information set and decision criteria for 
Americans’ food choices are far from uniform, as demonstrated by dietary knowledge and 
dietary recall surveys. There is a distribution of information and training in food choice 
identified in the literature, including differences identified by socio-demographic characteristics 
(Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock 2001). The correlation between an individual’s nutrition 
knowledge – sometimes scored on a standardized 100-point Healthy Eating Index (HEI)6
If the information set an individual actually uses is so incomplete that the decision criteria 
would be altered or the decision reversed if the individual had access to or employed a (relevant) 
 – and a 
healthful diet, has also been demonstrated (numerous references, including Variyam and Golan 
2002, Britten et al. 2000, and Marriott et al. 2010). Not all consumers use a full and relevant 
information set or full and relevant decision-making criteria in their food choices, meaning their 
dietary profiles are defined as unhealthful by nutrition authorities and the USDA, but occur 
nonetheless (Krebs-Smith 2001, Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock 2001, amongst others). 
                                                 
6 HEI was developed by the Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP) in 1995, and revised in 2006 by the 
CNPP, National Cancer Institute, and USDA Food and Nutrition Service to conform to 2005 Dietary Guidelines for 
Americans. 
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factual information set, then the completeness, transitivity, and rationality of the information-
constrained decision comes into question.7 Conceding for now to the neoclassical conception 
that individuals attempt to maximize utility based on their knowledge set when they decide, a 
problem remains. If the individual has not accounted for readily knowable real or probable costs 
in their calculation, and such costs actually come to bear, the individual may have failed to 
maximize utility.8
 Imagine a traveling consumer sees a Coke machine and chooses to pay $1.75 and enjoy a 
20-ounce cola, but did not read the sign next to the machine noting that customers cannot leave 
with the bottle, and there is a $5 bottle disposal fee. The consumer rationally chose given his 
information set at the time of choice, but his decision criteria allowed him to neglect knowable 
information that would have changed the cost-benefit figures in his internal utility-maximizing 
calculus, a change that may have led to a decision not to purchase (while his taste for Coke and 
for a fair price as he understands it have not changed). In the case that the consumer would have 
chosen differently, or experiences a diminishment of utility from paying the $5 that is larger than 
the increase in utility from drinking the cola, then there is a problem with rational choice or 
utility maximization. 
 If the realized costs are large relative to the utility from consumption, utility 
over time will not have been maximized. The “rational choice” made under a relatively severe 
information restriction (or poor or underutilized decision criteria) may lead to a “utility 
maximizing choice” that while within the rational subset given the information restriction, fails 
the larger test of actually maximizing utility experientially.  
                                                 
7 If this were to occur and the factual information set is costly for the individual to obtain relative to the costs that 
the ignorant individual miscalculates to be the ultimate costs of the choice to consume, this is a classic case for 
public investment in the dissemination of the useful information. Public investment can reduce the information 
gathering costs for so many individuals that the social welfare benefit over the cost of education is clear. 
8 For information gathering costs to be prohibitive in this context, they must be large enough to outweigh the 
realized costs that come to bear. In the case of consistent SSB consumption, whose later costs tend to include weight 
gain and morbidity, it is not clear that information gathering costs could be defended as prohibitive over a period of 
time, even if they might appear prohibitive while standing at a concession stand or in a supermarket aisle. 
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 The critical elements are: 1) that available knowledge was not employed in the decision 
calculus or the decision calculus was flawed because his experience had not taught him to look 
for a hidden fee (we will explore both cases below); and 2) that the added cost of diminished 
utility occurs after the choice to purchase/consume (i.e., in a future period). This introduces a 
time element that is critical in real-world cases. The individual attempting to maximize lifetime 
utility has made a decision based on costs in period 1, when there exist additional costs in period 
2 that are inescapable but unknown, or improperly applied or ignored in expected utility 
calculations for period 1. While the traveler’s underlying preferences between having a coke and 
not spending cash have not changed, his evaluation of the cost may make his preferred choice as 
retroactively evaluated in period 2 differ from his actual selection in period 1, a time 
inconsistency. Even while the decision to purchase was rational in period 1 given the limited 
information set in period 1, ignoring knowable costs is not utility maximizing over both periods.  
The health consequences of consistent SSB consumption are incremental and cumulative 
(details in section 6.7), which may aggravate the prospect for present bias and hyperbolic 
discounting as an individual weighs costs and benefits under uncertainty.  
There is a third factor that may affect the choice to regularly consume sCSDs that is not 
presented in the bottle-disposal-fee example. The biologically active tools by which an 
individual chooses to consume SSBs themselves may be influenced by the sugar in them. This 
process may display characteristics of chemical addiction (details in section 6.7). 
If there is an element of addiction, or any change of tastes, then a classically noted break 
from rational economic behavior may occur. If tastes are not consistent over time, preferences 
are not consistent, and a choice in one time period assuming similar tastes in a later time period 
will prove invalid as a utility-maximizing device when tastes in a later period have changed. 
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Hold in mind a textbook example of a change of tastes as occurs with addictive 
consumables like tobacco, or perhaps alcohol. If light consumption of a consumable (y) is 
preferred to no consumption (x), but light consumption leads one to heavy consumption (z), 
which to the same consumer would ex ante be ranked inferior to no consumption, then behavior 
z, which follows from preferring  y to x, violates transitivity [y x, x z, but choice y over x 
invokes outcome z, which is inferior to x]. “A rational decision maker will anticipate the induced 
change of tastes and will therefore attempt to tie her hand to her initial decision (Ulysses had 
himself tied to the mast when approaching the island of the Sirens)” (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green, p 8, on which the preference notation above is also based). If people with this preference 
set are not acting like Ulysses and constraining their choices to maximize utility now and across 
all future states, they are not behaving rationally.  
From evidence presented in Chapter 1, the particular role of SSBs in the obesity epidemic 
is inferable. Either many Americans have made an error similar to our traveler who failed to 
appreciate the utility-undermining costs of a later period, or they consciously and with full 
knowledge of the medical implications, chose to become overweight or obese, trading immediate 
gastronomic pleasures over future health. Some may have. I argue that experimental and 
laboratory evidence presented in this chapter from psychologists, behavioral scientists, and the 
medical community introduces factors that undermine the neoclassical case for rational choice 
and resulting utility maximization precisely for the case of regular consumption of SSBs. 
Foregoing long-term health for current sugar therefore may for some consumers routinely fail to 
be an informed or optimal choice, as the orthodox neoclassical theory of utility maximization 
suggests it is for all consumers who made the choice.  
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I do not attempt to construct here a new and definitive model of consumer choice, but to 
argue that a particular exception to the neoclassical model may exist for some food types given 
their particular characteristics, and that if true for any food, SSBs make an excellent case. My 
intent in this dissertation is not to question whether individuals can be rational in choice, but to 
formally consider factors that may impede or undermine rationality of the choice to regularly 
consume SSBs (including long-term effects of that choice), to identify the highest consumers of 
sCSDs, and to offer policy options that may help generally rational people make decisions more 
likely to maximize lifetime utility. 
 
6.6    A Theoretic Model of Endogenously Time-Inconsistent Food Choice – Modeling 
Common Behaviors That Break From Economic Assumptions 
 To some degree people expect that what they eat will impact their health. Regardless of 
their expectations, what they eat will impact their health. For simplicity, let’s focus the model to 
food choice and leave nonfood items (or a composite representation of nonfood items) out. 
Formalized, with q as a food item, with h as the (true biological) health effects from eating q (net 
positive or negative), and with Hs as personal state or stock of health, the choice to eat q is the 
choice to maximize utility given both current enjoyment from consumption, and given eventual 
health effects from eating q, where these health effects are a function of one’s overall state or 
stock of health.9
                                                 
9 Without compromising the generality of my approach, “stock of health” may be conceived exactly as Huston and 
Finke (2003) define it in the health economics literature, that is in financial terms:  
 Let x represent all other factors affecting one’s state or stock of health. So 
loosely formed, we may conceive: 
Health is a stock of capital (part of one’s human capital) which provides inputs (service flows) into commodities which are 
consumed for utility in the present and saved, or invested, for future consumption.  [These commodities are later explained 
to include “diet, exercise, medical care utilization, sleep, recreation,” and use or abstinence from drugs including tobacco.] 
There is a production aspect in that health is produced for both current and future consumption, as well as an investment 
aspect, where stock of health is accumulated to provide service flows in future periods. Just as income is used to afford 
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(Utility | eat q)max = u[enjoy q now] + u[later health effects of q | health state and health drivers] , 
which may be tightened to: 
(Utility | q)max (t→∞) = ut[q ] + ut++[h(Hs(q,x))],  (a) 
where t is for the current period, t++ is for relevant future periods, and utility is maximized over 
all relevant periods. (Infinity is an exaggeration, because a single milkshake consumed at the age 
of nine is not a continuing health driver for a 40-year-old.) Note that h being a function of Hs 
depicts the nutrition reality that the same nutritional components in a given q may affect different 
people differently, depending on their state of health. A high-fat meal for a starving child may 
prove highly nutritious, while the same meal for an overweight adult may mildly aggravate 
already atherosclerotic veins. An un-medicated diabetic will have a different health outcome 
consuming the same chocolate bar than will an individual with a normally functioning pancreatic 
response to the glycemic load. 
The time subscripts (equation a) are cumbersome, so will be dropped in exchange for the 
general understanding that the individual’s utility will be maximized or fail to be maximized 
over an appropriately infinite time period. Now the first right-hand-side term concerns present 
utility for the choice to consume or not consume q (the “now” term), and the last term concerns 
health effects from the consumption of q, dependent on other factors, but certainly extending into 
time periods past the original consumption (the “later” term): 
(Utility | q)max = u0[q ] + u1[h(Hs(q,x))].      (b) 
                                                                                                                                                             
utility in both the present (current consumption) and future (investment), health flows can also be used to afford utility in 
both the present…and future… (p 144). 
Below, when discussing the implicit iterative nature of dietary choice over time, the relation of h and H as current 
consumption of and future investment in health stock will be made clearer. 
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If one is protein starved and q is a large portion of protein-rich food, both terms are likely to be 
high, even if Hs is low – utility is maximized because both terms are strongly positive given the 
health condition and the particular qi. 
 In standard rational choice theory the right-hand-side terms are not separate, as health-
associated utility maximizing choices are assumed. The focus of choice is on comparisons of 
price and other visible economic signals and the external physical environment within which 
consumers choose. Separating the terms between current utility return and all future return from 
consuming q is a device to depict behavior that while rational given the information actually 
considered at the time of choice, may fail to maximize utility given inescapable health 
consequences that were not actively considered or properly weighted at the time of choice to 
consume. Individuals may fail to consider the internal physical environment and effects of a 
food choice, and may therefore routinely violate assumptions of rational choice theory. Some 
authors characterize the effect foisted on a future self by a present self an internality (versus an 
externality), and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) refer to current consumption negatively 
affecting future wealth as a negative internality.10 Individuals do this with imperfect (or ignored) 
nutritional information and decision-making criteria, and a time inconsistency in their utility 
realization results in part from their ignorance.11
 Equation (b) is general and flexible. Let qi 
  
∈Qt, where Qt are all food/drink options 
available at a given time (including the option to consume nothing). The choice to consume q, 
any part of q, or not, is binary. Then, comparing any qi to any other option from the Qt set as part 
                                                 
10 O’Donoghue and Rabin acknowledge that the term is borrowed from others, to mean a “within-person 
externality.” 
11 This may be characterized in Figure 3 as a failure to fully apply the “knowledge, beliefs...decision criteria” dashed 
box to the “economically rational decision criteria” box, perhaps due to the former being filtered first through the 
“current devotion of psychological decision-making capacity” box, as psychologists (including Nobel prize in 
Economics recipients Simon and Kahneman) claim. This argument will be covered in the literature review to follow, 
but would be represented by the arrow from the “knowledge/criteria” box going into the “current devotion” box 
rather than directly to the “rational decision” box as it is depicted in Figure 3 above. 
386 
 
of the current consumption decision still reduces to a binary choice to consume or not for each qi. 
Without diminishing this model’s descriptive power, the composition of the “food/drink item” qi 
may be generalized to any of the choices in a sequence, or to a composite set, where q could 
represent the nutritional profile of a whole meal or string of snacks, or embody a predominant 
characteristic that is not offset by other characteristics, such as lean protein, or “empty” 
carbohydrates.12
 Equation (b) may be viewed from two perspectives. Cleaving to the neoclassical model, 
equation (b) is a proactive decision-making model, where selection of qi from Q equals a 
maximal utility return for the choice under consideration. The neoclassical assumption of perfect 
or at least adequate information implies that the utility from consuming qi cannot generate a 
negative utility in a later period, because the individual would know this and account for it 
before consuming qi. The other perspective, from which I proceed, is that equation (b) represents 
realized utility,
 The biological consequence of the choice may also be considered binary. Either 
qi was consumed in all or part and affects the body chemically, or it was not consumed, and does 
not affect the body. For simplicity in the following equations qi will be represented simply as q. 
13
                                                 
12 Huston and Finke (2003) point out that reducing foods to characteristics that are important for choosing the diet 
and its effects necessarily references Lancaster’s (1966) “characteristic theory.” 
 being the sum total of actual experience of all effects over all periods that 
derive from the already determined (single) choice to eat qi. Realized utility may prove higher or 
lower than the utility expected before consumption. If realized utility ends up being higher than 
expected, utility is maximized at a higher than calculated level. When realized utility is lower 
than expected, the utility maximizing hypothesis of conventional theory comes more sharply into 
question. Life is tough, and full of surprises – apples are mushy, the Coke in the fridge is flat 
because someone left the screw cap loose.  
13 Realized utility may be seen as approximating Kahneman’s “experienced utility,” as he differentiates it from 
“remembered utility,” and “predicted utility,” the latter distinction also being one I make (Kahneman 1991). 
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In a sense, the neoclassicalist assumes equality, reading equation (b) from left to right, 
and I propose reading equation (b) from right to left, with a question mark over the equal sign. If 
the utility value of the “later” term is negative and of sufficient magnitude to significantly 
degrade the utility from the “now” term, utility maximization becomes a questionable 
conclusion. From the second perspective, the “max” on (Util | q) may be dropped, or with the 
question mark over the equal sign, left as a reminder that the individual may have been trying to 
maximize utility at the time of the choice to consume q, although the equation actually depicts 
the utility effects from that choice. If over time an individual does not adjust their choice criteria 
to account for information known from their own experience, then the rational utility 
maximization (RUMax) behavior in conventional theory does not model all actual behavior. 
Equation (b) is a device to describe cases where conventional rational-choice theory does not 
strictly apply because individuals do not follow its precepts. Either half of all Americans planned 
on becoming overweight or obese, or exceptions to RUMax behavior are occurring often enough 
to merit separate modeling. The appearance of Brian Wansink’s (with Just and Payne 2009) and 
Bertrand and Schanzenbach’s (2009) work in the American Economic Review suggests the latter 
is true: “People are often surprised by how much they consume. This indicates they may be 
influenced at a basic level of which they are not aware” (p 168). If they are unaware, at what 
point did rational choice enter, at what point did it leave? If RUMax behavior stops being 
employed at some point, what drives consumption? 
The neoclassical assumption is that individuals make the best choices for themselves 
(they do in fact what they should do), whereas evidence testing this assumption as it pertains to 
food (Wansink, Just, and Payne) and even to money (Kahneman and Tversky; multiple 
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publications) concludes that people often do not in fact do what an informed objective judge 
would determine they should do in their own best interest. 
What people can do (capability), should do (appropriate maximizing decision and action), 
and in fact do (actual consumption choices) are three separate aspects of decision making that are 
artificially unified by economic rational choice theory in part to enable the researcher’s capacity 
to conduct deterministic modeling. As evidence begins to expose cracks in this maximizing 
trinity – and the cracks in utility-maximizing food choice may well be large – the questions arise: 
“how/why do people fail to maximize?”, and “can we tell who seems to be doing this, and under 
what circumstances?” The flowcharts and realized utility concept are initial attempts to frame an 
answer space for these questions, and the empirical work in Essay One attempts for a particular 
food product to answer the “who is doing this?” question. 
 Observing equation (b) from the realized utility perspective, there are two places from 
which the individual may draw experiential information that may pertain to future food choices: 
the consumption experience, and the delayed experience of health effects. (This may be easier to 
conceive if one imagines qi as six strong mixed drinks at a sitting – a perfectly acceptable qi 
under the described generalized conditions.) To simplify the conceptualization of utility 
calculation here, all neoclassical considerations preceding a choice to consume that do not 
pertain to the biological effects of having digested qi are in the first term, the “now” term. These 
include economic factors including price, sense of getting a bargain, the individual’s 
psychological association with the advertised image of the brand, cost of gathering more 
nutrition information rather than “grab-and-go-with-what-you-know,” etc.; external 
environmental factors including sense of time constraint, consumption convenience of food in 
this form, perishability and access to adequate storage of oversized portion; and sense 
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experiences such as smell, taste, mouthfeel, hunger or thirst satiation, ability to enjoy sharing the 
food with others, etc.14
For a known food or a reasonable expectation of the eating experience, the magnitude 
of the first term is likely to be fairly certain. To simplify, let us assume that the expected 
utility of consuming q now equals the actual utility derived from consumption as depicted in 
the first term on the right hand side. However, when nutrition knowledge is low (meaning not 
well-correlated with dietary guidelines or nutrition literature), there is uncertainty as to the 
magnitude of the second term. Zimmerman (2011) claims that “consumers are largely 
unaware of their own daily calorie intake/expenditure balance, but they are also largely 
uninformed about the broader costs and benefits” (p 291). Even when nutrition knowledge is 
high, there is uncertainty as to the magnitude of the second term. Did eating that whole 
grapefruit at lunch keep you from getting the cold going around the office, or was it your 
health stock alone, or pure luck? So the individual must make an assessment, a guess, and an 
expectation must be placed on the second term on the right hand side: 
 Thus all realized utility from the direct experience of consuming q is 
either in the “now” term, or in the “later” term as cumulative health effects. 
Exp[Utility | q]max = u0[q] + Exp{u1[h(Hs(q,x))]}.  (c) 
Thus if q is a “superfood” imbued by the consumer with the expectation that a high antioxidant 
profile will generate positive health effects and that it will be enjoyable to eat, the expected 
utility is high. This may or may not be the ultimate effect, especially if it is a new food, and 
violates the individual’s assumption that it is enjoyable to eat, or if the positive health effects are 
little more than marketing hype. Note that the magnitude of the expected utility may not be fixed, 
but change over time, probably with changes in relevant information, and possibly with 
assessments influenced by moods or “visceral factors” (a term explored below in 6.8.3; “visceral 
                                                 
14 Factors included in this set are in part informed by Blaylock et al. (1999), and Huston and Finke (2003). 
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factors play a critical role in intertemporal choice,” Loewenstein 2000, p 430). For now it is 
enough to reflect that in certain states of mind, a person may behave less responsibly in their 
dietary choices than in other states of mind – say on vacation, under stress, when extremely 
thirsty or when intoxicated. These are recognizable vicissitudes demonstrated in the “visceral 
factor” literature that may affect how one calculates expectations, often pushing valuation of the 
present over the future.  
Introducing the expectation function serves to highlight both the lack of knowledge that 
defines decision-making uncertainty, and the temporal break between the first and second right-
hand-side terms. A food type may impact one’s health to a larger degree than one understands or 
believes when one chooses whether to consume a food in the current period, but one cannot 
escape the biological effect in a later period represented by the h. The degree to which one’s 
nutrition knowledge is accurate and the degree to which that knowledge is actually applied when 
choosing a food both affect how close the expectation employed at the time of decision will be to 
the actual health effect. For any combination of nutrition knowledge and a particular food (qi), 
the expectation function may be decomposed into an element that is a multiple of the health 
effect, and an element describing one’s level of responsible decision-making at the time of 
choice. Call the first element k, a function of nutrition knowledge applied to qi. Positive or 
negative personal inferences as to the health effects of eating qi will influence k, which may be 
larger or smaller than one. The impermanent moods, tendencies, or “visceral factors” that may 
affect the value one places on the future will enter the function as an a and re-enforce an element 
of endogeneity in the potential time-inconsistency of preferences when choosing certain foods to 
eat (regularly). Together these variables replace the expectation function on the right-hand side, 
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maintaining the concept that a, and to a lesser extent k, are more likely to be variables described 
by a distribution than constants: 
Exp[Utility | q]max = u0[q] + k · a· u1[h(Hs(q,x))].  (d) 
Equation (d) demonstrates how an individual’s ill-informed assessment of k in deciding 
whether to eat q can lead to an inequality between Exp[Utility | q]max from (d) and (Utility | q)max 
from (b). The values of k and a affect the expected utility of consuming q, but not the realized 
utility depicted by equation (b). Thus behavior divergent from utility maximization must follow 
if the right hand side in (d) is less than the right hand side in (b). The “correctness” of the last 
term in (d) is a function of nutrition awareness and its application in decision making in 
accordance with biological facts specific to the individual decision maker, because for a daily 
food, the consumption utility (first term) is well-known. 
If an individual’s knowledge is so incomplete as to break with reality, so their beliefs are 
scientifically wrong, their choice can still meet economist’s definition of rational, if it is 
consistent (complete and transitive) with preferences, budget, and the information set. If the 
knowledge gap and unrealistic belief set leads to consumption choice that imposes costs on a later 
self that would not be preferred, then consistency of preferences is broken, and rationality of the 
original choice cannot be assumed without risk of modeling error. A temporal trade-off may occur 
favoring present consumption over future discomfort, but it is rational only if the future self 
genuinely agrees with the earlier self’s choice. Genuine here means, without cognitive 
dissonance, by which one claims a preference merely to justify a choice that has already been 
made, or that is prohibited by an insuperable constraint that unexpectedly binds one from a 
desirable option. 
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A utility cannot be wrong, but an expected utility can be under- or mis-informed to a 
degree that demonstrably affects the choice one makes under uncertainty. Temporary mental 
states depicted by a may corrupt one’s capacity for rational expected utility calculation. An 
expected utility that is maintained in repeated choice sets despite evidence that the same 
expected utility has repeatedly failed to match one’s realized utility cannot be assumed to be 
unerringly rational. In the case of eating the same q daily, the health effects are inescapable, but 
they may be subtle, and accumulate slowly enough to avoid notice (a situation excluded by 
assumption in neoclassical utility maximization theory). For example, as one’s weight rises from 
consuming more calories than one expends over time, there is proof that the expected utility 
(enjoying consumption with no significant negative health effects) does not match realized 
utility. This defines irrational behavior – just as soon as one becomes aware that the expectation 
does not match the reality. If something blocks conscious detection of this break, or encourages 
one to notice this break without changing behavior, then utility-maximizing choice will not 
occur, even while choice remains rational given one’s limited – even faulty – information set. I 
present literature below explaining mechanisms by which these failures are likely to occur for at 
least some portion of the population who regularly consume SSBs.  
It is reasonable, rational, to assume that consumption of a particular commonly eaten q 
will not greatly affect one’s x, or by implication Hs. Everyone turns off their internal “later” term 
alarm now and again, and indulges. Any healthy active adult with a nutritionally responsible diet 
can eat a quart of caramel-nut ice cream at one sitting, once, without expecting to become obese 
or to thereby contract ischemic heart disease. The issue of policy relevance is identifying who is 
making unhealthful choices consistently, and why? Imagine someone who’s a seems to go 
haywire each afternoon a few hours after lunch in the form of a cookie craving, as described in 
393 
 
Charles Duhigg’s self-help bestseller The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and 
Business – habitual “lapses” may then drive a. Of particular interest here, are people consistently 
making unhealthful choices happy with their own behavior? If they are not, there is an implicit 
inefficiency that on a broad scale represents a lower social welfare than may be achievable if 
appropriate policy can be constructed to induce individual choices that result in higher realized 
utility over the long term. 
Food-choice utility decisions are made explicitly or implicitly dozens of times a day 
(Wansink and Sobal 2007), and may create patterns over time that strongly impact x and 
therefore one’s state and stock of health. Daily eating choices may be represented as a dynamic 
iteration of the simple utility model in equation (d), and one’s effectuated choices cumulatively 
raise, lower, or leave stable Hs. This must be true because in dynamic iteration the health effect 
of consuming q, h(Hs(q,x)) solves to h(q). This h(q) then becomes an element of x before the 
next day’s food choices are made. A positive h(q) tends to raise Hs on a later day, and a negative 
h(q) tends to lower Hs on a later day – certainly incrementally, perhaps almost imperceptibly, but 
as people adhere to certain eating habits, these effects may accumulate and manifest, perhaps as 
higher percentage of lean muscle mass, or perhaps as extra pounds that raise one’s BMI.  
Eating patterns reinforce health effects, and we may further distend our timeframe for 
equations (b) and (d), so that q is a food (or nutritional characteristic) eaten regularly over a 
week, month, or even years. Then the impact on h as a function of Hs(q,x), and of Hs as an 
iterative function of h(q) may become evident even to the layperson. It is precisely this 
conception that I refer to when using terms such as consistent, regular, or habitual when referring 
to daily or near-daily consumers of SSBs/sCSDs. The incidents of dietary choice are additive 
over time in their health effects (although not linear in their effects on body weight; Katan and 
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Ludwig 2010, Hall et al. 2011), unless behavioral control is used to breaks patterns or is used to 
offset these effects. (“Habit” and “habitual behavior” are explored in 6.8 in the context of 
literature that defines the terms.) 
I have not yet discussed the control variables by which the individual may maximize 
utility. Of course the choice to consume or refrain from consuming q is one, but those elements 
of x represented by the individual’s diet, exercise, and general health regimen15 also make x a 
control variable that determines whether consuming q will maximize realized utility over time.16
                                                 
15 Those components of x that are not pre-determined by genetics or extreme constraints in environment like being 
in prison, or a food shortage area, etc. 
 
An individual cannot control every aspect of x, but can if attention is paid and energy spent, 
control enough aspects to consciously impact Hs. Imagine that Olympic swimmer Michael 
Phelps and U.S. President Bill Clinton would both prefer to eat five large whole wheat pancakes 
as part of their daily breakfast. Phelp’s control of his x would accommodate this choice without 
degrading his Hs, whereas Clinton’s daily caloric demand being thousands of kilocalories less, 
would likely gain weight from the daily choice of q, to a degree that would iteratively make the 
utility from the “later” term in his equation (b) negative, and Clinton’s regret for the previous 
month’s choices would depict an ultimate failure to maximize realized utility. 
16 The fact that x represents a dynamic state influenced by factors that themselves change over time and have 
different effects according to context (e.g., you can eat more calories without weight gain when exercising more, so 
a nutritionally marginally poor food could become an acceptable option) makes equations (a), (b), (c), and (d) 
different from a value-maximizing Bellman equation, despite the superficial similarity. “Dynamic programming 
seeks a time-invariant policy function…mapping the state [variable]…into the control [variable]…,” so that the 
infinite sequence of control variables that change according to the policy function and the transition law for the 
equation solve the maximization problem (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2004, p85-6). Because the x in the above 
equations is comprised of a time-variant policy function, i.e., the mapping function may change over time given the 
dynamic nexus of health-generating inputs, there is a dynamic element exogenous to the Bellman dynamic 
programming construction. For this reason the above equations fail to satisfy the condition that there be a unique and 
time-invariant optimal policy mapping the state to the control (ibid. p 87). A similar argument may be made for the 
a variable. Thus the equations I propose are likely destined in this form to be primarily theoretical, that is, 
empirically intractable, except perhaps for consistent food profiles over significant periods of time. (Stanhope et al. 
2011 may well have set the current lower bound for determining significant effects, at two weeks.) The equations 
here are proposed to demonstrate the mechanisms by which rational choice of a consumable with immediate and 
longer-term utility impacts may fail to maximize utility. They are not currently intended to represent a prescriptive 
hypothesis subject to empirical testing. Loewenstein (1996) claims that aspects of elements I group into a follow a 
predictable distribution. 
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Similarly some people may build the discipline to recognize and control their a factor, 
and even spend the time to inform their k assessment, making these each at least theoretically 
also control variables. (Policy recommendations in Essay Three are designed to engage the 
individual to responsibly control a and k in their dietary habits.) 
If a decision maker does not consider x or k or a to be control variables when choosing a 
q, they may easily and avoidably make an ignorant decision, failing to satisfy precepts of rational 
utility-maximizing choice, and experiencing a lower realized utility than they projected when 
choosing to consume q. If Americans were making exactly this mistake in their overconsumption 
of high-added-sugar foods, the rise in overweight, obesity, and diabetes that are actually 
documented would result. I do not claim to have identified a strictly causal model, but the 
descriptive hypothetical model offered here represents one possible fit to the known facts. 
 
6.6.1    Similar Neoclassical Models Differ in Treating Time Preferences as Fixed 
I contrast this approach with Davide Dragone’s 2009 Journal of Health Economics article, 
“A Rational Eating Model of Binges, Diets and Obesity.” Dragone also models an intertemporal 
trade-off between food consumption and a later health state, including body weight (analogous to 
my “state of health”) as a state variable. But Dragone’s later health state is “the increased 
probability of dying as weight deviates from a given physiologically optimal level” (:803). 
Dragone models diets and binge eating as rational utility maximization in the presence of 
consumption habits that make rapid dietary change costly to individuals, allowing that these 
individuals differ in their sensitivity to consumption changes. The mathematically rigorous model, 
with its Hamiltonians and Jacobians, derives from the insightful premise that the neoclassical 
assumption of instantaneous and costless change to diet is simplistic. But Dragone then ignores 
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the literature presented here (section 6.8) that brings to question whether rational decision-making 
resources are fully employed at all in certain food consumption choices. By designating the 
rational choice as a balance between consumption and the discounted utility of higher probability 
of death, Dragone begs the question of whether people consciously and actively weigh the chance 
of death when deciding on that ice-cream cone for dessert. (Behavioral economics and decades of 
psychological criticism of economics suggests they do not, so striving to apply the neoclassical 
rational choice model to certain aspects of eating seems shaky on its fundamental precept.) 
If behavior fails to be either rational or utility maximizing, or both, then the mathematical 
elegance of the model may prove wasted effort. Dragone ignores that the body has an 
evolutionary proclivity to gain weight quickly, but defend that new weight against loss, with the 
effect that any small or temporary change in intake will not result in substantial and long-term 
weight loss (Katan and Ludwig 2010; Hall et al. 2011; Lambert 2004). By maximizing in part on 
the square of the difference between “physiologically ideal weight” (as if this is constant for an 
adult) and the individual’s true weight, Dragone ignores that weight is only one determinant of 
health associated with mortality. A normal weight individual with advanced cardiovascular 
disease may well be in far more mortal peril than a non-diabetic, technically obese individual 
with a consistently good lipid profile (high HDL:LDL ratios and low triglycerides).17
                                                 
17 As in 6.7.1.b below: Twenty percent of obese individuals have normal metabolism and lifespans, while 40% of 
normal weight individuals have metabolic syndrome with diabetes, hypertension, lipid problems, cardiovascular 
disease, and non-alcoholic fatty liver disease – all associated with excess added sugar consumption, regardless of a 
person’s BMI (Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 2012). 
 Dragone 
uses a simple discount rate applied the same to both actual and physically optimal weight, i.e. an 
external discount rate of classical (exponential) form. This seems unlikely to describe actual 
discounting in the mind of a dieter/binger, either as discounting or applied to the known and 
prescribed weight states. 
397 
 
In my Essay One estimations, I attempted to eschew the dangers of overassumption by 
posing a model that does not assume rational utility maximization in food choice. I have 
specifically avoided the strictures of a Hamiltonian, with the need for a discount rate assumption, 
and the need for concavity and convexity demonstrations to assure monotonic drivers pushing the 
utility-weight condition to a defined steady state. People change their goals, behavior, and 
weights over time, sometimes reacting to their own previous failure to maximize utility by 
equation (d), and sometimes without doing so.   
Michael Finke and Sandra Huston have also done interesting work that precurses my 
theoretical model above, again from the neoclassical assumption of RUMax behavior, in 
“Factors Affecting the Probability of Choosing a Risky Diet” (Finke and Huston 2003) and “Diet 
Choice and the Role of Time Preference” (Huston and Finke 2003). Finke and Huston 
characterize consumption of any ingestible (food, smoking, alcohol) as involving “a choice to 
weigh present satisfaction against the risk of a reduction in future satisfaction” (p 291). For both 
papers, they treat time preferences as exogenous and fixed, an assumption I avoid in my 
estimation in Essay One.  
Finke and Huston find that their proxies for individual time preference are correlated 
such that behaviors associated with higher discounting of the future correlate with riskier diets, 
where risky diets are measured by the Healthy Eating Index. HEI scores for individuals are 
compiled by the USDA’s Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion from a Continuing Survey 
of Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII), from 1994-1996 in Huston and Finke’s 2003 study. HEI 
scores are based on individual survey responses for a single-day dietary recall. Ten categories 
total to 100 possible points, scoring each by compliance with USDA recommended dietary 
guidelines. HEI scores below 51 are considered “poor” diet, 51-80 “needs improvement” and 80 
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and above a “good” diet. So HEI scores are based on a thin cross-section of an individual’s 
actual diet, and accuracy of self-reporting is a methodological concern (Huston and Finke 2003). 
Higher levels of education, income, exercise, nutrition panel use, not smoking, and higher 
“motivation for nutritional knowledge” are all associated with higher dietary quality by the HEI 
measure. Being African American, from the South, 35-54 years old (of four age categories), 
and/or male raised correlation with dietary risk. 
These are useful results, in that to the extent my variables overlap, these results often 
confirm results in Essay One. However, Finke and Huston’s definition of variables are in places 
simple, a diet is risky or not, a person smokes or does not, exercises or not, uses nutrition labels 
often or not. There is little spectrum, and no attempt to identify how variables might differ in 
their expression within other characteristics, such as for example Whites in the South versus 
Whites in the Northeast, which could be achieved through interaction of terms. Fundamentally, 
Huston and Finke cleave to the neoclassical assumption that dietary choice is conscious, using 
full rational faculties, from a clear understanding of both nutrition and the effects of the 
individual’s own dietary patterns: “Those who eat an unhealthy diet have made the decision that 
these costs outweigh potential future benefits, and have chosen a diet that provides maximal 
present utility and, in turn, increases probability of poor health” (p 294). Individuals making food 
choices out of ignorance of the effect of nutrition on later health or out of habits that eroded 
imperceptibly over time may not consciously or willingly be trading the present for the future in 
their choice phase (although they may be demonstrated to have done so, when “reading equation 
(b) from right to left”). 
Huston and Finke (the “diet and time preference” paper) proceed with similar 
assumptions and modeling, concluding that “of all factors in the model, time preference is the 
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most important predictor of healthy eating behavior” (p 155). Their results rank variables they 
use to proxy for individuals’ future discount rate [education level, smoking, exercise, use of 
nutrition labels, nutrition knowledge “motive”] as the most influential in predicting dietary score, 
followed by socio-cultural variables [race, sex, age, importance of taste in choice of food], then 
market characteristic variables [region, rural-suburban-urban, income, and price]. I have no way 
of modeling time preference in Essay One, but use a marketing panel database that accurately 
depicts household consumption over years. I evaluate which demographic characteristics rank 
most important in quantity of purchase for a single (perhaps the most) unhealthful food, sCSDs 
(see next section), and identify which marketing strategy seems to have the largest effect on 
purchase for different demographic sub-groups. 
 
6.7    Medical/Nutrition Literature Review 
The flowchart in Figure 3, and the two-phase utility models of equations (b) and (d) 
create conceptual place settings for relevant medical (and nutrition) literature. Medical literature 
relevant to the exploration of potential exceptions to utility-maximizing rational choice 
associated with an individual’s consistent consumption of SSBs falls into three categories.  
The first category includes articles demonstrating problems and costs associated with 
obesity, and that high amounts of simple added sugars in non-nutritive products lead to higher 
risk of poor health outcomes later. These articles demonstrate the effect on health of added 
sugars of the type and quantity typically in sCSDs, thus their impact on h and Hs. While near-
perfect nutrition knowledge is unlikely, when a decision maker is unaware of medical evidence 
from clinical nutrition studies, they are less likely to properly assess the direction or more likely 
the magnitude of the multiple k for their personal profile. Then proper weighting of the expected 
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utility effect over time is more uncertain and less reliable than the weighting of expected utility 
(current experience enjoyment) for the “now” period. Literature from psychology tells us that the 
current known will receive more weight than the uncertain later effect, both because it is current 
(see 6.8.2, habitual eating patterns; Downs, Loewenstein, and Wisdom 2009), and because the 
uncertainty is higher for the future effect  (see 6.8, a variant of Ellsberg’s challenge to a decision 
theory axiom by which decisions are assumed to mimic carefully calculated numerical 
calculations maximizing utility; see 6.8.1, Camerer).  
The second category includes articles empirically demonstrating the biological 
mechanisms by which sugar leads to poor health outcomes. The second category includes articles 
that detail in biological terms why the negative health effects of excessive added sugar 
consumption occur. These explain the link between added sugars in the diet and health effects h 
and Hs. 
The third category includes articles explaining the capacity for doses of simple sugars to 
directly affect decision-making psychology, or even to demonstrate addictive properties. 
Establishing these functional mechanisms would greatly undermine the case for individually 
objective rationality in the choice whether to consume sCSDs regularly. Such effects would be 
represented as corrupting the influence from the two dashed boxes that directly feed to the 
“economically rational decision criteria” box in Figure 3. This effect could successfully blind an 
individual to the “later” term in their sCSD consumption calculus. 
 
6.7.1    Effects of Obesity and Added Sugar Consumption on Health and Disease 
6.7.1.a    Effects of Obesity and Added Sugar – Overview 
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While U.S. increases in overweight and obesity are dramatic, the dietary and 
environmental factors driving the epidemic are not unique. In the Western world, there are now 
30% more obese citizens than undernourished ones (Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 2012). From 
the WHO Collaborating Center for Obesity Prevention, Boyd Swinburn, Gary Sacks, and others 
(2011) write: “The simultaneous increases in obesity in almost all countries seem to be driven 
mainly by changes in the global food system, which is producing more processed, affordable, 
and effectively marketed food than ever before. This passive overconsumption of energy leading 
to obesity is a predictable outcome of market economies predicated on consumption-based 
growth” (p 804). A more processed, affordable, effectively marketed, and passively 
overconsumed food than sCSDs may be hard to find. But as characteristic of the problem as 
sCSDs may be, the problem is much larger. The United Nations member states met in 
September, 2011 for “the first High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly” to discuss 
non-communicable diseases and “the inexorable global rise of obesity,” (Swinburn et al. 2011, p 
804). High-income countries led the global obesity epidemic from the 1970s and 1980s, since 
joined by middle-income and many lower-income countries, and with the epidemic expanding 
from adults to children (<18 years) in each, but with the US leading in childhood overweight and 
obesity by far. Worldwide in 2008 1.46 billion adults were overweight, a further 502 million 
were obese, along with 170 million children. 
 This subsection will proceed first by examining the degree to which more calories or less 
exercise drive the U.S. energy imbalance, and how excess calories enter the diet. 
 
6.7.1.b    Consequences and Economic Costs Associated with Overweight and Obesity 
We must conclude from medical and nutrition literature presented so far in this and the 
introduction chapter that the overweight and obesity epidemic is dangerous, that overweight and 
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obesity are at the population level the product of more calories rather than diminished exercise, 
that carbohydrate calories are a critical driver and perhaps the critical driver of overweight and 
obesity, and that SSBs are a primary component of that driver. We have examined some of the 
vectors by which extra calories may enter the diet and lead to weight gain. Is weight gain in turn 
associated with higher morbidity and mortality? Yes.  
Some estimates of morbidity: Anand et al. (2008) conduct an “expert review” for 
Pharmaceutical Research (no conflicts of interest declared, funding from a foundation claiming 
only health interest of the community) and find that “as many as 30-35” of all cancer-related 
deaths are due to diet (p 2097), and cite Harvard’s Walter Willett that 75% of prostate cancers; 
70% of colorectal cancers; and 50% of breast, endometrial, pancreatic, and gall bladder cancer 
deaths are diet related (p 2101, figure 4, information drawn from Willett 1995 [attributed as 
Willett 2000 (sic)]). “Findings from…[an American Cancer Society study] suggest that of all 
deaths from cancer in the United States, 14% in men and 20% in women are attributable to 
excess weight or obesity” (p 2101). They proceed to speculate on chemical pathways through 
which the relation between obesity and cancer manifests, stressing “inflammatory cascades.” 
Added sugars are strongly associated as inflammatory (Ludwig 2002, p 2419; Malik et al. 2010, 
p 1360). 
In many societies historically, including in the nineteenth century U.S. (Variyam and 
Golan 2002), having some corporeal heft was a sign of health and not just of prosperity. With the 
modern U.S. diet, does carrying some extra weight serve as padding against hunger and wasting, 
a way of maintaining health, as it was once thought to? No. A prospective study by the NIH of 
over a half million American men and women from 50 to 71 years old, with maximum follow-
ups of 10 years through 2005, controlled for age, race or ethnic group, level of education, 
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smoking status (and previous smoking history), physical activity, alcohol intake, and preexisting 
chronic disease. People at the highest and lowest categories of BMI (from self-reported height 
and weight) had increased risk of death, but among those who had never smoked, the increased 
risk of death diminished for those in the lowest BMI category. For healthy people who had never 
smoked, the risk of death was higher for overweight and obese men and women. For those over 
50 years who had never smoked, “the associations became stronger, with the risk of death 
increasing by 20 to 40 percent among overweight persons and by two to at least three times 
among obese persons” compared to normal weight individuals (p 763). “…[O]besity was 
strongly associated with the risk of death in both men and women in all racial and ethnic groups 
and at all ages. …[E]ven moderate elevations in BMI conferred an increased risk of death” 
(Adams et al. 2006, p 776). But rational decision makers (species: homo economicus 
americanus), being rational, know of and account for the increased risk of death in all their food 
choices, to ensure all-period maximization? If not all, to a person, see flowchart and lettered 
equations above for formalized concepts of the failure to do so. And, yes, it gets worse. 
A total of 5036 participants from 28 to 62 years old in the “Framingham Cohort Study 
were followed up every 2 years from 1948 for up to 48 years,” and the resulting data examined 
for any association between the length of time someone had been obese and mortality from all 
causes and specific causes, adjusted for BMI. The hazard ratio “for mortality increased as the 
number of years lived with obesity increased” (Abdullah et al. 2011, p 985). For each defined 
increment of time obese (roughly 0 to 5 years, 5-15, 15-25, and 25+) there was a dose-response 
relationship for all-cause, cardiovascular, cancer, and other-cause mortality. “The number of 
years lived with obesity is directly associated with the risk of mortality” (p 985). This had been 
overlooked in previous studies, and therefore not taken into account when estimating the likely 
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economic costs of the obesity epidemic. So the following estimates are likely to be lower than 
we may now expect. 
 What are some of the cost estimates without factoring in the duration effect? Yach, 
Stuckler, and Brownell (2006) claim that in a span of five years, the economic costs of diabetes 
and obesity doubled, from $44 million to $92 million, citing obesity as the primary driver, 
because costs of obesity mimic “health-system costs roughly equivalent to 20 years of natural 
aging” (p 63).  
The burden of obesity and diabetes on health systems only reflects a fraction of the financial disruptions 
they cause to sick individuals, their families and communities. Empirical evidence shows that the full costs 
of diabetes accrue to society through lower returns to education, decreased household wages, earnings and 
incomes, increased premature retirement and unemployment, and higher dependence on welfare (Yach, 
Stuckler, and Brownell 2006, p 64; eight citations supporting these claims omitted, see original.) 
 
As part of a dedicated series on obesity in The Lancet, Wang et al. (2011) offer some scope for 
the economic costs of overweight and obesity in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, and how they 
are trending. Citing Finkelstein et al. (2003, 2004, 2009), Wang et al. convey that “compared 
with normal-weight individuals, obese patients incur 46% increased patient costs, 27% more 
physician visits and outpatient costs, and 80% increased spending on prescription drugs” (p 816). 
The extra medical costs of obesity then comprise 4 to 7% of U.S. health-care expenditure, 
estimated at $75 billion for 2003.18
                                                 
18 Finkelstein EA, Trogdon JG, Cohen JW, Dietz W. Annual medical spending attributable to obesity: payer-and 
service-specific estimates. Health Aff (Millwood) 2009; 28: w822–31. 
 Adding similar costs for overweight to the same Finkelstein 
et al.  (2003) totals raises the estimate to 9.1% of overall US healthcare costs, estimated by others 
to be around $147 billion in 2003 (Malik et al. 2010). Annual workdays missed rises 0.5 days for 
overweight men, and 6.9 days for excessively obese men (BMI > 40). Lower productivity while 
Finkelstein EA, Fiebelkorn IC, Wang G. State-level estimates of annual medical expenditures attributable to obesity. 
Obes Res 2004; 12: 18–24. 
Finkelstein EA, Fiebelkorn IC, Wang G. National medical spending attributable to overweight and obesity: how 
much, and who’s paying? Health Aff (Millwood) 2003; W3 (suppl): 219–26. 
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still showing up (“presenteeism”) for excessively obese men has also been calculated by 
Finkelstein et al. 2010 as the equivalent of one month per year, averaging lost productivity of 
$3792 per year to employers.19
Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003 calculate that half of the costs of medical 
spending attributable to overweight and obesity are borne by the public through Medicare and 
Medicaid. This presents a potential means by which economically rational individuals may 
discount the economic costs of poor dietary habits, and presents a strong public incentive to limit 
health costs arising from the overconsumption of SSBs of all types. 
  
Wang et al. further extrapolate using Finkelstein and others’ figures for an aging U.S. 
population, and project the annual increase in obesity-related medical costs (not from 
overweight, not from workplace loss), will be $28B (95% C.I. 8–49) by 2020, and $66B (95% 
C.I. 19–112) by 2030, acknowledging that on their 20-year projection, they are almost certainly 
underestimating the effects from rising childhood obesity. 
Costs of obesity arise in the health care system from treatment for increased incidence of 
hypertension, coronary heart disease, diabetes, stroke, cancer, and arthritis. Beyond the health 
care system, costs are attributed to lower quality of life, and foregone productivity. Wang et al. 
do not factor in the increased incidence of death that we are familiar with from Adams et al. and 
Abdullah et al. – therefore ignoring the cost of premature death on loss of work productivity.  
Still, it remains critical to distinguish association from causality. Overweight and obesity 
do not cause ill health, they are markers for increased probability of certain diseases. Twenty 
percent of obese individuals have normal metabolism and lifespans, while 40% of normal weight 
individuals have metabolic syndrome with diabetes, hypertension, lipid problems, cardiovascular 
                                                 
19 Wang et al. 2011, referencing: Finkelstein EA, DiBonaventura MD, Burgess SM, Hale BC. The costs of obesity in 
the workplace. J Occup Environ Med 2010; 52: 971–76. 
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disease, and non-alcoholic fatty liver disease – all associated with excess added sugar 
consumption, regardless of a person’s BMI (Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 2012). This will 
become clearer as we continue. 
 
6.7.1.c    Genetic Expression, Calories Out, or Calories In? 
Biologically, overweight and obesity must derive from a systemic energy imbalance, 
where more calories consistently are consumed than are burned by the body to maintain 
involuntary and voluntary functions. The worldwide rise in obesity in a few decades rules out the 
possibility of population genetic changes over any location scale. Some literature claims that 
heritability of BMI explains 40-70% of BMI, “yet genome-wide association studies to identify 
common single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with BMI have been unable to explain 
more than a small proportion (<2%) of BMI variability.” “The genetic background loads the gun, 
but the environment pulls the trigger” (Swinburn et al. 2011, both quotes p 810, Panel 4, quoting 
George Bray in the second sentence). Swinburn et al. describe probable drivers of an obesogenic 
environment as: “the increased supply of cheap, palatable, energy-dense foods; improved 
distribution systems to make food much more accessible and convenient; and more persuasive 
and pervasive food marketing” (p 807). The authors further contend that in the U.S., food 
availability figures show a downward trend from 1920 to the 1960s as energy needs declined 
with greater mechanization of work and domestic chores, and that after a fairly stable 1960-1970, 
food availability has been rising, so that now energy intake drives weight outcomes more than 
energy expenditure, the reverse of the dynamic in the first half of the 20th century. The problem 
is not a balanced combination of less physical activity (than in the late 1960s) and more food 
intake per person. The problem is more calories in per person (Cutler, Glaeser, Shapiro 2003). In 
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a separate study, Swinburn, Sacks, Ravussin (2009) show that the increase in energy intake is 
more than sufficient to explain weight gain in the US from the 1970s, and Swinburn et al. (2011) 
cite nearly as definitive findings for the United Kingdom. 
Before we examine whether SSBs play a special role in the dietary energy surfeit fueling 
the obesity epidemic, it is worth verifying a cursory understanding of quantification issues 
associated with calculating energy imbalance and bodyweight. An August 2011 article in The 
Lancet (Hall et al. 2011) argues that bodyweight change in response to energy intake changes is 
slow, taking a full year to manifest half of the cumulative effect from a maintained per-day 
change. Thus, Hall et al. argue, the U.S.’s National Institutes of Health and American Dietetic 
Association “erroneously” predict weight reductions of a half-kilogram per week from a 2 
megajoule (500 kcal) per day reduction in energy intake. Katan and Ludwig (2010) give an 
example of the back-of-the-envelope weight-gain math before noting that actual gain is 
asymptotic: adding a 60-kcal cookie daily to one’s diet is naively projected to produce a half-
pound weight gain in a month, 6 pounds in a year, and 60 pounds over ten years. But as part of 
the energy goes to maintaining new tissue, the net weight gain from the daily marginal calorie 
bump eventually levels toward a final 6-pound gain, then stops. 
The current NIH & ADA recommendations ignore the dynamic physiological adaptations 
that occur with increasing or decreasing body weight, adaptations that alter the energy 
expenditures for both physical activity and resting metabolic rate (Hall and two of the other 
authors were NIH employees at the time of authorship). Hall et al. note that the field 
acknowledges that the static weight-loss model is overly simplistic, but that few methods 
attempted predictions of these dynamic changes over realistic time frames. They developed a 
sophisticated simulation based on a “web of interacting variables” from the “Foresight Obesity 
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Map” developed by the British Government Office of Science and Technology. Hall et al. model 
the average caloric increase needed to gain the amount the average American has over the last 30 
years, and factoring in adaptive biology, how much caloric change would be needed to lose what 
the average American has gained over the last 30 years. A small daily maintained increase in 
calorie intake can lead to big changes over time measured in months and years. The body adapts 
to the new weight by devoting new calories to maintaining the additional tissue, then resists 
weight loss due to the fact that more calories are devoted to functions to maintain the extra 
weight. 
The simulated results from Hall et al. have dramatic implications for understanding 
weight gain and weight loss. The margin of the positive energy imbalance which must be 
sustained daily to maintain an energy imbalance, and thus gain the average amount that 
Americans have from 1980 to 2010 is about 7 kcals/day. Remembering that 1 gram of 
carbohydrate or protein is 4 kcals, and 1 gram of fat is 9 kcals, the 7 kcals/day figure represents 
less than 2 grams of carbohydrate (or protein), or less than one gram of fat – bottom line, it’s 
small, equivalent to less than a half teaspoon of sugar per day difference. Note for example, that 
there are 65g = 240 kcals in a 20-oz. classic Coke. So the 7 kcals/day works out to less than an 
ounce of Coke a day.  
But Hall et al. explain this 7 kcals/day is just the energy “imbalance” gap. As the body 
adapts, more calories are needed to maintain the new tissue, so to maintain the gap, these calories 
must be added to the original “7.” Maintaining the “maintenance energy gap” required some 220 
extra kcals per day in 2005 over 1978 levels. Johnson et al. (2009) report an estimate by the 
USDA’s Economic Research Service that added sugars in the US diet rose almost 5 teaspoons 
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per day, or 76 calories, from 1970 to 2005, and another estimate that added sugars in the average 
American’s diet went from 235 kcal/day in 1977-78 to 318 kcal/day in 1994-95, a similar rise. 
The margin of the positive energy imbalance which must be sustained daily to lose the 
average amount that Americans have gained from 1980 to 2010 includes the energy imbalance 
and the energy maintenance gaps, again, foregoing the equivalent of 9 ½ teaspoons of added 
sugar a day, or about a 20-oz. classic Coke.  
…[M]uch larger changes are needed for obese individuals to return to the average bodyweight of the 1970s. 
[Because the actual amount varies by the internal dynamics of an individual’s BMI,] [f]or example, an adult 
with a BMI higher than 35…, representing 14% of the US population, needs a change greater than 2 MJ 
[megajoules] per day (500 kcal per day) (Hall et al. 2011, p. 833). 
 
Katan and Ludwig  concur: “Since the weight gain experienced by a typical American must be 
caused by repeated changes in diet, physical activity, or both, a small decrease in food intake or 
increase in physical activity will halt this increase only temporarily” (p 66). This suggests food 
environment or general behavioral changes will be required rather than isolated marginal 
consumption decisions (see McCrory, Suen, and Roberts in 6.7.1.c), and further supports the 
dynamic conception conveyed in equations (b) and (d) by the health-context-contingent nature of 
the effects from choosing a food habitually.  
Hall et al. propose a rule of thumb: every 100 kilojoules per day increase in energy intake 
(without compensatory energy expenditure) will lead to a 1-kilogram weight gain (or about 10 
kcals per day to about 1 pound weight gain), about half of this occurring in the first year, and 
95% of it within three years.  
Specifically, our computational model of macronutrient balance predicts that large isocaloric exchanges of 
dietary carbohydrate and fat result in changes of energy expenditure of less than 400 kJ [kilojoules] per 
day, which corresponds to a difference in body fat of roughly 10 g[rams] per day. To detect such a 
difference in body fat would require a sustained diet change of more than 100 days (p 831, Panel). 
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With this biologically responsible prediction of how weight may actually be gained and 
lost provided by the medical community, the lowly economist can begin to more easily imagine 
failures of rational choice from the individual failure to appreciate changes too subtle and 
asymmetric to be included in marginal daily food-choice assessments. In Figure 3, the degree to 
which one’s knowledge and nutrition criteria may diverge from realistic expectations of utility in 
rational choice calculation may be larger than neoclassicalists imagine. The k in equation (d) 
may appropriately be negative and larger than even a moderately nutritionally wary individual 
may have considered. Rational choice based on faulty information then seems more likely to fail 
to maximize realized utility. 
 
6.7.1.d    Sources of Excess Calories, and Food Environmental and Food Behavioral 
Changes Associated with Consuming Excess Calories  
 The question then arises whether elements of the food environment changed in ways that 
increased overall caloric intake, incremental ways that might not be noticed by a rational 
individual with utility-maximizing intent. There is evidence consistent with this explanation. 
 U.S. government dietary recommendations for portion sizes and quantities of defined 
food groups are designed to meet biological requirements such that hunger between meals should 
not arise. The Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010 caution: 
For most people, no more than about 5 to 15 percent of calories from solid [saturated] fats and added sugars 
can be reasonably accommodated in the USDA Food Patterns, which are designed to meet nutrient needs 
within calorie limits (Ch. 3, p.28). 
…Saturated fatty acids contribute an average of 11 percent of calories to the diet…(Ch. 3, p.25) 
…Added sugars contribute an average of 16 percent of the total calories in American diets (Ch. 3, p.27). 
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Belaboring the point: either the average American is rationally deciding to undermine her health, 
or she may be failing to maximize long-term utility out of ignorance, habit, and a passive 
response to the commercially-driven elements of her food environment.20
Making shelf-ready foods cheap and ubiquitous for on-the-go Americans is not 
necessarily consistent with maintaining nutrition content. Common food processing procedures – 
removing the bran and even the germ from whole grains (Anand et al. 2009; Hu 2010), leeching 
the minerals from cane sugar, cooking vegetables for canning – strip nutrients from final 
manufactured food products. Hydrogenating mono- and poly-unsaturated vegetable oils to make 
them solid at room temperature and more resistant to rancidity makes the fat profile trans-fatty-
acid rich. High transfat profiles in diets are associated with increased cardiovascular risk 
(Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010, p 25). As Americans turned to more and more 
processed foods, particularly after World War II, time-saving convenience was enhanced, and 
robust nutrient profiles from “new” processed forms of known foods degraded.  
 
Across a range of vitamins and minerals, dietary needs are complex. Even by the 1970s, 
nutrient deficiencies were a hazard for some (Popkin and Siega-Riz 1996) within a generally 
well-fed population (Swinburn et al. 2011, as noted above). Nutrient fortification of cereal grains 
that have been stripped of nutrients proved one solution – a solution indicating the degree of 
transition from whole foods to processed foods. In a then rare population-based study of the 
effects of nutrient fortification of cereal grains, Popkin and Siega-Riz (1996) offer: 
Results indicate a marked upwards shift in the intake distribution associated with consumption of fortified 
foods for all four nutrients [thiamin, niacin, riboflavin, and iron] regardless of income, education, or region 
of residence. This analysis provides strong support for the importance of food fortification as a source of 
                                                 
20 To the extent that “commercially-driven elements” are themselves demand led, and demand is fueled by 
exogenous preferences as assumed in neoclassical models (rather than influenced by advertising and addictive 
ingredients) there is an implicit irony in this characterization, one that is only overcome if the “ignorance and habits” 
weigh heavily enough in consumer behavioral choice to overwhelm underlying preference in purchase and 
consumption. 
412 
 
key nutrients in the U.S. diet during the 1970’s (sic) and also shows that these benefits cut across most 
sociodemographic barriers (p 20). 
 
These fortifications are found in “meal-based” foods, albeit including (occasionally heavily) 
sugared ready-to-eat breakfast cereals. Moving as we have from meals to more snacks and 
desserts would naturally imply fewer fruits and vegetables and less of the foods fortified to 
provide nutrients known to be deficient in cross-sections of the population. If Americans are 
eating far less fresh fruit, vegetables, and whole grains than U.S. Dietary guidelines suggest, and 
more calories are coming from snacking, then the calorie-to-valuable-nutrient ratio must rise, and 
might upset the diet-energy balance, adding body weight simultaneous with increasing nutrient 
deficiencies.21
 Buzby, Wells, and Vocke (2006) find that for Americans to meet the 2005 Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans, daily fruit consumption would have to rise 132%, demanding more 
than double the existing harvested fruit acreage (to 7.6 M acres from 3.5); legume consumption 
would have to rise 431%, and starchy vegetable (esp. potato) consumption would have to decline 
35%, demanding more than double the existing harvested vegetable acreage (to 15.3 M acres 
from 6.5, a 137% rise); whole grain consumption would have to rise 248%, while total grain 
consumption (including refined grains) would have to fall by 27%, for 5.6 M fewer acres in grain 
production per year. (The ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry began stressing “whole grains” 
in their cereals, with reformulations, around the time the 2005 Guidelines were released.) 
 Have all these factors occurred? Yes.  
 Using National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) and CSFII data 
generated in cross-sectional dietary recall studies spanning two- to five-year blocks from 1977 to 
                                                 
21 These deficiencies would result both from substituting whole and healthful foods for foods with more 
carbohydrates and fats purged of vitamin and mineral content, and from a move from fresh fruits and vegetables. 
One may certainly argue that calories are a critical dietary component, but the “valuable nutrients” here are from an 
economists’ perspective: the marginally less available ones than empty carbohydrate, fats, or fatty proteins. Valuable 
nutrients include: vitamins, minerals, enzymes, essential amino acids, and although not technically a nutrient in any 
of these ways, adequate and appropriate dietary fiber. 
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2006, Piernas and Popkin (2010) conclude that prevalence of snacking in U.S. adults increased 
from 71% to 97%, increasing in each period from the 1977-78 period. Incidents of daily 
snacking increased almost by one per day (0.97, P<0.01), and the contribution of snacked foods 
to total daily energy intake increased from 18 to 24% (P<0.01), as the energy density of snacks 
increased through all time periods studied. The largest increases in energy intake were for 
younger adults (19 to 39 years), indicating the likelihood of degrading dietary quality in the 
current generation. After high-fat desserts, SSBs were the main sources of adults’ snacking 
calories. Piernas and Popkin (2010b), using a similar database beginning from 1989, find that 
snack consumption among U.S. children has trended toward three per day per child, with more 
than 27% of children’s daily calories from snacking. High-fat desserts and sugar-sweetened 
beverages are the most energy prominent snacks, as for adults. 
The dietary shift from sit-down meals to snacks is reflected in higher sugar intake, where 
higher added sugars as a percentage of dietary calories is associated with inadequate intake of 
vitamins E, A, C, and magnesium (Marriott et al. 2010). Milk consumption has fallen off as 
meals have become less central to diet, and: 
…(P)ediatric crossectional (sic) and prospective studies across the globe have demonstrated significant 
negative association between dairy or milk intake and body mass index or body fat. …The pediatric 
literature on dairy provides no support to the notion that skim milk is more protective against excessive 
weight gain than whole milk and in fact raises the possibility that the very opposite may be the case (Slyper 
and Huang 2009, p 148). 
 
A decade ago, McCrory, Suen, and Roberts (2002)22
                                                 
22 Of the Energy Metabolism Laboratory at Tufts University, part of the Jean Mayer Department of Agriculture 
Human Nutrition Research Center on Aging at Tufts University, Boston, MA. 
 cited “epidemiological and 
experimental studies in animals and humans provid[ing] strong evidence that biobehavioral 
factors [specific eating behaviors]” influence hunger, satiety, and voluntary energy intake (p 
3830S). Biobehavioral factors associate with excess energy intake and increases in bodyweight 
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over time. The authors note that there was no change in self-reported physical activity over the 
nine years previous to the writing of their article. They list these biobehavioral influences as: 
dietary variety, liquid vs. solid food energy, portion sizes, palatability (taste), snacking patterns, 
foods away from home (including restaurant food), and dietary restraint and disinhibition (the 
tendency to overeat appealing foods). 
McCrory, Suen, and Roberts explain that variety of food is associated with overeating in 
animal and human laboratory experiments, and that the increase in variety of foods in U.S. 
markets tends to be in the nutrient-poor energy-dense categories.  
They site work demonstrating not only the greater-than-60-percent rise in soft-drink 
consumption from 1977 to 1998, but a pronounced difference in food compensation 
(consumption offset) at subsequent meals for energy/calories taken between meals. Solid-food 
snacks offset consumption at subsequent meals by 64%, semi-solid snacks  by 21%, while liquid 
snacks offset no subsequent eating (0%). Total energy intakes are significantly higher on any day 
that soda, alcohol, milk or juice are consumed, versus days when none of these are.  In a later 
Journal of the American Medical Association article, Schulze et al. (2004) confirm that SSB 
energy intake does not affect subsequent food and energy intake. Mourao et al. (2007) confirm 
that compared to solid forms of comparable nutrient value (high carbohydrate, high protein, or 
high fat) ingested by lean or obese young adults, consuming liquid food offsets later calorie 
intake less. Mourao et al. conclude that liquid calorie sources “pose a greater risk for promoting 
positive energy imbalance” (p 1688). 
From the late 1970s onward, package sizes of prepackaged foods began rising and 
portion sizes with them. Even a decade ago, McCrory, Suen, and Roberts find “Several studies 
show that portion sizes positively influence energy intake in single meals” (p 3831S). Nielsen 
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and Popkin (2003) confirm that portion sizes and energy intake significantly increased between 
1977 and 1998 for Americans older than 2 years, with the greatest increases from fast food 
restaurants and in the home. Of the “key food items” they list by energy, portion size, and 
location of consumption, soft drinks demonstrate the highest portion size increase over the period 
(13.1 oz. to 19.9 oz., after 1.0 to 1.6 oz. for salty snacks) and the largest portions in ounces 
(followed by fruit drinks at 15.1 oz., and Mexican food at 8 oz., 1994-1996 figures). Wansink, 
Just and Payne (2009) have since confirmed in labs at Cornell, that under conditions where the 
portion size changes during the meal by surreptitious replenishment, people eat more than they 
think they have. 
Taste/palatability ranks in surveys as the most important reason individuals give for why 
they choose certain foods (ranking higher than healthfulness), and taste is positively associated 
with energy intake. People’s taste for sweet foods and drinks can stimulate more eating. The 
glycemic index (GI) measures the rise in the level of sugar in the blood (blood glucose 
concentration) triggered by carbohydrate consumption. Glycemic load (GL) is GI divided by 100 
multiplied by the available carbohydrate content in grams, for the food being measured. So a 
food may have a high GI, but low GL, like watermelon. High GI foods can trigger more eating 
and thus more energy intake, independent of the calories in these foods, by initiating a biological 
sequence that ends in greater hunger (Ludwig 2002). For example: 
High GI meals have…been shown to accelerate the return of hunger and increase subsequent energy 
intake. Circulating free fatty acids (FFA) are also thought to be important in the control of food intake and 
are affected by GI. Plasma FFA were significantly lower 4 -5 h[ours] after high GI meals compared to that 
after low GI meals, and both glucose and FFA concentrations independently predicted within-subject 
differences in subsequent meal energy intake after test meals differing in GI (McCrory, Suen, and Roberts 
(2002, p. 3832S, emphasis added). 
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Roberts (2000) offers a table measuring GI from an index where bread=100 (white bread 
101, “wheat” bread 99), with GI scores for particular foods averaged across multiple studies. 
White rice is highest with 126, followed by baked potato and corn flakes, both around 120. 
Critical to the SSB question, pure sucrose (50% fructose, 50% glucose) earns a 92, and pure 
fructose a 32, but the fructose-sucrose sugar combination high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) that 
is the staple of SSBs in the U.S. earns soft drinks a 97, above either sugar alone.23
McCrory, Suen and Roberts conclude as Piernas and Popkin (2010 and 2010b) do, that 
Americans of all ages are snacking more, deriving more energy from snacks, and that snackers 
get more than 25% of daily energy from snack foods. 
 For reference 
apple sugar is fructose, as is most sugar in oranges. The GI for apple juice is 58, higher than the 
52 for an apple, and orange juice has a GI score of 74. 
Away-from-home food almost doubled as a portion of energy in the American diet 
between 1977-78 and 1995, from 18% to 34%. “U.S. national data also show that foods 
consumed away from home are less nutritious than foods consumed in the home, being higher in 
total fat and saturated fat, and lower in fiber and essential micronutrients.” Higher frequency of 
restaurant patronization is also associated with higher-fat, lower-fiber diets. High palatability of 
restaurant foods may also encourage overeating (McCrory, Suen, and Roberts (p 3832S).  
Dietary restraint – restricting what one consumes to maintain or lose weight – functions 
opposite of dietary disinhibition (defined above), but the two interact. Citing a study of 600 
postmenopausal women, McCrory, Suen, and Roberts report: “although dietary restraint itself 
did not predict weight gain, it modified the influence of disinhibition on weight gain, so that 
individuals who were highly restrained had less weight gain at each level of disinhibition” (p 
                                                 
23 HFCS-55, or 55% fructose, 41% glucose, 4% other sugars, is the HFCS used in soft drinks, whereas HFCS-42, or 
42% fructose, 53% glucose, and 5% other sugars, is the HFCS used in many processed foods and baked goods. 
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3832S). This reality is reflected in the last dashed boxes before the decision criteria box in Figure 
3, and in the individual- and time-specific k and a variables in equation (d). 
 
6.7.1.e    Health Effects of Added Sugars in the Diet, including versus Saturated Fat 
There is some evidence that Americans do respond to nutrition warnings from academia. 
To wit, to protect themselves from obesity and heart disease, Americans reduced saturated fats in 
their diets, from the early 1980s on. Remembering that liquids do not satiate hunger, the primary 
elements to fill the stomach are protein, fat, carbohydrate, and fiber. This implies a trade-off 
toward the other three groups if one is trying to keep fat content low – make that two, fiber has 
gone down, and as added sugars rise in the diet, fiber content falls (Marriott et al. 2010). How 
does the literature address the trade-offs made in avoiding fat (and the protein that usually 
accompanies it)? Harvard’s Fredrick John Stare Professor of Epidemiology and Nutrition Chair, 
Department of Nutrition, Walter Willett (1998): 
The percentage of dietary fat is widely believed to be an important determinant of body fat…. Comparisons 
of both diets and prevalence of obesity between affluent and poor countries have been used to support a 
causal association, but these contrasts are seriously confounded by differences in physical activity and food 
availability. Within areas of similar economic development, regional intake of fat and prevalence of obesity 
have not been positively correlated. …In short-term trials a modest reduction in body weight is typically 
seen in individuals randomly assigned to diets with a lower percentage of energy from fat. However 
compensatory mechanisms seem to operate because in trials lasting ≥1 y[ear], fat consumption within the 
range of 18-40% of energy appears to have little if any effect on body fatness. Moreover, within the United 
States, a substantial decline in the percentage of energy from fat consumed during the past two decades has 
corresponded with a massive increase in obesity. Diets high in fat do not appear to be the primary cause of 
the high prevalence of excess body fat in our society, and reductions in fat will not be a solution (p 556S, 
abstract, italics added). 
 
Willett (1999) also addresses the effects of dietary trade-offs from saturated fats: 
Patients prescribed a low-fat diet should be informed that such a diet is likely to increase serum 
triacylglycerol and reduce HDL-cholesterol concentrations, which are associated with a higher risk of 
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coronary heart disease. …[T]here is overwhelming evidence from prospective studies and randomized trials 
that replacement of saturated and trans fats with unsaturated fat in the diet will substantially reduce the risk 
of coronary artery disease, but that replacement of fat with carbohydrate in the diet will have little if any 
effect (p 108A, Willett’s citations omitted, his italics). 
 
Popkin, Zizza, and Siega-Riz (2003) cite trends in energy intake and USDA figures on food 
supply per capita, concluding that from 1965 to 1996 the consumption of fat remained constant 
while the consumption of sugars and sweeteners “increased dramatically.”  
Referring to a study (Jakobsen and Dethlefsen 2010) “notable for its large size, long 
duration and follow-up, and detailed assessment of dietary and lifestyle factors”24
It is the first epidemiologic study to specifically examine the effects of replacing saturated fats with either 
high- or low-quality carbohydrates, and it provides direct evidence that substituting high-GI-value 
carbohydrates for saturated fats actually increases IHD [ischemic heart disease] risk.  
 (p 1541), 
Frank Hu (2010) offers: 
…The obesity epidemic and growing intake of refined carbohydrates have created a “perfect storm” for the 
development of cardiometabolic disorders. 
…[R]refined carbohydrates are likely to cause even greater metabolic damage than saturated fat in a 
predominantly sedentary and overweight population (p 1541-1542). 
 
Refined carbohydrates, like the extremely refined carbohydrates in SSBs, represent a greater 
danger for obesity and heart disease to a population with American habits than when fats 
comprise up to 40% of total energy intake.  
 Particular to SSBs, “regular consumption of SSBs is associated with a higher risk of 
CHD [coronary heart disease] in women, even after other unhealthful lifestyle or dietary factors 
are accounted for” (Fung et al. 2009, p 1037). This study followed 88,520 women in the Nurses’ 
Health Study over 24 years, measuring risks of CHD while controlling for other factors for SSB 
                                                 
24 Jakobsen and Dethlefsen’s (2010) study was a prospective cohort study (strongest methodology) involving 53,644 
women and men heart-attack free at baseline time, with a median 12-year follow-up. “…[R]eplacing SFAs 
[saturated fatty acids] with carbohydrates with low-GI [glycemic index] values is associated with a lower risk of MI 
[myocardial infarction = heart attack], whereas replacing SFAs with carbohydrates with high-GI values is associated 
with a higher risk of MI” (p 1764). 
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intakes of less than once a month, 1-4 times per month, 2-6 times per week, once a day, and 
more than two servings per day. There was a significant rise in risk for each consumption level 
above 1-4 times per month, the highest risk being over one-third higher than the lowest – the 
results are quite robust. 
 Johnson and Yon (2010) note the risk for obesity, diabetes, and dental caries, but also 
summarize literature outlining the sugar-coronary disease link. “Relative to other carbohydrate 
sources” sugar intake is associated with increased triglyceride levels and lower HDL cholesterol 
levels (dyslipidemia and/or hyperlipidemia). From the Framingham Heart Study, consuming “one 
or more soft drinks per day significantly increased the odds of developing high blood pressure” (p 
1297). Johnson and Yon also refer to lower intake of needed micronutrients with even moderate 
proportions of added sugars in the diet. Marriott et al. (2010) expand on this, noting that levels of 
vitamins E, A, C, and magnesium tended to fall further below adequate levels with each 5% 
increase in added sugars more than 5-10% of dietary energy. Over 80% of the U.S. population is 
“at risk for select nutrient inadequacy” and thirteen percent have added sugar intakes greater than 
25% of energy intake. According to Marriott et al. (2010) the Institute of Medicine formed a 
committee on macronutrients, whose report recommended 25% or less of energy intake from 
added sugar, much higher than the WHO’s 2003 recommendation of 10% or less (Johnson et al. 
2009).25
 
 Marriott et al. recommend that the Institute of Medicine revisit their 25%-or-less 
recommendation, to lower it. Johnson et al. also note evidence for inflammation and oxidative 
stress rising with more added sugars in the diet, and evidence that iron, calcium, and zinc may 
also be deficient in higher-added-sugar diets. 
                                                 
25 Johnson et al. refer to: World Health Organization. Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases: 
Report of a Joint WHO/FAO Expert Consultation. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 2003. 
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6.7.1.f    SSBs and sCSDs as Primary Added Sugars in a Changing Food Environment 
SSBs and particularly sCSDs are the largest component in the average American’s added 
sugar profile. Sugar-sweetened beverages (sCSDs, energy drinks, sports drinks, and fruit drinks) 
comprise 46% of all added sugars in the American diet. For reference grain-based desserts are 
13%, candy 6%, and ready-to-eat breakfast cereals 4% (Johnson and Yon 2010). By the early 
2000s, SSBs contributed 8-9% of total energy intake for both children and adults (Nielsen and 
Popkin 2004). 
Of SSBs, sCSDs are the main source of added sugars “for all age/gender groups” on a 
gram-equivalent intake basis, beginning in adolescence, and peaking in adulthood, with some 
taper after age 50 (Marriott et al.). The gross predominance of SSBs and particularly sCSDs in 
American added sugar consumption that these authors report exactly mirrors percentages 
reported by Krebs-Smith in 2001. The particular role that SSBs and sCSDs play in American 
overconsumption of added sugars has been growing, and is now well-entrenched. 
Table 23 reduces dietary added sugar sources to equivalents of grams of table sugar. In 
the top half of the table, rows designate groups of people for whom added sugar is within a 
percent range of total daily energy intake. By looking at total added sugar consumed and of this 
the added-sugar grams of sugars, sweets, or beverages, and of this the added-sugar grams of 
sCSDs, an interesting pattern emerges. The last two columns assist in seeing this pattern. As 
added sugars from all sources increase as a percentage of total energy intake for a person, the 
portion comprised by sCSDs strictly rises. As a percent of all sweets, and beverages, there are 
plateaus below 10% of diet and above 30% of diet, but otherwise, the portion comprised of 
sCSDs again strictly rises.  If sugar is toxic as Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis claim, then sCSDs 
are on average the primary poison of choice for those most toxifying their diets with sugar. 
421 
 
The bottom half of Table 23 breaks down by sex of the individual within age groups 
above 8 the same ratios of sCSD sugars to overall added sugar intake and sCSD sugars to all 
sweets and beverages. Male intake is higher in every age group than female intake, and the sCSD 
portion of overall added-sugar intake is above half for every male group from 14 to 50, and is 
half for 50 and older. Females in age groups 14 to 30 reach the half mark. Sweetened CSDs are 
the #1 added sugar source in U.S. diets for all Americans older than 4 years, beating all other 
contenders by a very wide margin. Full tables from Marriott et al. and Krebs-Smith make this 
point more clearly. 
Nielsen and Popkin (2004) find that energy intake from SSB consumption rose 135% 
from 1977 to 2001 (CSFII and NHANES), for a 278-calorie-per-day net increase in beverage 
calories, after the 35% energy intake drop from reduced milk consumption. Portion sizes 
increased and number of servings, so that the proportion of people in all age groups consuming 
SSBs increased. Popkin (2010) points out that SSB intake more than doubled from roughly 1960 
to 2010. Wolf, Bray and Popkin (2007) also point out that the reason that human beings do not 
cut back on overall food/energy intake when drinking carbohydrate-rich beverages is “we lack 
the genetic information for a physiological response for responding to these beverage calories 
with complete satiation because we evolved with water as our major source of hydration” (p 
162). They also claim that the fall in peak gallons per capita of sCSDs after 1997 from 39 gallons 
per capita per year “may be an artifact of beverage classification” (p 152). The increasing market 
share of energy and sports drinks continue this trend (NPLAN 2011; Harris et al. 2011). 
Malik, Schulze, and Hu (2004) assess the likely mechanism for SSBs leading to weight 
gain to be the low satiety of liquid carbohydrates, and the failure to compensate for the liquid 
energy intake by eating less at subsequent meals. Olsen and Heitmann (2009) do a literature 
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review, also concluding that liquid versus solid sugars fail to satiate hunger and in fact stimulate 
it, locking the consumer into the medical effect just described –SSB consumption leads to more 
calories entering the body, and simultaneously more hunger.  
Vectors of overweight and obesity that the consumer is not aware of are not hard to 
imagine from that point. Metabolic effects particular to liquid sugars, and particularly high-
fructose corn syrup (HFCS), are also explored below, along with literature explaining how the 
ingestion or regular ingestion of these sugars may affect not only the body but decision making, 
including the decision to drink SSBs.26
Olsen and Heitmann note that the simple increase in energy intake from SSBs may not be 
an adequate reason for the weight gain associated with heavy SSB consumption. They find that 
the most rigorous studies (prospective studies with five or more years of follow up) show more 
consistent results linking SSBs to obesity than studies with shorter follow ups, addressing a 
concern raised by Wolff and Dansinger (2008) that results from larger and longer intervention 
trials were needed to cement the SSB-weight-gain link. 
 
 Bleich et al. (2009) do not agree directly with Olsen and Heitmann, claiming that 
NHANES data comparisons with BMI information from the 1988-1994 period to the 1999-2004 
period and large epidemiological studies indicate a strong independent effect of SSBs on weight 
gain and diabetes. Bleich et al. document a rise in the percentage of adult SSB drinkers (58 to 
63%), and a 46 kcal/day increase per adult, about 6 ounces per adult. They note that sCSDs 
represent around 60% of all SSB consumption, and that the largest share of SSB calories are 
consumed in the home. The highest rates of SSB consumption associate by sociodemographic 
                                                 
26 Bray, Nielsen, and Popkin (2004) point out that glucose enters cells by a transport system that depends on insulin 
in most tissues, whereas fructose does not. Glucose provides satiety signals in the brain that fructose cannot, because 
fructose is not transported to the brain.  
423 
 
characteristics with populations at the highest risk for obesity. Younger adults (20 to 44 years), 
African Americans, and Mexican Americans had notably high consumption rates. 
After reviewing 15 cross-sectional, 10 prospective, and 5 experimental studies, Malik, 
Schulze, and Hu (2004) also conclude that “greater consumption of SSBs is associated with 
weight gain and obesity” (p 274). In a meta-analysis of 88 studies relating soft-drink consumption 
to health outcomes, Vartanian, Schwarz, and Brownell (2007) go even further, reaching the same 
conclusions about energy intake, failure to compensate for liquid calories, and obesity, among 
others. They find clear associations with increased energy intake and body weight, lower intakes 
of milk, calcium, and other nutrients, and increased risk of severe medical problems, including 
diabetes. Most significantly: “larger effect sizes were observed in studies with stronger methods 
(longitudinal and experimental versus cross-sectional studies)”27
                                                 
27 For a description of the strength of methods, see footnote 7 in Chapter 1 above, with a quote from Malik et al. 
(2010). 
 (p 667). They further found 
“significantly larger effect sizes among (1) women, (2) adults, (3) studies focusing on sugar-
sweetened soft drinks, and (4) studies not funded by the food industry” (p 670). For example, in 
Schulze et al.’s 2004 prospective study of 91,249 women followed for 8 years, those who 
consumed one or more servings of soft drink per day had double the rate of developing diabetes 
over the course of the study (an effect only slightly mitigated when controlling for potential 
confounding factors including BMI and energy intake), and the effect disappeared when diet soft 
drinks replaced the sugared soft drinks. Similarly, after controlling for potentially confounding 
factors, women who increased SSB consumption by one or more servings of soft drink per week 
to one or more per day had the largest weight gain over 4 years, with the least weight gain among 
women who had decreased their intake. 
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In another literature review, Malik et al. (2010) find that not just added sugars, but SSBs 
are associated with long-term weight gain, adult-onset diabetes, and cardiovascular disease. They 
note that the high glycemic load and HFCS in soft drinks may increase diabetes and heart disease 
independently of the increased risk of obesity, due to the HFCS impact on inflammation, insulin 
resistance, and impaired function of the pancreatic cells that generate insulin. A direct link 
between fructose and increased risk of high blood pressure, visceral adiposity (belly fat), 
dyslipidemia (bad cholesterol and triglycerides), may all arise from increased fat creation in the 
liver from fructose consumption. They also find that “greater SSB consumption in childhood and 
adolescence predicted weight gain into adulthood” (p 1357). 
There may be more to this effect. Price (1970) argues that per capita estimations of food 
consumption in the population ignore that sex and age can restrict relative eating capacity. Price 
proceeds to argue for “unit scale equivalent” measures of food commodities that adjust for sex 
and age. Because SSBs do not satisfy – and in fact stimulate – hunger, a smaller person (child or 
woman) can consume the same amount of SSB that an adult male can much easier than an 
averaged-weight child or woman could eat the same weight in steak, popcorn, or pie. So SSBs 
are uniquely poised to bypass rudimentary biological limiting factors to consumption for younger 
consumers. 
As may be inferred from the literature review results, numerous studies confirm dose-
response and reversal effects, leaving little doubt as to the robustness of health effects from 
regular SSB/sCSD consumption by a person of any age, either sex. Going back to 1990 Tordoff 
and Alleva found significant increase in calorie intake and body weight across both sexes in a 
three week controlled trial adding HFCS versus aspartame-sweetened soft drinks to normal-
weight subjects. They also note that the literature (even then) had established that humans report 
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increased hunger after drinking certain sweet solutions and certain sweetened semi-solids, 
“suggest[ing] that sweet oral stimulation initiates a cephalic-phase metabolic reflex that increases 
appetite” (p 963). In 2001 from a 19-month prospective study of 548 ethnically diverse 
schoolchildren, Ludwig, Peterson, and Gortmaker reported that “[f]or each additional serving of 
sugar-sweetened drink consumed, both body mass index…and frequency of obesity…increased 
after adjustment for anthropometric, demographic, dietary, and lifestyle variables” (p 505). 
Higher SSB consumption at baseline was also independently associated with higher BMIs. In 
2006, Ebbeling et al. decreased SSB consumption by an average 82% in a randomized control 
trial on adolescents who regularly consumed SSBs. They found that BMI fell significantly versus 
the control (who had no SSB consumption change) for the upper baseline-BMI tertile over 25 
weeks, but not significantly for the lowest BMI group. In 2009, Chen et al. published results 
from a prospective study of 810 adults, measuring height, weight, and dietary recall at baseline, 6 
months, and 18 months, in a randomized, controlled, behavioral intervention. They found that 
reduction of liquid calorie intake had a stronger effect on weight loss than did reduction in solid 
calorie intake, and that a reduction of SSB intake of 1 serving per day was associated with a 
weight loss of 0.49 kg at 6 months, and 0.65 kg at 18 months (both results significant at the 1% 
level). 
 
6.7.2    Added Sugars, Health, and Disease – Medical Mechanisms 
The detrimental effects of sugars on the diet have been known to nutritionists for some 
time, but the knowledge seems not to have been absorbed by the general populace (potentially 
creating breakdowns of rational utility maximization in dietary choice posited in sections 6.5 and 
6.6 above). In 1985, Sheldon Reiser of the Carbohydrate Nutrition Laboratory of the Agricultural 
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Research Service at the USDA reviewed literature depicting sugars, versus starches, as strongly 
associated with risk factors for heart disease. Reiser concludes: 
1) Regardless of the experimental conditions used, the feeding of sucrose or fructose as compared to starch, 
either produced undesirable effects on metabolic parameters associated with heart disease or had no 
effect…. 
2) In the context of the diet consumed in industrialized societies (e.g., high saturated fat, cholesterol; low in 
fiber and copper), dietary sucrose or fructose can act synergistically with other dietary components and thus 
contribute to the many environmental factors producing the high level of heart disease in these societies (p 
210-211). 
 
Metabolic risk factors include elevated fasting blood triglycerides, higher LDL cholesterol and 
very-low-density lipoprotein levels, lower HDL levels, and elevated blood levels of insulin and 
uric acid. Rat and human livers convert 2.6 – 8.6 times more fructose than glucose to fatty acids 
under similar experimental conditions, indicating these species have the same de novo hepatic 
lipogenesis reactions to fructose carbohydrates (this is important when considering Bocarsly et 
al. 2010, below). Cutting sugar in the diet lowered fasting triglycerides, and more so for subjects 
with the highest initial blood triglyceride levels. The presence of saturated fats aggravates 
sucrose-induced increases in blood triglycerides. With 30% of calories from sucrose in the diets 
of either group, those who gorged showed higher triglycerides in the blood, while those who 
nibbled did not. When a lot of calories and sugar calories enter the body quickly, this triggers 
high blood triglycerides, associated with heart disease. Individuals fed excess sugar for one 
week, either sucrose or fructose, showed decreased insulin sensitivity and reduction in the ability 
of insulin to bind to monocytes. Uric acid levels in the blood can predict the risk of ischemic 
heart disease, and these levels rise when fructose is added to a sucrose load in the diet (as would 
occur if SSBs were consumed with a candy or pastry). 
Insulin desensitization and failure of insulin to be absorbed properly at the molecular 
level lead to overwork by the pancreas, which may eventually fail, producing adult-onset 
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diabetes. In a 2002 JAMA article, Ludwig reviews dozens of clinical trials validating the 
glycemic index as a valid mechanism for associating carbohydrate loads with obesity, diabetes, 
and cardiovascular disease. Ludwig quotes a medical author from 75 years earlier, who 
conjectured even then that eating too much sugar exhausted the pancreas, causing diabetes, and 
that the hunger that arises when the blood-sugar level suddenly drops after spiking upward in a 
high-carbohydrate ingestion cycle may be a driver of obesity, independent of an associated 
diabetic condition. Roberts (2000) notes that “insulin sensitivity is well known to be influenced 
by exercise, with highly active individuals typically being more insulin sensitive than sedentary 
ones” (p 6). 
Ludwig explains the precise biological mechanisms by which high glycemic index meals 
cause acute metabolic events. The brain needs a consistent flow of glucose. “Glucose enables 
cerebral functioning by providing the fuel for neurons to fire impulses” (Gailliot and Baumeister 
2007, p 306). But too-low levels can trigger coma, seizure, or death, and too-high levels have 
immediate and long-term negative health impacts. The body therefore tries to regulate blood 
sugar levels. High blood sugar, or hyperglycemia stimulates the hormone insulin to promote 
uptake of glucose by muscle and adipose (fat) tissues, telling the tissues to use sugar rather than 
free fatty acids as fuel (free fatty acids being “the other major metabolic fuel”), leading to higher 
free fatty acids in the blood, a marker for cardiovascular disease. Low blood sugar 
(hypoglycemia), which can result from the body’s attempt to return to homeostasis after a 
hyperglycemic surge triggers counterregulatory hormones (glucagon, epinephrine, cortisol, 
growth hormone) that antagonize insulin. High insulin and low glucagon levels persist after the 2 
to 4 hours it can take to digest refined carbohydrates, pushing blood sugar low and triggering a 
hunger hormonally similar to “a state of fasting normally reached only after many hours without 
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food” (p 2417). Postprandial hypoglycemia (low blood sugar a few hours after eating a high GI 
meal) “is so common as to be considered normal” despite the complexity and severity of the 
hormone response (p 2417). Low-GI foods are less likely to trigger postprandial hypoglycemia 
because they do not illicit a counterregulatory hormone response as high-GI foods do (Roberts 
2000). “High insulin in the blood: is believed to mediate, in part, the increased risk for heart 
disease associated with the insulin resistance syndrome…through independent effects on blood 
pressure, serum lipids, coagulation factors, inflammatory mediators, and endothelial function” 
[this last concerns the lining of the blood vessels; Ludwig, p 2420]. 
Ludwig goes on to emphasize that the high-insulin, low-sugar state “may preferentially 
stimulate consumption of high-glycemic foods, leading to cycles of hypoglycemia and 
hyperphagia [overeating]” (p 2417). Simply put, people falling from a sugar high may 
specifically experience a desire for more refined carbohydrates, rather than more nutritious, 
filling food, like protein, fat, and fiber. Dieters trying to restrict overall calories who eat high-
glycemic index foods may exacerbate this phenomenon. In a clinical trial, obese children were 
given either steel cut oats or high-GI instant oatmeal for breakfast, and subsequent energy intake 
through the afternoon was 53% higher for subjects having eaten the high-GI versus low-GI 
breakfast. 
High-GI meals stimulate more insulin secretion calorie-for-calorie than low-GI meals due 
to postprandial hyperglycemia. Regular hyperglycemia may cause insulin resistance, notes 
Ludwig, “[e]ven a modest elevation in blood glucose concentration…may produce insulin 
resistance in humans. Insulin resistance, in turn, generally leads to compensatory 
hyperinsulemia” (p 2418). High levels of insulin and glucose may circulate in the blood 
simultaneously in insulin resistant people. Pancreatic cells that produce insulin come under long-
429 
 
term stress, which may trigger adult-onset diabetes. “Postprandial hyperglycemia has…[also] 
been recognized as an important risk factor for [cardiovascular disease]…among persons with 
diabetes…[and] the general population.…[by producing oxidative stress]” (p 2419). This 
oxidative stress from a blood-sugar spike after high-GI consumption manifests in lipids, proteins, 
lipoproteins, and DNA, and also “activates inflammation,” and lowers antioxidant 
concentrations. These are all changes that likely increase blood pressure and blood clot 
formation.28
Ludwig defends the science on high- versus low-GI diets, recommending diets high in 
fiber, micronutrients, and antioxidants, and low in energy density. SSBs, and particularly sCSDs, 
approximate the polar opposite of this recommendation about as completely as a food can. 
 Administration of antioxidants can prevent or reverse these effects.  
 
6.7.2.a    SSB Sugars, Fructose as HFCS: Unique Medical Mechanisms and Health Effects? 
U.S. sugar tariffs and quotas and subsidies to corn growers make HFCS an economical 
ingredient for food manufacturers. In 1984 the two sCSD-industry majors, Coca-Cola and Pepsi, 
switched from using sugar (sucrose) to HFCS in the U.S., while they continue to use sugar in 
sCSD manufacture in other countries. HFCS is marginally sweeter per unit equivalent than 
sucrose (by about 20%, Bocarsly et al. 2010), easy to blend and transport as a liquid, and in low- 
                                                 
28 Numerous animal studies indicate that high-sugar diets promote oxidative stress, and reduce anti-oxidant effect. 
Chaudhary, Boparai, and Bansal (2007) look at high-sucrose, low magnesium diets in rats, and find causation of 
oxidative stress. Kizhner, Shilovizki, and Werman (2007) find that long-term fructose (the primary sugar component 
in HFCS, and “a potent agent in the glycoxidation process”) reduces oxidative defense (through the Maillard 
reaction, see in this note below) and alters mitochondrial performance in mice, indicating accelerated aging. Levi 
and Werman (1998) found long before in rat studies that long-term fructose consumption accelerates glycation 
(bonding of a protein or lipid molecule to a sugar molecule) and “several age-related variables” in male rats. The 
biological mechanisms for sugar absorption at the cellular level are extremely similar in rats, mice, and humans. 
Archer (2003) explains that sugar metabolism and the (in vivo) Maillard reaction – an interaction of an amino acid 
and a sugar molecule that inside the body represents one step in the formation of advanced glycation endproducts 
(AGEs) that contribute to a range of human diseases – result in cross-linked proteins whose loss of elasticity is a 
contributor to cardiovascular disease, and potential degeneration of the heart, kidneys, and brain. Archer explains 
that studies on rodents, dogs, and primates apply equally to humans “as their glucose metabolism is similar” (p 925). 
This is relevant to Bocarsly et al. (2010) referenced later. 
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and intermediate-moisture foods serves as a humectant (HFCS is hygroscopic, drawing water 
from the atmosphere), keeping foods moist and improving shelf life, as well as providing 
cohesiveness for chewiness in gums, cereal bars, and candies. Fructose, and by implication 
HFCS, is better at chemical reactive “browning” of proteins when they are mixed with sugars 
and heat (the Maillard reaction) than sucrose, making HFCS attractive for baked goods. 
Americans on average now consume nearly as many pounds per year of HFCS as sucrose. 
In a peer-reviewed study supported by PepsiCo North America, Melanson et al. (2008)  
review studies linking HFCS to weight gain from the hypotheses that HFCS fails to trigger an 
adequate insulin response to a sugar load, which in turn fails to stimulate the appetite-
suppressing (brain receptive) hormone leptin and also fails to suppress the appetite-stimulating 
hormone ghrelin, which could according to Malik et al. (2010) “initiat[e] the hunger cascade in 
the central nervous system”29
                                                 
29 Leptin production is regulated by insulin responses, lower insulin implies lower leptin, Elliott et al. 2002. Leptin 
is produced by adipose tissue, ghrelin by gastroenteric tissue. Bocarsly et al. (2010) provide a useful condensed 
description of the biological mechanisms by which fructose versus sucrose produces unhealthy fats and fat in the 
sense of weight gain (see original for embedded citations omitted for brevity here): 
 (p 1360). Melanson et al. argue that these studies fail to make an 
adequate case, but it appears that they themselves are fighting the uphill battle. The stakes in this 
argument are not low. If fructose/HFCS critics are correct, then a policy-created economic 
advantage for HFCS may have enabled the food processing industry to cheaply employ a device 
that is sweet, preservative, and more stimulating of further hunger than previously common 
forms of refined carbohydrates – a win-win-win situation for large food processors whose 
offsetting lose-lose-lose might include more obese, diabetic Americans with higher blood 
pressure and higher cancer rates. 
HFCS is different than sucrose in many ways. …[F]ructose is absorbed further down the intestine than glucose, with much 
of the metabolism occurring in the liver, where it is converted to…a precursor to the backbone of the triglyceride 
molecule. …[F]ructose is metabolically broken down before it reaches the rate-limiting enzyme…, thereby supplying the 
body with an unregulated source of three-carbon molecules. These molecules are transformed into glycerol and fatty acids, 
which are eventually taken up by adipose tissue, leading to additional adiposity. …HFCS causes aberrant insulin 
functioning, in that it bypasses the insulin-driven satiety system. Whereas circulating glucose increases insulin release 
from the pancreas, fructose does this less efficiently, because cells in the pancreas lack the fructose transporter (p 105). 
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As the literature progresses, doubts that Melanson et al. raise in fact seem less well 
founded. In a 2002 review, Elliott et al. cite studies and biological mechanisms demonstrating 
that while fructose does not stimulate and insulin response (due to its digestion in the liver rather 
than in the stomach, which is one reason that triglycerides rise rapidly with fructose digestion), 
long-term fructose consumption is directly associated with insulin resistance, a trigger for 
diabetes, and obesity, due in part to compensatory hyperinsulemia – the body’s “emergency” 
regulatory hormone response to a state of low insulin in conjunction with high blood sugar. 
Elliott et al. find health effects of fructose consumption – insulin resistance, impaired glucose 
tolerance, hyperinsulemia, hypertriacylglycerolemia (high blood triglyceride levels, a heart 
disease marker), and hypertension – to be clearer for animal studies than for human studies. But 
that was 2002. By 2004, Elliott is second author on Teff et al. showing that normal weight 
women fed dietary fructose with meals had reduced circulating insulin and leptin, less 
suppression of ghrelin, and increased blood triglycerides (all effects at 1% levels of 
significance). Also in 2004, Bray, Nielsen, and Popkin examine the same biological triggers 
specific to HFCS using USDA-reported food consumption patterns, and conclude that HFCS-
sweetened beverages are directly linked to the US obesity epidemic. 
By 2008, the human trials that Elliott et al. called for, and Melanson et al. claimed were 
to date ambiguous, began to find station in the literature. Stanhope et al. (2008) find from 24-
hour endocrine and metabolic profiles for 34 men and women fed isocaloric meals with sucrose- 
or HFCS sweetened beverages, that the insulin, leptin, and ghrelin responses were similar, 
although the triglyceride profiles after HFCS were as high as for pure fructose. They conclude 
that short-term effects are similar, but for the triglyceride exception. In 2009, Stanhope and a 
longer list of co-authors published results of a study of similar size comparing glucose- versus 
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fructose-sweetened beverages as 25% of overweight and obese men and women’s diets for 10 
weeks. Fructose but not glucose consumption significantly increased triglycerides, bad 
cholesterol, and plasma glucose and insulin levels, while decreasing insulin sensitivity (for 
women more than men). While weight gain was similar for both groups, the fructose group 
gained more weight in the belly (visceral adiposity; in men more than women). These effects 
specifically associate Syndrome X (metabolic syndrome) markers with fructose and not glucose 
consumption. “Metabolic syndrome is a name for a group of risk factors that occur together and 
increase the risk for coronary artery disease, stroke, and type 2 diabetes.”30
In 2010, Bray conducts a meta-analysis of the relationship between soft-drink 
consumption and the risk of overweight, diabetes, and cardiometabolic disease. He finds a 24% 
higher cardiometabolic risk for the top versus the bottom quintiles of soft-drink consumption, 
and that versus glucose consumption, fructose consumption induces higher triglycerides, higher 
fat creation, higher blood pressure, more inflammation, and less release of insulin and leptin. He 
concludes that “fructose is hazardous to the cardiometabolic health of many children, 
adolescents, and adults” (p 55), and looks to coming literature to determine whether there is a 
“threshold effect” for fructose-related health impacts. 
 
Stanhope and other authors return in 2011 with a study testing diets including the U.S. 
“Dietary Guidelines for Americans, 2010” recommendation of added sugar intake at a maximum 
of 25% of total energy. They tested glucose, fructose, and HFCS at 25% energy in controlled 
(energy-balanced) diets over two weeks on 48 young adults with a range of BMIs under 36, one-
third in each added sweetener group. 24-hour triglycerides, fasting LDL, and other markers were 
measured. HFCS “increased risk factors for cardiovascular disease comparably with fructose and 
                                                 
30  From the U.S. National Library of Medicine, A.D.A.M. Medical encyclopedia (online):  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0004546/, accessed March 17, 2012. 
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more than glucose in young adults” (p E1596). This prospective study strongly suggests that the 
negative effects clinically proved for fructose consumption extend to a significant degree to 
HFCS, and that markers for cardiovascular disease rise in young adults in less than two weeks on 
a diet that conforms with the maximum limit for added sugars defined by the U.S. government. 
As 13% of Americans already consume at or above this added sugar “maximum recommended 
level,” Stanhope et al. conclude that the maximum “may need to be reevaluated” (p E1604). The 
concerns of PepsiCo-funded Melanson et al. have been effectively refuted by prospective studies 
on humans. 
The animal-based literature has now established that with access to equal sweetness 
solutions of either HFCS or sucrose in addition to all the food and water they desired, rats over a 
long period (6 or 7 months) gained more weight, especially in the abdominal region, and had 
higher circulating triglyceride levels on HFCS solution versus sucrose solution, despite having 
equal total energy intake (Bocarsly et al. 2010). Of those subjects with 24-hour access to HFCS 
solution, males gained more weight, and at a faster pace, than did females. In contrast, additional 
sucrose did not lead to obesity, despite the fact that fewer calories were consumed directly from 
the HFCS than the sucrose, which also may indicate that HFCS stimulates hunger more than 
sucrose. In their discussion, Bocarsly et al. note: 
Abdominal obesity in humans is considered the most dangerous form of fat accrual, leading to impaired 
health and diminished longevity.  … 
Storage of excess body fat subsequently can lead to chronic changes in leptin, insulin and corticosterone. In 
obese animals, leptin and insulin insensitivity can ensue, with the loss of hormonal satiety signals.  … 
[I]n the presence of obesity, elevated TG [triglyceride] levels are commonly associated with a clustering of 
metabolic risk factors known as the metabolic syndrome [or Syndrome X]. … 
[B]y chronically elevating serum TG levels, HFCS may create a propensity towards fat intake and fat 
deposition (p 4, emphasis added). 
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Having established earlier here that the biological mechanisms for sugar absorption and 
conversion are extremely similar in rats and humans (Reiser 1985; Archer 2003), these results 
seriously implicate HFCS, versus chemically similar sucrose, in the obesity, metabolic 
syndrome, and cardiovascular disease epidemics. This may help explain why obesity rates rose 
for the 20 years to the year 2000 despite lower dietary fat profiles, as Americans followed dietary 
advice to reduce dietary fat (Roberts 2000). 
In 2012, Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis note that sugar has not only been proved (in 
humans) to dampen suppression of the hunger-signaling hormone ghrelin, but to interfere with 
the satiation-signaling hormone leptin, as well as reducing dopamine signaling, which decreases 
the pleasure from eating, compelling an individual to eat more to achieve former dopamine 
levels associated with eating.31
 
 Eating a lot of sugar not only signals the brain to eat more sugar, 
but conditions it to do so, a habit-forming drive that occurs on a subconscious, chemical level. 
6.7.2.b    Medical/Nutrition Literature Clear About the Health Effects of Added Sugars 
Sweetened beverages are a multi-billion-dollar industry. The medical/nutrition science 
must be sound if there are to be policy recommendations claiming that they are associated with 
poor health outcomes, and designed to curtail their consumption. The sweetened beverage 
industry will defend itself from poorly conducted studies and unwarranted attacks, as any 
industry must. While Malik et al. (2006) and Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell (2007) seem to 
be the benchmark reviews of clinical trials examining the weight and other health effects of 
SSBs, or HFCS, there are other reviews defending HFCS and questioning the SSB-weight-gain 
                                                 
31 A hormone-disruptive process not wholly unlike effects leading to higher amounts of cocaine and heroin use by 
abusers of these drugs. Cocaine suppresses dopamine reuptake, and heroin modifies the chemical action of 
dopamine in the brain reward centers. All three refined substances interfere with the “normal” brain reward-center 
chemistry that prevails before these refined substances are introduced into the body in sufficient quantities. 
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link. In an American Journal of Clinical Nutrition editorial, Anderson (2007), claims that the 
ratio of fructose to glucose in the American diet did not change in the 40 years since HFCS 
replaced sucrose, that there is no evidence that sucrose used in place of HFCS would be less 
harmful, and that there is no causal role documented for HFCS beverages in obesity. If these 
contentions were marginally plausible when Anderson published this, they have been overturned 
by evidence from prospective and clinical intervention trials now. Anderson consults for the 
Canadian Sugar Institute, and Archer Daniels Midland, a primary U.S. manufacturer of HFCS. 
Melanson et al. 2008, also in the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, from which 
many of the above-cited articles were taken, conduct a review questioning the implication that 
HFCS is associated with weight gain (ignoring the cardiovascular disease connection entirely), 
and conclude that “HFCS is more similar to sucrose than it is to fructose in terms of its content 
[true], appetitive responses [highly unlikely given (later) results presented in 6.7.2.a here], and 
aspects of its metabolism…” (p 1741S-1742S). Melanson et al.’s review was supported by 
PepsiCo North America. 
Gibson (2008) reviews the SSB-obesity connection in observational and intervention 
studies, including Malik et al. (2006), and Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell (2007), and finds a 
very small effect, and inconclusive evidence, based on “inconsistencies of definition, design, 
statistical treatment and interpretation” (p 144) which naturally arise when teams of researchers 
attack similar but varying questions in different ways. Her review was commissioned by the 
Union of European Beverages Associations. Gibson acknowledges that cross-sectional studies 
are the weakest design, followed by longitudinal, with intervention trials the strongest (see Malik 
et al. 2010, from the seventh footnote in 1.2). 
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Despite Melanson et al.’s 96 citations, and Gibson’s 62 citations (“up to July 2008”), they 
both seem to have overlooked Lesser et al.’s January 2007 work. Lesser et al. identified reviews, 
observational studies, and intervention studies from January 1999 to end-December 2003 
concerning soft drinks, juice, and milk, for a total of 206 articles, from which 111 declared 
financial sponsorship: 
22% had industry funding, 47% had no industry funding, and 325 had mixed funding. Funding source was 
significantly related to conclusions when considering all article types (p = 0.037). For intervention studies, 
the proportion with unfavorable conclusions was 0% for all industry funding, versus 37% for no industry 
funding (p = 0.009). The odds ratio of a favorable versus unfavorable conclusion was 7.61…,comparing 
articles with all industry funding to no industry funding (p 41). 
…Articles sponsored exclusively by food/drinks companies were four to eight times more likely to have 
conclusions favorable to the financial interests of the sponsoring company than articles which were not 
sponsored by food or drink companies (p46). 
 
Of course Lesser et al.’s work could not include Anderson’s, Melanson et al.’s, or Gibson’s 
work, so the responsible reader must either infer a continuing pattern, or speculate on these latter 
authors’ dominant incentives. 
However, when SSB/sCSD/sugar/HFCS-industry-defensive arguments find any purchase 
in the medical/nutrition literature, they may be used to publicly defend the existence of an 
uncertainty in the literature. This could be viewed as the specific and conscious manipulation of 
the uncertainty consumers already feel, and excuse the internal tendency to distrust the available 
science when it conflicts with a current food desire (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2000; 
Fulponi, OECD 2009, Jonas et al. 2001). 
Research shows that consumers are often overwhelmed and frustrated by the numerous and diverse messages 
about diet and health that are issued to the public. A 1996 USDA study found 40 percent of meal 
planners/preparers strongly agreed with the statement “There are so many recommendations about healthy 
ways to eat, it’s hard to know what to believe.” A 1995 American Dietetic Association survey found that 
almost 50 percent of respondents thought news reports on nutrition were confusing and 81 percent preferred 
to hear about new research only after it was accepted by nutritional and health professionals (Variyam and 
Golan 2002; p 18). 
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Of course the well-funded campaign of television commercials defending HFCS as identical to 
sugar in biological effect, funded by the Corn Refiners’ Association (www.sweetsurprise.com; 
http://news.consumerreports.org/health/2008/10/high-fructose-c.html, accessed Jan 02, 2012), 
can only aggravate confusion. The “nutrition” debate has been focused by the industry to revolve 
around whether the product is “natural” and sucrose-similar, when the biological issues are the 
degree of refinement (see Smith and Tasnádi 2007, sub-section 6.7.4.a below), specific effects 
that differ from sucrose or glucose, and volume in the diet. 
Thus, the k in equation (d) as applied to SSBs may be artificially prevented from being 
adjusted downward by information from sound science, preventing a leftward shift in demand for 
SSBs/sCSDs. Formally, this would be attributed to an information failure or a failure of 
rationality, with either failure being encouraged by industry’s purchase of literature that with 
obvious profit-incentives confounds sound science (per Lesser et al.).  
 While at this point in the literature more recent intervention and prospective longitudinal 
studies provide stronger and clearer evidence supporting known effects of added sugars and 
HFCS as cited above, Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell’s 88-study meta-analysis still offers 
the best summary of where the nutrition science stands: 
 One of the most consistent and powerful findings is the link between soft drink intake and increased 
energy consumption. … 
   The available literature supports the observation that people do not adequately compensate for the added 
energy they consume in soft drinks with their intake of other foods and consequently increase their intake 
of sugar and total energy (p 672).  … 
   …[F]ructose is digested, absorbed, and metabolized differently than glucose in ways that favor de novo 
lipogenesis [new fat creation] and do not stimulate insulin secretion or  enhance the production of leptin, 
both afferent signals in the regulation of food intake and body weight. … 
   [While] cross-sectional and longitudinal studies showed only small positive associations between soft 
drink consumption and BMI (rs=0.05 and 0.09, respectively)…a moderate effect size (r=0.24) was 
observed for experimental studies that controlled for extraneous variables. … 
438 
 
   [I]ncreased soft drink intake is related to lower consumption of milk and calcium…lower intakes of fruit 
and dietary fiber, and lower intakes of a variety of macronutrients…[in all study types]. 
   [From a study of over 91k women over 8 years]…those who consumed 1 or more servings of soft drinks 
per day were at twice the risk of developing diabetes as those who consumed less than 1 serving per month. 
… [And the clinchers…]  
   [W]e found that effect magnitudes were consistently larger when studies involved more powerful designs. 
… 
   Our analyses revealed that the overall pattern of results differed significantly when studies funded and not 
funded by the food industry were compared. …[T]he average overall effect size for industry-funded studies 
was significantly smaller than the average effect size for nonfunded studies. This discrepency was 
particularly striking in studies examining the effects of soft drink consumption on energy intake; effect 
sizes were moderate (r=0.23) for nonfunded studies and essentially nil (r=0.05) for funded studies (p 673). 
 
Their summary is representative, not comprehensive. For example, it does not include the clear 
cardiovascular disease risk established for frequent SSB consumption. Tersely stated, by 
consensus of the medical community including the American Heart Association and some USDA 
publications, a male (female) adult that is not extremely active can have either added sugar at or 
under 150 (100) kcal/d, or a healthful diet. 
 Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012), in their Nature article, “Public Health: The Toxic 
Truth About Sugar,” pull no punches. “[S]ugar induces all of the diseases associated with 
metabolic syndrome,” including hypertension, diabetes, ageing (“…caused by damage to lipids, 
proteins, and DNA through non-enzymatic binding of fructose to these molecules”)32
 
, as well as 
cancer and cognitive decline. “[F]ructose exerts toxic effects on the liver that are similar to those 
of alcohol. …Sugar also has clear potential for abuse” (p 28, all this paragraph). 
 
 
                                                 
32 Builds on work including Baynes (2002), “The Maillard Hypothesis on Aging: time to Focus on DNA,” Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences, 959. 
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6.7.3    Health Literacy and SSB Consumption 
“Health literacy refers to the ability to obtain, process, and use health information in 
managing one’s health. Knowledge is a key component of health literacy and thus increases in 
knowledge are important for developing health literacy skills” (Soederberg Miller et al. 2011, p 
803; emphasis added, embedded citations omitted). Soederberg Miller, Gibson, and Applegate 
(2010), refer to “[t]he ability to understand and use health information to make decisions 
regarding one’s health, [as] a set of skills” they call “health literacy” (p 108). They note 
“nutrition knowledge is an important component of health literacy…[and] is positively related to 
dietary quality” (p 107). Understanding the application of nutrition knowledge to health as a skill 
characterizes some of the variability in the “Knowledge, beliefs…decision criteria…” box in 
Figure 3 (section 6.5), and has the power to explain some of the variability in decision making 
that leads to higher or lower sCSD consumption. When low knowledge is empirically associated 
with low diet quality, nutrition education is an appropriate policy solution, independent of tax 
policies. This is underscored by their finding that motivation to obtain more nutrition knowledge 
is also a predictor of healthy diet. 
From corrections and commentary in The New England Journal of Medicine on Popkin, 
Siega-Riz, and Haines’ 1996 comparison of dietary trends among racial and socioeconomic 
groups in the U.S., it is clear that nutrition performance improved with rising incomes and rising 
education in the U.S. for African Americans and Whites, but that a constructed index of healthy 
diets had fewer than ten percent of both groups eating a healthy diet in 1965, and between 25 and 
30% for both groups in the early 1990s. In a NEJM letter to the editor, Kumanyika (1997) calls 
these “percentages with favorable dietary pattern scores… extremely low in all…periods. For 
example, in the 1989-1991 survey, only 1 in 10 high-income whites met the recommended 
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dietary pattern….”33
Low active nutrition knowledge will prejudicially lower the k multiplier in equation (d), 
increasing the likelihood of a negative long-term health result larger than expected in a priori 
utility calculation. Amongst others, from Soederberg Miller et al. (2011): 
 While there is no question that health literacy has improved with a 
generation’s worth of rising average education and incomes, applied nutrition knowledge 
remains low for many Americans.  
[K]nowledge of nutrition is related to accurate perceptions of food healthiness (p 795). … 
[This] study adds to a growing literature showing that knowledge is critical for understanding dietary 
choice (p 802). … 
[P]rior knowledge was a significant predictor of the acquisition of new nutrition knowledge (p803). 
 
Beydoun and Wang (2008) clarify this effect, measuring nutrition knowledge and beliefs 
about the importance of nutrition. They find a clear association between higher diet quality and 
higher education or higher income for the highest knowledge and belief tertiles, but that this 
association is completely undermined – such that there is no significant association between 
education or income and diet quality – for the lowest tertiles of nutrition knowledge and nutrition 
beliefs. For the three levels of education and income regressed (thus “tertiles”), diet quality rises 
with rising education or income, but starts at a higher baseline and rises most for the highest 
tertiles of nutrition knowledge and beliefs. “[Socio-economic status] factors may have an 
influence on dietary choice only for those who have the desirable knowledge and beliefs about 
nutrition” (p 152).  
This finding identifies a mechanism by which the “Knowledge, beliefs…decision 
criteria…” box affects “economically rational decision criteria” (an effect that will become 
clearer with the specification of Figure 4, below in 6.9). Zoellner et al. (2011) find that higher 
                                                 
33 S. Kumanyika. N Engl J Med 1997; 337: 1848. Printed in response to Popkin Siega-Riz, Haines, 1996, NEJM 
335: 716-720. 
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health literacy scores are associated with fewer SSB calories taken in each day. Thompson et al. 
regress demographic variables on dietary intake of added sugars, finding significant inverse 
associations between sugar intake and education level or income levels for men and for women. 
Race/ethnicity groups significantly differ. Their results confirm what one would expect by 
Beydoun and Wang, that low income and low education will be associated with lower diet 
quality, in the form of higher added sugar intake. (See 2.3.2 for more detail on the authors cited 
in this paragraph.) From 2003–2006 NHANES data, Marriott et al. find that non-Hispanic 
African Americans, people below the poverty line, and underweight people are more likely to 
consumer greater than 25% of daily calories from added sugars. This last result is provocative, 
reminding us of the fact that most sugar-related diseases can be independent of above-normal 
weight classification. Overweight and obesity are merely symptoms, not the core problems from 
excessive sugar consumption that Marriott et al refer to. “With each 5% increase in added sugars 
category above 15% added sugar intake, we found a lower prevalence of overweight and obese 
individuals, with the exception of > 35% added sugars for BMI>30 where the prevalence 
increased to 3.2%” (p 236). Is it possible that the effects of high sugar consumption are more 
invisible in under- and normal-weight individuals, perhaps because they damage without causing 
weight gain, whereas as the body’s processes change above a certain weight, weight effects from 
high sugar consumption become a visible symptom of the otherwise similarly damaged health 
profile?   
 
6.7.4    The Neurobiology of Preference – Addictive-like Properties of Sugar 
We have so far established that there are drivers of obesity and diet-related health 
problems that are likely unknown to the average consumer, but nonetheless direct results of 
442 
 
fairly habitual food choices. Whether foods, and particularly sugars, display addictive properties 
that would more directly upset a rational utility-maximizing (again, RUMax) calculus of food 
choice is suggested by some of the previous discussion, but remains an open question. 
Psychiatrists and Neuroscientist Levine, Kotz, and Gosnell (2003) attempt to explain the 
neurobiology of preference for specific foods and nutrients. “The appetite for specific foods and 
nutrients may be under neuroregulatory control,” and “sustained consumption of sugars and fats” 
may result in “neurochemical changes in brain sites involved in feeding and reward, some of 
which are also affected by drug abuse,” that is, affect the central reward systems and may 
increase food intake (p 831S). They also suggest that energy expenditure may be affected by 
similar mechanisms:  
…[F]indings may be related to the actions of both food and drugs on a common substrate, the mesolimbic 
dopaminergenic system. Many drugs of abuse cause an increase in dopamine release in the nucleus 
accumbens. Similarly, the ingestion of sucrose and other palatable foods has been shown to cause an 
increase in dopamine release (p 832S). … 
Diet composition may lead to changes in neuropeptides within brain nuclei regulating energy metabolism. 
… Sustained fat and sugar consumption affects neural circuitry in a number of brain areas involved in 
appetite, reward and energy metabolism (p 833S). 
 
So a diet regularly high in sugar or fat or both seems to affect the neural receptors 
associated with reward in the brain. To the extent this is true, and holds for humans, habitual 
consumption of sCSDs must affect the subconscious chemistry involved in neurochemical 
pathways signaling reward. As early as 1985, Fullerton et al. inferred from animal and human 
studies that hyperglycemia in humans may increase the affinity and number of opiate receptors in 
the brain, and that this effect and the increased production  of beta-endorphins by the pituitary 
gland might “lead to further ingestion of sugar (sometimes in the form of binges), contributing to 
the pathogenesis of obesity” (p 678).  
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Rat experiments also suggest that the increased “availability of foods might negate 
physiological controls of ingestion” (p 831S), meaning that consumption may rise with the 
simple presence of sweetened liquids relative to water (Levine, Kotz, and Gosnell 2003). Again, 
to the extent this holds for humans, the ubiquity of sCSDs then may tend on some level to 
overwhelm conscious restraint on one’s dietary choices. To a degree both seem to hold, 
according to articles by Wang et al. (2001, 2004), by Avena, Rada, and Hoebel (2008), and by 
Lutter and Nestler (2009), who specifically verify that foods and drugs of abuse share the same 
limbic pathways of behavior motivation in animals and humans. 
If these neurochemical processes do exist as hypothesized, then pathological overeating 
and obesity may involve a dopamine neurotransmitter modulating rewarding properties of food. 
Rats are used because they can be injected, starved, overfed, and killed and dissected. 
Establishing similar neurochemical effects in humans requires non-invasive procedures. In a 
2001 The Lancet article, Wang et al. use a radioactive binder to a dopamine type and positron 
emission tomography (PET) to find a dose-response correlation: “[t]he availability of dopamine 
D2 receptor was decreased in obese individuals in proportion to their BMI. …[D]opamine 
deficiency in obese individuals may perpetuate pathological eating as a means to compensate for 
decreased activation of these circuits” (p 354). The neurochemistry of food preference seems on 
some level to be dopamine based in humans, mirroring animal study results. 
In 2004, Wang, and a modified set of co-authors again publish work based on PET scans 
of active human brains, and report the effects on normal-weight adults. Appetitive food stimuli 
significantly increased metabolism in the whole brain by 24% (P<0.01): 
The marked increase in brain metabolism by the presentation of food provides evidence of the high 
sensitivity of the human brain to food stimuli. This high sensitivity coupled with the ubiquitousness of food 
stimuli in the environment is likely to contribute to the epidemic of obesity. In particular, the activation of 
the right orbitofrontal cortex, a brain region involved with drive, may underlie the motivation to procure 
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food, which may be subjectively experienced as “desire for food” and “hunger” when exposed to food 
stimuli (p 1790).  
 
Wang et al.’s experiment involved actual food stimuli. If there is an extension to presence 
of packaging or television advertising (beyond the current scope of this research) then there 
would be a neurobiological mechanism for explaining positive purchase associated with food 
advertising as demonstrated in Essay One here. Berning (2011) cites evidence that brand 
association for an sCSD may impact the brain independently of the reward associated with the 
taste experience. 
Lutter and Nestler (2009) explain the two pathways regulating human food intake: the 
homeostatic pathway controlling energy balance that increases motivation to eat after energy 
stores are depleted, and the hedonic (reward-based) pathway that can override the homeostatic 
pathway when energy reserves are adequate but palatable foods are present and/or desired. They 
conclude: “…it is clear that chronic consumption of highly palatable foods can alter brain 
function in ways similar to drugs of abuse, particularly within the mesolimbic dopamine reward 
pathway” (p 631-2, emphasis added). As part of a larger exploration of whether food can be 
addictive, Lutter and Nestler define food addiction as the loss of control over food intake, as by 
conditioning hedonic pathways reflexively override the homeostatic pathway. 
Lindqvist, Baelemans, and Erlanson-Albertsson (2008) find that rats fed a regular diet 
overconsumed calories when glucose, sucrose, or fructose solutions were also presented, but the 
authors traced chemicals and hormones in the subjects to prove that weight gain occurred due to 
hunger activation signals, depression of satiety signals, and activation of reward chemicals in 
subject’s brains. They were also able to block increased calorie uptake by blocking the 
hypothesized chemical pathways. From animal experiments: 
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…results in this paper show that sugar solutions (e.g. soft drinks) may contribute to the epidemic-like 
increase in obesity throughout the Western world by altering the feeding pattern and promoting weight 
gain. The increase in weight gain seems to occur through a caloric overconsumption which may be 
attributed to an altered secretion and production of hormones and peptides, such as ghrelin, leptin, and PYY 
[peptide YY], involved in appetite regulation and feeding, and possibly also through the activation of 
reward systems in the hypothalamus (p 31). 
 
This establishes with clear biomechanical pathways that chronic soft-drink consumption may 
corrupt the hormones regulating hunger and satiation as well as the reward signaling mechanisms 
in the human brain.  
In an extensive review intended to assess the evidence for sugar addiction, Avena, Rada, 
and Hoebel (2008) examine the behavioral and neurochemical effects of intermittent, excessive 
sugar intake. They note that “food addiction” is plausible because of the similarities in reward 
(dopamine and opioid) pathways between some foods and addictive drugs: “any substance that 
repeatedly causes the release of DA [extracellular dopamine] or reduces DA reuptake at 
terminals via …[known] circuits may be a candidate for abuse. A variety of foods can release 
DA in the NAc [nucleus accumbens, the ‘pleasure center’ of the brain] including…sugar, 
saccharin, and…[pure fat]” (p 23). They conclude that: 
the reviewed evidence supports the theory that, in some circumstances, intermittent access to sugar can lead 
to behavioral and neurochemical changes that resemble effect of a substance of abuse. Sugar “dependency” 
was operationally defined by tests for bingeing, withdrawal signs, craving and cross-sensitization to 
amphetamine and alcohol. 
…[T]his review demonstrates…that rats with intermittent access to a sugar solution can show both a 
constellation of behaviors and parallel brain changes that are characteristic of rats that voluntarily self-
administer addictive drugs. In conclusion, this is evidence that under some circumstances sugar can be 
addictive(p 32).  
 
In a later review of dopamine/opioid theories of reward-system-based overeating, Avena, 
Rada, and Hoebel (2009) state: “[c]ollectively, these clinical studies support the view that 
overeating can affect behavior and brain systems in a manner that resembles aspects of an 
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addiction” (p 625). Experiments on rats confirm that: 1) animals will binge eat on a sweet food 
or pure fat, if it is offered intermittently; 2) drug abuse symptoms are evident in sugar-binging 
rats, including intake behaviors, neurochemical commonalities between sugar bingeing and drug 
abuse – particularly an adaptive effect from extracellular dopamine, and “signs of opiate-like 
withdrawal” when administered an opioid blocker, including “[s]omatic signs of withdrawal, 
such as teeth chattering, forepaw tremor, and head shakes, as well as behavioral manifestations 
of anxiety” (p 625); 3) rats that binge on sugar subsequently will drink more of a 9% alcohol 
solution, “suggesting that intermittent access to sugar can be a gateway to alcohol use.” It may be 
particularly easy to imagine a human parallel to this last effect in American beverage 
consumption patterns as adolescents graduate to adulthood. Avena, Rada, and Hoebel conclude 
that it is sweet taste that “may be largely responsible for producing addictive-like behaviors that 
include a withdrawal syndrome” (p 627, from solutions whose sugar concentration was chosen to 
parallel that in soft drinks).  
Thus the sweetness in soft drinks evokes many characteristics associated with addictive 
substances in animals whose biological processing of these sugars closely mirrors our own. 
Inferring from Avena, Rada, and Hoebel’s careful reviews (2008, 2009), there is enough clinical 
evidence in animal trials and from known parallels in human biochemical pathways to offer 
reserved support for the contention that sugar is likely addictive to humans under some 
circumstances. These circumstances are likely to include intermittent binges within a pattern of 
sugar consumption that “trains” neurochemical reward pathways, where self-administration of 
sugar dosing is possible. Make no mistake about inter-species comparisons. The neuroeconomist 
Camerer states definitively: “rats become biologically addicted to all the substances that humans 
become addicted to… Our shared past just implies that when humans struggle to control animal 
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impulses (such as drug addiction), the struggle is between the neocortex and older temporal-lobe 
areas. Knowing which areas are involved in the struggle is useful for crafting theory and for 
prescribing treatments” (p C 30). 
 Compared to sugar, the addictive properties of the caffeine present in many SSBs and 
sCSDs is little disputed, but also represents an addictive factor that can subconsciously affect the 
decision to consume sCSDs. Describing caffeine as “the world’s most widely used drug,” and 
comparable to “air in having a hardly noticeable taste but participating in a critical metabolic 
exchange involving every cell in the body’s central nervous system” (p 298), Hirsch, Lu, and Ma 
(2007) cite beverage industry figures when claiming that the average American consumes about 
two 12-ounce cans per capita per day. More than 95% of the caffeine in sCSDs is added by 
beverage companies, with a small fraction occurring naturally. They list the following factors 
relevant to the conscious or unconscious choice to drink caffeinated colas [embedded citations 
omitted for brevity, see original]: 
…direct physiologic effects of caffeine include enhanced wakefulness, alertness, concentration, and 
energy; calmness, steadiness, and improved performance of tasks; mood enhancement; and decreased 
reaction time. Caffeine may also act indirectly by mitigating effects of its own withdrawal, and its 
pharmacologic effects may include hedonic effects. … 
[American Psychiatric Association-recognized] …caffeine-induced psychiatric disorders include anxiety 
disorder, and caffeine-induced sleep disorders. … 
Symptoms of caffeine withdrawal include fatigue, depression, anxiety, confusion, irritability, insomnia, 
headaches, and dysphoria. …Ameliorating the symptoms of caffeine withdrawal by consuming caffeinated 
cola may promote an unconsciously positive view of caffeinated cola beverages, which the consumer may 
interpret as a positive physical characteristic of cola (p 298). 
 
Hirsch, Lu, and Ma proceed to demonstrate that just like 92% of adults, 86% of teenagers 
claiming they drink caffeinated cola over non-caffeinated cola for the taste also failed to be able 
to taste the difference, or to drink more of the caffeinated cola in a blind tasting. 
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 Coca-Cola abandoned the use of some nine milligrams of cocaine in their soft drink in 
1903, and now uses only cocaine-extracted coca leaves in its formula, but the company stuck 
with sugar and caffeine for reasons that seem obvious – given a profit-maximizing incentive, 
weak regulation, and evidence from current medical literature.34
In their 2004 American Economic Review article, “Addiction and Cue-Triggered 
Decision Processes” Bernheim and Rangel use results from psychology and neuroscience to offer 
a new economic model of addiction: 
  
…[T]he notion that choices and preferences can diverge is contrary to the standard doctrine of revealed 
preferences and therefore requires thorough justification. 
   There are plainly circumstances in which it makes no sense to infer preferences from choices. …Habituated, 
semi-automatic responses beneficially increase the speed of decision-making in some circumstances but lead 
to systematic mistakes in others (p 1561-2). 
 
Bernheim and Rangel offer the example of the many Americans who injure or kill themselves by 
looking left and walking into the street in Britain, where they know traffic approaches from the 
right. Note that people are failing to gather readily available information that could be used to 
maximize the utility from the decision, and failing to do so because they are driven by habit, the 
exact mistake described in my theoretical models accommodating potential failure of RUMax 
behavior. There is a decision to “cross the street now,” to be sure, but not one that maximizes 
utility without error, as many economists routinely assume. “A literal application of the doctrine 
of revealed preference compels us to conclude either that these people simply prefer to look left, 
or that they’re masochistic”35
                                                 
34 When the U.S. government lost United States v. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola (241 US 265), and 
Coca Cola was able to maintain caffeine in its product, the 1912 U.S. Pure Foods and Drug Act was amended to list 
caffeine as a “habit-forming” and a “deleterious” substance that must be listed on a product’s label 
(
 (p 129). 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coca-Cola, accessed 31 Dec 2011). Coca Cola calculates that across its beverage line, 
worldwide customers consume 1.7 billon servings per day (http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/?WT.cl=1&WT.mm=footer1-about-red_en_US, accessed 31 Dec 11). 
35 Bernheim and Rangel (2005, p 129; the 2004 AER article will remain the default Bernheim and Rangel reference 
unless otherwise noted.) 
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[T]he decision is plainly a mistake….this systematic error is traceable to features of the human brain. 
   Recent research on the neuroscience of addiction has identified specific features of the brain that appear to 
produce systematic errors with respect to decisions involving the consumption of addictive substances. The 
key process involves a mechanism (henceforth called the “hedonic forecast mechanism” or HFM [Bernheim 
and Rangel offer this as an economic, not a neuroscience, term] ) that is responsible for associating 
environmental cues with forecasts of short-term hedonic pleasure/pain) responses. …Addictive substances 
interfere with the normal operation of the HFM by acting directly (i.e., independent of the pleasure 
experienced) on the learning process that teaches the HFM to generate the anticipatory response. … 
   A large body of recent research indicates that the MDS [mesolimbic dopamine system,  a.k.a. Levine, Kotz, 
and Gosnell’s ‘mesolimbic dopaminergenic system’ above] functions, at least in part, as an HFM. …[A]s 
time passes, the MDS fires with the presentation of a cue and not with the delivery of the reward (p 1562). … 
   The HFM’s main advantage is that it can produce rapid decisions with generally beneficial near-term 
outcomes, provided the environment is stable. It cannot, however, anticipate sufficiently delayed 
consequences, and when the environment changes, it can neither ignore irrelevant past experiences nor adjust 
forecasts prior to acquiring further experience. The competing cognitive forecasting system addresses these 
shortcomings (albeit imperfectly) but is comparatively slow (p 1564).  
 
Evidence presented above in this sub-section indicates that sugar works on the mesolimbic 
dopamine (reward) system just as addictive drugs do. Bernheim and Rangel state that addictive 
substances “activate dopamine firing directly,” so sugar qualifies, albeit with the difference that 
the addictive drive is less urgent or potentially overwhelming than for the “11 addictive 
substances” that they list (p 1558). Their theory of addiction is built on three main premises: that 
use among addicts is frequently a mistake, that use of the addictive substance “sensitizes the 
individual to environmental cues that trigger mistaken usage,” and that addicts “understand their 
susceptibility to cue-triggered mistakes and attempt to manage the process” (p 1559). Assuming 
that sugar poses a weaker level of addictivity than opiates or barbiturates, one aspect of this is 
that the substance and negative health effects are less obvious, and generally slower to manifest. 
Thus a person whose decision making is influenced by frequent dosing of sugar in the diet may 
                                                                                                                                                             
     Of course this point exactly parallels the argument that Americans have become overweight, obese, diabetic, 
hypertensive, and cancer-prone because their diets reveal their true (and long-term) preferences, their masochism, or 
their stupidity, rather than revealing a correctable ignorance, or a (perhaps nutrition-education-deficiency- or 
marketing-induced) Achilles’ heel in otherwise rational consumer decision profiles.  
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be far less prone to recognize the short-term or long-term effect, and would not “understand their 
susceptibility” and “manage the process” as would someone might who was trying to beat a 
heroin habit.  
Due to less pressing effects of its consumption, sugar may not meet all three criterion for 
Bernheim and Rangel’s model, but it still meets their definition of an addictive substance, despite 
the fact that they do not list it. If sugar use in the quantities common in the American diet is a 
mistake as medical literature suggests, and if people become sensitized to environmental cues 
that trigger mistaken usage, sugar use may prove an informative extension of Bernheim and 
Rangel’s model, even if the applicability of their third precept is less binding due to the longer 
time it takes to notice the negative health effects from consuming sugar. Sugar does have the 
potential to influence decisions through the same neural pathways as substances more likely to 
produce the “hot” states that Bernheim and Rangel include in their model. Then the last 
paragraph in the last block quote above seems quite relevant to the problem of short-term 
pleasure elbowing out long-term effects in decision-making about sCSD consumption. “[T]he 
MDS seems to affect which stimuli the brain attends to, which cognitive operations it activates 
(what it thinks about), and which memories it preserves, and this may make it more difficult to 
engage the cognitive operations required to override the HFM” (p 1563-4). This neurologically 
based decision-behavioral pathway finds support among numerous authors in section 6.8 below 
(including at least Kahneman, Baumeister, Loewenstein, and Peters, across various publications, 
and never together). 
If Becker and Murphy (1993) are correct in modeling advertising as entering the utility 
function directly as a complementary good, is it much of a reach to inquire whether the 
psychological bond that sCSD companies make between their advertising and the products they 
451 
 
differentiate in large part through their advertising may cause the ads or the packaging to trigger 
the MDS to fire with the presentation of the visual cue rather than with the biological delivery of 
the sugar reward, planting a “wanting process” that is substantively different from a hedonic 
“liking process” (Bernheim and Rangel’s terms, p 1563)? If this occurs, then the ubiquity of 
sCSD machines, sponsorships, and television commercials we “consume” by Becker and 
Murphy’s argument may encourage the very mistakes (systematic breaks between actual 
preference and consumption choice) that Bernheim and Rangel identify as resulting when 
addictive substances are involved – the same mistakes that the doctrine of revealed preferences 
entirely rules out as possibilities36
This supports the case already made that consumers of sCSDs are choosing based on 
systematically skewed information. Also interesting when extended past Bernheim and Rangel’s 
explicit intention to the case of very regular sCSD consumption: 
 (p 1582). Bernheim and Rangel: “with repeated use of a 
substance, cues associated with past consumption cause the HFM to forecast grossly exaggerated 
pleasure responses, creating a powerful (and disproportionate) impulse to use. When this 
happens, a portion of the user’s decision processes functions as if it has systematically skewed 
information, which leads to mistakes in decision-making” (p 1562).  
…[T]he processes that produce systematic mistakes are triggered by stochastic environmental cues and are 
not always operative. …[C]ue-triggered mistakes are specific to narrow domains. …[T]hey adhere to 
particular activities in particular circumstances and do not reflect a general bias toward immediate 
gratification. …[I]t does not follow that a general deficit in cognitive control is necessary for addiction.  … 
   …[T]here is an emerging consensus in neuroscience and psychology that decision-process effects, rather 
than hedonic effects, provide the key to understanding addictive behavior (p 1564-5).  
 
If the premises upon which Bernheim and Rangel make these assertions hold, this boldly upsets 
the “preference type” analysis which constrains a decision maker to be an exponential or a 
                                                 
36 It is worth noting the irony that Becker and Murphy would then be using the doctrine of revealed preferences as 
one justification for their modeling of an effect which may defeat this very premise. 
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hyperbolic discounter, or risk-loving or risk averse, as a fairly monotonic personal characteristic. 
This is a quite restraining assumption. The flexibility inherent with the Bernheim and Rangel 
assertion is consistent with what we observe, people rational in most choices, but perhaps 
irrational or failing to maximize utility in their dietary choices – substance-specific “mistakes” 
for most people. Bernheim and Rangel state this many pages later, while critiquing other 
economic models of addiction: 
In models with present-biased decision-makers, choice is always aligned with the preferences prevailing at 
the moment when the choice is made. Even so, one can interpret present-bias as shorthand for considerations 
that lead to systematic mistakes in favor of immediate gratification, contrary to true (long-run) preferences. 
As a model of addiction, this framework suffers from two main shortcomings. First, the decision-making bias 
is not domain-specific. A present-biased decision-maker mistakenly consumes all pleasurable commodities 
excessively; in this respect there is nothing specific about addictive substances. Second, the bias is always 
operative—it is not cue-conditioned (p 1581, their emphasis, embedded citation dropped). 
 
Bernheim and Rangel specifically attempt to move beyond constraints that appear too simplistic 
in contrast to certain evidence. Bernheim and Rangel (2005)37
 
 reference “behavioral evidence 
indicating that users of addictive substances are often surprisingly sophisticated and forward 
looking” (p 116), including those who demonstrate the consumption reductions in response to 
future prices that Becker and Murphy use to support the model they espouse in their 1988 
“rational addiction” work, but also including users who fake attempts to quit in order to intensify 
the pleasure of the next use experience.  
6.7.4.a    A Theory of Natural Addiction – Smith and Tasnádi (2007) 
Smith and Tasnádi (2007) propose an evolutionary hypothesis based in neurochemical 
biology that explains how rational addiction (Becker and Murphy 198838
                                                 
37 The 2005 paper is an admittedly less formal derivative of the 2004 AER article. Thus the former will remain the 
default Bernheim and Rangel reference unless otherwise noted. 
) might evolve, and the 
38 More detail below and in section 6.7.5. 
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ways in which modern systems may corrupt the effects of once advantageous biological 
mechanisms. Smith and Tasnádi are careful not to question Becker and Murphy’s assertion of 
adjacent complementarity, the idea that the marginal utility of consumption increases with 
experience of a good.39
Smith and Tasnádi explore the biological foundations of opioid reception, and connect 
opioid rewards in the (meso)limbic system (dopamine reward center in the brain) with the 
evolutionary advantage of learning that sweet foods (mother’s milk, ripe fruit, raw honey) are 
high in valuable micronutrients and very likely nontoxic. They also posit that in primitive 
mankind’s foraging for appropriate foods in an uncertain environment, an opioid reward for 
learning which foods taste good and importantly when and where they can be located would be 
most advantageous when rewarding an associative learning process. They note laboratory 
evidence confirming dopamine transmission in the limbic system is associated with learning. 
New experiences generate dopamine responses, but once the stimulus is well known, the reward 
only fires for “surprises,” or new stimulus-reward pairings. 
 In the case of an addictive good, this may mean that the relative cost of 
withdrawal makes current marginal utility higher than the option of not consuming the product 
one already craves. They also note that other authors who question Becker and Murphy’s 
assumptions of perfect information, foresight, and self-knowledge also do not question the 
adjacent complementarity assertion. (I maintain this caution.)  
Addictive substances – opioids, caffeine, alcohol, nicotine, and perhaps sugar – break this 
pattern by offering dopamine rewards with every use, with the most powerful drugs not 
diminishing in their dopamine effect with repeated use. Smith and Tasnádi then make a thought-
provoking point. Before chemical refinement, many of the natural sources from which drugs are 
                                                 
39 George Constantinides (1990) refers to adjacent complementarity as “habit persistence,” perhaps an easier term 
for the effect of this more (topographical or) mathematical concept. 
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made have potent toxic and physically unpleasant properties, protecting early humans from a 
pure reward. There are no refined carbohydrates in nature. Refining sugar, like refining cocaine, 
or distilling grain alcohol, is a sophisticated process that developed quickly and recently within 
the evolutionary timeline. Brain chemistry seems not to have adapted to distinguish dopamine 
responses that genuinely reward survival learning and naturally-occurring high-quality 
substances from those that merely mimic the dopamine rewards of authentic natural ingestibles: 
[W]hat we observe is the manifestation of a sophisticated biological system in which environmental cues 
trigger predictable internal neurological and physiological responses; that this system shows all the signs of 
being adapted to a pre-industrial environment; and that drugs of abuse, largely developed in the modern 
era, have the demonstrable ability to disrupt this system. … 
[A]lthough the evidence suggests [that the dopamine-receptive limbic system] evolved for a particular 
purpose (choosing a balanced diet), this system can be “hijacked” by technological advances such as the 
syringe, refined sugar, and television advertising (p 334-5).  
 
Smith and Tasnádi thus bridge the addictive drug and sugar dopamine pathways with the 
neoclassical model of rational addiction, noting that it is industrial processes and products that 
create the “mismatch between the modern world and the ‘beliefs’ about the world implicit in our 
behavior” (p 328). In the figures and equations proposed in sections 6.5 and 6.6, I proceed where 
Smith and Tasnádi do not, questioning Becker and Murphy’s assumptions of perfect information, 
foresight, and self-knowledge. I believe the “mismatch” to which Smith and Tasnádi refer 
suggests failures of all three of these other Becker and Murphy assumptions, the result being a 
biologically driven appetite for non-nutritive SSBs in some people (that may extend to a larger 
set of refined carbohydrates). This appetite may be consciously and conscientiously avoided or 
rectified by applying what we may learn from medical/nutrition literature and from the 
connections Smith and Tasnádi have made. But for at least some portion of the population, I pose 
this does not occur, to the threat of their health (see section 6.7 here). 
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With the above results from the medical community indicating precise effects of habitual 
intake of sugars on hunger/satiety hormones and dopamine reward receptors, one need not 
unequivocally adopt a position that sCSDs are addictive. There is for habitual consumption of 
sCSDs little evidentiary defense of the neoclassical economists’ assumption of perfectly rational 
utility-maximizing choice in the sense that it is voluntary, deliberative, and considers future 
effects in a time-consistent fashion. To assume habitual sCSD consumption is not influenced by 
unconscious biological drivers which may motivate behavior independent of rational choice, 
when these drivers are themselves the product of an initial sequence of regular sCSD 
consumption, begins to strain credibility. Regular consumers of sCSDs are certainly hurting 
themselves, and there is strong evidence for many aspects of addiction in chronic consumption of 
refined carbohydrates, certainly when they comprise 25% or more of overall energy intake. 
Richards, Patterson, and Tegene (2007) run a dynamic random coefficients logit model 
on a 30-household sample to look for predicted rational addiction behavior based on 
macronutrient characteristics of food, and conclude “it is…apparent that the addiction to 
carbohydrates is far stronger than to other nutrients” ([protein, fat, salt] p 322). 
 
6.7.5    Questions Concerning Becker and Murphy’s Theory of Rational Addiction 
 The neoclassical argument of rational choice is defended in Becker and Murphy’s famous 
1988 The Journal of Political Economy article, in which they defend addiction as a rational 
utility maximizing choice. In doing so, they maintain that the rate of disappearance of the 
physical and mental effects of past consumption of a potentially addictive good is exogenous, 
employ the assumption of a constant rate of time preference, and argue that tastes do not change 
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over time.40
As noted by Smith and Tasnádi, many have criticized these assumptions. From the 
medical literature presented here, we know that a substance that directly affects the limbic 
reward system, including sugar, can have a conditioning effect on the brain that trains the brain 
to want it. Because one state exists before this conditioning effect occurs and another after, 
clearly the rate of disappearance of the physical and mental effects in turn influences 
consumption. Becker and Murphy acknowledge tolerance effects dependent on previous use, but 
turn these directly into utility effects without noting that tolerance must indicate that the rate of 
disappearance of the physical and mental effects changes with tolerance, and therefore must not 
be fixed or entirely exogenous.
 Optimal paths for “consumption capital stock” of an addictive good are made using 
fixed time-preference and rate of disappearance values. For Becker and Murphy, addiction 
involves an interaction between persons and goods, such that “greater current consumption of a 
good raises its future consumption” (p 682), and this may hold for one person and not others. 
41
Becker and Murphy’s assumption set precludes the notions that behavior may be 
involuntary or non-deliberative or lead to regret that is not induced by changes in external 
circumstances (i.e. not from an external shock). This assumption set necessitates a critical break 
from how psychologists and social psychologists find people to behave. Becker and Murphy’s 
assumption set almost tautologically confirms rational behavior, because these critical elements 
that undermine their model are assumed away initially. If someone is acting involuntarily or 
 
                                                 
40 Becker and Murphy do consider time preferences that change when utility is separable over time, but are fixed 
within any period. The shortcomings of this approach as I see them are addressed within this sub-section in the main 
text. Becker and Murphy consider tastes to be intrinsic to the user, but exogenous in the sense that they cannot be 
created or shaped by will or by external influence. Lowenstein offers a much different vision, summarized below, 
with empirical evidence. 
41 By Becker and Murphy’s first figure, the rate of disappearance times capital stock from consumption of the 
addictive good (for any individual) is linear, suggesting that the rate of disappearance is fixed. (The stock of 
consumption introduces the adjacent complementarity argument by allowing past consumption to affect future 
utility.) 
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without deliberation, reverses preferences, is time inconsistent in their behavior, or develops 
tolerance to the addictive substance (behavior) such that more is required to achieve the same 
utility effect, then at least one of the precepts upon which Becker and Murphy defend rationality 
of choice fails to bind. People whose outcomes are rationally determined (and/or utility 
maximizing) beg policy intervention less than those whose outcomes are not rationally 
determined (and/or utility maximizing). 
Because the rate of disappearance may not be fixed (see also reference to Lipscomb, 
Weinstein, and Torrance, from Sassi and Hurst, below), the implications for rational behavior 
based on the equation of motion of capital stock of consumption may not be as deterministic as 
Becker and Murphy claim. Obviously there are levels of addiction, say between a gram-a-day 
heroin addict and someone who is grumpy and unfocused without that morning cup of coffee. If 
for example the disappearance effect becomes faster with deeper addiction, the preference for 
present versus future satisfaction may rise, aggravating the existing problem suggested by the 
constant time preference assumption.  
Kahneman and the behavioral economists that follow him have long since demonstrated 
hyperbolic discounting, where the point in a multi-period sequence that one makes a decision 
affects which intertemporal choice is made, particularly with a present bias that discounts future 
periods more rapidly and at a higher rate than a fixed discount rate would. Becker and Murphy’s 
argument seems to sidestep that a deeply addicted person will steal from immediate relatives, or 
risk incarceration or injury to steal from a stranger to fuel the habit and stop the discomfort/pain 
(see Loewenstein, 1996, in section 6.8). Such behavior may reflect a change in degree of 
preference for the present, and a deep discounting of future welfare, neither of which find 
accommodation in Becker and Murphy’s model. In their 1999 American Economic Review 
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article, “Doing It Now or Later,” O’Donoghue and Rabin cite “[c]asual observation, 
introspection, and psychological research” that “the assumption of time consistency is 
importantly wrong,” (p103), and conclude “the existence of present-biased preferences is 
overwhelmingly supported by psychological evidence, and strongly accords to common sense 
and conventional wisdom” (p120). They find that whether costs are immediate or rewards are 
immediate changes the type of person (categorized by their time preferences) who can be harmed 
by a poor choice. 
Becker and Murphy do consider that in time-separable utility functions, time preference 
may change, relative to a fixed rate of interest. Both of these, in addition to a fixed rate of 
disappearance of the physical and mental effects of past consumption, are necessary to calculate 
the optimal consumption paths by Becker and Murphy’s method. But Becker and Murphy never 
consider that while each time-separable decision event may appear rational, that with increasing 
addiction to a harmful good, the costs to future utility may rise in a way that proves the addict’s 
previous calculations of future expected utility to be in error. They attribute the difference to an 
increasing preference for the present, when it may be a loss of control by someone who does not 
consciously discount the future so heavily. The loss of control would be a failure of rationality. 
In either case, the increasingly addicted individual may enter future periods to find the cost 
(lower utility, lower earnings) much higher than self-projected in previous periods. This delusion 
or sustained ignorance depicts a failure to realize the utility previously “expected,” with the 
problem getting worse. The pattern depicts that the individual’s decisions were not and are not 
maximizing in their effect, and the failure to appreciate a degrading pattern of utility would not 
be rational. This plausible scenario is precluded by Becker and Murphy’s assumptions. My 
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theoretical modeling allows it, but sacrifices predictive power to the more inclusive description. 
Policy implications change with perspective, however.  
Becker and Murphy suggest that critics of their similar approach (from Stigler and 
Becker, 1977) claim that it implies that addicts are happy in their addiction (as they continually 
maximize utility). Becker and Murphy defend this by pointing out that it is an existing state of 
unhappiness that may fuel addictive-creating behavior. But they ignore the potential for future 
regret (as an addict robbing his mother or a stranger may have), to reverse the effect of the 
positive expectations for utility that influence current consumption as a maximizing strategy over 
all periods (lifetime).42
This approach imbues Becker and Murphy’s addicts with perspicacity and foresight I 
claim to be uncharacteristic of addicts. I do not deny that a predictable adaptation to a future 
price change is achievable in some circumstances, but beyond that narrow demonstration, the 
economics of our contrary positions boils down to premises that will or will not find support in 
other analyses including those of specialists in psychology, habit, and addiction. It is the 
fundamental nature of addiction to harmful goods that people are not voluntary in their choice of 
level of consumption, so calculation of the costs of effects would be elaborate, and perhaps 
 They acknowledge that the full price of the stock component (multi-
period effects from consumption of the addictive good) includes harm to future earning capacity, 
but the individual is assumed to possess the ability to calculate this cost with full cognizance of 
changes in their expected level of addiction over time. There is no regret for any other effect on 
health or lifestyle, and apparently perfect knowledge of health effects and how much they will 
cost.  
                                                 
42 Becker and Murphy incorporate a Z(t) variable representing individual experience, meant to individuate the 
consumption stock variables’ effect on the change of consumption stock (their equation 22). But their mathematical 
defense of this assertion still employs a fixed rate of disappearance and fixed time preference, both of which I 
challenge with experimental evidence in surrounding sections here.  
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beyond the abilities even of someone whose rational faculties were not compromised by 
substance abuse. Failure to appreciate the severity of one’s condition, or denial of that severity 
would similarly lead to failures to update one’s choice criteria and behavior given new 
information (a failure of “Bayesian learning”), so that a Bayesian proxy maximization of utility 
also might not be achievable, much less serve as the primary assumption for deterministic 
modeling.  
Clever re-definition of the term addiction can lead to consistent conclusions when crafted 
by bright minds, but the provocative results must not be confused with comprehensive 
descriptions of behavior when an artificial ideal of behavior is being described. Their taught 
metaphor overextends when they describe binge eating as not reflecting inconsistent behavior 
because the binging individual is maximizing over time to balance future weight and the desire 
to eat more (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2000; Fulponi, OECD 2009, Maio et al. 2007). 
 Becker and Murphy maintain that “cold turkey” solution to addiction is a lowering of 
demand (due to price cues), or of stock of consumption. Such lowering is due to “events” that 
somehow do not affect time preference, or involve new awareness, or new resolve. Their model 
is consistent, but not determinative. The only element preserving its integrity are the assumptions 
that people are rational. When people are indeed rational, the math is consistent. If people are not 
rational, the findings are not as deterministic as the authors imply. 
For example, a “come to Jesus” moment inspiring a “cold turkey” break in severe 
addiction can also be a sudden change in time preference favoring future utility in greater 
relation to present utility. Car crashes, near fatal overdoses, arrests, nearly killing one’s own 
child – all things that might suddenly change someone’s preferences or time preferences – are 
assumed to occur without changing time preferences. This is not a change in price, but a change 
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in awareness of price. If there was a lack of awareness before, there was not a full application of 
available and relevant information, and this is a failure of rationality. With such a dramatic 
moment, there may be a paradigm shift that may lead to an aspect of self-control being exercised 
that was heretofore unwanted, considered too costly, or which the individual judged themselves 
incapable of executing. While this may be described by the convex utility curve with 
discontinuity (figure 2 and Appendix B, in Becker and Murphy), it could just as well be a shift in 
time preferences. 
Such an event may motivate the employment of an alternate time preference, a conscious 
choice that weakens the grasp of an addiction whose primary power is in its seeming resistance 
to conscious change. Or failure of rationality may revive and dominate, with the addictive 
behavior returning: “people seem to have a powerful ability not to apply general lessons they 
understand well to specific situations” (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, p 114). In their discussion 
of how rational addicts will handle sufficiently strong complementarity (cold turkey or high 
sustained use, figure 2 and Appendix B, in Becker and Murphy), Becker and Murphy clearly 
explain what endpoint solutions may look like given particular values of their consumption 
capital variable. But they do not describe why their consumption capital variable may abruptly 
change, or revert once changed. They describe equations of motion and graphs of optimal paths 
for control variables, but ignore psychological effects of “events,” and treat changes in time 
preferences (time-separable utility) as if conscious decision cannot generate them. Numerous 
real-world possibilities defy their assumptions. 
This exploration of the limitations of the Becker and Murphy Rational Addiction model 
demonstrates that there are potential weaknesses in the theory of rational addiction that mirror 
problems with the neoclassical theory of rational choice as a utility maximizing process. 
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Breaking from the unifying vision of all decision makers actively using a rational utility-
maximizing calculus in every decision, I cite critics of this theory not to argue against the precept 
that a rational utility-maximizing calculus remains a useful construct, but against the assumption 
that it is a universally applicable descriptor of behavior. As section 6.8 elaborates, evidence for 
other decision criteria is well documented. Particular to the seemingly minor decision to have a 
serving or two of sCSD every day or two, clinical evidence for “failures of rationality” (see Sassi 
and Hurst in section 6.8 below) is compelling. There may still exist a rational decision process, 
but one hardly conforming to neoclassical assumptions of exponential discounting, fixed tastes 
and time preferences, perfect information about the physical and mental effects of continuing the 
habit, or to the assumption that the individual is consciously making (rather than avoiding) a 
logical calculation in the first place. 
 
6.8    Psychology, Behavioral Economics, Decision Theory, and sCSDs 
 Those not indoctrinated to the neoclassical economic assumptions of narrow but 
comprehensive self-interest, perfectly competitive markets – including full information, zero 
transaction costs, complete markets – dispassionate and conscious decision-making, and choices 
for which all costs and benefits are accounted now and for the future have been questioning the 
rigor of these assumptions for some time. They are occasionally awarded Nobel prizes in 
economics, like psychologists Herbert Simon (1978), and later Daniel Kahneman, who in 2002 
was a co-recipient with Vernon L. Smith.43
                                                 
43 Attacks of these same assumptions, attacks that rely on empirical evidence, arise from many camps, including 
from Harvard Law Professor Christine Holls, and University of Chicago Jurisprudence Professor Cass Sunstein, and 
University of Chicago Professor of Economics and Behavioral Science Richard Thaler, in “A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics,” from a 1988 volume of the Stanford Law Review. Kahneman’s long-time co-author Amos 
Tversky would likely also have been honored with the Nobel in economics, but had become ineligible, as Nobels are 
not awarded posthumously. 
 Smith was one founder of behavioral economics, a 
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field that studies the effects of social, cognitive, and emotional factors on economic decisions – a 
field tending to produce “experimental findings that suggest inadequacies of standard economic 
theories” (Pesendorfer 2006, p 712).44
 Herbert Simon’s theories of bounded rationality and satisficing were introduced in 
association with Figure 3 in section 6.5. Simon’s theories address choice made under uncertainty.  
 The theories of these critics suggest some immediacy in 
addressing the question why some people routinely ingest large amounts of added sugars despite 
some understanding that this will negatively impact their health. 
Kahneman and Tversky propose that people use experience-based techniques for problem 
solving, called  heuristics, that establish “rule-of-thumb” guidelines to simplify decision making 
(Kahneman 1991). Kahneman and Tversky also proffer a “prospect theory” by which the 
reference point from which one judges gains and losses that are to result from a decision tends to 
affect which decision is made (Pesendorfer 2006). This further supports the notion that context 
has the capacity to drive choice at least as much as any known internal preference structure. 
Indeed, empirical proof of the propositions of prospect theory require that one of the four axioms 
of traditional Bayesian decision theory as developed by Ramsey and Savage must be abandoned, 
because proof that an introduced reference point can change an individual’s choice means that 
                                                 
44 Pesendorfer, 2006, p 720 (his emphasis): 
Behavioral economics has reached the status of an established discipline.  
…This symbiotic relationship with standard economics works well as long as small changes to standard assumptions are 
made. In that case, the behavioral evidence can be the impetus for small changes of standard models that leave the basic 
structure intact. … 
With the success of behavioral economics, more radical departures are being considered.  …There is no “small” 
modification of the standard model that can deal convincingly with the hypothesis that people are wrong about their 
objective function or process probabilities incorrectly. 
Behavioral economics emphasizes the context-dependence of decision making. 
To re-iterate, in my flowchart model of food-choice behavior, I do not question the objective function, but do 
question whether individuals are routinely well-enough informed to construct accurate probabilities. This is not a 
claim that they could not properly process actual probabilities, if provided them. Separately, I suggest that 
individuals may not act on known probabilities if they are addicted, or if they subsume the active decision 
process purely out of habit, or from a heuristic derived from faulty premises about the consequences of the choice 
to regularly consume SSBs, or from faulty premises about the state of knowledge in nutrition science. 
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environmental factors other than utilities determine the value of choice alternatives (Gärdenfors 
and Sahlin 1988).  
Once there is concession that factors exogenous to an individual’s preference structure 
(utility) influence maximization calculations, the objectivity of theories dependent on 
calculations requiring objective probability of (payoff) states (per van Neumann and 
Morgenstern) is compromised. This is a critical break, because a Bayesian decider need only 
satisfy the four Savage axioms to achieve a result “as if he assigned numerical utilities, at least 
implicitly, to alternative possible outcomes of his behavior” (John Harsanyi, 1977, his emphasis, 
quoted p 13 in Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1988). Proving failure of even one of the Savage axioms in 
certain contexts thus implies that individual ability to maximize utility cannot be assumed. 
Individuals who resist incorporating new information in their decision process fail in Bayesian 
learning, and cannot be assumed to maximize utility by standards of classical decision theory. 
Some obesogenic behaviors refute a Bayesian learning process (Maio et al. 2007). 
Daniel Ellsberg also demonstrates a paradox arising from the four Savage axioms. 
Differences in information about the (payoff) states can reflect in individual preferences, such that 
“the alternative for which the exact probability of winning can be determined is preferred to the 
alternative where the probability of winning is ‘ambiguous’.” This violates the assumption (third 
axiom) “that a decision maker’s beliefs can be represented by a unique probability measure; the 
quality of a decision maker’s information about the state should thus not affect his or her 
preferences” (Ellsberg, 1961, quoted p 12 in Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1988, who note that 
“ambiguous” is Ellsberg’s term). For someone who enjoys their cola but has a low level of 
nutrition knowledge, there follows from this example a preference for the known payoff 
(enjoyment of consumption experience), versus the “ambiguous” long-term health effects. The 
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effects are well-known to the medical community, but as long as they are poorly understood by 
the consumer, s/he may be overconsuming due to a miscalculation of expected utilities rooted in 
poor nutrition knowledge. From Maio et al., this behavior is also resistant to Bayesian updating.  
Reproduced on a large scale, this would result in a state mirroring actual U.S. sCSD 
consumption figures and very high-volume purchase increase (tripling since 1970, Nielsen and 
Popkin 2004) that follows from poor nutritional knowledge. Because much of this purchase 
derives from ignorance and habits, it is not an unambiguous expression of preferences. Therefore 
sCSD “demand” is right-shifted by both poor information – a form of the “Ellsberg paradox” 
under which individual choice does not conform with highest expected utility – and by 
environmental factors. Fully informed consumers with Bayesian learning, the kind economists 
tend to assume, would “demand” millions of gallons less of a product with no redeeming 
nutritional features that accounts for 7% of all caloric intake. The environmental context in 
which food decisions are made has been studied in detail since Kahneman and Tversky’s work, 
becoming a focal point of behavioral economic research, with Brian Wansink a prominent name 
in the oeuvre. 
 
6.8.1    “Fast and Frugal” Heuristics, Neurobiology of Decision, Failures of Rationality – 
When Neoclassical Assumptions Fail to Hold 
Gerd Gigerenzer, director of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, in an 
essay for the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (vol. 5, 2001), 
summarizes a concept of Simon’s that will prove useful in evaluating failures from the 
neoclassical model of rationality. Taking for simplicity but one of an individual’s goals, if in 
attempting to satisfy that goal an individual has an aspiration level rather than optimization 
466 
 
criteria, s/he will choose among the universe of alternatives the first choice that satisfies or 
surpasses the aspiration level. An aspiration level may be dynamically adjusted according to 
feedback. Gigerenzer also modifies Kahneman and Tversky’s (1974) “heuristics and biases” 
approach to what Gigerenzer calls fast and frugal heuristics – fast in that there are simple 
stopping rules to a search that employ little computation, and frugal in that they use little 
information. Fast and frugal heuristics can include ignorance-based decision making and 
elimination heuristics. He is careful to explain conditions under which such criteria could prove 
optimal, and notes that fast and frugal heuristics could be dynamically altered just as aspiration 
levels may be. “The challenge here is to understand what the class of heuristics is, how a 
heuristic is selected, and in which environments it is successful” (p 4). 
Camerer offers further scientific support for some behavioral-economic challenges to 
conventional economic assumptions: “neuroscience has established some tentative neural 
foundation for ideas from behavioural economics which were first derived earlier from 
experiments and field data” (C32). There is clear evidence for nonlinear probability weighting, 
where low probabilities are overweighted, and near certainties are underweighted, seen in the 
part of the brain (caudate) that anticipates reward. There is clear evidence that in strategic games 
some players use fewer cognitive steps, limiting their strategic thinking, and irrationally 
jeopardizing their chances for a favorable outcome. With regards to time discounting, there is 
neural evidence that discounting in the conventional economic sense occurs in frontal parts of the 
cortex, whereas “present bias” occurs in a more emotional part of brain, implying that the full 
process of discounting is “a splice of two processes” (p C32). “Ambiguity aversion” manifests in 
a rapid emotional response in the amygdala, more rapid than conscious processing can occur. 
This response is observed when there is ambiguity, and does not occur merely for risky bets. 
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People with a higher brain activity in an area above the eye sockets had higher ambiguity-
aversion parameters in studies. Thus there is neural evidence that risk and ambiguity are 
processed quite differently. Camerer cites decision theorist Raiffa from a 1961 article, on clinical 
results of decision trials: “But if certain uncertainties in the problem were in cloudy or fuzzy 
[ambiguous] form, then very often there was a shifting of gears and no effort at all was made to 
think deliberately and reflectively about the problem. Systematic decomposition of the problem 
was shunned and an over-all ‘seat of the pants’ judgment was made which graphically reflected 
the temperament of the decision maker” (p C33).  
There is a certain computer logic to this. Why devote scarce decision resources to a 
problem whose outcome cannot be probabilistically determined due to ambiguity? There may be 
no plainly logical solution. Still, consider how critical this difference must be when one doesn’t 
understand the proven risks of global warming, or bad diet, but instead follows the suggestions 
of industries commercially threatened by actual science. Emotion is engaged, deliberative 
processes are short-circuited, and one reverts to belief rather than evidence. Taking Raiffa’s 
evidence as definitive would predict that industries under threat of regulation or taxation may 
thus diffuse the force of public opinion simply by generating contrary studies, and airing 
advertisements favoring their own views, or without fraud, phrasing the problem in a way that 
deflects attention from settled science and toward an ambiguous personal value. Even if these 
industry gambits can claim no scientific merit to vouch for them, the public, hearing only a 
summary on the news or at the water cooler, will understand that there is scientific ambiguity, 
and the industry’s objective is obtained: public support for binding new measures less likely 
builds to a strong majority. How could it build when an emotional tie to the status quo is pitted 
against a failure to engage a deliberative rational choice process? From the Red Scare of the 
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early 1950s, to resistance to controls on smoking before 1964, to resistance to global climate 
change, to resistance to nutritional evidence of poor health outcomes from the predominant 
American diet, one might find reams of evidence over the last 60 years supporting a prediction 
that the neuro-psychological tendency that Raiffa, and later Camerer identify, would be exploited 
by any faction with a greater political-economic self-interest in others deciding from emotion 
rather than based on empirically supported hypotheses and facts. 
Fast and frugal heuristics may engage by default for behaviors already relegated to a 
secondary level of attention. The decision having already been made to move a behavior to 
secondary status, habit and passive influences would be expected to reign without tempering 
from deliberative thought. I mentioned in association with Figure 3 that eating has been 
determined to be often a “secondary behavior” to behaviors receiving primary attention, such as 
working or watching television. Bertrand and Schazenbach, from their evaluation of the Eating 
and Health Module of the American Time Use Survey, calculate that “half of all daily calories 
are consumed while also engaged in another task” (p 170). They refer to Brian Wansink’s results 
that demonstrate that when a person’s cognitive load (demand for attention, decision-making and 
judgment) is high, the person is prone to overeating and misjudging how much they eat 
(Wansink 2006). The degree to which Wansink’s many experiments confirm this suggests 
diminished flow to the food-decision criteria in the last dashed box influencing decision criteria, 
in Figure 3 (section 6.5).  
Who is prone to overlooking minor food decisions to a degree that suggests an 
automaticity of behavior and a potential impact on health? Wansink and Sobal (2007) conduct 
studies that suggest the answer is, well, almost everybody. One study of 139 college students 
found that each underestimated the number of food-related decisions they made daily by an 
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average of around 221 decisions per day. A second found that subjects presented with an 
exaggerated environmental cue (a larger bowl) not only ate more, but “21% denied having eaten 
more, 75% attributed it to other reasons (such as hunger), and only 4% attributed it to the cue” (p 
106). It seems people are unaware of the vast majority of food decisions they make, meaning 
these decisions must be habitual and routinized, or at least fly under the radar of discrete decision 
making, and people are unaware of how the food environment influences their decisions or are 
unwilling to acknowledge such influence (Wansink and Sobal 2007).  
“Habitual processes are especially relevant to understand eating because people eat in 
regular patterns that are likely to be susceptible to habit formations” (Rothman, Sheeran, Wood 
2009; p S12). Who wants to admit they are not actively controlling something as basic as their 
food choices, as these sets of authors suggest we must be doing? Who indeed. But there is a 
strength in not actively controlling food choice, albeit one that seems chronically to be turned to 
a weakness. 
Consider evidence and conclusions from Cohen and Farley (2008), both medical doctors 
with masters’ degrees in Public Health, who offer a RAND-Corporation-sponsored special topic 
piece in Preventing Chronic Disease that explains why many eating behaviors would be 
automatic, and some of the reasons people seem unlikely to admit this. Sampling from multiple 
points in their piece quickly stitches an empirically consistent case for viewing eating behavior 
as only minimally determined by conscious thought, and largely determined by environmental 
factors that if obesogenic, may well be denied: 
Assuming that people who are overweight are simply unconcerned about their weight is tempting. But most 
Americans consider themselves to be overweight, and nearly one-third are actively trying to lose weight 
(including nearly one-fourth of women of normal weight). The observation that so many people continue to 
gain weight despite wanting to be thin is more accurately explained by describing eating as an automatic 
behavior (p 4).  
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   Human beings have limited cognitive capacities, with the ability to consciously process only 40 to 60 bits of 
information per second—equivalent to a short sentence. However, the entire processing capacity, which 
includes the visual system and the unconscious, is estimated to be 11 million bits per second. Therefore the 
brain needs mechanisms that do not require cognitive awareness to perceive the environment and react to it. 
Indeed, human beings’ ability to be effective, high-functioning beings depends not only on their ability to 
think abstractly and creatively but also on their ability to free their minds for this higher-level thinking by 
assigning routine tasks to lower-level brain involvement. Therefore noncognitive behaviors are not a sign of 
weakness but rather an adaptation that allows human beings to be a uniquely productive species. 
   …A great deal of mental effort is required to make conscious decisions and then implement them in the 
form of behaviors. Most of our responses to our environment can be understood as automatic behaviors. … 
   Bargh has defined four characteristics of automatic behaviors: 1) they occur without awareness, 2) they are 
initiated without intention, 3) they continue once initiated without control, and 4) they operate efficiently or 
with little effort. … Once people initiate eating, they usually continue until the food is gone or until some 
other external occurrence changes the situation. 
   Automatic behaviors…occur without awareness, are initiated without intention, tend to continue without 
control, and operate efficiently or with little effort (p 1). … 
Automatic behaviors share another important characteristic. Because people are unaware of the behaviors, 
they are also unaware that the behaviors are not under their control. … 
Bargh and Chartrand found that even after people have been shown the results of experiments demonstrating 
the automatic nature of their actions, they steadfastly refuse to believe that those actions did not result from 
conscious choice. … We blame our lack of willpower on the inability to maintain a diet, when it is more 
likely that our automatic responses to ubiquitous cues to eat and the availability of cheap, convenient, calorie-
dense food are responsible (p 4, emphasis added, Cohen and Farley’s citations omitted). 
 
Cohen and Farley do not push this argument beyond plausibility, offering hope for policy 
intervention: “Characterizing eating as an automatic behavior does not mean that human beings 
cannot bring eating under volitional control. …All automatic behaviors can be controlled 
temporarily” (p 4). Their policy proposals are drastic to the economists’ eye however (see Essay 
Three), but more modest policy proposals can follow from their insights. 
For many individuals eating manifests behaviors consistent with the Simon and 
Kahneman and Tversky critiques, as explained in the OECD’s 2008 The Prevention of Lifestyle-
Related Chronic Diseases: An Economic Framework (which is Sassi and Hurst 2008) : “bounded 
rationality…essentially refers to the presence of cognitive errors in the exercise of rational 
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choice for particular forms of consumption. Examples…include the erroneous or partial 
understanding of long-term health risks, bias associated with framing of information upon which 
choices are based, and others” (p 27). Section 6.7 here details dietary and medical knowledge 
upon which many American consumers are failing to act, to the consequent compromise of their 
own health. If their conscious goals do not include raising their own chance of obesity, diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, and cancer, then obviously their information is not complete, or their 
heuristics are biased, or they are not considering the consequences of their dietary choices much 
at all (hyperbolic discounting), or all three. (All of this is in Figure 3, with more to follow before 
we see Figure 4, below.) From Sassi and Hurst: “In the case of health-related consumption 
behaviors, information is often lacking on the nature and magnitude of the associated health 
risks….because it does not exist…because it is concealed or communicated in a misleading form 
by parties that have a vested interest…or because it is complex and not easily accessible to the 
lay person” (p 25).  
Also writing for the OECD, a year after Sassi and Hurst, Fulponi (OECD 2009) explains 
heuristics that are efficient in one dimension, but which manifest with low utility outcomes: 
Experimental research findings [in behavioral economics] suggest that heuristics or rules of thumb are 
often used to simplify decision making and are important in predicting which foods an individual eats, how 
much, and whether he will eat these again. This may be an efficient approach to decision making given 
time constraints. However, if decision making under time constraints is coupled with outcomes that are 
uncertain or occur in the future, errors of judgment can become large (p 13). 
 
We can now see this type of error as ignorance and hyperbolic discounting combining to define 
food-choice decision heuristics that “backfire” by imposing lower or negative long-term utility 
(as in equation c).  
Sassi and Hurst refer not only to information failures as undermining rationality 
assumptions, but also to failures of rationality, which include the way choices are made (rules of 
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thumb or heuristics may be flawed), biased perception of the information available, including 
bias due to the way that information is presented, and cognitive errors in the interpretation of 
information.45 Cawley (2004) refers to “lack of rationality” as, along with information deficits 
and externalities, one of the three broad areas of market failure. Cawley states that “lack of 
rationality” “covers a vast gray area, with borders undefined by economics and which need to be 
informed by cognitive and life sciences”46
                                                 
45 Cognitive errors in the interpretation of information would include what psychological research shows to be a 
cognitive bias in misinterpreting new information as more supportive of a previously held hypothesis than it is, 
called a confirmatory bias. Agents are seen by Rabin and Schrag (1999) to reach beyond overconfidence, to “near 
certainty in a false hypothesis despite receiving an infinite amount of information” (p 37). This brings into new light 
the Variyam and Golan quote in 6.7.2.b about the confusion surrounding nutrition information in consumers’ minds, 
where perhaps nutrition beliefs consumers hold due to ignorance, poor heuristics, or to justify previous behavior (L. 
Festinger’s cognitive dissonance) could bias them to discount or ignore scientific evidence that would provoke a 
change of diet in homo economicus. 
 (p 120). Sassi and Hurst also offer evidence from 
Lipscomb, Weinstein, and Torrance (1996), who “summarized the key findings from a large 
body of empirical literature about time preferences in relation to a variety of outcomes, including 
health” (Sassi and Hurst, p 26). They note from Lipscomb, Weinstein, and Torrance that “people 
may discount heavily future risks that are perceived as relatively small at the time of 
consumption;” “discount rates for losses are typically lower than for gains;” and because 
possibly adverse health outcomes are considered for periods far enough in the future so that good 
health may be valued less, this “may diminish the importance of such outcomes (heavier 
discounting) in the eyes of the consumer” (p 26). Each of these documented behaviors translates 
easily to the series of small daily decisions regarding added sugars. “…[S]ubstantial empirical 
evidence…indicates that individual health related behaviours often reflect hyperbolic 
discounting. This refers to an accelerated form of discounting, which heavily penalises future 
outcomes in present judgments, in a way that makes time preferences inconsistent” (p 26).  
46 Sassi and Hurst precisely cite cognitive sciences (behavioral economic estimations of time preference) as a means 
to inform economic gray areas, and I refer to cognitive and life sciences in this chapter, as Cawley broadly defines 
them. 
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Sassi and Hurst’s critique is consistent with Pesendorfer, who cites David Laibson that 
there is “experimental evidence of an ‘immediacy effect’ in behavior: subjects have a tendency 
to choose earlier, smaller rewards over later, larger rewards when the earlier reward offers 
immediate consumption but reverse this preference when both rewards are delayed” (p 713). 
Again, the implication for sCSD consumption versus abstinence is implicit, and blends well with 
implications from Ellsberg’s paradox, showing a preference for the known payoff now versus the 
less certain payoff later. 
Addressing habitual and addictive behaviors specifically, Sassi and Hurst note that 
whether there is a chemical or psychological addiction, “the non-independence of acts of 
consumption…may cause concern about individuals’ ability to maximize their own welfare,” 
much as I model in sections 6.5 and 6.6. They cite a UK government report emphasizing two 
psychological mechanisms that present obstacles to changing habitual behaviors. “Tunnel 
vision” reduces the motivation to seek or use information that may better inform people of the 
consequences of their behavior, and creates a tendency to discount the value of new information, 
especially “when it highlights risks associated with the habitual behavior.” The second 
mechanism is that people with habits tend to implicitly assume that because it was desirable to 
build the habit, it must be desirable to continue it. Referring to these mechanisms, they state that 
“in doing so consumers may overlook longer-term consequences of that consumption which may 
well offset any short-term efficiency gains” (p 27-8, for this paragraph). They concede that there 
is empirical support for Becker and Murphy’s prediction from rational addiction theory that 
higher permanent prices will dissuade addiction, but Sassi and Hurst warn: “Of course, 
individuals may still be subject to information failures or failures of rationality which would 
make their behaviours inefficient, leading to less than desirable outcomes…” (p 28). Thus, there 
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is in this OECD document much to support contentions with Becker and Murphy (6.7.5), much 
that exactly supports the concepts defining the models proposed in sections 6.5 and 6.6. 
 
6.8.2    Habitual Eating Patterns – Ignoring Information, Ad-Hoc Preference Formation 
In a 2000 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making article, O’Donoghue and Rabin 
characterize results quite evocative of the minimal attention paid by some to habitual sCSD 
consumption and the longer-term effects of even minor self-control problems, among which we 
may consider including unhealthful eating habits: 
[S]mall-scale day-to-day decisions are where self-control problems are most likely to influence behavior. 
...As we have shown with examples where mild self-control problems cause severe welfare losses, when 
making a long sequence of day-to-day decisions, none of which seem important in isolation, even a small 
bit of a self-control problem can lead a person to behave in ways different from how she would like to 
behave from a long-run perspective” (p 247). 
 
Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood (2009), psychologists exploring deliberative and automatic 
processes in dietary choice, offer insight into habits47
 [H]abits bypass reflective action control and automatically maintain dietary behaviors without people 
being aware of or intending to respond in the same way as they did in the past. 
 and their effects on eating patterns: 
     …As people repeatedly purchase and consume, the size of food portions [exogenously influenced by 
packaging, we know from Wansink and Sobal’s results], types of food eaten, and frequency of eating form 
characteristic patterns that can become habitual and activated by the context cues that were associated with 
eating in the past. 
                                                 
47 Use of the terms “habit” and “habitual behavior” in this paper are not intended to have the full force that 
psychologists or social psychologists assign the terms, because I do not claim fluency in their literatures, but are 
meant to convey behaviors that are repeated to the point that they take on a degree of automaticity and performance 
without conscious intent or perhaps even awareness. Thus, there is at least some degree of bypassing a discrete and 
deliberative choice process. I do not intend to conflate “frequency of purchase” with “habitual use” of sCSDs in the 
empirical work (Essay One, i.e. Chapters 2–4, built on household purchase data), but in this theoretical work and the 
empirical work, I wish to distinguish purchase and consumption patterns that are presumptively automatic (will 
average a high minimum each month, even if exact dates vary) from those households that purchase rarely or are 
specifically motivated by rare events in the household. No household that purchases 3 liters of Coke every 
Christmas and no other time should be characterized as habitual consumers, and no household that buys a few 
hundred ounces every few weeks should be exempt from being labeled a habitual purchaser/consumer. 
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     …[Practice of habits] not only heightens habit accessibility but also reduces the accessibility of 
alternative responses. …[B]ehaviors, once they become habitual, are maintained without reference to 
preferences and intentions (S11-12; emphasis added; Social psychologists Verplanken, Aarts, and Van 
Knippenberg [1997] offer some of the empirical support for these conclusions, as do Verplanken and Faes 
[1999], and Verplanken and Wood [2006]). 
 
The last sentence is critical for it claims that everyday behaviors can routinely bypass an 
individual’s active set of preferences and goals, in which case deliberative RUMax behavior does 
not automatically or easily re-engage once habitual behavior diverges from what deliberative 
RUMax behavior would be. The sheer number of Americans unhappy with their weight, heart 
disease, and type II diabetes suggests that divergence is quite possible. Perhaps even probable, 
given our natural tendency to form habits, then automatically follow them without programmatic 
checking to confirm they conform with our RUMax preferences and personal goals. 
Social psychologists specifically caution that “frequency of past behavior” is inadequate 
to define a habit, as there must not only be repetition, but the development of a degree of 
“automaticity” to a behavior for it to be what they call “habitual” (Maio et al. 2007, addressing 
obesogenic behavior and how to combat it). 
…[A] habit is frequent behavior that is conducted with little conscious awareness and intention, is mentally 
efficient, and may sometimes be difficult to control… In addition a habit is cued by the environment in 
which the behavior is conducted. 
…Previous research has established a number of factors that make habits formidable obstacles…: [f]irst, 
habit leads to ‘tunnel vision.’ When habits have developed, an individual is less motivated to attend to and 
acquire new information, particularly information that is not consistent with the habit. …[H]abits tend to 
resist information-based interventions. Second, habitual behavior seems less guided by attitudes and 
intentions than behavior that is conducted in a more deliberative fashion. When a particular behavior is 
repeated over and over again, the original reasons and arguments why that behavior was adopted in the first 
place may vanish over time (Maio et al.: p 104, citing numerous others). 
 
From these two last quotes we see that particular to food choices, the development of 
habits is likely to divorce actual behavior from known preferences and long-term intentions, to 
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exclude options for improving habits or deliberative consideration of information that may 
expose the flaws of one’s habits. All of this follows from a type of mental efficiency that obeys 
biological constraints of perception, information processing, and decision-making resources in 
the formation of initial habits, a process that will generate the habit as an output, and no longer 
account the environmental (including marketing) cues that were used in the formation.  
But habits once formed have a further advantage over intentions – they engage faster, and 
without the need to consult the brain’s regulatory center, where the decision to deliberate incepts: 
In short, the environment’s automatic activation of well-practiced responses is a key to persistence of habits 
despite people’s best intentions. … 
First, given that habits are cued relatively directly by the environment with minimal decision making, the 
practiced response is likely to be more immediately available than thoughtfully generated alternatives. When 
multiple response options are available, the speed of automatically activated responses gives them 
precedence over responses generated through slower routes. Second, habits require minimal regulatory 
control (p 93). … 
In summary, the expectations established through behavior repetition and the automaticity of habit performance 
are conservative forces that reduce openness to new information and that perpetuate well-practiced behaviors 
despite people’s intentions to do otherwise (Verplanken and Wood 2006, p 95). 
 
In a mode of biological and psychological efficiency (saving decision capacity and the 
glucose needed to fuel higher brain functions), under familiar circumstances with no clear and 
imminent threat, eating behavior often becomes routine. This saves decision making for choices 
considered more important. This is then “satisficing,” and eating as a secondary behavior 
occurring as an internally efficient process may recur daily, until habitual. Once established, 
habitual patterns are hard to break, as the biological and environmental triggers of habitual 
behavior reduce awareness and shrink the window for assertion of intentions – intentions being 
consistent with longer-term objectives. 
Developing habits, can be a useful functional build-out of heuristics into a behavioral 
framework that saves effort and time. Naturally, such solutions favor short-term results to the 
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exclusion of better long-term options that would require careful information gathering, Bayesian 
learning, and deliberative changes in routinized behavior. “…Habits are functional in obtaining 
certain goals or end states. Habits are thus specific behavioral responses to specific cues in the 
environment. …Habits may also become the main driving force of behavior, while attitude and 
intentions become unrelated to behavior” (Verplanken and Faes 1999, p 594). Development of 
habits solves some problems in the low-priority realm of daily eating (from a single day’s 
perspective), while establishing an inertia resistant to efforts to change those habits. No one 
would wish to make all of their hundreds of daily food decisions discretely. The question 
becomes the degree to which one allows one’s rational utility maximization to be compromised, 
and whether one has calculated the effects of failing to do so in a way that is fair to one’s future 
self. 
 
6.8.2.a    Eating Habits and Decision Theory 
Do habits override intentions as the social psychologists contend, such that a preference 
for immediate gratification overwhelms goals for long-term health? If so, there is time-
inconsistent preference, and if also regret, a failure of rationality. If preferences are known 
ordered discrete and considered, as neoclassical economists argue, then no such conflict exists. 
This returns us to decision theory.  
Decision research scientist Ellen Peters (2009) provides further insight into the decision 
environment associated with eating. In sharp contrast to treating preferences as individual 
characteristics that can be handled empirically as known, fixed, and beyond the individual’s 
control or the environment’s ability to affect, Peters quotes other authors as noting that nearly 
every current theory in decision making may be characterized as a theory of preference 
construction. Thus Peters indicates knowledge among a great class of decision theorists that 
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preferences are constructed at the time of decision making “based on internal and external cues 
available at the moment” (p S81). “…[E]ven in familiar domains such as everyday eating 
behaviors…decisions are quite prone to preference construction” (p S82). According to Peters, 
preference construction (versus recall and application of known preferences in a consciously 
deliberative decision process) is more likely when there are conflicts between known preferences 
(say, a sweet drink now, versus target weight later), when feelings are difficult to fit onto a 
numeric scale, and when people do not have strong feelings about different options (eating habits 
do not trigger strong feelings).  
Beyond simple comprehension, individuals must be able to determine meaningful differences between 
opinions, weigh factors to match their needs and values, make tradeoffs (e.g., between risks and benefits) 
and ultimately choose. But consumers often make food purchases and consumption behaviors based on 
habit, implying that many of these later processes do not always take place in day-to-day eating behaviors 
and are instead replaced by habitual responding (p 85). 
 
Peters further offers that as preferences are constructed “on the spot” based on internal 
and external cues at the moment, there are two tracks, a fast one that conserves decision 
resources, and a slow one that does not. She labels these “affect heuristics,” which use emotion, 
and are effortless, spontaneous, implicit, intuitive, automatic, associative, and fast; and the 
“deliberative mode,” which uses rational thought and is “conscious, analytical, reason-based, 
verbal, [and] relatively slow” (p S82). For most eating, habitual behaviors are therefore likely to 
“kick in” unless there is an uncommon demand for a deliberative process. With this perspective 
we can see why marketing of snacks, fast food, and soft drinks can be so effective. It specifically 
triggers the mode that quickly and automatically intercedes before deliberative (rational utility-
maximizing) thought, unless one is quite wary: “Marketers, who well understand the power of 
affect, typically aim their ads to evoke an experiential mode of information processing. As a 
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result, individuals must learn to cope with these feelings that food marketers attempt to elicit if 
they want healthy eating habits” (p S82).  
Maio et al. (2007) speak of “automatic attitudes” that “arise spontaneously without 
thought or deliberation,” and “implicit measures” that affect evaluations of choice options 
whether or not people can remember what these implicit measures are. These largely parallel 
concepts that decision-theorist Peters and behavioral economists and psychologists (including 
Kahneman) discuss, albeit with differing vocabulary, describe a fast and reflexive decision 
process mode that one would associate with a successful marketing/television-advertising 
campaign – one that ties a conceptual image to a branded product. Of many possible examples, 
consider Coca-Cola®, with its themed campaigns selling “life,” enjoyment, and an active sports 
life – images more central to its ads than the sugar water itself. Particular to food, Maio et al.’s 
implicit measures “arise quickly and spontaneously without thought or deliberation.” 
“…[I]mplicit measures can predict variance in behavior that is not explained by self-report measures of 
attitude. …[R]esearchers…found that implicit measures of preference for brands of yoghurt…fast-food 
restaurants…and colas significantly predicted brand choice, product usage, and even brand recognition in a 
blind taste test. …[T]he implicit measures predicted variables even after controlling for the explicit ratings 
[self-reported measures of attitude]. Thus implicit measures have a unique relationship with common, food-
related behaviors. …[T]his unique relationship may be particularly strong when the behaviors are relatively 
spontaneous and automatic, rather than thoughtful or deliberative (…) (p 115-6; emphasis added; embedded 
citations dropped, and marked by “(…)”). 
 
This is further empirical support directly refuting the assumption that food choices are evaluated 
subject to deliberative, RUMax choice, or inflexible intrinsic preferences. 
 
6.8.2.b    Poor Information Gathering, Advertising, and Failure to “Bayesian Update” 
Zimmerman (2011) adds to literature concerned with the ability to affect perception and 
preference by controlling marketing variables. He refers to retailers who construct an appearance 
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of value by placing higher cost items near lower cost ones, as with “supersizing” and “value 
meals.” Using Peters’ perspective, this triggers the rapid “affect” reward of getting a deal, the 
illusion of having deliberated properly, while preventing a deeper deliberation on overeating: 
“the marketer’s trick is to get the consumer to overconsume by focusing on the virtue of 
economy, not on the vice of gluttony” (Zimmerman, p 294).  
There is clear and longstanding evidence that time constraints affect the gathering of 
nutrition information as well as the preparation of healthy meals. When quality of food is a 
secondary or tertiary focus of attention, food advertising may fill a gap, but will also favor 
convenience foods and highly processed foods. Food is the second most advertised product 
category, with expenditures in 1995 of around $16 billion, versus the $0.3 billion the USDA 
spent promoting the Food Guide Pyramid and healthy eating practices (Blaylock et al. 1999, for 
the paragraph). Smith (2002) argues that people evolved searching for particular biological 
information about food options, but that the information in television advertisements poorly 
matches the biological search criteria, and that television ads for processed foods in this sense 
misinform. 
Advertising showing happy, attractive, successful people (or professional athletes), or 
cute carefree cartoon animals enjoying SSBs/sCSDs might join an individual’s own socialization 
watching her family and friends drink soft drinks. At the very least it is clear that the ads appeal 
to an emotional level rather than conveying economic or nutrition information about the product, 
and this would trigger the emotional decision structure (Peters’s “affect”), versus a deliberative 
(slower) one. Smith (2002) cites evidence that the actual nutritional quality of advertised foods is 
usually poor. But the associative imagery from the ads may still trigger socialization or possibly 
preference formation (Smith 2002), and more certainly may trigger selection of the advertised 
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food. In this way advertising might feed “social norms and social imitation” that “function as 
decision-making guidelines that keep individual learning and information search to a minimum.” 
“Custom, not optimization, governs much of life, even in the economic and intellectual worlds” 
(Gigerenzer 2001, p 3308, both last quotes). Effective marketing of high-energy low-nutrient 
foods can promulgate habitual consumption that divorces behavior from utility maximization, 
and from the updating of decision behaviors with the availability of new information (Bayesian 
decision theory, or Bayesian learning) that one would expect from a rational utility maximizer.  
Without conformity to the precepts of the Bayesian theory of learning, there is no 
theoretical mechanism determining that individuals with differing initial subjective probabilities 
will “converge toward an intersubjective probability distribution if given more and more 
information about what the world is actually like” (Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1988, p4, their 
emphasis). The rigorous, comprehensive, self-correcting model of decision theory breaks down 
given actual evidence of eating behaviors and the difficulties observed in trying to change them. 
Eating environment and habits are factors that can mask, override, or even create at least 
some portion of individual preferences. Wansink, Just, and Payne (2009) discuss ways the food 
environment can lead to unconscious eating behaviors: 
…[C]onsumption can also be unknowingly influenced by environmental cues—benchmarks or reference 
points [such as large packages, plates or serving bowls, or even food stocked in pantries]—that may subtly 
suggest a consumption norm that is appropriate, typical, reasonable, and normal. …[T]he tendency to be 
biased by these cues may be even as powerful—within limits—as the taste of the food itself. 
   All of these cues perceptually suggest that a larger amount of food is normal, appropriate, typical, and 
reasonable to consume. Most individuals dutifully follow these implicit suggestions. The influence of 
consumption norms, as with normative benchmarks generally, often occurs outside of conscious awareness (p 
165-6).  
Low levels of nutrition knowledge can help formation of bad habits that themselves work 
against the acquisition and incorporation of information that would update the decision structure 
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toward achieving an equilibrium where long-term health is not significantly compromised. The 
chain of rational utility maximization is broken, as long-term preferences are unconsciously 
ignored by those in the rut of unhealthful eating habits. In the common food environment 
contexts that satisfy Maio et al.’s, Wansink’s (including more evidence below), and Gärdenfors 
and Sahlin’s observations, utility maximization cannot be assumed, and rationality seems 
unlikely to hold to the defensible theoretical standard set by classical decision theory. 
University of Chicago professors, Richard Thaler, of Economics and Behavioral Science 
at the graduate school of business, and Cass Sunstein of the Law School came to many of these 
same conclusions before much of the newer food-related behavioral economic work by Wansink 
and colleagues was published. They refer to “Bayes’ rule” as a proxy for Bayesian learning, 
discussed above, which explains how existing beliefs change the probability assigned to a 
particular hypothesis as new evidence presents (Sunstein and Thaler 2003). “People do not 
exhibit rational expectations, fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’ rule, use 
heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders, exhibit preference reversals (…) and make 
different choices depending on the wording of the problem” (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, p 176). 
“It is the strong claim that all or almost all Americans are choosing their diet optimally that we 
reject as untenable” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p1168, their emphasis). They advocate re-
engineering of aspects of the food environment, as will be discussed in the Policy chapter (Essay 
Three). 
Thus a litany of theories well-tested by psychologists and behavioral economists criticize 
the idea that Americans rationally optimize in their dietary habits. Just and Payne 2009: 
Behavioral economic models combine heuristic decision rules with economic decision making. … Thus some 
behavioral economic models seek to tell us how individuals’ decisions deviate from the decisions that might 
make the individual better off. In the context of food, we may be able to model and identify when individuals 
make decisions to consume that disregard or underweight health information. … …[I]n deciding whether to 
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employ a rational or heuristic model, [we must question] whether the individuals are freely able to choose 
the outcome they want. In this case, it is difficult to argue that obese individuals have chosen 
deliberatively to become so. Rather, individuals invest 40 billion dollars annually in attempts to restrict their 
own eating behavior in the form of diet plans (S50, emphasis added). 
 
We can easily picture an individual with bounded rationality and imperfect 
nutrition/medical knowledge with reasonable health goals that are short-circuited by the decision 
habits he uses in the rush of daily life. It is easy to imagine an American who may not know their 
optimal weight, but has an aspiration-level goal of a certain weight that may be maintained with 
what he considers to be a reasonable level of food choice effort. If he edges over that weight, or 
substantially overshoots the target without realizing it, he may justify the new weight in a 
dynamic update to his aspiration, rather than updating his aspiration for his effort level. This may 
well ignore the medical literature on the risk involved. In a daily environment, his own fast and 
frugal heuristics may be much more focused on solving problems unrelated to diet, and these 
could allow sugar fixes and thirst quenchers from the (perhaps advertised) options present when 
his energy flags or thirst develops. An individual’s heuristics may be influenced by culture and 
habit more than by his own perhaps vague “target-weight-per-food-selection-effort” aspiration. 
Failure to adapt dietary habits given the weight increase above a target level is a demonstration 
of failure of Bayesian learning – violating a critical theoretical assumption justifying the ability 
of individuals to subjectively achieve optimal outcomes without calculating strictly numeric 
probabilities. The rationality criterion from which individual choices cannot be impugned 
because they maximize according to the individual’s preference structure no longer remains 
adamant, but is exposed to be flexible, permeable, possible but not deterministically descriptive, 
as in the theoretical models proposed here in sections 6.5 and 6.6. 
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6.8.2.c    Automaticity of Habit versus Rationality in Habit Formation 
The previous sections present the argument that many people tend not to think through 
food choices or eating pattern development in deliberative, rational ways, for reasons whose 
mechanisms are now fairly clear. This does not imply that conventional economic analysis can 
tell us nothing, but that the differing assumptions between the two approaches limits crossover in 
understanding.  
Zhen et al. (2011) estimate a model of demand for SSBs “under habit formation,” and use 
the results to analyze short- and long-term effects of a half-cent-per-ounce tax on SSBs at two 
levels of household income. The dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System they estimate employs 
Becker and Murphy’s (1988) concept of consumption in one period affecting consumption in a 
later period. They infer from Becker and Murphy that addiction is “an extreme form of habit 
formation,” and seek to “investigate the plausibility of beverage addiction” (p 176). But this 
cannot be addiction or habit in the sense that a rational process has been overwhelmed or short-
circuited, because it follows from the Becker and Murphy construct.  Zhen et al. investigate 
rational habit formation within a dynamic flexible demand system, but “the consumer is rational 
in the sense that effects of current purchases on future utility are accounted for through user 
costs” (p 178). The consumer is rational because s/he accounts for all future costs including the 
“durability effect” of the good (as a service flow into future periods from current consumption) 
and the degree of habituation. But the degrees of durability and habituation are estimated by 
purchase behavior assuming lifetime utility maximization and calculation of the durability and 
habit effects relative to the interest rate. This again follows Becker and Murphy in that the 
assumption of rational decision-making in part predicates results. Zhen et al. define a consumer 
as myopic if s/he does not consider the effects of current purchase on future utility, so “user costs 
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are replaced by market prices” (p 180). While a useful proxy in this approach, this method would 
overestimate utility gains if future utility would be compromised by current consumption (as we 
have seen from the medical literature it probably will be), and this method cannot accommodate 
failures of rationality due to failures of information or a behavioral process that skirts 
deliberation (because it implicitly assumes a two-stage budgeting process, one that could not be 
conscious and therefore could not be deliberative if evidence from the previous two sections 
holds). So while valid on its own terms, the model does not conform to the precepts of the 
models I offer. As with Dragone (2009), Huston and Finke (2003), Finke and Huston (2003), and 
Mancino and Kinsey (2008, to follow), the work flows from the assumption that consumers do 
not act with a degree of engrained automaticity, in contrast to repeated arguments we have just 
seen that people actually do. This will affect policy recommendations, as all of these approaches 
will overlook the importance of the need to directly help people become more aware of their 
behaviors and improve their eating heuristics as a means of achieving rational utility-maximizing 
behavior, rather than assuming it. 
Zhen et al. report interesting results consistent with expectations. For high-income 
households, a rational behavior model seems to fit the data better, and for low-income 
households, a “myopic” model seems to fit better, where consumers do not seem to account for 
later utility effects of current purchase. Results are not inconsistent with my own empirical 
results (that lower-income households, particularly at lower-education levels, tend to be less 
price responsive and more advertising responsive than higher-income households), perhaps to a 
degree supporting the robustness of both approaches. 
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6.8.3    Loewenstein and Visceral Factors 
In the consideration of why people make food choices that they know on some level must 
harm them over time, it is useful to consult Carnegie Mellon’s George Loewenstein, who offers a 
theoretical structure extending rational decision theory to include the prospect that people may 
not always feel in full control of their actions, and may not admit or respect that condition later. 
In a 1996 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes article, Loewenstein 
cites theoretical and empirical research across decision theory, psychology, sociology, and 
behavioral economics, to craft an argument that explains discrepancies between actual behavior 
and rational self-interest. He proposes that there are “drive states” (“hunger, thirst, sexual desire, 
moods and emotions, physical pain, and craving for a drug one is addicted to”, p 272) that 
usually negatively have a direct hedonic impact, and which affect the desirability (current 
expected value) of a good or action. He calls these visceral factors, and assesses two central 
premises to this perspective: “First, immediately experienced visceral factors have a 
disproportionate effect on behavior and tend to ‘crowd out’ virtually all goals other than that of 
mitigating the visceral factor. Second, people underweigh, or even ignore, visceral factors that 
they will experience in the future, have experienced in the past, or that are experienced by other 
people” (p 272).  
This first premise supports my contention for equation (d) that the “now” term is likely to 
be disproportionately weighted over the “later” term, just as Gigerenzer, and Sassi and Hurst 
directly contend, from different premises. Loewenstein’s second premise, in that he clearly 
means this as a reflexive bias, would explain why people are so reluctant to change behaviors 
that are not working toward longer-term goals – because they are in some way strongly inclined 
not to acknowledge that their habits are failing to work toward longer-term goals. Regular 
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consumption of high-sugar non-nutritive foods like SSBs certainly follow from these premises 
for at least some portion of the population – otherwise the nutrition figures on added sugar 
consumption as a percentage of total energy intake, and on obesity, diabetes and cancer rates, as 
well as volume turnover and profits for major food manufacturers, would hardly seem plausible. 
 Verplanken and Faes (1999) come to a similar conclusion, although tending toward the 
reflexive influence of environment rather than the flipped switches of preference that 
Loewenstein describes: 
Counterintentional habits may be especially formed when behavior involves short-term hedonistic-driven 
motives [have a Coke and a smile] at the expense of long-term benefits of attaining valued goals [target 
weight]. …[B]y satisfactorily repeating a behavior, relatively chronic contingencies between situational 
cues and habitual responses are formed, which bring behavior under the control of specific situational cues 
(p595) [say, automatic purchase of large Coke, with popcorn at the weekly trip to the cinema]. 
 
Returning to Loewenstein, he slowly outlines a spectrum for the influence of visceral 
factors on behavior, from low levels, where “it makes good sense to eat when hungry…and to 
take pain killers when in pain”; to “excessive” influence, where “visceral factors can be so 
powerful as to virtually preclude decision making…[ –  n]o one decides to fall asleep at the 
wheel, but many people do”; to “overriding of rational deliberation by the influence of visceral 
factors” such as occurs with phobics and heroin addicts (p 273, emphasis his). He recommends 
that decision theory would gain advantage by distinguishing between visceral factors and tastes, 
because as visceral factors intensify, they focus attention and motivation to forms of 
consumption associated with that factor, while “[n]on-associated forms of consumption lose their 
value” (p 274). In contrast to other contemporary decision theorists who “typically define 
irrationality as a failure to adhere to certain axioms of choice such as transitivity or 
independence”: 
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The theoretical perspective proposed here views irrationality not as an objective and well-defined 
phenomenon, but as a subjective perception that occurs in the mid-range of the continuum defined by the 
influence of visceral factors. At low levels…people generally experience themselves as behaving in a 
rational fashion. At extremely high levels…decision making is seen as arational—that is, people don’t 
perceive themselves as making decisions at all. It is in the middle region…when people observe themselves 
behaving contrary to their own perceived self-interest, that they tend to define their own behavior as 
irrational (p 289, emphasis his). 
 
Loewenstein refers to “a good-specific collapsing of one’s time perspective toward the present” 
(p 275), such that “intense visceral factors cause behavior to depart from perceived self-interest” 
(p 288). This creates “an inherent asymmetry between the temporal selves” (p 288) within an 
individual over time that implicitly negates the assumption of a constant time preference. 
The subjective nature of decision making under ephemeral influences that include 
conditioned brain-reward-center pathways associated with pure-sugar consumption bring into 
question assumptions of utility maximization in the routine consumption of sCSDs.48
Loewenstein describes propositions characterized by the influence of visceral factors, by 
which one’s own failures of rationality (Sassi and Hurst’s term) are discounted by individuals in 
their internal assessments of the influence of such factors. The first proposition reduces roughly 
 The 
economic assumption that people bought and consumed what they wanted based on a fully rational 
calculus of all of their goals over all periods does not stand up well to Lowenstein’s argument, or 
implications from medical evidence. Lowenstein cites a spate of researchers – not theorists – 
arguing that “most behavior is relatively ‘automatic,’ ‘mindless,’ habitual, or rule-guided” (p 289, 
embedded citations omitted, see original). “Contrary to the central assumption of decision theory, 
not all behavior is volitional, and very likely most of it is not. … My argument is that much 
behavior is non-volitional or only partly volitional—even in situations characterized by substantial 
deliberation” (p 289). 
                                                 
48 Beyond the neurobiology already discussed, see Baumeister’s various works, section 6.8.4. 
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to “the more you want it now, the more likely you are to overvalue having/doing it now.” 
Second: in assessing the effect of future visceral factors, our current valuation of a future good 
and our guess at the valuation we will place on it later are fairly close. Third: immediate visceral 
factors will lead to greater valuation of immediate consumption than delayed consumption, even 
when visceral factors for immediate and delayed consumption increase equally. Fourth: currently 
influential visceral factors will have mild effects on decisions for the future, even if their 
influence will fade before the future. Lowenstein’s fifth and sixth propositions are critical to my 
contention in the models in section 6.5 and 6.6 that rational utility maximization may fail in part 
due to a dynamic element, where decision criteria are poorly formed or poorly maintained, and 
not updated: “[5th] People underestimate the impact of visceral factors on their own future 
behavior. [6th] As time passes, people forget the degree of influence that visceral factors had on 
their own past behavior. As a result, past behavior that occurred under the influence of visceral 
factors will increasingly be forgotten, or will seem perplexing to the individual” (p 278). In his 
final proposition, Loewenstein extends these six propositions from intrapersonal to interpersonal 
comparisons, where other people play the role of the later self. 
 In a 2000 American Economic Review  article, Loewenstein refers to : “Numerous 
studies…[employing] diverse methods to show that people tend to interpret their own behavior 
as the result of deliberative decision-making even when this is not the case” (p427). Loewenstein 
continues, claiming that contrary to standard beliefs, it is the visceral factors that while 
changeable are highly systematic in their influence on behavior, while the effects of cognitive 
deliberation “are a major source of unpredictability” (p 427). Loewenstein models the influence 
of visceral factors on behavior as a form of “state-dependent preferences” within a vector of 
visceral states (p 427). Economists tend to discredit the influence of visceral factors, says 
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Loewenstein, because people appear to act in conflict to their own best interest, and because 
“people tend to underestimate the impact of visceral factors on their own current and future 
behavior” (p428). Visceral factors: “function biologically to grab the attention… designed to 
function with minimal or with no higher-level cognitive mediation. For this reason visceral 
factors can have an enormous influence on behavior in the absence of cognitive deliberations. 
They can even override such deliberations” (p 428). 
Loewenstein poses that welfare maximization lies somewhere between the extremes of 
ignoring visceral factors and treating them as the same as any other influence on tastes. 
According to Loewenstein, visceral factors may critically affect bargaining power, intertemporal 
choice, and decision-making under risk and uncertainty. They thus may explain anger and 
selfishness triggers in negotiations; otherwise ‘normal’ decision-making suddenly yielding to 
extreme discounting of the future; the low correlations observed between different intertemporal 
trade-offs by the same individual; and divergence between emotional reactions and cognitive 
evaluations to perceived risks (p430). “Understanding the emotions people experience at the time 
of consuming, or deferring consumption, is critical for understanding and predicting the 
intertemporal trade-offs they make” (p430). One may speculate on the emotional effect of 
decades of television advertising by the world’s number-one soft drink seller that associate Coke 
consumption with Joy, Life, and Love, and of other major brands with youth (Pepsi), 
independence (Dr. Pepper), and sports acumen (Sprite). Berning (2011) states that television 
advertising creates long-term brand identity, which can stimulate the brain independently from 
the brain reward for consumption. 
In a 2001 article Loewenstein et al., making clear that their model of “risk as feelings” is 
based on a substantial body of research and extends to decisions that do not involve risk, contend 
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that “the gut feelings experienced at the moment of making a decision, which are often quite 
independent of the consequences of the decision, can play a critical role in the choice one 
eventually makes” (p 281). The effect of emotions, which biologically are more basic and rapid 
than cognitive evaluations (p 268) allow feelings to affect if not bypass cognitive processes, 
undermining what the authors call the “cognitive-consequentialist” approach (taken by 
economists among others).  
[F]eeling states are postulated to respond to factors, such as the immediacy of risk, that do not enter into 
cognitive evaluations of the risk and also respond to probabilities and outcome values in a fashion that is 
different from the way in which these variables enter into cognitive evaluations. Because their determinants 
are different, emotional reactions to risks can diverge from cognitive evaluations of the same risks (p 270). 
 
Certainly the immediacy of risk in the mind of someone thinking about having a Coke is remote, 
while there is a “positive affect” to the anticipated emotion of the experience, constructed in part 
by decades of advertising (acknowledging that soft-drink manufacturers keep investing billions 
in advertising because the strategy works; Fulponi OECD 2009). Then despite actual risk (from 
regular consumption), there is no perceived need to balance emotion with rational consideration 
of long-term effects, and one “obeys the thirst” (as Sprite television ads tell us to do) with no 
engagement of rational mechanisms to protect long-term health. The “cognitive-
consequentialist” paradigm fails in this case. 
By Loewenstein’s argument, which is well supported by common example and clinical 
evidence, tastes (preferences) do change, and are influenced by internal and external factors, 
such that the visceral factors can make the taste for one good or behavior overwhelm other 
desires, if only briefly. Satisfying a lust “right now” is something people do, something that 
demands flexibility in tastes/preferences and in time preferences. This theory explains why 
someone would consume sCSDs daily, while also being able to answer that they know this may 
harm them, and informs connections in the models presented in sections 6.5 and 6.6. “I want 
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some sugar” may be a subtle, barely-noticed cue upon which one acts, forgetting the force of the 
impulse later, and by Loewenstein’s propositions, entirely discounting that cue’s influence when 
assessing the motivations of one’s own behavior.  
So it is no surprise that Read and van Leeuwen’s (1998) empirical test designed in 
response to Lowenstein’s theoretically- and empirically-based work strongly confirms 
predictions. Participants made a choice one week in advance with an opportunity at the time of 
consumption to have a healthful or unhealthful snack at a time soon after lunch, or later when 
they are usually hungry. 
Preferences often fluctuate as a result of transient changes in hunger and other visceral states. When current 
decisions have delayed consequences, the preferences that should be relevant are those that will prevail 
when the consequences occur. However, consistent with the notion of an intrapersonal empathy gap 
(Loewenstein 1996) we find than an individual’s current state of appetite has a significant effect on choices 
that apply to the future. …First, advanced choices were influenced by current hunger as well as future 
hunger: hungry participants chose more unhealthy snacks than did satisfied ones. Second, participants were 
dynamically inconsistent: they chose far more unhealthy snacks for immediate choice than for advance 
choice (p189). 
 
This is strong support for the application of Loewenstein’s theory exactly for SSB-type 
consumption, demonstrating  the influence of visceral factors and dynamic inconsistency.  
 
6.8.3.a    Mancino and Kinsey – A Structural Economic Model of Loewenstein’s Visceral 
Factors, and How It Differs From My Theoretical Model 
Mancino and Kinsey (2008), citing Loewenstein and behavioral economists, offer a 
structural model including visceral factors – no easy feat as this requires some quantitative proxy 
for an individual’s relevant visceral state. They cleverly dig into daily dietary recall data to 
construct a mini-panel of meal-by-meal behavior for individual participant types to which fixed 
effects can be applied. Mancino and Kinsey are motivated in part by the rise in health concern 
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among food shoppers, and demonstrated demand for health and diet books, that exists 
simultaneously with rising obesity and poor-nutrition-related illnesses of overconsumption 
already documented here. “These conflicting trends highlight a disturbing inconsistency. …A rift 
between long-term objectives and short-term desires can lead to time-inconsistent choices” (p 1). 
This forces them toward behavioral economic literature, which offers models attributing time-
inconsistent behavior “entirely to a reward’s temporal proximity” (p 3-4), which Mancino and 
Kinsey find lacking. They turn to Loewenstein’s theory of visceral influences, which “allows a 
broader range of situations to trigger present-biased behavior” (p 4). Loewenstein poses visceral 
factors that are temporally separable, affecting a decision only in its time period, and separable so 
that each factor may affect only one consumption variable (p 4). 
Mancino and Kinsey offer a model of utility that is solvable in standard economic fashion 
(Lagrangian optimization with respect to food choice, whose first-order conditions are used for 
comparative statics, to predict the effect of different values of variables). Some of Mancino and 
Kinsey’s predictions follow strictly from assumptions that differ from assumptions in my model, 
but their work is clean, and clearly supports their motivating hypotheses: increasing visceral 
factors in period 1 cause more unhealthful food choice; increasing an individual’s awareness of 
the effects of poor dietary choice lowers the choice of unhealthful foods; and as visceral factors 
rise in intensity, the individual’s nutrition information impacts food choice less, such that those 
with higher information are less likely to forego their longer-term goals and choose unhealthful 
food. 
Mancino and Kinsey empirically test their model using CSFII and DHKS food intake 
survey data. When there are longer intervals between meals, or food eaten away from home, 
individuals consume “more calories and more calories from solid fats, alcohol, and added sugars. 
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Longer intervals between meals are also associated with lower diet quality” (p i). Increasing time 
pressures – more hours worked in a week – aggravate the interval-between-meals effect. This 
offers further empirical support for the hypothesis that situational factors change time 
preferences, and the quality of dietary choice. 
Mancino and Kinsey’s model is an important step forward in the move to incorporate 
factors that can change time preferences in real time into economic models of consumer food 
choices. My model continues beyond the two-time-period model, indicating the degree of failure 
of rational choice within an unhealthy pattern of consumption. The structural model is 
constrained to define a discount factor identifying time preference. This is simple for the two-
period case, and their discount factor is a constant between 0 and 1. But when extended to more 
periods, the strength of visceral factors – to be consistent with Loewenstein and others – will flex 
this discount factor, so that it is not consistent. And at meal-level analysis, the effects of 
breakfast may last more than one further meal time, with different discount rates within the day. 
This complicates a structural analysis considerably, and depending on the effect length, 
tractability may become an issue. While this may not upset the basic direction of Mancino and 
Kinsey’s findings, it shows a weakness of structural assumptions about time preference. 
I am forced by my characterization of choice within a dynamic pattern to implicitly use 
distributions of k and a as each is the product of a combination of influences, including time 
preference and changing levels of discipline in evaluating food choices, that impact one’s 
assessment of later health effects from current choices. Thus my model, which I do not yet claim 
is quantifiably estimable, allows an even ‘broader range of situations to trigger present-biased 
behavior.’ When an individual’s dietary habits are fairly consistent, this may prove estimable –  
with k as an estimate or an estimable distribution based on an individual’s dietary pattern of 
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choices, and a an estimable distribution of larger patterns in which visceral factors play out to a 
predictable degree – in a way that a time-preference constant that changes meal-by-meal may or 
may not be. It is perhaps informative to recall that in Loewenstein’s 2000 American Economic 
Review paper, he models visceral factors formally as state-dependent variables, claiming visceral 
factors are “highly systematic in their influence on behavior,” relative to the unpredictability of 
outcomes from cognitive deliberation,  and  may be “mathematically represented as a slightly 
more general form of …[O’Donoghue, Rabin, and Loewenstein’s 1999] ‘projection bias.’” (p 
427, 428). While Loewenstein draws on many clinical studies verifying mechanisms and 
behaviors, identifying temporary psychological states to a level an empirical economist may 
consider to be “data” may prove difficult. Still, Loewenstein’s confidence suggests that some 
form of quantitative modeling of equation (d) may at some point prove tractable. 
Ultimately, Mancino and Kinsey’s model still assumes a discrete rational choice for a 
single incident, assumptions I explicitly question (the figure/graphic models I offer above and 
below stress this). This again favors viewing my model as for a pattern of behavior more than for 
a single food choice incident. My view that realized utility may break from expected utility in a 
way that would surprise the earlier version of the decider also extends beyond the classical 
approach of Mancino and Kinsey, which assumes utility maximization. Nothing in my equation or 
flowchart models violates Mancino and Kinsey’s predictions or results, but my formulations 
cannot fit within their assumption set. 
Ultimately, any good existing somewhere on the positive scale of addiction must be said 
to have visceral influence. Sugar (HFCS) displays addictive-like properties (Lustig, Schmidt, and 
Brindis 2012; Avena, Rada, and Hoebel 2009), but these are less compulsive to behavior than 
opiate addictions like heroin, if we may infer that fewer crimes and acts of violence are 
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committed to satisfy an acute need for (admittedly legal) sugar than to procure (illegal) heroin. 
Lowenstein’s spectrum of visceral factors may help frame how to respond to the failures of 
rationality associated with daily intakes of sugar well in excess of recommended dietary limits. 
Vohs and Baumeister (2009) “encourage a view of addiction that allows people to sustain a 
belief in free will and to take responsibility for choices and actions” (p 231), as a means to 
dissuade anti-social behaviors (cheating, stealing, aggression, reduced helping of others) 
associated with weakened free will. Because sugar is at the lowest end of the addiction scale, the 
simple act of bringing more attention to its consumption may break the power of visceral and 
emotional factors to undercut or bypass more fully rational choice. This would involve policy 
designed to get people to change their food-choice heuristics permanently. 
 
6.8.4    Baumeister, Ego Depletion, and the Influence of Sugar on Decision-Making 
We have already observed that sugars in sCSDs may condition the brain’s system of 
chemical rewards to expect more sugar, that added sugars are objectively and routinely too high 
in the American diet, and that visceral factors may exercise a disproportionate influence on the 
choice to consume now versus satisfying other goals, such as long-term weight or health. 
Princeton-trained social psychologist Roy Baumeister offers further insight into how the conflict 
between health objectives and daily – even hourly – needs and desires may tip decision criteria to 
favor the marginal soft drink over the long-term health goal.49
                                                 
49 Economists unfamiliar with Baumeister might gauge his influence in other social sciences by noting that 6 of the 
nearly 150 academic papers Baumeister has authored or co-authored have been cited more than 500 times in Scopus 
listings. SciVerse Scopus is an Elsevier-owned bibliographic database spanning over 18,000 titles, including over 
16,500 peer-reviewed journals. 
 In short he offers theoretical and 
clinical evidence supporting a theory as to why self-control fails, that is, why the voice of homo 
economicus may be drowned out in the internal conflict over what to do(/eat). 
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As early as 1991, Heatherton and Baumeister proposed that binge eating (“eating that 
results from disinhibition of dietary restraints” whether or not within a pattern of bulimia as 
clinically defined) is motivated by a desire to escape from self-awareness dominated by 
emotional distress, including anxiety, and depression. By “narrowing attention to the immediate 
stimulus environment and avoiding broadly meaningful thought” there is disengagement from 
normal inhibitions against eating, and “an uncritical acceptance of irrational beliefs and 
thoughts” (p 86, quotes for paragraph). Heatherton and Baumeister provide an extremely 
thorough review of literature supporting the case that gastronomic stimulus can be used to 
disengage from the constraints of rational thought. If this effect exists to scale – and lesser 
degrees of binging, with less critical mass of emotion motivating the consumption of highly 
palatable foods – then the diet-based break from rational thought they identify could plausibly 
extend to high dosing of refined sugar products, like SSBs. 
But speculation is unnecessary on this point. Baumeister’s later work connects more 
important dots for us. Baumeister et al. (1998) coin the term ego depletion to describe a state 
where one’s inner capacity for active volition in choice and action becomes depleted by use. 
They conduct multiple laboratory tests – resisting tempting food, making a meaningful personal 
choice, suppressing emotion, and performing a task involving high self-regulation – and 
conclude that across a variety of executive functions, people’s capacity for active volition 
demonstrates measurable signs of depletion, from what the authors believe is a common resource 
of “ego”/self-assertive energy.  
In a 2002 Journal of Consumer Research article, Baumeister describes this depletion as 
one source of self-control failure associated with consumer behavior. The depletion may result 
from or consequently affect any conflict in goals or standards, and may induce a failure to 
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monitor one’s own behavior. When weighing the decision to drink a sCSD versus one’s longer-
term health – and by Loewenstein’s later propositions that one ignores the strength of visceral 
effects when looking back on a decision – it is easy to extend Baumeister’s theory of consumer 
behavior to a failure to rationally maximize (lifetime) utility when one’s will fails and one drinks 
a sweetened soda for the fifteenth day in a row. In another 2002 article (2002b), Baumeister 
concludes from clinical evidence that the effects of self-control energy depletion “appear after 
seemingly minor exertions because the self tries to conserve its remaining resources after a 
depletion” (p 129). If true, this could prove that it is very easy to reach a state where one’s will to 
resist a sugary treat may be lowered. His continuing work hypothesizes as to why this should be, 
then experimentally explores his hypotheses.  
In a 2003 article, Scheichel, Vohs, and Baumeister report on tests of the depletion of the 
volition and self-control response after simpler and after more complex mental activities. 
Participants asked to regulate attention and emotion before being tested performed worse at logic 
and reasoning tests, but the same as controls on general knowledge, rote memorization, or 
nonsense-syllable recall. “Cognitive tasks…depend on executive control,” and “in the current 
research the more complex tasks were impaired precisely because they required the self to exert 
executive control” (p 45). Logical reasoning is “especially impaired when the self has already 
expended some of its resources in a prior, seemingly unrelated act of self-regulation (such as 
stifling one’s emotional distress or keeping attention away from extraneous stimuli)” (p 45). This 
would be the same capacity for logical reasoning that neoclassical economics asks us to assume 
naturally automatically and flawlessly governs every choice decision in life. 
By 2007 Gailliot, Baumeister et al. are measuring blood glucose after laboratory tests of 
self-control (the Stroop task [attention focusing], thought suppression, emotion regulation, 
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attention control), and social behaviors (helping, coping with thoughts of death, stifling prejudice 
in an interracial interaction). Test results demonstrate that: 
(a) acts of self-control reduced blood glucose levels, (b) low levels of blood glucose after an initial self-
control task predicted poor performance on a subsequent self-control task, and (c) initial acts of self-control 
impaired performance on subsequent self-control tasks, but consuming a glucose drink [versus a placebo] 
eliminated these impairments. Self-control requires a certain amount of glucose to operate unimpaired. A 
single act of self-control causes glucose to drop below optimal levels, thereby impairing subsequent 
attempts at self-control (p 325). 
 
Why should these striking results be? 
[R]ecent evidence…[indicates] that some brain and cognitive processes…consume substantial amounts of 
energy—indeed, some far more than others. The “last-in, first-out rule” states that cognitive abilities that 
developed last ontogenetically are the first to become impaired when cognitive and physiological resources 
are compromised. Self-control, as a relatively advanced human capacity, was probably one of the last to 
develop and hence may be one of the first to suffer impairments when resources are inadequate. The 
present findings suggest that relatively small acts of self-control are sufficient to deplete the available 
supply of glucose, thereby impairing the control of thought and behavior, at least until the body can retrieve 
more glucose from its stores or ingest more calories (p 334-335). 
 
Late in 2007, Gailliot and Baumeister offer a comprehensive review of literature linking 
blood glucose with self-control. “Self-control failures are more likely when glucose is low or 
cannot be mobilized effectively to the brain (i.e. when insulin is low or insensitive)[sic]. 
Restoring glucose to a sufficient level typically improves self-control. …Self-control appears 
highly susceptible to glucose” (p 303). Remembering from Smith and Tasnádi that humans 
evolved believing sweet taste meant high-nutrient, toxin-free nutrition, we may suspect humans 
do not seek a particular type of sweetness when reflexively moving to restore self-control. But as 
sugar, and especially HFCS, lead to insulin resistance, glucose diminishment in the higher brain 
becomes more likely, and we may infer that the “visceral factor” driving us for a sugar fix may 
increase to a degree that would preempt any economically “rational” resistance to sugar that 
might remain. 
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This biological focus can tend to pull our attention from the simple self-medication to 
treat an emotional low that high-use SSB drinkers may be performing when drinking Coke – a 
product with decades of catchy expensive feel-good-if-you-drink-our-product ad campaigns – or 
even when drinking one of Coke’s less successful cousins, since the sugar load is similar: “when 
people feel distressed, their greatest priority is likely to be repairing their negative mood. Solace 
can often be achieved by immediate pleasures that derail the goal. For instance, stress may cause 
consumption of high-fat foods, derailing the goals of a good diet” [Maio et al. 2007, p111].  
Gailliot and Baumeister note also that automatic information processing requires far less 
mental effort and energy than the demands of higher logic and self-control, and also that the 
glucose-self-control relationship is by no means linear in effect beyond its restoration to a full-
functioning level: 
Effortful, controlled, or executive processes require more glucose than simpler, less effortful, or automatic 
processes, and they are more likely to be impaired when glucose is low or cannot be used effectively (p 
306). …  
Getting more glucose beyond having enough will not yield further increments in self-control, whereas 
getting enough glucose to recover from a depleted state will yield improvements until optimal level is 
reached (p 307). 
 
Incidentally, consuming alcohol impairs most forms of self-control, note Gailliot and 
Baumeister, perhaps largely due to the fact that it reduces glucose metabolism throughout the 
body and brain, particularly to the regions of the brain underlying self-control functions (the 
frontal cortex, p 315). Some other features noted by Gailliot and Baumeister are that: depressed 
individuals exhibit lower cerebral glucose levels in the regions of the brain regulating emotions; 
self-control deteriorates throughout the day, which “might be partially attributable to reductions 
in the flow of glucose”; and “the effects of glucose on self-control often seem independent of 
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people’s urges” (they cite evidence that glucose improved smoking cessation, whether or not a 
nicotine patch was also used; p 320).  
 Not everyone agrees with Baumeister’s work. According to a New York Times Magazine 
article on ego depletion (“Do You Suffer From Decision Fatigue,” 21 Aug 2011, by John 
Tierney, who co-authored Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength with 
Baumeister) Heatherton turned against Baumeister later in his career, but eventually surprised 
himself by coming to the same results regarding blood glucose depletion in higher- versus lower-
order brain centers. Job, Dweck, and Walton (2010) of Stanford University undertake 
experiments whose results indicate that participants’ beliefs about whether ego depletion can 
occur predicts the stick-to-it-ive-ness of their performance in a range of lab experiments. 
Critically for the inference here, they “do not question that biological resources contribute to 
successful self-control” (p 1692). They do not refute Baumeister and colleagues’ claims, but do 
offer an important caveat that may be important for policy. Job, Dweck, and Walton’s results 
associating beliefs about the depletability of self-control resources with self-control performance 
echo in some ways the work of Beydoun and Wang that consistent belief that elements of 
nutrition are not important tend to break the positive effect education has on dietary choice. Job, 
Dweck, and Walton indirectly offer some hope for education-policy-based reforms to help 
correct the way in which Americans may be sugaring up as a way to self-medicate in order to 
stay highly functional: awareness of the problem and updated nutrition beliefs may prove 
economical policy approaches to reducing added sugars in the American diet. Becker and 
Murphy seem likely to agree that a stressful environment is associated with higher levels of 
addiction (p 690), but whereas Baumeister would attribute this to stress overtaxing self-control 
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faculties, Becker and Murphy would characterize the effect as the addictive good appearing to 
have a higher marginal utility relative to the low marginal utility of an uncomfortable life. 
In a 2008 Journal of Consumer Psychology article, Baumeister et al. find that: 
Ego depletion affects consumers. Researchers showed that people shifted toward less edifying and more 
self-indulgent fare when depleted…[including] shifting toward candy instead of healthful granola bar 
snacks. … 
Actual consumption is affected too. …[D]ieters ate more food when depleted than they would otherwise. 
Nondieters were relatively unaffected by ego depletion. The distinction is important because it suggests that 
ego depletion does not simply increase appetites or pleasure seeking. Rather, it undermines the defenses 
and the virtuous intentions that would otherwise guide behavior (p 9). … 
The rational pursuit of enlightened self-interest requires intelligent thinking. Ego depletion makes people 
think less intelligently [on IQ tests and other mental tests]. … 
[D]epleted persons succumbed to various flawed decision strategies, all of which conserve effort by taking 
short cuts instead of reasoning out the problem (embedded citations omitted throughout, see original; 
emphasis added throughout, p 10). 
 
The effects Baumeister and others identify define some ironic and alarming vicious 
circles for chronic sCSD drinkers (/refined carbohydrate lovers). The very self-control needed to 
avoid consuming sCSDs (if one is attracted to them and understands their danger) fails when 
blood sugar is low – and a sugar fix can temporarily re-boot self-control. Refined sugar products 
are cheap, legal, and ubiquitous, and thus are perfectly poised to serve as a means to self-
medicate against flagging blood glucose that the brain seeks to replenish after executive-function 
stresses. A sugar ebb seems to create a state resistant to one’s ability to decide using more 
comprehensive information and a longer time perspective, and a sugar fix seems to replenish 
one’s focus and capacity to judge. A temporary blood-sugar drop during a stressful day seems to 
generate precisely the present-oriented behavior that will bypass rational consideration of longer-
term effects, and then replenish one’s capacity to think through long-term effects if one were so 
inclined. And from Loewenstein’s propositions we can see this magic window of opportunity for 
SSB consumption opening, closing itself with consumption, then being forgotten or explained 
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away. The result might then be SSBs accounting for a large portion of daily added sugars, and a 
consequent rise in weight and diabetes trends, consistent with those observed over the last 30 
years. 
It may now seem rational over the very short term to grab a sugary beverage if one’s 
ability to self-determine is flagging. Remember, people have not read Baumeister’s academic 
literature and are ignorant to the depth of the medical literature as well. They are responding to 
their environments and to internal cues over time with an eye to, if not maximizing personal 
performance, at least to avoiding feelings of low energy and lack of will. Physical evidence on a 
time-scale short enough to appreciate and account for tells them they feel better and are more 
productive with their sugar-caffeine fix. The negative health effects, while very real (e.g., an 
immediate boost in blood triglyceride levels) are invisible until much later. As HFCS (55-
fructose, 45-glucose) digestion forces high blood glucose levels, this stresses the body, but offers 
repair of a depleted ego – until the hypoglycemic crash that follows when insulin is dramatically 
spiked to seek blood sugar balance. Even this crash might be avoided if one drip feeds oneself 
sugar all day (thank you, 7-11 “Big Gulp”), which in turn is more likely to provoke insulin 
resistance, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease over time. Chronic added sugar consumption 
quite plausibly seems to the passive or even the self-aware observer over weeks or months to be 
a rational patch for the leaking air from the self-control tire, and in fact works in any short period 
– while simultaneously oxidizing the rubber, rim, and axle. 
Of course this type of “rational” patch ignores the alternative of eating a diet that does not 
set up a hypoglycemic cycle, or addressing low blood sugar with a piece of fruit (not fruit juice) 
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that offers natural sugars in the presence of fiber, which controls against hyperglycemia (that 
stages a hypoglycemic crash)50
Baumeister et al. here have brought in dozens more clinical studies that deepen the 
evidentiary base for some of Kahneman and Tversky’s assertions, and the evidentiary base for 
exactly the failures of rational utility maximization posited by the models in sections 6.5 and 6.6 
to describe the decision to consume sCSDs regularly. Let’s return to the figures and equations 
from sections 6.5 and 6.6, updated with this new information. 
 or other nutrifying choice. 
 
6.9    Empirically Informed Decision Theory Pertaining To Regular Consumption of SSBs 
Figure 4 combines element from Figures 2 and 3, and delineates features informed by 
clinical evidence from the medical, psychology (pharma-, consumer, and social), decision theory, 
and behavioral economics (for convenience, I will include Loewenstein in behavioral 
economics). So the existing classical structure from Figure 2 remains a possible path, and the 
elements of Figure 2 now inform this path within the context of elements from Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Fiber intake with any food creates a better blood profile, with better lipid and coronary heart disease marker 
values, and natural fruit sugars reduce serum triglycerides (Jenkins et al. 2000). Fiber intake with sugar intake 
lowers the blood sugar spike, regardless of the type of fiber (Jenkins et al. 1978). (Psyllium) fiber-enriched meals 
“decreased glucose, insulin, ghrelin, and [peptide YY] responses,” strongly modifying postprandial signals from the 
gastrointestinal tract (Karhunen et al. 2010). Nature apparently refuses to bend in the body’s response to refined 
carbohydrates versus the fiber-rich whole-grain and natural fruit/vegetable varieties we evolved eating. No amount 
of marketing or artificial flavorings and colorings seems to throw over the biological need to take in fiber with sugar 
in order to soften blood-sugar surges and blunt their effects.  
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Figure 4.    Model of Choice Behavior Flexible to Internal and External Influences 
 
 
 
The critical new features in Figure 4 are potential feedback loops from consuming or 
failing to consume refined carbohydrates (dashed arrows), the separation of decision making 
capacity devoted to a current decision into low- or high-faculty modes, and the introduction of 
reflexive choice (guided by strong visceral factors and/or simple heuristics) rather than active 
choice (box above “active choice”). Potential behavioral paths now include RUMax behavior 
and the capacity to bypass active choice and lifetime-utility-maximizing discrete choice (large 
curved clear arrow, with question marks for the two final paths to consume or not to consume). 
The feedback loops derive from the medical/nutrition literature and work co-authored by 
Baumeister on the importance of glucose to active decision making, and the failure to apply self-
discipline associated with low blood glucose. Low-faculty or low priority decisions would tend 
to use reflexive mechanisms, either without attention, or employing a simple heuristic. The 
separation of low- and high-faculty dedication of decision resources follows from at least 
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(complete and transitive) 
? 
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Kahneman and Tversky, Loewenstein, Gigerenzer, Peters, and Baumeister and co-authors. It is 
this likelihood to not devote decision-making resources to the SSB decision that is incompatible 
with the rational utility-maximizing framework. 
In an American Economic Review (1978) printing of his address to the American 
Economic Association (the year he received his Nobel prize), Herbert Simon suggests that 
attention may be a more scarce resource than information, by implication limiting the application 
of available information to decisions whose priority is necessarily subsumed by more pressing 
decisions: “In a world where information is relatively scarce, and where problems for decision 
are few and simple, information is almost always a positive good. In a world where attention is a 
major scarce resource, information may be an expensive luxury, for it may turn our attention 
from what is important to what may be unimportant” (p 13). This offers a plausible explanation 
for the failure to devote information-gathering resources and rational decision-making capacity 
to a choice of foods, given other priorities and stresses in life. The stresses of modern life 
encourage hyperbolic discounting, and one notices only later the health/weight effects of one’s 
heuristics. A group tasked by the United Kingdom with thinking through 50-year scenarios for 
how to tackle the obesity problem notes that “the role of habit and volitional control over 
behaviors that have a cumulative day-to-day impact over many years has been poorly 
articulated” (Maio et al. 2007, p 103). But related mechanisms have been proposed and tested 
across many fields. The flow chart and lettered equations offered here are consistent with various 
mechanisms supported by substantial empirical evidence. Maio et al. are themselves a gateway 
to a deep variety of empirical literature demonstrating what methods facilitate and what methods 
fail to induce behaviors and behavioral change.  
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It is not the case that people cannot override any suggestion, drive, or visceral drive to 
consume sugar if they want to, there simply seems to be enough empirical evidence to suggest 
that many people imbibe SSBs regularly because they act without a health-preserving heuristic 
predisposed against added-sugar consumption. There is every indication from clinical results that 
an admittedly low-priority decision will be determined with very little conscious consideration, 
likely a heuristic informed by habit. From Baumeister and co-authors, and from Loewenstein, 
there are explanations supported by clinical evidence that people with future-oriented time 
preferences can find their time preferences compromised to value the present much more highly 
in mundane daily circumstances. Greater SSB consumption is likely to increase under these 
conditions of temporary re-calibration of time preference – for example, in a bar when one wants 
to drink less or no alcohol. 
This process implicitly circumvents active economic decision making of the type one 
would expect to occur for the much rarer choices with higher lifetime stakes, such as whether to 
join the army or go to college, whether to marry, whether to pay for a biopsy. From section 6.8, 
we may expect that the heuristics are subject to “fast and frugal” dynamics, and a consumer 
burdened with dozens of more critical decisions daily would to conserve her own time and 
decision resources seem unlikely to look for, acknowledge, or incorporate uninvited health 
information, or to observe health states that change slowly over time. Arising from these 
incentives and the generally poor nutrition knowledge Americans demonstrate by their lifestyle-
related chronic diseases, her decision heuristics may be poorly constructed and poorly 
maintained from a long-term health perspective – while seeming perfectly rational to her. (She 
may unwittingly be following Loewenstein’s propositions that the effects from visceral factors 
on decision-making are greatly discounted when they are not present.) 
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Individuals have the capacity to update their heuristics concerning SSB/added-sugar 
intake, but on a daily basis are likely to notice little incentive to do so, and are perhaps more 
likely to notice environmental or internal cues consistent with reasons driving high SSB/added-
sugar consumption to became habitual in the first place. We expect from Loewenstein and from 
Baumeister that any internally acknowledged promise to “be better” about one’s diet may easily 
fade in one’s decision calculus in the presence of stress, decision fatigue, or slightly flagging 
blood sugar. So as habits develop, there is biological feedback that may reinforce habit-forming 
behavior in an already stressful daily environment, and thus reinforce the simplistic heuristics 
that support SSB consumption instead of a fully rational utility-maximizing calculation over 
lifetime utility. With high socialization of SSB use, with fairly consistent, very stylish 
advertising for sCSDs (and SSBs) over one’s lifetime, and given the extremely low priority of a 
non-filling snack amongst the competition for one’s decision-making resources, SSB habits may 
develop in persistent ignorance, driven to some degree by one mode of rational thought. The 
SSB-consumption heuristics then dominate, crowding out any re-consideration of dietary 
behavior without a new and demanding signal, one apparently more demanding than slowly 
increasing BMI. 
The critical point in the behavioral chain of decision is the heuristic that dominates when 
decision-making capacity is low. A heuristic that is present-biased with a poor health outlook 
will guide reflexive choices toward consuming more added sugars, while a heuristic that is 
medically (or at least statistically) informed, constructed, and maintained with an eye toward 
future health outcomes will guide reflexive choices toward fewer added sugar consumption 
choices. This context presents a critical opportunity for nutrition education policy. In an 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2009 article, Downs, Loewenstein, and 
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Wisdom report that: “Present-biased preferences typically encourage unhealthful choices 
because enjoyment of a meal is immediate whereas the consequent weight gain is delayed” (p 2, 
original emphasis), then the authors demonstrate that reversing a present bias toward consuming 
an unhealthful meal can be achieved simply by changing the default option the potential 
consumer faces. 
 The social failure to properly educate people about how to feed themselves healthfully 
puts the information-gathering onus on them, increasing the marginal “rationality” of unhealthful 
choices and habits by increasing the cost of learning to improve diet. Previewing results in Essay 
Three, the obvious policy fix is a dedication to teaching responsible nutrition-seeking heuristics 
to a higher average level. Given the large expenses associated with diet-based chronic disease, it 
seems that social welfare has a strong chance of improving with the investment of even many 
billions of dollars if the result is more healthful food habits. The net improvement over 
investment would result from an offset in direct and indirect medical costs, including 
productivity impairment and loss from high rates of obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular 
disease.  
People need to be given enough education so that their natural desire for health can be 
accommodated, rather than failing under the prospect of trying to learn all the facts and heuristics 
on one’s own limited budget of time and attention. The simple act of eating a diet rich in protein, 
fiber, and micronutrients, and secondarily in fat (which is filling and provides the main energy 
source for muscles when carbohydrates do not) will help avoid hypoglycemic incidents 
associated with diets high in refined carbohydrates. Reverting for a moment to the neoclassical 
model, if there are elements of rational addiction as defended by Becker and Murphy (1988) 
present in this system as applied to SSBs, then a high tax would be effective. Empirical results 
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from Essay One suggest that for many higher-volume purchasers of SSBs, a tax high enough to 
achieve this would seem ridiculous on its face (and Finkelstein et al. 2009 find a 40% tax on 
SSBs would cost little and affect weight only little). While Becker and Murphy agree that higher-
educated people demonstrate lower preference for the present versus the future (p 687), they do 
not attribute causality in either direction. 
 All of the arguments supporting Figure 4 extend to equation (d) from section 6.6 as it was 
described:  Exp[Utility | q]max = u0[q] + k · a · u1[h(Hs(q,x))]. These arguments variously 
impact the direction and magnitude of the weighting factors k and a on the “later” term, while 
enriching the understanding of time-preference changes and some of the biological and 
psychological mechanisms that drive them. 
Empirical results in Essay One may also be used to test hypotheses suggested from the 
psychology and behavioral economics literature. If we assume that low level of formal education 
suggests a higher likelihood of poorly developed critical skills for effective nutrition – poor 
eating decision heuristics, lower ability to gather or understand nutrition facts, less humility 
when weighing one’s desires and prejudices51
 
 against scientific evidence – then low education 
would dominate low household income in predicting higher positive response to sCSD marketing 
variables. It strongly and generally does. The significantly different purchase responses to 
marketing variables across ethnic sub-groups may comply with the notion that levels of effective 
nutrition education are passed socially, or that the markets for certain foods are “social markets” 
(OECD 2008, citing Becker and Murphy 2000).  
 
 
                                                 
51 Jonas et al. 2001, on “confirmatory bias,” see 7.7.2a. 
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6.10.    Summary and Key Conclusions   
This essay examines the ways and reasons that habitual sCSD consumption may break 
from economic assumptions of rational utility maximization. Bringing to bear neighboring 
literature that refutes neoclassical economic assumptions about how consumers make (food) 
decisions, this essay presents an empirical model and flowchart depicting dynamic consumer 
choice behavior to routinely drink SSBs/sCSDs. The model and flowchart presented here are 
flexible to failures of neoclassical economic assumptions about consumer behavior. Both the 
model and the flowchart provide a valid track for individual decision making consistent with 
classical theory, and provide a track defended by literature presented here for which sCSD 
consumption is inconsistent with rational utility-maximizing (RUMax) choice. 
Clinical, empirical, as well as theoretical results from a range of fields that border terrain 
claimed by economics confirm that not only might consumer preferences not be fixed, time-
consistent, and consistent with long-term utility maximization, they almost certainly fail in all 
three ways for routine patterns of SSB consumption for many consumers – perhaps the majority. 
The active breach of these economic assumptions violates both the completeness and transitivity 
conditions necessary to meet the economic definition of rational, and breaks the logical support 
for much of the applied field’s presumption that preferences revealed through consumer choice 
are mathematically equivalent to knowing a consumer’s full preference set. As Bayesian 
updating of information criteria is also unquestionably disputed for this product type, there is no 
clear case for a self-correcting mechanism to ensure a rational or stable utility function 
associated with SSB consumption.   
It is no longer safe to conclude that the amount of SSBs consumed is that which 
maximizes the utilities of the individuals who buy them. The weight of evidence presented here 
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directs the challenging conclusion that for many consumers the amount purchased is not driven 
by utility maximization, but by the impact of other forces on decisions. As by definitions in the 
medical and nutrition literature the average American overconsumes SSBs, we must conclude 
that conventionally estimated demand for the SSB category depicts a curve shifted to the right, 
because it is driven by internal and external forces that provoke consumption in excess of what 
an objective utility maximization strategy would (were one calculable), assuming individuals 
value their future health even moderately. This is no small result, as it re-orients how economists 
present the fundamental motivations of our SSB demand studies and how we justify application 
of our empirical results. Why focus on price-elasticities of demand as indicators, if product price 
may be a tertiary driver of consumption rates? 
If the argument in this essay is valid, then some of the same unobserved unmeasured or 
accountable but un-included factors that right-shift demand almost certainly skew estimable 
price elasticities of demand, but we may not be able to empirically determine how much. Policy 
recommendations from economists usually flow from the assumptions that the quantities of 
sCSDs that individuals purchase represent an optimum consciously derived using stable internal 
and time-consistent preferences that properly factor effects across future time periods – 
assumptions biased to embrace a status-quo driven by this premise of maximization. This 
premise drives policy recommendations independent of the accuracy with which most current 
demand models account for relevant influences on consumer behavior. When the development 
and maintenance of food habits, SSB marketing environment factors including ubiquity of the 
product and of highly sophisticated persuasive advertising, and the biochemistry of decision-
making may all affect consumption patterns more than rational utility-maximizing discrete 
choice leveraged by price and flavor may, then policy recommendations intended to curb 
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overconsumption must address this gamut of causative factors, not just assume that consumers 
will react rationally to taxes and the provision of more product information. This is how material 
in this essay connects to Essay Three. 
The effort in this essay is not an indictment or dismissal of current approaches. It is an 
exploration of where these methods, when facing a larger body of scientific evidence, are 
constrained to fail by their own logic. It is also an exploration of how to begin to model a post-
neoclassical model of consumer decision-making as it is, rather than how we wish it were in 
order to satisfy mathematical requirements for our estimation models, and in order to study 
theoretically optimal individual choice. 
The model and flowchart I present here (both expanded or repeated in section 6.9.) differ 
from partially similar models published by Dragone (2009), Huston and Finke (2003), and by 
Mancino and Kinsey (2008) in that they do not assume rational behavior by individuals in their 
dietary choices, and the time-inconsistency of preferences is not assigned a fixed value, but 
assumed to vary, given supporting evidence from neighboring literature. I make no claim that 
either of my models is empirically estimable, only that they describe actual behavior more 
comprehensively than current neoclassical approaches to modeling do, constrained as these other 
approaches are to representative individuals who consistently and rationally optimize when 
making choices. 
Much of the chapter – all of 6.7 and 6.8 – surveys empirical clinical and theoretical 
literature challenging economic precepts of RUMax behavior as these precepts apply to SSB 
consumption. This review builds the spine of arguments refuting neoclassical assumptions about 
consumer behavior relevant to regular SSB consumption. Three types of medical/nutrition 
literature are presented: the costs of medical effects from overconsuming added (not naturally 
514 
 
occurring) sugars, the biological mechanisms by which these effects occur and the degree to 
which SSB sugars may be particularly harmful, and the effect of dietary sugar on decision 
processing. Primary elements are summarized here, usually without citation unless directly 
quoted, and occasionally simplified, i.e., without requisite academic nuance that is in the main 
text. Both choices assist brevity here.  
Conditions of overweight and obesity associate with higher morbidity, higher mortality, 
and higher medical costs at every age “equivalent to [adding] 20 years of natural ageing” (Yach, 
Stuckler, and Brownell 2006). It is the amount of calories ingested that drive weight gain in the 
U.S. in recent decades, not a diminishment in or failure to exercise, the physical activity level 
remaining similar to the mid-‘70s level while caloric intake greatly increased.52
The food environment changed considerably from the 1960s on, making energy-dense 
nutrient-poor (ENDP) foods relatively cheaper and more ubiquitous, with exceptionally heavy 
marketing. Snacking on ENDP foods, including SSBs and all added sugars, greatly increased, as 
vitamin mineral and fiber intakes per dietary calorie dropped considerably. Dietary fat does not 
drive body fat. Dietary fat consumption remained flat from 1965–1996 as sugar consumption 
greatly increased, and American’s body fat greatly increased. SSBs and sweetened Carbonated 
Soft Drinks (sCSDs) are the primary source of added sugar in American diets, and for the 
average American consuming the average daily number of SSB ounces, SSBs alone overwhelm 
the limit set for all discretionary calories (i.e., for all fats, sugars, and alcohols) allowable after 
meeting a USDA-defined balanced daily diet. This average excess holds for most age groups 
  
                                                 
52 All estimates of weight gain or loss that rely on linear models of addition or subtraction by fixed kilocalories 
(kcals) per day are medically incorrect, and suggest conclusions that are not defensible. Hall et al. 2011 correct this 
problem, and Hall works with other authors on this. We do know it is much harder to take weight off than put it on, 
and the amount of sustained calorie reduction for an average American to lose the weight gained from 1980 to 2010 
is roughly equivalent to a 20-oz. Coke per day – but an obese person would have to cut many more calories than 
this, with 95% of the cumulative weight reduction taking three years to manifest for either type. 
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above 8 and below 60, with some variance owing to larger intake by males than females. From 
Table 23, for those who consume above 25% of all their dietary calories as added sugar, sCSDs 
are the preferred vector of delivery. 
Two primary factors fuel SSB overconsumption. First liquids satiate less than semi-
liquids and solids, displacing less food intake at meals. Second sugar causes hunger by 
suppressing hormones that signal satiation and reduces dopamine signaling. This induces hunger 
for more sugar as insulin levels are pushed too low then too high in response to an overload of 
incoming added sugars, and induces more (sugar) eating to meet conditioned expectation levels 
of dopamine reward. 
SSBs are associated across many surveys of clinical studies with weight gain, diabetes, 
and heart disease (independent of the increase from weight gain). Weight gain seems particularly 
fueled by the fructose in SSBs (high-fructose corn syrup, HFCS) versus glucose, as specific 
differences in digestion of fructose versus glucose engage natural mechanisms that increase the 
lipid profile in the blood and the likelihood that these lipids will deposit in fat cells and on 
arteries. While high sugar intake in combination with low fiber intake triggers a cycle that wears 
out the insulin-producing areas of the pancreas, high fructose intake actually makes the body 
more insulin resistant, demanding more be produced, while also triggering hormones that block 
satiation, providing direct mechanisms for diabetes and weight gain. HFCS-based SSBs (nearly 
all in the U.S. from 1984) present the worst commonly available sugar profile for triggering all 
of these effects. A 2011 study induced markers for heart disease in dozens of healthy young men 
and women by replacing 25% of their total calories with an HFCS solution – an effect not seen 
with a 25% replacement by a glucose solution. 
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Surveys of literature concluding that HFCS and SSBs containing it are no worse than 
other sugars are directly discredited, and attempts to purchase “academic” results intending to 
discredit mechanisms summarized in the last paragraph are exposed. While never final, the 
medical literature is largely unambiguous in consensus about these mechanisms. 
The neurobiology of preference may now be identified in ways that can inform economic 
theory, filling in gaps that greatly frustrated many of the great economists a century ago, who 
gave up on the field of psychology as unable to quantify utility. Consuming high-added-sugar 
foods wires dopamine pathways to favor more sugar in patterns nearly chemically identical to 
opiate addiction. Using animals with brain chemistry extremely similar to humans, every 
condition of chemical addiction is confirmed for sugar. Eating a lot of sugar not only signals the 
brain to eat more sugar, but conditions it to do so, a habit-forming drive that occurs on a 
subconscious, chemical level. Note that most sCSDs also include caffeine, for which the 
addiction argument is already conceded. So everything in an sCSD bottle but the water, coloring, 
and some artificial flavors is chemically addictive. In a 2004 American Economic Review article 
bridging neurobiology psychology and economics, Bernheim and Rangel discuss chemically 
addictive substances (and although not included, sugar very nearly matches their criteria): 
There are plainly circumstances in which it makes no sense to infer preferences from choices. …Habituated, 
semi-automatic responses beneficially increase the speed of decision-making in some circumstances but lead 
to systematic mistakes in others (p 1561-2). 
 …[T]here is an emerging consensus in neuroscience and psychology that decision-process effects, rather 
than hedonic effects, provide the key to understanding addictive behavior (p 1564-5). 
Addiction when it exists works as if it biases information, and episodes of consumption 
of addictive substances are cued in part by one’s environment. Mistakes of judgment or choice 
can be substance specific, meaning the appearance of different time preferences for an individual 
contingent on which choice the individual is considering. Thus decisions do not occur as 
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rationally or as optimally as economists assume, especially for addictive substances, and while 
less urgently driving behavior than controlled substances may, sugar is close to the set Bernheim 
and Rangel describe. An SSB consumer’s apparent willingness to trade future health for current 
taste may not reflect a general present-biased time preference, once one acknowledges that time 
preference need not be monolithic. A single discount rate applicable to all decisions then seems 
clunky, restrictive, and potentially inept for characterizing decision behavior.  
With the above results from the medical community indicating precise effects of habitual 
intake of sugars on hunger/satiety hormones and dopamine reward receptors, one need not 
unequivocally adopt a position that sCSDs are addictive. There is for habitual consumption of 
sCSDs little evidentiary defense of the neoclassical economists’ assumption of perfectly rational 
utility-maximizing choice in the sense that it is voluntary, deliberative, and considers future 
effects in a time-consistent fashion. To assume habitual sCSD consumption is not influenced by 
unconscious biological drivers begins to strain credibility. Becker and Murphy’s (1988) Theory 
of Rational Addiction (not intended to include sugar) maintains that the rate of disappearance of 
the physical and mental effects of past consumption of a potentially addictive good is exogenous, 
employs the assumption of a constant rate of time preference, and argues that tastes do not 
change over time. Becker and Murphy’s assumption set precludes the notions that behavior may 
be involuntary or non-deliberative or lead to regret that is not induced by changes in external 
circumstances (i.e. not from an external shock). This assumption set necessitates a critical break 
from how psychologists and social psychologists find people to behave. Becker and Murphy 
never consider that while each time-separable decision event may appear rational, that with 
increasing addiction to a harmful good, the costs to future utility may rise in a way that proves 
the addict’s previous calculations of future expected utility to be in error. They attribute the 
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difference to an increasing preference for the present, when it may be a loss of control by 
someone who does not consciously discount the future so heavily. The loss of control would be a 
failure of rationality. Failure to appreciate the severity of one’s condition, or denial of that 
severity would similarly lead to failures to update one’s choice criteria and behavior given new 
information (a failure of “Bayesian learning”), so that a  Bayesian proxy maximization of utility 
also might not be achievable, much less serve as the defense for the revealed preference 
assumption needed for deterministic modeling. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin: “[c]asual observation, introspection, and psychological 
research” support that “the assumption of time consistency is importantly wrong” (p103), and 
conclude “the existence of present-biased preferences is overwhelmingly supported by 
psychological evidence, and strongly accords to common sense and conventional wisdom” 
(p120). They find that whether costs are immediate or rewards are immediate changes the type of 
person (categorized by their time preferences) who can be harmed by a poor choice. 
But how could sugar demonstrate very similar neuro-chemical influence to opioids? 
Smith and Tasnádi 2007 contrast their Theory of Natural Addiction with Becker and Murphy’s 
theory, noting that the evolutionary development of neurochemical preference for sweetness 
included no refined substances, only mother’s milk, ripe fruit, and rarely found honey. Processed 
carbohydrates falsely trigger chemical reward signals associated for millennia with wholesome 
non-toxic and often short-seasonal foods. At the cellular level, the brain cannot distinguish the 
difference, the body accepts or regulates incoming sugar automatically. Large continuous 
quantities and fructose-heavy loads strain the body’s regulatory (homeostatic) systems, leading 
to disease conditions listed above. 
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Certainly people are capable of rising above this chemical trickery once they are aware of 
it and committed to change? Indeed, but other mechanisms that also serve practical and efficient 
functions may tend to thwart awareness and commitment. Psychologists studying decision theory 
for decades, including Nobel prize winners Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman, have inferred 
then clinically demonstrated the existence of decision-resource-preserving short-cuts of 
judgment called “heuristics” (rules-of-thumb), by which we efficiently circumvent biological 
bounds to how much information we can process at once, and by what priorities. They have also 
demonstrated that “prospect theory” functions, with the effect that one’s choice is affected with 
changes in reference point from which one judges gains and losses – something that would not 
occur with fully known preferences and constant time preference in full-attention utility 
calculations. This demonstration demands that at least one of the classic set of Savage axioms 
ensuring objectivity of utility assessments – ruling out reversal of choice, the influence of 
context, and regret – must be violated. The theory of revealed preferences, and the Bayesian 
updating equivalent which extends the theory practically, are no longer axiomatic. Favoring 
more certain(/nearer) outcomes, over less certain or further away outcomes then occurs even 
when this means that an individual choice will not conform with highest expected utility (the 
Ellsberg paradox; in our context, think of sweet taste now versus the prospect of poorer health 
later). Lipscomb, Weinstein, and Torrance 1996 survey a large body of empirical literature, 
finding with Pesendorfer’s 2006 survey of behavioral economics strong support for an 
“immediacy effect” that heavily, hyperbolically discounts the future. 
Utility maximization may not be the criterion of choice. Simon proposes “satisficing,” 
that takes from available or near options to minimize search costs, and Gigerenzer (2001) 
discusses “aspiration level” criteria by which one accepts the first candidate that rises to a 
520 
 
minimum requirement. This non-optimizing criteria is in the class of “fast and frugal heuristics” 
that are likely to apply to small-expense, mundane choices like snack foods and soft drinks. 
“[S]mall-scale day-to-day decisions are where self-control problems are most likely to influence 
behavior. ...[W]e have shown…examples where mild self-control problems cause severe welfare 
losses…” (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2000, p 247).  
Evidence from neurobiological studies shows people favor simple quick decision 
processes versus investing the brain resources for full rational processing. Ambiguity of 
information or outcome – such as a person only vaguely familiar with the health effects of 
routine SSB consumption would perceive – triggers the brain to pick a simple decision process 
rather than fretting through a full-resource process, and errors in judgment follow (Fulponi, 
OECD 2009). This certainly applies to food decisions: 
Experimental research findings [in behavioral economics] suggest that heuristics or rules of thumb are often 
used to simplify decision making and are important in predicting which foods an individual eats, how much, 
and whether he will eat these again. This may be an efficient approach to decision making given time 
constraints. However, if decision making under time constraints is coupled with outcomes that are uncertain 
or occur in the future, errors of judgment can become large (Fulponi, OECD 2009, p 13). 
Wansink finds that people are unaware of many dozen food decisions daily, and time-use survey 
results clearly show that eating is often a “secondary behavior,” conducted when primary 
attention is focused elsewhere. Consistent with an array of Wansink results, medical doctors with 
MPHs, Cohen and Farley, argue that eating is often a function of automatic behavior, not 
complex choice (quote structurally condensed for brevity): 
Human beings have limited cognitive capacities, with the ability to consciously process only 40 to 60 bits of 
information per second—equivalent to a short sentence. ... Therefore noncognitive behaviors are not a sign of 
weakness but rather an adaptation that allows human beings to be a uniquely productive species. …A great 
deal of mental effort is required to make conscious decisions and then implement them in the form of 
behaviors. Most of our responses to our environment can be understood as automatic behaviors. … Once 
people initiate eating, they usually continue until the food is gone or until some other external occurrence 
changes the situation. Automatic behaviors…occur without awareness, are initiated without intention, tend to 
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continue without control, and operate efficiently or with little effort (p 1). … [E]ven after people have been 
shown the results of experiments demonstrating the automatic nature of their actions, they steadfastly refuse 
to believe that those actions did not result from conscious choice. … We blame our lack of willpower on the 
inability to maintain a diet, when it is more likely that our automatic responses to ubiquitous cues to eat and 
the availability of cheap, convenient, calorie-dense food are responsible (p 4). 
People develop (food) habits to conserve decision-making resources and “get by” rather 
than optimize. Then their habits can drive behavior without reflection let alone deliberation or 
maximization, and indeed may shield against new information and deliberation. “…[B]ehaviors, 
once they become habitual, are maintained without reference to preferences and intentions,” 
(Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood 2009, p S12). From a British study commissioned to address 
obesity long-term: 
…[A] habit is frequent behavior that is conducted with little conscious awareness and intention, is mentally 
efficient, and may sometimes be difficult to control… In addition a habit is cued by the environment in 
which the behavior is conducted. 
…[H]abit leads to ‘tunnel vision.’ When habits have developed, an individual is less motivated to attend to 
and acquire new information, particularly information that is not consistent with the habit. …[H]abitual 
behavior seems less guided by attitudes and intentions than behavior that is conducted in a more 
deliberative fashion. When a particular behavior is repeated over and over again, the original reasons and 
arguments why that behavior was adopted in the first place may vanish over time (Maio et al.: p 104, citing 
numerous others). 
Decision theorists now generally agree that preferences, rather than being a fixed ordered 
and known priority set, are formed at the time of decision making: “…even in familiar domains 
such as everyday eating behaviors…decisions are quite prone to preference construction.” 
Spontaneous quick emotional heuristics can easily trump a slow deliberative analytical decision 
mode. “Marketers…well understand the power of affect, [and] typically aim their ads to evoke 
an experiential mode of information processing,” the quick emotional heuristic (Ellen Peters, p 
S82, both quotes). Food is the second most advertised product category, with fast food chains, 
where sCSDs are prominent, often appealing to an appearance of value by supersizing low-
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nutrition and EDNP foods, “focusing on the virtue of economy, not on the vice of gluttony” 
(Zimmerman 2011, p 294). 
All the mechanisms confirmed by empirical research and described here challenge the 
contention that revealed preference theory or Bayesian learning by consumers can to any 
measure be relied upon to demonstrate that consumers have maximized utility. The nutrition 
effects of chronic sCSD consumption are so strongly negative that they seem destined to degrade 
future utility for most chronic sCSD consumers, making utility maximization an unreasonable 
premise. 
Consumer psychologist George Loewenstein formalizes the notion that drive states such 
as thirst hunger and sex drive that he calls visceral factors crowd out long-term objectives, 
creating good-specific collapsing of time perspectives, which arise temporarily then fall away. 
Consequences associated with regret that one has acted against one’s longer-term goals may 
follow. Unfortunately, Loewenstein (1996) concludes based on reams of empirical evidence, 
“people underweigh, or even ignore, visceral factors that they will experience in the future, have 
experienced in the past, or that are experienced by other people” (p 272). Thus humans routinely 
enter states where they dismiss the import of later consequences, but will not account for this in 
advance calculations, and afterword will honestly claim that they were optimizing. This would 
seem a structural economist’s nightmare: chronic violation of our assumptions about optimal 
behavior, with embedded irrationality, or at least dishonesty as to motives and effects. Mancino 
and Kinsey (2008) rise to structural modeling of a Loewenstein effect, but despite clever 
formulation and responsible execution, are forced to restrict themselves to two periods and a 
fixed discount factor applied to discrete rational choices. 
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Psychologist Roy Baumeister has identified that the higher-order brain functions of self-
control flag when overtaxed, and finds that higher-order brain functions, being the last to 
develop, have the heaviest glucose draw, and are the first to be winnowed when glucose levels 
begin to dip. So one’s ability to resist a sweet treat now actually falls at the time that a sweet 
treat would be suggested by the body to get a needed boost – as we now know it will when 
coming off of a sugar high. Baumeister et al. 2008 (quote structurally condensed for brevity): 
Ego depletion affects consumers. Researchers showed that people shifted toward less edifying and more 
self-indulgent fare when depleted…[including] shifting toward candy instead of healthful…snacks. 
…[D]ieters ate more food when depleted than they would otherwise. Nondieters were relatively unaffected 
by ego depletion. …[D]epletion…undermines the defenses and the virtuous intentions that would otherwise 
guide behavior (p 9). …Ego depletion makes people think less intelligently [on IQ tests and other mental 
tests]. …[D]epleted persons succumbed to various flawed decision strategies, all of which conserve effort 
by taking short cuts instead of reasoning out the problem (p 10). 
The prospect for habituation or addiction in the kinetic modern environment, as people self-
medicate with sugar (replenishing a depleted ego), is self-evident. Baumeister et al. bring dozens 
more clinical studies that deepen the evidentiary base for some of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
assertions, and the evidentiary base for exactly the failures of rational utility maximization 
posited by the equation and flowchart in 6.9. 
Refreshed with this overview, reviewing assertions throughout the main text will now 
cohere better. The degree to which one’s knowledge and nutrition criteria may diverge from 
realistic expectations of utility in rational choice calculation may be larger than neoclassicalists 
imagine. Low active nutrition knowledge will prejudicially lower the k multiplier in equation (d), 
increasing the likelihood of a negative long-term health result larger than expected in a priori 
utility calculation. Low active nutrition knowledge will also raise the influence of a, according to 
Beydoun and Wang (2008) and Zoellner et al. (2011). This finding identifies a mechanism by 
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which the “Knowledge, beliefs… decision criteria…” box affects “economically rational 
decision criteria” in Figure 4. 
The k in equation (d) may be negative and larger than even a moderately nutritionally 
wary individual may have considered. Rational choice based on faulty information then seems 
more likely to fail to maximize realized utility. Choice is uninformed, and without Bayesian 
learning serving to update decision criteria (which are likely to be habitual triggers rather than 
deliberative anyway), the “later” term in (d) will remain negative in some proportion to the 
consumption in the “now” term.  
In Figure 4, when “Current devotion of psychological decision-making capacity” follows 
the “Low” track, choice is reflexive, and there is no handle for new information to be 
deliberately and rationally applied. The k in equation (d) as applied to SSBs may be artificially 
prevented from being adjusted downward by information from sound science, leaving demand 
for SSBs/sCSDs artificially high. Formally, this would be attributed to an information failure or a 
failure of rationality. 
In imagining empirical applications of this model, I am forced by my characterization of 
choice within a dynamic pattern to implicitly use distributions of k and a, as each is the product 
of a combination of influences, including time preference and changing levels of discipline in 
evaluating food choices that impact one’s assessment of later health effects from current choices. 
Thus my model, which I do not yet claim is quantifiably estimable, allows an even “broader 
range of situations to trigger present-biased behavior” than does Mancino and Kinsey’s. When an 
individual’s dietary habits are fairly consistent, this may prove estimable – with k as an estimate 
or an estimable distribution based on an individual’s dietary pattern of choices, and a an 
estimable distribution of larger patterns in which visceral factors play out to a predictable degree 
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– in a way that a time-preference constant that changes meal-by-meal (as Mancino and Kinsey 
use) may or may not be. 
To summarize, there is preponderant evidence that consumption of SSBs at even average 
levels is unlikely to result from a utility-maximizing process, and this may hold for a range of 
EDNP foods. This essay models in two ways consumer decision paths that diverge from 
conventionally assumed RUMax decisions, without disallowing RUMax choice in either model 
type. This essay argues that a number of assumptions necessary for neoclassical-theory-based 
empirical strategies are proved false by clinical evidence of consumer behavior applied to 
unhealthful foods. Economic characterizations of consumer behavior predicated on these 
assumptions may be suspect, and may benefit from re-examination. Policy recommendations 
derived from quantitative work that is grounded on assumptions that do not withstand empirical 
scrutiny may need to be narrowed in scope or reformulated by proponents, or discounted by 
policymakers. 
The next essay marries some elements from my results in Essay One with arguments here 
to generate a policy package scientifically more likely to lower SSB consumption than any 
existing recommendation set I have found. 
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Table 23.    Mean Intake of Added Sugars in Gram-Equivalents [g-eq (SEM)]a,b,c 
 
Group 
No. of 
Obs. In 
Group 
Total added 
sugar consumed 
(A) 
Sugars/sweets/ 
beveragesd 
(B) 
Regular soft 
drinks 
(C) 
Rough 
Fraction 
(C)/(A) 
Rough 
Fraction 
(C)/(B)  mean gram-equivalent (standard error of mean) 
Tw
o-
D
ay
 M
ea
n 
of
 
En
er
gy
 fr
om
 A
dd
ed
 
 
0 ≤ x ≤ 5% 987  24.9 (0.54) 7.7 (1.01) 2.7 (0.19) 1/8 ~ 1/3 
5 < x ≤ 10% 1,976 45.0 (0.79) 19.8 (0.58) 6.8 (0.30) 1/7 ~ 1/3 
10 < x ≤ 15% 2,551 67.0 (0.95) 36.5 (0.98) 14.6 (0.50) 1/5 2/5 
15 < x ≤ 20% 2,278 91.6 (1.03) 57.0 (1.30) 27.3 (0.80) 3/10 ~1/2 
20 < x ≤ 25% 1,427 127.2 (1.74) 86.0 (2.43) 47.1 (1.06) >1/3 >1/2 
25 < x ≤ 30% 689 160.4 (3.31) 115.5 (2.42) 69.0 (2.42) >2/5 3/5 
30 < x ≤ 35% 275 197.6 (4.95) 152.5 (10.03) 96.0 (3.93) just < 1/2 > 3/5 
>35% 249 232.9 (7.48) 187.6 (14.52) 116.7 (4.12) 1/2 > 3/5 
        
D
ie
ta
ry
 R
ef
er
en
ce
 In
ta
ke
 L
ife
 
St
ag
e 
G
ro
up
s 
 
Children 4 to 8 yrs 1,136 92.2 (1.73) 51.5 (33.94) 21.1 (1.09) > 1/5 2/5 
Males 9 to 13 yrs 688 103.4 (2.37) 65.8 (13.81) 31.0 (1.54) 3/10 < 1/2 
Females 9 to 13 yrs 749 87.2 (2.16) 51.2 (5.51) 22.3 (1.61) 1/4 > 2/5 
Males 14 to 18 yrs 836 115.2 (3.02) 83.4 (27.48) 44.6 (1.99) < 2/5 > 1/2 
Females 14 to 18 yrs 901 81.7 (1.62) 58.6 (33.52) 28.8 (1.84) 1/3 1/2 
Males 19 to 30 yrs 578 117.7 (4.02) 84.3 (31.11) 47.6 (2.40) 2/5 >1/2 
Females 19 to 30 yrs 641 76.3 (1.56) 51.6 (23.51) 25.6 (1.66) 1/3 1/2 
Males 31 to 50 yrs 954 106.3 (2.24) 69.6 (12.08) 39.2 (1.79) >1/3 >1/2 
Females 31 to 50 yrs 987 69.2 (1.36) 40.5 (4.37) 19.3 (1.32) <1/3 <1/2 
Males 51 to 70 yrs 858 78.2 (1.96) 44.2 (12.78) 22.8 (0.96) 3/10 1/2 
Females 51 to 70 yrs 956 58.0 (1.32) 28.9 (8.69) 13.0 (0.80) >1/5 >2/5 
Males 71+ yrs 594 58.9 (1.67) 30.9 (13.39) 15.1 (0.86) 1/4 1/2 
Females 71+ yrs 554 47.3 (1.29) 22.7 (5.60) 9.4 (0.60) 1/5 2/5 
a Table adapted from Marriott et al. 2010, Table 7 and Appendix Table 7. All names, categories, definitions, and values in 
columns before “Rough Fractions” are from Marriott et al., whose original table names follow. Table 7: Mean Intake of Added 
Sugars in Gram-Equivalents [g-eq; see next Table note] by Food Category for all people aged 4 years and above by Range of 
Percent of Estimated Daily Intake from Added Sugars With Total Energy Intake as a Covariate and Covariates from the Food 
Frequency Questionnaire in the Analysis, National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 2003–2006. Appendix 
Table 7: Mean Intake of Added Sugar in Gram-Equivalents (g-eq) by Food Category for Dietary Reference Intake (DRI) Life 
Stage Groups with Total Energy Intake as a Covariate and Covariates from the National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Survey (NHANES) Food Frequency Questionnaire in the Analysis, NHANES 2003–2006. The standard error of the means 
(SEM) is the standard deviation of the sample means over possible samples drawn from the population. Particularly for the Life-
Stage-Group gram equivalents (lower portion of table, below the grey bar), “the standard errors reported in this [Marriott et al.’s] 
table have been adjusted via balanced repeated replication, and therefore account for the complex NHANES sampling design.” 
Table titles in this note, the text after the parenthetic clause in the previous sentence, and all remaining Table notes are verbatim 
from Marriott et al table annotations. 
b One Gram-equivalent equals an amount of added sugar comparable to 1 g sucrose in carbohydrate content. 
c Sample excludes under 4 years, fasters, and pregnant and lactating women. Analysis controlled for total energy intake. 
d Examples of sugars/sweets/beverages sub-categories include: sugars/sweets: sugar, sugar substitutes, candy, ice cream toppings, 
syrups, chewing gum, gum drops, ice pops, gelatin desserts, jams, jellies; regular soft drinks: cola and non-cola type, cream 
sodas. Ginger ales, root beer, chocolate-flavored soda; regular fruitades/fruit drinks: all single fruit and mixed fruit beverages 
such as apple juice, apple-cranberry-grape juice, fruit punch, lemonade, fruit flavored sports drinks; fruit flavored powdered 
drinks; low calorie beverages: any sugar-free or low calories beverage, carbonated or not carbonated; alcoholic beverages: any 
alcoholic drinks including beer, wine, cocktails; other non-alcoholic beverages: coffee, tea, coffee substitutes, non-fruit 
beverages, non-alcoholic beer, wines, cocktails, non-carbonated water. 
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Essay Three 
Habitual Soft-Drink Consumption: How Markets Fail, and How Policy 
Prescriptions Must Adapt 
 
Chapter 7 
Policy Options for Reducing SSB Consumption –  
Moving Beyond Platitudes  
 
Abstract 
Standard economic analyses of sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) demand focus on 
transactions between manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, but ignore market failures 
associated with marketing environments and consumer failures to maximize lifetime utility 
through acquired food habits. Literature from many fields indicates consumer behavior divergent 
from economic theory. I offer a vocabulary that brings attention to a full spectrum of market 
failures. Drawing from quantitative findings in economics, my own empirical results, and from 
broader literature, I propose a heretofore unique policy program that will improve health 
outcomes by scientifically addressing and countering causes of SSB overconsumption in the U.S. 
 
7.1    Overview 
The empirical work in Essay One suggests that providing information/education is likely 
to be more efficacious than other tax-based initiatives in addressing sugar-sweetened beverage 
(SSB) overconsumption. The evidence that eating behaviors very often exhibit compromises or 
failures of the rational utility-maximization (RUMax) behavior assumed by neoclassical 
economists suggests that policy proposals that flow from standard economic models may prove 
inadequate for achieving policy objectives. I consider standard economic tools and current policy 
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proposals regarding SSB/sCSD ([calorically] sweetened carbonated soft-drink) consumption, 
bringing to bear my own quantitative results, as well as evidence and perspectives from critics of 
standard economic models as they apply to eating behavior and behavioral change. 
This process yields a revised set of policy proposals, justified by a wide range of 
empirical and theoretical literature (quasi-exogenous literature: behavioral economics, 
neuroeconomics, decision theory, psychology, consumer psychology, social psychology, 
medical/nutrition). I contend that this new proposal set, so informed, supersedes the body of 
singular, and first-level-combination proposals that currently dominate the literature of policy 
proposals meant to impact SSB consumption. In short, I contend that all policy proposals to 
reduce SSB consumption rates and the effects of this consumption currently advocated by the 
economic, medical, and public health communities each tend to overlook key behavioral factors 
that are likely to severely undermine the effects of these policies, at least at politically achievable 
tax rates. By pooling empirically-based understanding across fields into a comprehensive 
perspective, I suggest a scientifically based combination-policy regimen, that if implemented 
should prove more effective than the recommendations from any of the existing fields that have 
weighed in on the health epidemics associated with dramatic overconsumption of nutrient-
deficient sugar calories, as we find in SSBs.1
                                                 
1 Often, our enjoyable work as economists occurs when we are able to create, derive, prove, or find empirical 
evidence for concepts that challenge limits of conventional thinking, concepts that offer perspectives that explain or 
rectify apparent paradoxes. Perhaps the most famous example is the theory of marginal value, by which Adam 
Smith’s famous diamond-water paradox was solved. Many names are associated with that attribution, including 
W.S. Jevons, M.E.L. Walras, J.B. Clark, A. Marshall, and V. Pareto. Becker and Murphy (1988) propose that 
substance addiction is a rational behavior, and offer limited empirical support for some aspects of this perspective. 
Others – particularly psychologists, social psychologists, and behavioral economists, but including some consumer 
psychologists and economists – have challenged the rational utility-maximizing paradigm of individual behavior as 
it concerns eating habits and American health epidemics. I have attempted to conceptually identify where standard 
economic thinking overlooks elements fueling behaviors which from the neoclassical perspective have rational 
utility-maximizing individuals choosing to make themselves large and unhealthy, often while simultaneously not 
only claiming but in action demonstrating a desire to be thinner and more healthful. 
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By accounting for behavioral and environmental factors already identified across a range 
of disciplines as consumption decision drivers (Essay Two = Chapter 6), I propose a policy set 
that I contend is capable of reorienting these drivers toward healthier dietary patterns, without 
significantly limiting adults’ range of consumer choice. These include changes to SSB marketing 
environments, and the use of tax revenues on SSBs (sCSDs) and their multi-media 
advertisements to fund public service announcements and public education programs with 
content specifically designed and tested to achieve multiple objectives. These objectives include 
the raising of public awareness to the presence of added sugars and to health effects from 
consuming them in excess; suggested reformulations of internal decision heuristics relevant to 
unhealthful food consumption; and a systematic building of nutrition education to a level that 
will accommodate more health-producing self-regulatory behavior. 
After an introduction to and discussion of research objectives for this essay, Section 7.4 
reviews the neo-classical perspective of markets and market failures, and the types of corrective 
prescriptions that may follow from market failures. Section 7.5 introduces a theoretical model 
and vocabulary to clarify or expand these concepts in a framework relevant to market failures 
associated with sCSD/SSB consumption. Sections 7.6 through 7.10 serve as a review of literature 
suggesting market failures in the sCSD/SSB industry(/ies) that meet the definitions in 7.5.  
Section 7.11 draws from the set of related literatures that confirm factors likely to 
associate with market failure in sCSD/SSB markets and consumption, and lists proposals 
emanating from these literatures intended to address overconsumption problems.  
Section 7.12 integrates knowledge developed or reviewed throughout the three-essay 
dissertation to this point to identify policy vectors to reduce sCSD/SSB overconsumption. I 
specifically link policy tools to the mechanisms identified in the literature as contributors to this 
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overconsumption, and suggest forms for these policy tools that preserve producer and consumer 
choice, that re-orient toward a more efficient (and fairer) market, and that from quantitative 
evidence and theory will actually alter behavior, rather than only theoretically doing so. Section 
7.13 anticipates problems implementing the policy set, including industry and political 
objections. Section 7.14 summarizes arguments and key conclusions. 
 
7.2    Introduction 
Human nutrition and public health are complex systems, with dozens or even hundreds of 
influences affecting ever-changing outcomes. No one food type can ever definitively be said to 
be the sole cause of a disease, just as tobacco use can never unassailably be said to strictly cause 
cancer – so long as any small but significant number of people smoke regularly and remain 
cancer free. But correlations can be very informative, and compelling enough to justify policy 
interventions designed to reduce consumption. There are precedents for illegal drugs, and the 
heavily regulated and taxed consumables alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana.  
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012) point out that “over the past 50 years, consumption 
of sugar has tripled worldwide,” “sugar consumption is linked to a rise in non-communicable 
disease,” and “excessive consumption of fructose [added sugars] can cause many of the same 
health problems as alcohol” (p 28-29). The radical increase in sugar-sweetened beverage 
consumption, and especially the consumption of sCSDs over recent decades has been studied 
extensively by the medical community. The independent medical community (those not 
contracted by sweetener or SSB manufacturers, per Lesser et al. 2007) find the SSB and sCSD 
categories to be the largest contributors of added sugars (non-naturally occurring in the food) to 
the American diet. Marriott et al. 2010 further find that Americans tend to consume added sugars 
greatly in excess of recommended limits, on the order of 83 grams-equivalent per day, or around 
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320 kcals – more than double the recommended limit for adult men and three times the limit for 
adult women.  These refined carbohydrates in combination with the inadequate intakes of 
essential nutrients that they displace (Marriott et al.), are associated with or are contributing 
factors to: weight gain, metabolic syndrome, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, hypertension, and 
certain cancers, including some of the most common non-smoking-related cancers in both sexes. 
It is a mistake to characterize SSB policy primarily as a vector against overweight and 
obesity. Overweight and obesity are markers for disease, symptoms that may or may not 
correlate to actual diseases that are strongly associated with high consumption of simple 
carbohydrates as a portion of overall diet (Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis 2012; Fulponi OECD 
2009). The sugar-disease connection exists independent of individual BMI, and although high 
sCSD consumption causes weight gain (Malik et al., all claims here extensively supported in 
Essay Two) the connection between added sugars as a percentage of diet and rising BMI is not a 
linear relationship (Marriott et al., p 236). Medical costs and insurance rates in the U.S. have 
been rising at double-digit rates for decades. Not including insurance companies, the medical 
sector now accounts for some 17% of the U.S. economy. Diet-related diseases now cost more 
than contagious diseases and genetic disorders combined (Fulponi OECD 2009, Swinburn et al. 
2011). There is a strong public health case for dramatically lowering SSB consumption, as well 
as a strong economic case for preventing diseases rather than treating them, especially because 
half the treatment costs for diet-related diseases are borne by the public (in the range of  $45B in 
2002, Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003). This represents a substantial externality cost for 
the public, outside of the economic transactions between soft-drink manufacturers, individuals, 
and health insurance companies.  
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The empirical work in Essay One demonstrates that lower education is more strongly 
correlated with high sCSD purchase than lower income, although both are consistently 
associated, especially in combination. This finding suggests that information-based or education-
based policy interventions are likely to be more effective than tax interventions in reducing SSB 
purchase. Ethnic grouping is also a strong relevant factor, but there is no identification of the 
mechanism involved. There may be more sub-cultural acceptance of sCSD consumption in 
certain groups, but this cultural tolerance is arguably a derivative of effective nutrition education, 
as for the Education variables. So policy recommendations favoring an educational rather than 
tax-based (i.e., price-, or income-based) approach may also be effective in addressing ethnically 
identified differences in purchase response to sCSD marketing variables. 
Specific implications from my results (or others’) for policy will be more useful if 
discussed later in this essay (7.11 and 7.12). It is important to note early on that in emphasizing 
educational policy interventions, a frustrating problem arises. It seems that more information 
does not seem to lead consumers to more healthful dietary choices: 
• “Perhaps the most puzzling and frustrating aspect of the obesity epidemic is the contrast 
between our understanding of the biology of the problem and our inability to halt the 
epidemic” (M.D.s and Masters of Public Health, Cohen and Farley 2008, p1). 
• “How can we explain this seeming paradox – increased information, observable information 
effects, yet disappointing public health outcomes? One problem is that dietary quality 
depends on overall patterns of behavior…. [C]ontradictory changes…[such as the shift to 
low-fat milk while eating more high-fat cheeses in fast food] may reflect consumer difficulty 
in assimilating and using information in the more complex ways necessary to create an 
overall healthy eating pattern” (Food Assistance and Nutrition Research Program, Economic 
Research Service, USDA, Guthrie and Smallwood 2003, S47). 
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• “Poor diets and rising obesity rates among Americans have persisted despite increased 
awareness and publicity regarding the benefits of a healthy lifestyle” (applied economists 
specializing in consumer food topics, Mancino and Kinsey 2008, p i). 
 Are there assumptions that responsible researchers make when conscientiously 
recommending policies, assumptions about behavior and behavioral change that may not be 
accurate and may preempt the effectiveness of well-intentioned policies? If so, to what extent do 
economists tend to fall prey to overassumptions that may doom policy effectiveness? (Of course 
the entire field of behavioral economics exists in response to the latter question.) Are economists 
looking in the right places to resolve this paradox, or does our work contribute to the patterns 
identified in the paradox, and then stop? 
 
7.3    Research Objectives for Policy Essay 
Intriguing answers from the empirical and theoretical essays here suggest that current 
policy proposals to limit sCSD consumption are too narrow, and are in their currently proposed 
forms unlikely to yield intended effects. Formally: If the implicit decision to consume sCSDs 
regularly proves to be questionable in its rational utility maximization for typical individuals, 
what policy actions seem most likely to effectively curb overconsumption?  How do my 
empirical results further inform which policy interventions are likely to be most efficacious?  
 
7.4    Market Failures and Economists’ Standard Prescriptions 
Economists’ standard approach to SSB consumption or the obesity problem is shaped by 
our basic approach to any economic question, an approach that tends to narrow the analyst’s 
focus to price-quantity reactions. Assumptions about individual preferences, rational choice, and 
market dynamics all incline the economist to look past many factors that influence actual 
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purchase-consumption dynamics (factors explored in Essay Two, Chapter 6, and here). To the 
degree that what we tend to focus on diverges from real and influential dynamics, policy 
recommendations that follow from these same assumptions are likely to fail.  
Why? Because conventional industrial-organization or marketing analysis relies on 
economic theory presuming utility-maximizing consumer choices when estimating demand for 
SSBs.2
A market consists of sellers and buyers consciously transacting in a common space.
 Then from an obesity policy perspective, the same conventional approach seeks to curtail 
consumer demand using tools from the standard tool kit for correcting minor market failures: 
taxes or product information. But the market failures that need correcting are now so deep and 
endemic that they challenge the scope of standard economic market-failure theory. Over the last 
four decades, these more recently recognized market failure types have grown very quickly in 
bio-evolutionary terms, but too slowly in relative cultural terms to trigger focused consumer 
awareness. These newer market failure types create a market context in which standard economic 
demand estimation and policy recommendations are likely to be misplaced – even when they are 
responsibly executed and consistent with their own assumptions. 
3
                                                 
2 While my quantitative work is on sCSDs, because I focus on the psychological and medical aspects in Essay Two, 
I conduct estimation in a way that while associating quantity purchased with category price, may accommodate 
consumers who do not maximize lifetime utility with their sCSD purchases. Later in this chapter, I explain that 
despite my empirical focus on sCSDs, policy derived from my quantitative and theoretical analyses should apply to 
the entire SSB category. The biology of sCSD consumption closely parallels that for nearly any SSB consumption, 
although health effects may be worse from sCSDs, for reasons described in Essay Two. Psychologically and 
medically, that which binds for sCSDs holds for SSBs. 
 If 
all first principles of neoclassical economic theory hold, transactions are competitive and “fair” 
3 The definition from the beginning of the methodology chapter: “‘The market’ is a solution to an equation 
consisting not only of sellers, their evident marketing tools (e.g., price, sale, advertising), and buyers, but a venue 
(the local Designated Marketing Area) that exists distinctly in each period of observation for both buyers and 
potential sellers.” The key differences are that “venue” must now be understood to include elements of the market 
space that include less-than-evident marketing tools, and we now recognize that sellers and buyers may not be 
rational and utility-maximizing (RUMax) in their behavior. “Common space” may be physical, or more etheric in 
conception, such as a web-based transaction platform like e-Bay, or e-Trade, which bring buyers and sellers together 
through an electronic clearinghouse whose computer servers may be thousands of miles from buyer or seller. 
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in the sense of achieving a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. If there is any structural or transactional 
impediment to achieving a Pareto optimal solution, then some type of market failure exists. 
Economists classically define four primary classes of market failure: market power, 
externalities, public goods, and information failure/asymmetric information. All of these exist in 
sCSD/SSB consumption, but not always where economists are trained to look. Many of the 
newer-type market failures (yet to be clarified here) occur within the purchase and consumption 
environment that behavioral economists have described, but also result from failures of rational 
utility maximizing (RUMax) behavior described in decision theory, consumer psychology, 
social psychology, and in the nutritional/medical literature describing the effects of consuming 
SSBs. To the extent that conventional demand analyses and the policy recommendations that 
flow from them fail to conform to actual decision and market processes, analytical results must 
be non-determinative, and will be more normative than positive, despite claims to the contrary. If 
the degree of dissonance is high enough, results and policy recommendations may even be 
suspect. 
I shall proceed to describe the classical and newer-type market failures in order, as a 
prelude to a discussion of the literature on policy approaches to SSB consumption, and to a 
discussion of why a new level of integrated policy approach is not only warranted, but necessary. 
Market power is the ability to advantageously influence markets, market behavior, or market results. While 
market power is typically associated with influence over prices, it also can take the form of influence over 
demand, product flows, quality, marketing functions, and other firms’ market behavior. Firms seek and use 
market power in order to achieve their economic goals (Kohls and Uhl 1985, p 300; my emphasis). 
In any discussion of sCSD industry market power, there is no question that an industry 
strongly dominated by a few world-famous brand names that each have been marketed for over 
100 years – with aggressive television advertising over the last forty years – has determined 
prices far in excess of anything close to the marginal costs involved in producing and distributing 
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spiced sugar water. Coca-Cola is the number one brand by far, with Coke and Pepsi controlling 
up to three-quarters of the world beverage market (Sharma et al. 2010), but many brands are 
household names, and can be found in nearly every grocery, fast-food, convenience, and vending 
outlet in the U.S. Successful branding makes product-specific demand more inelastic, and 
industry-level advertising in addition to other marketing strategies helped more than triple caloric 
intake of sCSDs in less than 25 years (including private label; Nielsen and Popkin 2004; while 
Fletcher, Frisvold, Teft 2011 note a 500% rise in consumption over the last 50 years). Along 
with rising income and changing U.S. dietary habits, the end effect is a demand curve shifting 
out in each decade since at least 1950. One must include a wider range of SSBs, including 
energy and sports drinks, for this to remain true after 1997 (Nielsen and Popkin 2004; NPLAN 
2011; Harris et al. 2011).  
Market structure and successful product differentiation in the sCSD industry indicate 
significant market power by themselves (e.g. concentration ratio of 2 ≈ 75%). However even this 
market power is enhanced by manifestation of the other three classical market failures, which by 
their existence each serve to block any market corrections that would naturally reduce demand 
and leave prices to collapse toward a competitive oligopsonistic level (characteristic of highly 
advertised differentiated products). In economic theory one expects market power to raise prices 
and therefore reduce demand. But the marketing of the product and century-long acculturation of 
sCSD consumption has been so effective that demand has expanded despite continued high profit 
margins. As documented in Essay Two, the scale of sCSD consumption now directly impairs the 
health of the U.S. population as a whole. 
If “a consumer or firm…[is] directly affected by the actions of other agents in the 
economy,” i.e., by a transaction to which the consumer or firm is not an explicit party, there is a 
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spillover effect, or externality. “In general, when external effects are present, competitive 
equilibria are not Pareto optimal” (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 350). The cost of obesity, 
diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and cancers (all of which are correlated with SSB consumption, 
of which sCSDs are the primary component) does not fall only on those individuals who 
regularly consume SSBs. Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang (2003) estimate that half of health 
care costs related to overweight and obesity fall on the public in the form of U.S. government 
health care programs, an externality cost estimated to be around $45B in 2002. Of course the 
costs to insurance premiums resulting from this vector of poor health also becomes externalized 
if premiums are not adjusted by dietary behavior or at least by degree of overweight and obesity 
of insured policyholders. Then there is the externality of foregone productivity that occurs within 
firms, from the lower productivity or increased absence of those who have damaged their health 
marginally by SSB consumption. 
But these market failures still cleave closely to standard economic analyses. The “public 
good problem” is not as obvious. “Public goods…are commodities that have an inherently 
‘public’ character, in that consumption of a unit of the good by one agent does not preclude its 
consumption by another. Examples abound: roadways, national defense,…and knowledge all 
share this characteristic. …[P]rivate provision of public goods is typically Pareto inefficient” 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 350). 
In the context of the greater sCSD market, any “public good problem” must be perceived 
as the failure of government to sustain adequate elemental features of the sCSD market, in the 
interest of ensuring that transactions are generally capable of allowing individuals to maximize 
utility as firms are allowed to maximize profits. The need for emphasis will become clearer as 
we proceed.  
538 
 
Information asymmetry market failure, like public good market failure, does not readily 
appear to the standard economist in the form it is most relevant for SSB markets. For example, 
there is nothing known to be in the proprietary formulas of sCSDs or SSBs that is a poison 
known to the companies but not to the public – as substandard brake linings in a car might be. 
Information failures tend to be far more subtle. The Oxford Health Alliance’s “Chronic Disease: 
an Economic Perspective” addresses some subtleties of public goods and information failures: 
  It is…important to distinguish between problems due to insufficient and those due to asymmetric 
information – despite the interrelations between the two. Asymmetric information occurs when one party to 
an exchange has private information that it does not share with the other party. Insufficient information is 
information that is not deliberately hidden, but which some individuals cannot use or interpret adequately. 
These differences lead to very different policy conclusions. In the case of asymmetric information, a 
mechanism has to be developed by which the party with private information reveals the information; 
insufficient information can be corrected using comprehensive or targeted information campaigns. 
   Two key features of consumers’ incomplete and possibly asymmetric information are potentially relevant in 
the context of chronic disease: 1) insufficient awareness about health risks involved in consumption choices; 
and 2) inadequate information about certain addictive aspects associated with the consumption of unhealthy 
goods…. 
   Insufficient and/or asymmetric information is more likely to prevail under certain circumstances, such as 
among children and teenagers. Imperfect information is also more common: where the health effects of a 
behaviour are insufficiently understood and researched (for example, because of the long time lag between 
behaviour and outcome). …and where industry’s marketing efforts distorts information, intentionally or 
otherwise (p 35). ... 
   On the whole, government intervention in the form of the provision (and production) of health information 
is in principle justifiable, as information is a public good, which leads to it being under-supplied in the 
absence of government intervention. … The public provision of information can in principle take many 
forms, including product labeling, comprehensive or targeted public-information campaigns, or restricting the 
marketing of unhealthy food  (p 36). … 
   Time-inconsistency [of preferences] can be easily confused with insufficient information…, especially in 
the case of addictive goods. …The outcomes of these market failures may be identical, but the causes – and 
hence the policy implications – differ significantly. While the solution to limited information is to provide 
more information,…, the solution to time-inconsistent preferences is to provide individuals with effective 
commitment devices (Suhrcke et al., p 37, embedded citations deleted for all pieces of this block quote). 
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It is clear that if industry marketing efforts distort information, even unintentionally, government 
intervention may include public-information campaigns and restriction of marketing. If we 
expect “distorting information” to include the suggestion that SSBs are not unhealthy because 
they are favored by top professional athletes then there are at least some cases where information 
has been distorted by marketing. The topic will be handled in coming paragraphs and sections 
below, citing economists and non-economists who claim that industry marketing has a causal or 
near-causal effect on the American obesity epidemic (and diabetes epidemic, etc.). The validity 
of such arguments would build a case (at least) for restriction of SSB industry marketing.  
While neither individuals nor firms can have or process perfect knowledge, we can easily 
imagine a ratio between knowledge relevant to their respective maximization processes that they 
are aware of and use, and knowledge relevant to their maximization processes that they are 
unaware of or do not use. One type of “information failure” would then involve consumers 
having a lower ratio of relevant knowledge necessary to maximize their utility than the ratio of 
relevant knowledge that firms need to maximize profit. The firms would have an implicit 
advantage, because their relevant information ratio for optimizing would be larger. Consumers 
would be more vulnerable to failing to optimize, given the market cues they do consider.  
An example of this is the classic asymmetric information problem of firms knowing how 
consumers will react to marketing cues when individuals themselves remain relatively naïve 
(Fulponi OECD 2009). (Again, these contentions may seem overstated, but will be clarified 
below in discussing the literature considering sCSD market failures in practice.) Here it is 
already clear that if economists assume that consumers are completely aware of the marketing 
cues being presented them, and make fully cognizant choices, then these same economists must 
conclude as a direct correlate of this assumption that there is no asymmetric information problem 
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of this type. In Essay Two, and in this chapter, literature is presented suggesting numerous 
reasons that consumers may fail to appreciate the influence of sophisticated marketing signals as 
marketing signals controlled by a firm or industry. The simple ubiquity of soft-drink vending 
machines is so commonplace to Americans that while the visual message is constantly 
reinforced, it may no longer be perceived as advertising. Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010) refer 
to general empirical demonstrations indicating that a persuasive influence from advertising exists 
independently from advertised information, and both can change a receiver’s beliefs: 
“[u]nsophisticated receivers neglect incentives, noninformative dimensions of messages affect 
behavior….” (p 665). Information: asymmetric. Advantage: firms. 
Adverse selection, signaling, and screening are further types of failure of information, but 
are not prominent issues in the sCSD market between manufacturers and the buying public. 
Again, market failures of the information type will become clearer as we proceed. 
Consider some of the opening sentences of Phillip Nelson’s classic Journal of Political 
Economy (1970) article, “Information and Consumer Behavior,” in light of market failures as 
they may exist in the sCSD industry. “Consumers are continually making choices among 
products, the consequences of which they are but dimly aware” (p 311, all quotes this 
paragraph). This applies directly as a premise for the theoretic model in Essay Two, which co-
informs the policy prescription analysis here. “Monopoly power for a consumer good will be 
greater if consumers know about the quality of only a few brands of that good.” Coke and Pepsi 
have massive market shares. Is this really an edge due to consumer “experience” (verified by the 
experience of using the good), or an edge due to consumers limited need to “search” for Coke 
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and Pepsi brands, the latter determined by their ubiquity?4
 
 Besides production function and 
market-size variables, “...consumer behavior is also relevant to the determination of monopoly 
power in consumer industries.” A view of “consumer behavior” broad enough to include RUMax 
failure would again put Nelson exactly ahead of my interpretation. “…[A]dvertising and 
inventory policy are affected by consumer ignorance about quality differences among brands.” 
Change “brands” to “product categories” and we have consumer nutritional ignorance facilitating 
the move from milk to SSBs as with-meal beverages. “The difference in the price of information 
can lead to fundamentally different kinds of consumer behavior.” Forty percent of household 
meal planners overestimate the nutritional quality of their diets (Variyam Shim and Blaylock 
2001). Appreciation of this fact makes one of Nelson’s statements once again prescient to the 
current work. Nutrition knowledge is an underprovided public good, placing the information 
search cost on the consumer to obtain a knowledge base adequate to keep them from creating 
health problems with their diet. If so “fundamentally different kinds of consumer behavior” will 
not be solved by simple blanket tax or information policies. Remember, by treatment cost, diet-
based non-communicable diseases are now the number one health problem in the world (Fulponi 
OECD 2009). 
7.5    Market Failures Resulting from Compromise of Elemental Features of a Market 
Appreciating arguments derived from empirical work in behavioral economics, social 
psychology, and the medical/public health community, it seems that a Pareto optimal equilibrium 
may not be achievable, even at market-clearing prices, if the elemental features of a market that 
can influence market transactions do not satisfy the neoclassical assumptions that define the ideal 
                                                 
4 “Experience” may be affected, per the argument of Becker and Murphy (1993), by utility-raising advertising, but I 
refer here specifically to whether the taste experience itself (blindfolded) is so unique as to determine category-
leader market shares.  
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market setting in which a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium must occur. These neoclassical 
assumptions include a level playing field on which players transact and rational players 
unerringly acting in their own long-term self interest – i.e., they do not neglect incentives, nor is 
their behavior affected by noninformative dimensions of messages, such as those that Della 
Vigna and Gentzkow summarily identify. To clarify the discussion, establishing reference terms 
will prove useful. Let’s call these elemental features: 
(market) frame = the market environment or transaction space, inclusive of all features 
that may affect the probability of transactions occurring or that may affect transaction outcomes 
(i.e., allow transaction outcomes to conform to, or cause them to fail to conform to, a competitive 
ideal); and 
RUMax agents = rational utility-maximizing agents, which for parsimony of terminology 
will include consumers as “agents” of their own interests, and will allow the term “utility” to 
extend beyond consumers to include the pursuit of profits, market share, or firm life by firms, 
and individual interests of agents for a firm, insofar as these may impact sale in the market. 
RUMax agents are actors we expect to consistently (predictably) pursue self-interested (utility or 
profit-maximizing) goals that can be met by transacting in this market.  
Failures of frame (to be perfectly competitive) would include a compromised market 
environment, giving one side advantage. Failures of RUMax agents would be market-relevant 
behaviors that are not comprehensively rational (as neoclassically defined, see section 6.4 here) 
or utility maximizing. RUMax-failing agents, for internal reasons or from influence by a frame 
whose pure competitiveness is compromised, may not consistently act according to neoclassical 
precepts. RUMax-failing agents do not perfectly defend and pursue their own best long-term 
interests when representing themselves in the market. Where “failures” of frame or of RUMax 
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agents seems too absolute a term, I shall use “compromise of frame,” or “compromise of RUMax 
agents,” to denote a similar but less absolute concept. Note that compromises or even failures of 
frame or of RUMax agents do not preclude the existence of a market, they simply make a Pareto 
optimal market outcome unlikely or impossible, just as the four classically acknowledged market 
failures do. “Market failure refers to problems in the decision-making process, and cannot be 
judged solely by looking at which decisions were made” Cawley (2004, p 120).  
Academic authors in the medical and Masters of Public Health communities refer to 
“obesogenic environments” which would be classified as failure of frame, e.g., food 
environments oriented toward low-cost energy-dense low-nutrient foods as default options, 
where the default options are the choices favored by the structure of the environment in which a 
decision is to be made. (Think “office vending machine” for between-meal hunger at work.) 
Behavioral economists occasionally refer to “failures of rationality,” or describe unstable and/or 
time-inconsistent preferences, that would fall under the failure of RUMax agents. While 
“obesogenic environments” may arguably tend toward embodying some diluted ambient form of 
market power, and time-inconsistent preferences may tend toward some form of information 
failure, it is difficult to attribute either of these discipline-specific criticisms to particular market 
failures of the “classic four” type. Failures of frame or of RUMax agents can therefore arguably 
be represented as different types of market failures from the “classic four.” 
Returning to the definition of a market, the buyers and sellers are RUMax agents, and the 
transaction space (not just spatially, but holistically) is the frame. Because a market cannot exist 
without the elemental features of agents or a transaction space, these elemental features comprise 
a substrate below the market transactions themselves. Let’s call this substrate: Level 1.  
544 
 
Given that a market exists (the elemental features of Level 1 are present), the market 
enables transactions, where transactions are a type of product made possible by the machinery 
(elemental features) of Level 1. Let’s call the transaction level: Level 2.  
The character of transactions may be freely competitive, or may be compromised in some 
way. Three of the four classic market failures represent failures of the market to transact in a 
perfectly competitive way that yields a Pareto optimal outcome: market power, externalities, and 
public goods. This leaves the information-based market failure types – information failure, i.e., 
inadequate supply or signaling of information, and information asymmetry. Information flow or 
problems with information flow occur between: 1) economic agents in the form of product 
information, pricing, and buyer-seller communication; 2) between the frame and economic 
agents in the form of market-environmental influences on appetites or behavior (red table cloths 
in Italian restaurants); and 3) between Level 1 and Level 2 in the form of information asymmetry 
affecting a transaction type (say, buyer ignorance that there is a second and cheaper merchant of 
the same product in town, in which case the buyer might be willing to pay a monopoly 
premium).  
These relations suggest the following theoretical graphic: 
 
 
Using the vocabulary and depiction in this theoretical graphic, we can see what a failure 
of frame may look like for the market for energy-dense nutrient-poor foods, such as sCSDs or 
Level 1: 
Holistic Market Environment   transaction-relevant info    Transacting Agents 
           (market frame)       (RUMax agents) 
Level 2:       Discretely Economic Transactions 
(character of transactions:  freely competitive  OR  not freely competitive) 
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SSBs (or pretzels, for that matter). If the market “setting” or environment has evolved over time 
under influence of one transacting party (firms with sophisticated marketing strategies), over 
another (individuals who are not conscious of firms’ attempt to manipulate their appetites) to 
favor the first party, then this dictated market evolution does not favor a Pareto optimal 
transaction set. Note that this dictated market evolution is not strictly visible as market power, in 
the sense that firms raise price, increase market share, or enforce barriers to entry, which are 
each manifestations of market power of the type that industrial organization economists might 
usually attempt to measure and empirically discern. If this dictated market evolution continues 
over time, with more effective marketing strategies that influence consumers on a level below 
their attention, then a “new normal” is created in which the evolved market space resembles the 
previous market space in most ways, but with a new tilt favoring the profit-maximizing firm. 
Industrial organization economists might usually fail to see or to measure such influences, and 
being trained to explain them away as matters of individual taste, built on preferences that are 
characteristics of the consumer, as sex, age, or ethnicity are. 
If a market environment biased by dictated market evolution exists, this represents a 
compromise of frame, where the playing field for market transactions is no longer level – the 
“free and fair market” frame will have been bent to favor SSB firms. There is little resistance, 
even among neoclassical economists, to the notion that where free and fair markets are 
compromised, there is a possible role for government to intervene. This concession to 
government power is based on the fundamental role of government to redress market 
imperfections that are not self-correcting. Even the most libertarian will concede government 
must enforce contracts, protect property, and correct any of the classic four market failures if 
they are large enough to lower net public welfare more than the costs involved in correcting such 
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failures. Governments have the right and responsibility to set regulate and enforce market 
conditions conducive to Pareto-optimal outcomes. These include equalizing knowledge, 
information access, and market dynamics, so that weaknesses or biases in elemental features of 
the market do not implicitly favor sellers or buyers. 
Returning to the claim that there is a public good problem in the sCSD market, the 
government role in maintaining strong and robust elemental features of a market comes to bear. 
From a perspective, because participation in a market like that for a common foodstuff does not 
preclude others from participating, provision of an institutional or regulatory or legal space in 
which a fair market can exist is a type of public good. Public goods are non-rivalrous, non-
exclusionary spaces [goods] for public activity [consumption], which are underprovided by 
private markets. People usually follow their incentive structures, as do firms. But individuals 
with multiple objectives and capacity constraints may fail to be RUMax in their eating behavior, 
as supported by the literature justifying the theoretical model in Essay Two. For example, 
economist Frederick Zimmerman (2011), discussing how the inherent complexity of weight gain 
thwarts rational choice assumption, states that “consumers are largely unaware of their own daily 
calorie intake/expenditure balance, but they are also largely uninformed about the broader costs 
and benefits” (p 291).  Arguments in Essay Two make clear that many sCSD consumers will 
have tendencies to be RUMax compromised in their food choices, while it is implicitly clear that 
firms have the incentive to bend the market frame to their profit-maximizing advantage 
whenever and however they can, and as long as legally possible. This can be done without fraud, 
or dishonesty, by constructing environmental cues that stimulate subtle aspects of consumer 
psychology – ubiquity of product and placement within retail settings, ubiquity and character of 
advertising, shape color image and lettering on packaging, etc.  
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Again, Zimmerman, this time intemperately but unambiguously states: “Culture – not 
individual rationality – has given people around the world broadly healthy diets for millennia” (p 
291); and “ … In the past 30 years, food culture has been manipulated by the marketing of highly 
processed foods as never before. Food culture no longer hews to tradition, but increasingly 
answers to commercial interest, funneling consumption toward high-profit foods” (p 292). 
To the extent that Zimmerman is accurate, this is precisely the “bending of the market 
frame” being discussed. Zimmerman also makes clear that the culture has changed rapidly, but 
not so quickly that the majority of consumers or policymakers resisted. Why would they when 
the advertising and marketing techniques emerged incrementally? Only someone cognizant of 
the market frame and interested in maintaining a level and square frame would care and protest. 
Recognizing that this dictated market evolution unfolded over decades, and its effect was in part 
masked by the slow breakdown of traditional family structures and specific food subcultures, 
may mean accepting that the solution must also unfold over decades.   
Human biology and psychology may be influenced by manipulations of taste and 
perception. This incentivizes firms manufacturing and marketing their products to stage and 
exploit an individual’s RUMax failure, so that firms profit off of the individual’s naiveté as they 
sell us energy-dense low-nutrient foods. This is the accusation that behavioral economists, 
psychologists, decision theorists, social psychologists, and many in the medical community are 
making. One such example is Coca-Cola dominantly purchasing shelf space at eye level in 
supermarkets; another is ubiquitous soda vending machines. (Where are the fresh fruit vending 
machines?) Where dictated market evolution of the frame occurs, a perfectly competitive 
outcome is not trivial, because the market is no longer “fair” in the way a coin or die or strategic 
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economic decision-making game may be. This compromise of frame may be attributed to the 
government failing to provide a public good – a competitive market environment.  
Knowledge is a public good (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, p 350). If RUMax failure 
by sCSD consumers occurs in part because nutrition knowledge is too low to motivate formation 
of healthy dietary habits that overwhelm less health-producing desires (Variyam and Golan 
2002, Beydoun and Wang 2008), then non-RUMax individuals by dint of their failure to 
maximize utility will determine a Pareto sub-optimal outcome. This can be characterized as 
resulting from individuals with too little knowledge relevant to their maximization process, 
which in turn results from public failure to provide an adequate knowledge base for participants 
to engage the market in their own best interests (Cawley 2004). Failure to provide an adequate 
minimum base level of nutrition education shifts the cost of privately acquiring nutrition 
education onto consumers. With an inadequate education base, consumers do not properly 
calculate the benefits of self-informing, and consequently do not undertake education to raise 
their level of active nutrition education to a level that would foster RUMax dietary choices. The 
proof is a population that is the most overweight and unhealthy due to diet-based diseases of any 
population in history, where the people are not happy with this outcome. If the diet industry were 
very small, if no one seemed disappointed in diagnosis of Type II diabetes, if one’s diagnosis 
with one of the cancers that primarily feed on blood glucose were seen as a small price to pay for 
the enjoyment of sugar in the diet, then we might infer that people did not regret their current 
health status and had maximized their utility with their previous dietary patterns. 
The sCSD industry politically defends the existing market frame – whose evolution has 
in part been dictated by profit-motivated marketing mechanisms over decades – as “the market.” 
The hackneyed mantra: “the market” should not be meddled with, as doing so would move firms 
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and individuals from a Pareto optimal outcome. The sCSD industry’s economic power is 
converted to political power, as with many examples in agricultural economics,5
Economists, focusing on the “classic four” market failures, tend to overlook these deeper 
Level 1 market failures, so there is not from economists’ ranks a common cry for public 
investment to correct frame and RUMax agent (Level 1) problems. By keeping the frame 
oriented toward an optimal market outcome, making much more nutrition knowledge and 
awareness of marketing influences the new default for consumers, there would be no domination 
of information or frame by industry (sellers over buyers). A government providing adequate 
public goods and consumer protections would correct these deep market failures, failures to a 
large degree proved by research presented in Essay Two and below. 
 and the 
industry’s political power is used to thwart Congress from defending the proper economic role 
for government in establishing an unbiased and self-correcting market frame with RUMax-
enabling education (Brownell and Warner, 2009). But a market frame that is biased by dictated 
evolution should be challenged as resulting from government failure to provide a public good, 
failure to maintain a fully competitive frame.  
Notice also that the “4 P’s” of marketing – product, price, place, and promotion – also 
focus the attention on Level 2 aspects, rather than on the transactional subtext and aspects of the 
agents rather than the products. Place is more physical, and seems more a stage rather than a 
                                                 
5 Even a short list of examples of corporate/industry power in agricultural economics must include Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM), Cargill, and Monsanto. All three of these companies have primary stakes in making HFCS, the 
primary non-water ingredient in American sCSDs. To ADM’s creation and manipulation of U.S. ethanol policy: “A 
bet on ethanol, with a convert at the helm,” New York Times, October 8, 2006, Alexei Barrionuevo. To Cargill’s 
behind-the-scenes style of political influence versus ADM’s more open style: The Political Economy of US 
Agriculture, Brooks and Carter, 1994. To allegations claiming extensive documentation that Monsanto has exercised 
extreme influence over U.S. and international policies affecting the disbursal of genetically engineered crop 
technologies, there is the film the World According to Monsanto (2008, National Film Board of Canada, co-
producer; dir. Marie-Monique Robin), http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=209 (accessed 19 Feb. 2013), and 
listings in OpenSecrets.org. 
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shapeable space; the mind of the buyer is not referred to directly. There is no apparent foothold 
for an industry’s marketing to skew a probability of transaction or the character of a transaction. 
Level 1 problems, while still market failures, though not of the classic four type, cannot 
be solved by Level 2 analysis, results, or policy recommendations (except coincidentally). This is 
the root of criticisms of the standard economic approach from behavioral economics and other 
fields that weigh in on the epidemic threat to health that current trends in American waistlines 
portend. The sugar/SSB/sCSD problem is in fundamental aspect a Level 1 problem. So all pure 
Level 2 recommendations are destined to fail, because singly and by the level of analysis, they 
will be of inadequate scale to address market environmental and consumer RUMax problems. 
“In general, our review of research on effective habit change strategies for complex behaviors, 
such as those that yield obesity…suggests that any single intervention strategy is unlikely to be 
sufficient to yield change across the whole population” (Verplanken and Wood 2006, p 98). 
The question then becomes do we as a nation want to solve our market and health 
problems? Before we answer we must recognize that this can be done without limiting consumer 
choice much at all (Sunstein and Thaler 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Just and Payne 2009; 
Maio et al. 2007). If our answer is yes, then we must scale our policy solutions to address Level 
1 problems. This would involve an intentional policy set to reverse the effect of market elements 
determined by a dictated market evolution, wherever the effects bias the market environment 
toward the interests of the sCSD/SSB industry. Reversing these effects would first require 
regulation and restriction of certain marketing practices for products that consumed in quantities 
common to many Americans are fundamentally harmful. This would further require a large and 
careful education campaign, with new nutrition education and marketing-awareness messages. 
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The scale of the problem – diet-related diseases are the number one health-care cost in 
the world, and SSBs are the largest energy-dense-nutrient-poor calorie source in the diet – 
further dictates that we must not succumb to protests from “free marketers” and the sugar-
products industries. These reforms will not be unfair encroachment on private operation or trade, 
but would be regulatory adjustment of a compromised market frame – a compromised market 
frame that would not have been established over the last four decades if the government had 
acted warily against a dictated market evolution. In addition to setting a fairer market frame, the 
provision of an under-provided public good in the form of education to raise the sophistication of 
the general public in nutrition and response to marketing will allow consumers to make 
responsible choices in their health-production calculus.  
 
7.5.1    Market Demand and Market Correction – Perspective Affects Policy Prescriptions 
A level market frame and adequate level of effectively applied nutrition education would 
serve as quantity purchase dampeners for most individuals.6, 7
From a meta-economics perspective, the problem results from a failure to 
comprehensively apply the very principles that economists stand on. Economists assume that 
people make utility-maximizing decisions by deliberatively and efficiently using information and 
cognitive resources. We assume this is done only for discrete rational decision making and that 
 Without such (Level 1) 
interventions, inference done on any (Level 2) market demand would tend to ignore that much of 
the entire curve is right-shifted. 
                                                 
6 Some may conceivably maximize their utility at high levels of SSB consumption, so these changes would do little 
to affect their purchases. This would be the group that loves SSBs so much that they never regret the weight gain, 
heart disease, diabetes, work loss, etc.  
7 In order to speak briefly and comprehensively about this sub-section topic, there is a reliance here on material 
supported in detail elsewhere, mostly in 6.8, but also in 7.6 through 7.9 below. This material includes citations from 
decision theory, behavioral economic, psychology, consumer psychology, social psychology, medical/nutrition, and 
neuroeconomic literatures.  
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only discrete rational decision making is used for purchase and consumption choices. Empirical 
economists working on Level 2 make assumptions about preferences and behavior, then use real 
data to calculate estimates of demand and price elasticities of demand, infer market structure, and 
draw conclusions about policy recommendations. All of these tools and processes are useful. 
A problem arises when we are forced to recognize that the assumptions economists are 
trained to make about preferences and behavior, that consumers are RUMax in the given market, 
are repeatedly challenged by empirical evidence from other fields and some evidence within the 
field, and that failure of these assumptions to hold brings down in cascade the structures built on 
these assumptions, structures that end in calculation of demand, consumers’ price elasticities of 
demand, and policy recommendations. 
In fact, for eating habits and especially for highly marketed sugar-based products, long 
before the discrete rational decision making process may be consciously engaged, biological 
application of efficient use of information and cognitive resources has already engaged, and 
psychological application of efficient use of information and cognitive resources has already 
engaged, narrowing the awareness of the preference and choice process to favor elements in the 
environment that are highlighted in some way, that are common, and that have been consumed 
without noticeable short-term ill effect. (This psychological application is explored by social 
psychology, consumer psychology, and decision theory, in addition to classical psychology, see 
Chapter 6.) Cohen and Farley (2008) explain biological and psychological efficiencies are useful. 
But economic models of demand for highly processed and marketed foods do not appreciate that 
mechanical gains in decision efficiency do not imply conscious rational choice: “noncognitive 
behaviors are not a sign of weakness but rather an adaptation that allows human beings to be a 
uniquely productive species. …A great deal of mental effort is required to make conscious 
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decisions and then implement them in the form of behaviors. Most of our responses to our 
environment can be understood as automatic behaviors” (p 3). 
These noncognitive processes that engage before and perhaps instead of discrete rational 
choice designed to maximize lifetime utility (economists’ bailiwick) meet economists’ own 
definition of efficient use of available resources, but these resources are neural, not economic. 
These processes can and do shunt decision through an emotional rather than a deliberative 
pathway. When this occurs, the process obviates the late-stage, high-neural-resource deliberative 
process that classical economists assume always characterizes economic decisions. It is these 
biologically and psychologically precedent processes that have been hijacked to a degree by 
decades of high-quality persuasive (not informative) marketing, social acceptance of a good-
tasting product sampled and enjoyed by nearly everyone, but whose primary ingredients are 
addictive or nearly addictive. Economists’ analyses, assumptions about the correctness of their 
analyses, policy prescriptions, and presumptions about the correctness of these, are all contingent 
on a level of discrete choice and efficiency that is actually unlikely to exist in the choice to 
consume sCSDs or their near-cousins, SSBs and other well-known, ubiquitous, high-sugar/low-
nutrition snack foods. All such foods use similar marketing techniques and take advantage of the 
same biological and psychological processes. The sCSDs are simply the best at this game, and 
Coca-Cola® is king. Calorically-sweetened carbonated soft drinks  are the purest sugar (no trace 
of fiber, protein, or fat), often plus caffeine, in a low-cost form that is so convenient that it 
doesn’t even require chewing to consume. 
Classical economic logic dictates that to the degree that SSB market outcomes are not 
efficient due to failures of frame and RUMax behavior, the larger system must change, because 
the quantity we see purchased is not demand, as it would be under neoclassical assumptions for 
554 
 
free markets and rational choice, but an artificially large demand. Quantity purchased does not 
equal market demand for SSBs, in the sense of a fair market, where consumers act rationally and 
the frame is level. There are a host of empirically identified mechanisms that manipulate 
preference and consumption quantity for this type of product. Marketing, product ubiquity, 
stocking, and flavor enhancement can all increase purchase and consumption patterns by 
affecting biological and psychological drivers – drivers that may not correlate strongly with 
underlying individual preferences in the absence of these environmental cues. Meanwhile, lack 
of nutrition education and lack of consumer awareness of the impact of sophisticated marketing 
techniques or even of consumers’ own dietary habits decreases resistance to increased purchase 
and consumption. So long as the distinction between quantity purchased and demand is clear, the 
term demand may be used as a simplifying proxy. But demand cannot mean the sum of 
exogenous individual preferences expressed by purchase quantity in a fair market, because 
evidence in Essays Two and below suggests this seems very unlikely to occur for perhaps the 
vast majority of people in the SSB market. Arguments against policy intervention cannot cite 
that they undercut legitimate preferences and demand for a majority of the population, without 
expressly refuting decades of corroborative evidence suggesting the demand they fill is created, 
not a genuine reflection of original preferences. 
No matter how efficient the production, distribution, and from the firm’s perspective, 
marketing, of sCSDs (SSBs) may be, if the volume sold is meeting an artificially large demand, 
it is a misallocation of social resources, and as such can only detract from attempts to maximize 
social welfare. Given the market failures implicit in and the health effects that follow from this 
inflated artificial demand, there is a perfect case for attaining higher total welfare by any 
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government intervention that results in market outcomes that more closely comply with 
fundamental economic definitions of market-clearing demand.  
To account for the empirical evidence, changing economists’ assumption set to reflect 
scientific evidence has serious implications for our estimates and our policy recommendations. 
Empirical evidence from studies of the psychological and biological mechanisms involved 
suggest that every popular policy mechanism currently proposed will in the form proposed, fail 
to reduce the scale of SSB consumption enough to produce the intended effect on public health. 
 With combinations of policy interventions expressly designed to address Level 1 market 
failures, gross product purchased will fall. This is not an assault on commerce, commercial 
rights, or market demand. The fall in quantity purchase within a square market frame in which 
informed aware individuals choose based on long-term utility maximizing goals will allow a 
classically defined market demand to equilibrate.  
Changes to the SSB market are not impositions on SSB markets, but necessities. They do 
not threaten free speech or commercial rights, they protect the rights of consumers that have been 
infringed through the construction of artificially large demand for health-threatening products. 
Considering Loewenstein’s (see 6.8.3) depiction of “arational” behavior, and the at least semi-
addictive nature of high-sugar foods (especially in the absence of dietary fiber), as well as the 
often unexamined momentum of dietary habits, it is clear that much SSB consumption is not well 
deliberated, and may not be volitional in a solidly defensible sense. If sCSD (SSB) purchase and 
consumption is not fully and freely volitional, then policies to regulate advertisement, packaging, 
content, or marketing of sCSDs may be more freely considered, without the full weight of the 
counterargument that their restriction must be undercutting welfare. If regular consumption at 
levels challenging dietary recommendations is not fully intentional and rationally utility 
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maximizing, then it is overconsumption to begin with, and policies that decrease consumption by 
educating consumers and countering the dictation of market evolution is simply a reasonable 
intervention to correct market failure. Policy intervention is a responsibility. When markets are 
fundamentally broken, policy must apply to foster a more socially efficient outcome. 
 
7.6    Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro: Well-Known Level 2 Analysis Misses Level 1 Problems  
A clear example of Level 1 problems being lost to Level 2 analyses may be found in the 
famous explanation of U.S. obesity offered by Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (CGS) in their 
National Bureau of Economic Research paper ultimately published in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (2003). CGS are sensitive to potential failures of some standard economic premises:  
The standard model of consumption involves rational individuals who decide how much to consume on the 
basis of price and income, fully accounting for the future health consequences of their actions. But at least 
some food consumption is almost certainly not fully rational. People overeat, despite substantial evidence that 
they want to lose weight. The diet industry has $40-100 billion in annual revenues [CGS cite: Cummings, 
Laura. 2003. “The Diet Business: Banking on Failure.” BBC Online. February 5]. Food brings immediate 
gratification, while health costs of overconsumption occur only in the future (p 112). 
 
By this point much of that argument will sound familiar (from Essay Two, and Just and Payne 
2009 make it too). As food processing has moved more from the kitchen to outside factories, the 
time-cost of food preparation has fallen, allowing people to eat a greater variety of foods and 
higher volumes. CGS note that the amount of food eaten at meals has not changed much, and 
that “most of the increase in calories is from calories consumed during snacks…the number of 
snacks in the typical day increased dramatically over [the mid-‘70s to mid-‘90s] (p 101).” They 
also note that total exercise has not dropped enough to count fall in caloric expenditure as a 
factor in general weight gain. They note that the increase in the food supply over their study 
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period is “three to four times the increase that is needed to explain the increase in average 
obesity over the time period” (p 102). 
CGS reject that changing demographics, market price and household income changes, a 
relative price decline for food, or an increase in women in the work force driving more meals 
away from home are responsible for the rise in caloric intake and American obesity. CGS offer 
theory and empirical evidence to support their hypothesis that a lowering of the relative cost of 
food preparation is responsible for the extra calories. Their result is a solid explanation rooted in 
a Level 2 approach that is foundational in the literature concerning the economic approach to the 
modern obesity problem, with some tips of the hat to potential Level 1 problems. 
But being primarily a Level 2 analysis, it overlooks some compromises of frame and 
RUMax behavior that may exist on magnitudes that could explain more of the obesity effect 
CGS attempt to characterize. First, they find only a 20-minute-per-person-per-day decrease in 
food preparation time from 1965 to 1995. If this is indeed a critical motivation of increased 
caloric intake, then how is it that weight gain continued, even accelerated in the last decade of 
the study period, while the time advantages of food preparation technology would have been 
mostly captured in the 1970s and 1980s, with proliferation of snack and pre-made foods? 
There is no question that more processed foods in the diet “lowered the time price of food 
consumption” (Gortmaker et al. 2011, p 838), but most food preparation time is for meals, not 
snacks. Excess calories entered the diet primarily with the addition of snack foods, by CGS’s 
own claim. So this is a vector of new food that would have proved time-prohibitive to prepare 
using in-home technology, had it been eaten before (daily potato chips or frosted snack cakes 
from scratch?), but it was not. No food preparation time savings accrue from foods that were 
rarely or not eaten before. Time saving in period B relative to period A demands that a task be 
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performed in both periods. Some move from fresh to canned or frozen meal ingredients would 
mean potentially lower nutritive quality of calories in meals, and a lowering of preparation time, 
but again, the predominant caloric influx is from snack foods. High-calorie-low-nutrition 
processed snack foods were not a major part of the 1965 diet, but entered and proliferated as an 
obesogenic behavior in parallel to, but largely unrelated to, the lowering of food preparation 
times. Couldn’t proliferation of the microwave alone account for much of the difference in meal 
preparation times? 
Also, workout time, including travel to and from a workout site may average more than 
20 minutes daily for many people, so a rational person wanting to manage their weight would 
have recognized this and stopped snacking, to block the time inefficiency of spending more time 
to exercise than the time-cost savings from lower food preparation time. Or if physical 
conditioning is not a priority, a rational person would weigh 20 minutes per day and snack 
enjoyment against the probability of lower life enjoyment and lower productivity from obesity, 
and later insulin injections and dialysis, or even chemotherapy bills. (This returns us to capacity 
constraints recognized by Herbert Simon, psychologists, decision theorists, and behavioral 
economists. Cohen and Farley 2008 offer exact numbers for neural processing bits/second.)  
Underappreciation of an increase in low-nutrient dietary calories may follow from a 
misapplication of linear logic, or from a compromise of market frame that consumers fail to see, 
while failure to adapt one’s snacking behavior may follow from consumer failure to do full time-
cost calculations for their weekly time budgets. These are “failures of rationality” (Sassi and 
Hurst OECD 2008), which CGS in principle acknowledge may occur, but that they do not 
appreciate in their empirical model. 
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Beyond these, the primary factor CGS overlook in a Level 2 analysis is the compromise 
of frame represented by changes in food quality. Meals are more likely to have some nutritional 
plan than snacks, and meals are often comprised of culturally traditional mixtures of protein, fat, 
starches, and nutrient-rich foods (meat, potatoes, salad), while processed snack foods are often 
extruded or gun-puffed refined grain-based products, often with soy oil and added sugar. To treat 
them as equivalent foods under the category of either “food” or “calories” – as a person with low 
effective nutrition education may be wont to do, especially in a hurry – is in error, given the 
tremendous difference in nutritive profiles.  
Food quantity may rise a small amount as relative price falls, but highly nutritional foods 
are filling, whereas low-nutrition foods are less filling. Calories alone may tip the BMI scale in 
bio-physical terms, but the types of calories ingested do matter for hunger and eating behaviors, 
and it is this qualitative difference that undermines the CGS analysis. Refined carbohydrates 
stimulate hunger, while protein and fat satiate it, with the effect amplified for semi-liquids and 
liquids, as less solid foods ingested between meals displace meal calories less (Olsen and 
Heitmann 2009). After a Coke and chips, you will be hungry again soon, both from the 
ingredients, and because you did not respond to the initial hunger by nutrifying the body to 
properly neutralize the hunger. If low-nutrient, carbohydrate-rich snacks are eaten instead of fruit 
or nuts or whole grains, or protein, etc., a person will eat more – because these snacks are easier 
and faster to eat, because hunger will return quickly if satiating hormones are not generated (or 
are suppressed, as high-fructose corn syrup [HFCS] does, Teff et al. 2004), and because hunger 
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will return more quickly if hunger-producing hormones are triggered by postprandial 
hypoglycemia (Ludwig 2002, Olsen and Heitmann 2009, and others).8
Food manufacturers in the CGS study period could have produced and advertised 
nutritive and filling snacks out of sweet potatoes, kale, and lean beef, and some may have. These 
could still be made crunchy, spicy, sweet, savory, or “fun.” But the vast majority make refined-
flour crackers, snack cakes, potato starch products, etc., because these tend to predominantly use 
artificially cheap (farm-program-supported) ingredients.
 
9
Fruits and vegetables and raw nuts are nutritious snacks. Where is the big margin in that? 
Profit margins rise with more levels of processing. The lower the percentage of the retail price 
the grower gets, the higher the mark-up for the “value added” by processing, labeling, and 
distribution for everyone else in the chain. Where is Madison-Avenue advertising for bananas? A 
banana is a banana; highly nutritive, but without a big advertising budget. Dried shredded sugar-
coated banana chips attached to sweetened crunchy ready-to-eat cereal flakes…now there is a 
profit margin middle men want a piece of.  Buy cheap, sell dear: manufactured refined-grain- 
and -sugar-based snack foods. Because these foods do not fill biological needs in a way likely to 
satiate hunger over time, people will eat more of them. (Doritos television ad from the 1990s, 
 Profit margins are higher with cheap 
ingredients and highly advertised “fun” snacks (see Becker and Murphy 1993, Table 1, for foods 
and Coke as among the top 10 largest advertising-to-sales ratios among major national 
advertisers).  
                                                 
8 See also Essay Two, 6.7. Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro were capable of recognizing the food quality argument, as 
evidenced by the following quote, but they either missed it or discounted it for some reason  (p 94): “Countries with 
a greater degree of regulation that support traditional agriculture and delivery systems have lower rates of obesity.” 
9 Potatoes do not receive farm support, but are much higher calorie per acre than grains, and the few whole potatoes 
in bags of chips make for a high profit margin that is well-known. There is less than a single raw potato in a child-
lunch snack bag of potato chips that sells even at a very low retail price in a discount membership store in a large 
bulk pack for $12 for 50 ounces ($0.24 an ounce,  
http://www.samsclub.com/sams/shop/product.jsp?productId=163825&_requestid=17934, accessed on 04/06/12). An 
average potato weighs about 6.5 ounces. 
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starring Jay Leno: “crunch all you want, we’ll make more.” Doritos isn’t selling food, it is selling 
the crunch experience, coated with spices engineered to encourage another bite involuntarily – a 
taste development process similar to that described in Schlosser 2001.) 
Food manufacturers will argue that their product lines are driven by consumer demand, 
but while perhaps slightly true, the argument is made assuming that no one notices that the 
market frame is bent. For example, this argument ignores the artificiality of demand created by 
advertisements, the fact that there was no general clamor for such products in the 1950s and ‘60s, 
ignores the fact that there is no good counterfactual where wholesome foods were more 
aggressively marketed (or where the increasing sophistication of processed food marketing was 
countered in the U.S. by public service announcements or advertising restrictions), and tends to 
deflect attention from firms’ incentive to secure a higher profit ratio for cheap ingredients sold 
dear.  
Lowered cost of food preparation and “cheap” snack foods will make them more 
attractive to consumers exactly as CGS state, and consumers will enjoy a larger variety of 
processed branded products and with greater net volume of caloric intake, relative to fruit and 
nuts, and to any snack food prepared in the home. The variety is an illusion, because of the very 
narrow range of commodities involved in most of these snack foods (USDA program crops and 
potatoes). It is a compromise of RUMax to continuously fail to notice that there is very little 
biological (vitamin, mineral, and enzyme) variety in your “varied” food consumption set. More 
importantly, the majority of the obesity effect need not have occurred if the manufactured snack 
foods had been nutritious. Snacks would be more filling, so there would be fewer empty calories 
going in, and less than the 27% displacement of nutrient-dense foods by energy-dense nutrient-
poor foods (Marriot et al., p 229). But if snacks were more nutritious, people would stop eating 
562 
 
them when they became nutrified, because hormones would signal satiation. Satiating hunger 
quickly would lower snackfood sales volume, so firms will naturally prefer to manufacture 
products whose consumption triggers more consumption (sCSDs or sugary snacks), rather than 
quickly satiating a temporary desire.  
CGS also do not mention that if people are eating enough quality foods at meal times, 
they are less tempted to snack at all, because the slower digestion of protein and fat stave off 
hunger. Only if advertisements (or socialization, or addictive properties) manufacture desire 
(persuasive rather than informative advertising) could a well-fed person be induced to intake 
large amounts of a low-nutritive snack. Ignorance of the health effects of the snack food may be 
cited to defend why a well-fed person would snack so much, but this violates classical economic 
RUMax assumptions, and again, supports my case.  
So the obesity problem may in part derive from the lower food-preparation cost that CGS 
identify – which being a time-saving is hardly a problem at all – but seems much more likely to 
result from a change in net dietary quality that strongly encourages unconscious overeating of 
empty calories. Meal habits may also have degraded over CGS’s period of study (suggested by 
trends recognized by Senauer, Asp, Kinsey 1991), amplifying the transition to lower food 
quality. More food enters the diet that has lower relative shelf price (compared to meat, fruit, 
vegetables, and nuts) and lower nutritive quality. These cheaper lower-quality foodstuffs fail to 
satiate and often induce hunger, and will do so if consumed, regardless of  meal habits. If these 
alternative explanations hold, CGS fail to empirically identify what may prove to be the 
preponderant causal factors, leaving a well-executed but mis-specified model. 
Alternative explanations presented here represent changes of frame, possibly from 
dictated evolution of markets, and possibly provoking RUMax-compromised behavior of 
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individuals who unconsciously equate snack foods with satiating nutritive foods, or tend to eat 
by reflexive rather than deliberative behaviors. Cohen and Farley (2008), characterize eating as 
generally an “automatic behavior,” while being clear that it can be brought under volitional 
control (“All automatic behaviors can be controlled temporarily,” p 4). Consider the CGS 
conclusion based on the premise of rational rather than reflexive (rather than “automatic”) 
behavior. If people made a responsible economic trade-off – maximizing utility when eating 
more, because relative food costs dropped as processing times were transferred out of the home – 
then these people are happy enough being overweight, and are therefore better off: “People 
without extreme self-control problems will be better off. While there is no evidence on the 
incidence of extreme hyperbolic discounting in the population, we suspect that most people are 
better off from the technological advances of mass food preparation, even if their weight has 
increased” (p 115). 
From a Level 1 perspective, this seems to be a tenuous leap, while from a Level 2 
perspective rooted in the classical economic approach, it is at least defensible. But if CGS are 
correct, people have to be less concerned about their weight than about the 20-minutes saved 
each day. Without expressly intending to, Cohen and Farley parry and thrust: 
Assuming that people who are overweight are simply unconcerned about their weight is tempting. But most 
Americans consider themselves to be overweight, and nearly one-third are actively trying to lose weight 
(including nearly one-fourth of women of normal weight…)(…). The observation that so many people 
continue to gain weight despite wanting to be thin is more accurately explained by describing eating as an 
automatic behavior (p 4; citations omitted, marked using “(…)”). 
These are Level 1 problems, and it is little wonder that Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro did 
not fully appreciate them in a responsible and well-defended Level 2 analysis. CGS do 
responsibly use qualifiers for those individuals who are not strictly RUMax in behavior: “People 
are worse off if this health cost is greater than the welfare gain from lower costs of food 
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preparation” (p 114). “People with self-control problems may find themselves overconsuming 
food, particularly when the time costs of food preparation fall. In this situation lower time costs 
of food preparation may be a welfare loss” (p 113). 
They assume that this group is by far the minority, and “people without extreme self-
control problems” are the majority, so “most people are better off” at the higher weight (p 115). 
In contrast to the medical literature and national diet-industry figures, CGS seem to have 
mischaracterized the preponderance of type in each group, and therefore while carefully 
defending their argument, imply that there is general welfare gain, when a Level 1 appreciation 
suggests a general welfare loss, because there are more losers on the scale than winners. It is not 
only those with “extreme self-control problems” who are losing out, but the majority, who are 
subject to reflexive eating habits, and the third who signal that they regret their weight. Perhaps 
even more people regret their overweight, obesity, or diabetes, and no longer actively signal this 
because they believe that their weight is beyond their control. Maio et al. 2007 refer to a sense of 
control as one of the three primary motivators of behavior or behavioral change.   
Ultimately, the 20-minute/day time savings does seem too small to primarily motivate a 
nationwide obesity epidemic. For many of the reasons presented in Essay Two it seems doubtful 
that most Americans consciously traded their long-term health for more snacks. For reasons 
carefully supported in Essay Two, the Level 1 factors may prove far more compelling an 
explanation than CGS’s primary argument. From a policy perspective, CGS are bound to 
conclude that if most people are better off from the division of labor in food processing 
(apparently despite the $90B/yr obesity-related U.S. medical bills), there is little reason for 
government intervention. The Level 1 assessment explains why people may ignore changes in 
quality when they (falsely) see most “food” as equivalent, and why they may fail to understand 
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the full consequences of eating high-calorie low-nutrition foods, artificially inflating estimated 
demand for these foods. This “demand” tends to inflate BMIs, and not artificially. The Level 1 
analysis suggests that compromises of free market assumptions exist in sufficient severity to 
merit policy intervention. 
In contrast to CGS, who provide a balanced Level 2 analysis, Marlow and Shiers (2010) 
use Level 2 blinders, demonstrating the type of bristly defense of results determined by precepts 
that usually associate with industry sponsorship of research (Essay Two, Lesser et al. 2007). 
They conclude that soda taxes are unlikely to significantly lower obesity (as do Fletcher, 
Frisvold, Teft 2011, referring to their own earlier quantitative work), but proceed to argue on 
general principle that because a government is unlikely to assess the perfect tax level, and taxes 
will likely prove regressive, that desired behavioral corrections will not occur, and such taxes 
“may promote unintended consequences that may adversely affect public health” (p 34). Marlow 
and Shiers’ conclusions are scientifically irresponsible while by strict logic not incorrect. This is 
the result of intentional framing of arguments they seek to overturn, so that their arguments must 
logically prevail over logically indefensible straw-man arguments. Marlow and Shiers rely on 
logical tricks like the inability to definitively establish single-source “causality” as a failure to 
strongly associate product use with health effect (a move from the tobacco industry playbook, 
explained by Brownell and Warner 2009). Similarly, they dismiss peer-reviewed meta-analyses 
that conclude that SSBs harm health. If one stays strictly in the Level 2 mindset, it is easy to miss 
the many ways in which such arguments mimic responsible economic assessment while failing 
to achieve honest academic assessment.  
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7.7    Conventional Economic Approaches to sCSD Market Failure: Taxing sCSDs and 
Giving Consumers More Information 
Having outlined how conventional, “Level 2,” analyses tend to overlook causative factors 
relevant to SSB overconsumption, let us now turn to policy options that flow from different 
assumption sets and recognition of causes. Section 7.7 discusses current policy approaches to 
reduce SSB consumption usually advocated by economists, and the strengths and limitations of 
these tools. Section 7.8 examines arguments and empirical evidence from within or near 
economics that question neoclassical assumptions. 
 
7.7.1    Taxing sCSDs or SSBs 
Taxes (subsidies) are a classic policy tool for addressing market failure, and given the 
flexibility of tax policies compared to regulatory bans or command-and-control policies, 
economists favor taxes. Consumers and companies facing a new tax may adapt their methods 
while still remaining relatively free to determine their own process of maximization (utility or 
profit). There are many reasons a food may be taxed, from redressing market failure, to import 
restriction, to general revenue generation (such as a state sales tax covering entire categories of 
products), to specific revenue generation (for targeted revenue use), to a sin tax. Sin taxes are 
used to partially discourage consumption when some sort of market failure presumptively 
encourages overconsumption,10
                                                 
10 As a general rule in discussing policies and the need to correct market failures, I will use the term 
overconsume/overconsumption to mean consume in excess of recommended limits, referring usually to 
consumption of added sugars in excess of American Heart Association (Johnson et al. 2009), and Institute of 
Medicine (Marriott et al. 2010) recommended limits, or finally to Stanhope et al. (2011), who question the roughly 
25% limit as too generous after discovering significant increase in markers of heart disease after healthy subjects 
were on a diet with 25% of their energy intake as added sugar in soft-drink form for two weeks. Using the inferably 
more scientifically objective World Health Organization’s 2003 recommendation that added sugar intake be less 
than 10% of total energy intake (Johnson et al. 2009) is a stricter standard, one the U.S. is clearly not yet prepared to 
accept. Inference on the relative objectiveness of the American and WHO standards is suggested by processes 
 including a compromise of consumers’ RUMax behavior from 
567 
 
addictive goods (this is an economist’s wording of a perspective more commonly held by non-
economists, who are less likely to ascribe to Becker and Murphy’s A Theory of Rational 
Addiction, 1988). Sin taxes are a “cultural intervention,” given the cultural judgment implicit in a 
sin tax (Zimmerman 2011). According to Fulponi (2009), so far no OECD (federal) government 
has taxed specific foods to reduce their consumption – as a sin tax would apply. Powell and 
Chaloupka (2010) confirm within the U.S. that as of 2009 no state or local government uses soft-
drink taxes to promote healthier eating. The implicit choices in the OECD and U.S. of not having 
imposed such taxes is in part attributable to the relative ineffectiveness of tax measures in 
achieving health outcomes, due to the low price elasticity for food and often easy substitutability 
that may lead to poor correlation between policy target and tax effect. 
Imperfect information about products or health effects, distortions of preferences by 
marketing campaigns, time-inconsistent individual preferences, and negative externality costs 
associated with consumption have all been cited as motivation for taxing soda (Brownell et al. 
2009). The taxing of sodas in the U.S. is often currently proposed as a new policy intervention 
using economic justification, but are proposed also as a form of sin tax, since sCSDs are 
generally considered to be an unhealthful product. This is not a novel concept: “Sugar, rum, and 
tobacco, are commodities which are nowhere necessaries of life, which are become objects of 
almost universal consumption, and which are, therefore, extremely proper subjects of taxation” 
(Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776;11
                                                                                                                                                             
described in the books of Marion Nestlé, David Kessler, and the articles at least of Lutter and Nestler 2009, and 
Brownell and Warner 2009. 
 or 
Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui 2011b, p 650). 
11 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3300/3300-h/3300-h.htm, accessed 06 April, 2012. 
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Taxes can be effective mechanisms for achieving second-best outcomes closer to 
estimated/hypothetical “free-market” equilibria as would be achieved in the absence of market 
failures. 
In practice to date, the consistency and level of state sales taxes, even when applied to 
soda despite a general waiver for food items (Smith, Lin, and Lee 2010 provide a table of state 
taxes in 2009), does not seem to serve as an active disincentive large enough to impact health 
outcomes, as an effectively large sin tax might (Fletcher, Frisvold, Teft 2011; Powell and 
Chaloupka 2010; Sturm et al. 2010; Brownell et al. 2009). Smith, Lin, and Lee (2010) use 
estimation results to predict a 37 kcal/day reduction in SSB consumption from a 20% tax on 
SSBs. Finkelstein et al. (2009), estimate a mean reduction of 12.4 kcal/day from a 40% tax on 
SSBs, at a mean household cost of $28.48. These are disappointingly small effects, given the 120 
kcal/day rise in SSB consumption from 1977-78 to 1999-2001 (Nielsen and Popkin 2004).  
Anyone expecting a politically feasible tax scheme to greatly affect consumption 
behavior may be in for a disappointment. Smith, Lin, and Lee claim to be the first to have 
calculated cross-price elasticities for products to which tax-deflected SSB drinkers would 
substitute, and encouragingly find that water would be the strongest substitute (albeit bottled 
water, which will give major soft-drink bottlers less to complain about, given their ownership of 
dominant bottled-water brands: PepsiCo=Aquafina®, Coca-Cola Company=Dasani®). Smith, 
Lin, and Lee do warn that without straight pass-through of the tax (100% of the 20% excise tax 
is passed to the consumer), effects may vary, and a tax higher than 20% would be required to 
achieve targeted effects on consumption. 
From Powell and Chaloupka (2010), we know that recently 40 states tax junk food and 34 
states tax sCSDs, from which Powell and Chaloupka conclude that small stable taxes or 
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subsidies are unlikely to produce significant changes in BMI or obesity prevalence. Nonetheless, 
larger pricing interventions may affect those most at risk for overweight, as well as children and 
low-socio-economic-status individuals. Furthermore:  
…results suggest that taxing high-sugar food items may have long-run significant effects on weight outcomes 
(p 244).  
The current body of empirical literature that we reviewed offers limited evidence that weight outcomes could 
be improved by using fiscal policies and that substantial price changes are needed to improve these outcomes 
significantly (p 246). 
So small taxes seem not to have positive health effects by themselves, but relatively large taxes 
might for certain target groups. Powell and Chaloupka note that no studies to date have linked 
tax data to individual-level data to derive BMI or obesity tax elasticity estimates, but Fletcher is 
currently working on this (spring of 2012). Lopez and Fantuzzi (2012) conduct a counterfactual 
with a 10% ad valorem tax on CSDs (caloric and diet), using results from a random coefficients 
logit model, and find that a tax of this magnitude would discourage some CSD use, but not 
enough to impact obesity. They do not consider hunger-promoting effects of caloric CSD 
consumption (Olsen and Heitmann 2009), nor do they break from most economists and use an 
accurate (Hall et al. 2011) model of caloric-change-to-weight-effect over time. The age of the 
data places it before the rise of sports and energy drinks in the market, and the authors do not 
discuss consumer adaptation to a post-tax pricing scheme, ignoring the likelihood that after an 
initial price shock habitual consumers would – goaded by advertising and with no education to 
help alter behavior – revert to use of the same or calorically similar products (Zhen et al. 2011). 
Given the similarity of Lopez and Fantuzzi’s results to related empirical work, it appears their 
findings – that low-income consumers will be more effected by a 10% tax and that obesity would 
likely be unaffected by such a tax – likely would not change if the authors were to appreciate the 
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potentially confounding factors just mentioned. Lopez and Fantuzzi conclude that a program 
more comprehensive than a stand-alone tax on sCSDs will be needed to affect obesity rates. 
 
7.7.1.a    The Type and Scope of Tax Strongly Impact Policy Efficacy 
Assuming that an effective tax policy can exist that redresses market failures in the 
sCSD/SSB industry and improves health outcomes from consumer choice, the efficacy of such a 
policy still depends on a number of factors. Policymakers must determine the definitions of 
which beverages to include or exclude in the tax framework, and the type of tax. No one with 
health objectives should include sCSDs while excluding other calorically sweetened beverages 
including energy and sports drinks, and fruit drinks – carbonation is irrelevant to the medical 
effects of high sugar intake.  
Sales taxes are calculated as a percentage of retail price; excise taxes are calculated per 
unit or per volume. Brownell, in conjunction with various authors back to Jacobsen and Brownell 
(2000), has proposed a one-cent-per-ounce excise tax on calorically sweetened beverages (and 
not on non-calorically sweetened sister products in the same supermarket aisle). Brownell also 
with various co-authors proposes a sales or excise tax that would kick into effect above a certain 
threshold level of grams of added caloric sweetener, or kick in above a certain number of 
kcal/oz., or a tax per gram (equivalent) of added sugar, acknowledging that some theoretically 
possible tax structures would prove difficult to administer. Pomeranz et al. (2009, including 
Brownell), note that a regulatory cap on the amount of sugar in certain products is also a 
theoretic policy option that could achieve the same ingestion targets as a tax at a certain level. 
They do not that economists generally prefer taxation strategies to command and control, without 
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noting that this is because it allows firms more flexibility to discover the most efficient 
solution.12
Brownell et al. (2009) recognize three disadvantages to sales versus excise taxes. 
Consumers might simply switch to lower-cost brands or large containers (excise taxes are more 
effective in raising price when volume discounts are available, Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui 
2011c). Also problems with sales taxes – consumers may become aware of the tax only after 
purchase, lowering the disincentive to purchase because it does not appear as a higher shelf 
price, and free refills on fountain drinks would remain untaxed. Moreover, many states exempt 
all foods and beverages from sales taxes, which could further legislative difficulty.  As 
disincentives to the amount of sugar per ounce in SSBs, excise taxes offer advantages, and can 
be assessed on producers and wholesalers, where they would be easier to levy and enforce. 
Targeting bottlers with an excise tax might miss taxing fountain drinks. Brownell et al. (2009) 
suggest raising excise taxes with inflation. 
 
As a policy option, sales or excise taxes rise or fall on the same premise: that consumers 
and firms will be making rational economic choices, and respond to the tax in their own best 
interest. This makes any tax method unlikely to be an effective primary vector for reducing SSB 
consumption if the consumption itself is not demonstrably determined by consumers’ RUMax 
behavior. If consumers are not RUMax in their SSB consumption, other policy options should be 
emphasized. Brownell et al. (2010) advocate SSB taxes because “changing food prices is a 
means of creating better defaults [meaning ‘default options’]” (p 386). While this is strictly true, 
this assumes rational response to a tax, when the original quantity purchased may not have been 
the product of RUMax behavior. Why would non-RUMax consumers suddenly flip to RUMax 
                                                 
12 Pomeranz et al. (2009) is a shotgun approach, focused on laying out every possible strategy to lower SSB 
purchase, without exploring the mechanisms by which strategies might work, as provided here. 
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when faced with a modest new tax on their habitually favored good?  As Just and Payne (2009) 
plainly state:  
Because food decisions are made with little cognitive involvement, food policies designed to appeal to highly 
cognitive thought (e.g. fat taxes, detailed information labels) are likely to have little impact. …As a general 
principle, when individuals do not behave in their own interest, markets will feed perverse and sub-optimal 
behaviors (p S47). 
   …[T]here is substantial evidence that prices are not the primary driver of many food decisions. Many 
purchases are separated from the consumption either by time or individuals making it difficult for price to 
play a direct role. …[A]bout half of individuals cannot recall the price of items they have placed in their 
shopping carts only seconds after the fact. If  individuals do not recall prices at the time of purchase, it is hard 
to imagine price playing much of a role in consumption decisions once the item is in their home. Multiple 
grocery items purchased together results in consumers dissociating the item from the purchase price in a 
process referred to as payment decoupling (p S49). 
   …If people make systematic mistakes, then policy makers may have another justification to help (p S50). 
   …If policies simply proscribe some behaviors by consumers, raise the relative prices of some foods, or provide 
more health information, this will not fundamentally alter the structure of the game (p S53). 
   …We conclude that many of the proposed solutions to the obesity problem are unlikely to have much of an 
impact. In particular, policies that adjust prices or increase health information are likely to be ignored by 
exactly those individuals who have a tendency toward obesity. Rather individuals have become obese or 
overweight by making food decisions that ignore cognitive factors, relying more on heuristic decision 
mechanisms (p S54).13
Policies better oriented to addressing the psychological factors (often Level 1) that induce 
purchase levels higher than most peoples’ physiologies can healthfully accommodate are 
preferable to the standard (independent) tax policy that Level 2 analysts usually propose. 
 
Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui (2011b) claim that “the weight of the evidence suggests that 
taxes on the order of a cent or two per ounce will raise prices by enough to reduce net caloric 
intake and obesity.” They continue: “At worst, such taxes would have little impact on overall 
caloric intake, while promoting substitution of healthier alternatives for the empty calories 
contained in SSBs, reducing some of the health consequences of SSB consumption” (p 651). 
                                                 
13 There is a larger presentation of Just and Payne’s 2009 work exploring bad heuristics associated with low 
information levels by consumers, in sub-section 7.8.4 below. 
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Few economists echo their argument that health effects will result from tax rates that low. The 
political infeasibility of much higher tax rates is likely to rise with the proposed rate. (Industry 
resistance to SSB-consumption-reducing policy proposals is discussed in sub-section 7.13.1 
below.)  
The penny-per-ounce proposal translates to a 15-20% rise for a 20-oz SSB. Brownell et 
al. (2010) cite -0.8 to -1.0 own-price price elasticities of demand for SSB as a category, but 
expect higher elasticities to result in practice as many consumers switch to diet versions 
(untaxed). Smith, Lin, and Lee use an Almost Ideal Demand System and Nielsen HomeScan data 
for demand estimation with cross-price elasticities. They estimate (uncompensated) own-price 
price elasticities of demand for the calorically sweetened beverage category of -1.26, meaning an 
effective price rise of ten cents would lead to a 12-and-one-half ounce purchase reduction. Smith, 
Lin, and Lee find that diet beverage consumption also drops significantly in rising caloric 
sweetened beverage price (-0.457), while there seems to be positive substitution to skim milk 
(0.198), to fruit and vegetable juices (0.557), and an even stronger substitution to bottled water 
(0.749). (All of the Smith, Lin, and Lee results are reported to be significant at the 1% level.) 
Using their own less rigorous calculation of own-price elasticities of demand, Brownell et 
al. (2009) calculate that a penny-per-ounce tax on SSBs (larger category than sCSDs) may 
generate $14.9B/yr. Jacobsen and Brownell had estimated in 2000 that $1.5B/yr. could be 
collected from a penny-per-ounce tax on sCSDs. 
In classical economic style, Jensen and Smed (2007) note that: “A key result from the 
economic literature on regulation is that the cost effectiveness of a policy instrument depends on 
the instrument’s precision in targeting the considered problem. The more precisely the regulation 
targets the problem the smaller will be substitution effects” (p 2). 
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A key motivation for my quantitative essay (Chapters 1–4) was to identify specific 
demographic groups to target for policy intervention to reduce sCSD purchase. Jensen and Smed 
claim there were no empirical studies evaluating the design of tax/subsidy instruments for 
optimizing efficacy of policies intended to have nutrition effects. They quantitatively analyze 
seven different food tax and subsidy instruments or combinations of instruments, and find that 
average cost effectiveness of taxes to reduce ingredients in products is 10-30% higher than for 
taxes targeting whole products. For SSBs/sCSDs, this implies that policies targeting sugar/HFCS 
will prove more cost effective in nutrition result that policies targeting products. There is little in 
the quasi-exogenous literature explored here that would dispute this. Calorically sweetened 
carbonated soft drinks still remain a good policy target as a product, because they are archetypal 
in being pure HFCS vectors (in U.S. recipes) with no other nutritive features of any kind. Taxing 
caloric sweeteners (ingredients rather than products) in the general way that Jensen and Smed 
suggest is most efficient is likely to prove politically even less feasible than taxing SSBs, 
because the industrial coalition moving against initiative legislation will be larger, and probably 
no less unified. Perhaps ignoring political constraints, Powell and Chaloupka (2010) find 
empirical evidence supporting a “multipronged approach” to food-price and obesity problems, 
advocating taxes on less healthy energy-dense foods, and subsidies for “healthier, less-dense 
foods” (p 249). 
A common objection to taxes on SSBs is that the taxes will prove regressive, because 
poorer households spend a larger percentage of their income on food. Brownell and Frieden 
(New England Journal of Medicine, 2009) dismiss objections to the regressive nature of an SSB 
tax because poor households are disproportionately affected by diet-related diseases, and would 
therefore derive the greatest benefit from dietary improvement (which curbing SSB consumption 
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implicitly is). Powell and Chaloupka (both economists, 2010) argue that the regressive nature of 
taxes may be offset if low-income households actually consume more, because they would 
benefit more from use reduction. Powell and Chaloupka point out that some of the tax revenue 
could be used to subsidize healthy foods for low-income households, compensating for lost 
income, and promoting health. Of course without draconian administration there would likely be 
a mismatch between taxees and recipients, but there could still easily be a net positive effect 
versus having no program. Frazão and Allshouse (2003) use USDA dietary budget information 
to make the interesting point that eating a healthy diet need cost no more than current diets for 
most Americans, which undermines the regressivity argument, and Carlson and Frazão (2012) 
revisit the question with more varied analysis and similar results. SSBs can be cut from the diet 
with no nutrition loss at all, and may decrease hunger in their absence. 
Taxes can only be regressive if people actually pay them. Extension of other arguments 
in this essay (including but not limited to those of Peters 2009 in section 7.10.1, and Kapteyn and 
Wansbeek 1982 in section 7.8) may also weaken the argument that SSB reduction may lower 
overall utility. If SSB consumption results from preferences constructed by compromise of frame 
and RUMax, instigated in part by aggressive marketing and product ubiquity, then cutting them 
from the diet would represent a form of return to more “original” or “default” preferences as they 
did or would exist in absence of dictated market evolution. In this case predicting a utility 
decreasing outcome from an SSB-reducing policy strategy would be difficult to defend. 
A sin tax, which the current set of tax proposals for SSBs ultimately is, discourages 
primary users from using the taxed good. If the net burden of a cent-per-ounce tax on SSBs 
should total $1/wk for two households each drinking 100 ounces per week after the tax (down, 
we may assume from an even higher level, on the order of 4 liters a week, given Smith, Lin, and 
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Lee’s elasticities), one household with poverty-level income for a family of four and one 
household with four times that income, there is a disproportionate burden on the first household. 
But is the burden significant relative to the (holistic) result without a tax? $52/$21,000 = one-
quarter of one percent of income, for a household that may be less likely to have full health 
insurance coverage, and $52/$84,000 = six-hundredths of one percent of income, for a household 
more likely to have full health insurance coverage. The first household, described categorically 
rather than individually, is less likely to get preventative or early diagnosis care, which would be 
cheaper for either the household or the public, whichever will pay ultimately for health care. 
Temporarily bringing externalities of health care costs into the mix, it is far less clear that there is 
an unfairness imposed by the tax, if the public is to pay half the burden for health problems 
generally, given its large share of billing for lower-income households and retirees (Finkelstein, 
Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003). Given the variety of other beverage options, including water, it 
does not necessarily ring true that the household forsaking SSBs in the face of a penny-per-ounce 
excise tax will continue to feel this is a particular burden into the future. If SSBs were consumed 
out of habit rather than from repeated informed choice, there may not in cutting or quitting SSB 
consumption be much loss of utility to the household, and the unfairness argument becomes 
moot. If fairness includes the society-wide “social planner” perspective, the regressivity problem 
of an SSB excise tax may find inadequate footing.  
In a 2011 paper, Lin et al. (again with Smith and Lee, but also with Hall to add dynamic 
estimation of weight loss) claim that a 20% effective tax rate, about 0.5 cents per ounce, would 
generate $5.8 billion per year, on the order of Brownell et al.’s 2009 estimate. Lin et al. note that 
while likely regressive, the tax would represent about one percent of household food and 
beverage spending, higher than my back-of-the-envelope calculation, but not a budget breaker.  
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Finkelstein et al. (2010, of which Zhen is second author), estimate that a 40% tax on 
SSBs would cost the mean household $28.48, with the largest share of the $2.5 billion in annual 
tax revenues coming from high-income households. 
Zhen et al. (2011) run a policy analysis scenario for a half-cent-per-ounce tax on SSBs, 
using results from an Almost Ideal Demand System model adapted to account for “habit” of 
purchase in the sense that consistent purchase indicates habit. They find that the long-run effect 
falls 15-20% as habits reclaim some of the short-term purchase offset from the tax, but settles 
between $1.47-$1.55 per month for low-income households and $1.32-$1.44 per month for high-
income households. This remains a trivial degree of regressivity, even if doubled or quadrupled. 
 
7.7.2    Information Asymmetry in sCSD or SSB Markets – Is Giving Consumers More 
Information an Adequate Strategy? 
U.S. federal laws requiring nutrition labeling provide consumers with the opportunity to 
see basic nutrition content of foods.14
                                                 
14 The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 updated the longstanding Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 
1938, which replaced the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. 
 Not everyone readily avails themselves of this opportunity. 
Those with higher levels of formal education and higher levels of prior knowledge tend to read 
labels more (Variyam and Golan 2002;Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock 2001), and tend to respond 
to relevant new information about a food product by modifying their behavior more than those 
with lower levels of formal education (Guthrie and Variyam 2007; Guthrie and Smallwood 
2003). Peters (2009) cites a study proving that many people did not properly understand food 
labels, and a third could not do the math to convert carbohydrates per serving in a bottle of soda. 
From this we must conclude that many people are not using or cannot effectively use label 
information to consistently update a conscious nutrition plan. In “Economics, Food Choices, and 
Nutrition,” Blaylock et al. (1999) lament: “On balance, Americans appear to be acting on 
578 
 
nutrition information, but offsetting the cumulative effect on their total diets with increased 
calories and added fats and oils” (p 283). 
Most paradigms assume that when the consumer is provided with knowledge—nutrient content of foods, for 
example—attitudes toward diet will change, resulting in changed dietary behavior. However, knowledge by 
itself will not affect behavior; motivation must be provided. 
   … Knowledge of nutrition can take two general forms: knowledge of principles…and knowledge of the 
specific nutrient content of a food (p 276-7). 
More facts are not enough to break habits, and education must be designed to change 
motivation. Just and Payne (2009): “…individuals tend to have very little knowledge of how 
eating impacts their health. …[I]ndividuals tend to cite convenience and taste as the primary 
drivers of food decisions—with health playing only a very minor role” (p S49). In a comparison 
of diet quality changes between 1965 and 1996, Popkin, Zizza, and Siega-Riz (2003) find that a 
high level of formal education (College) was associated with the most improvement in diet 
quality, with larger effects than those correlated with race or income. Results in Chapter 5, from 
regression on household sCSD purchase alone, tend to confirm this, with the exception of 
African-American female heads of household. Beydoun and Wang (2008) find that low nutrition 
knowledge and nutrition beliefs that do not mesh well with nutrition facts tend to strongly 
undermine any positive diet effect one would expect with rising education level. One can see 
how this relative ignorance and apathy would push food decision-making toward reflexive 
choice rather than rational choice (as I model in Essay Two). The fact that low nutrition 
knowledge confounds a positive education effect suggests that nutrition education specifically 
must be a key part of policy. There will be better dietary outcomes by raising nutrition 
knowledge and nutrition as valued by the consumer, relative to a general rise in level of formal 
education. Nutrition knowledge and concern by consumers above a certain level magnifies a 
positive education effect. 
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General education level does not prevent self-deception about diet quality: “Our results 
caution against expecting rising incomes and educational levels to improve the accuracy of diet 
quality perceptions” (Variyam, Shim, and Blaylock 2001, p 321). General education level may 
have some effect, as with the supposition in the empirical essay here that education level may 
proxy for level of effective nutrition education (defined in this essay below). But nutrition 
education itself is the only thing that may change motivations, nutrition education based on 
principles relevant to dietary habits, not just nutrition facts specific to a product. Variyam and 
Golan (2002): “Studies show that nutrition knowledge differences among consumers translate 
into measurable differences in food and nutrient intake” (p 16). 
Everyday behaviors like food choice often are subject to such failure. People do fail to 
update their decision strategies for complex behaviors whose effect are long term. Verplanken and 
Wood (2006) discuss how to change dietary habits: “In summary, the expectations established 
through behavior repetition and the automaticity of habit performance are conservative forces that 
reduce openness to new information and that perpetuate well-practiced behaviors despite people’s 
intentions to do otherwise” (p 95).  So people rutted in dietary habits not rooted in nutrition 
knowledge are either ignoring relevant information, which is not consistent with assumptions of 
rational decision making, or are not applying Bayesian learning, which is also not consistent with 
assumptions of rational decision making. Those who do apply relevant information, demonstrate 
Bayesian learning, or genuinely don’t care about what they eat or the long-term costs or health 
effects still conform to classical precepts of rational economic choice.  
The point is that there is more than one type of consumer, and not all types meet 
rationality criteria. This builds on the theoretical model in Essay Two, and goes to the difference 
between information and education. This difference has important implications for policy 
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recommendations, the primary ones being that increasing the amount of information about the 
product – a natural recommendation from a Level 2 perspective – is likely to be inadequate to 
change consumer behavior on a scale commensurate with better health outcomes on a national 
scale; and that a commitment to raising effective levels of nutrition education and consumer 
awareness must be vested, despite the relative difficulty and expense, if health goals are to prove 
achievable.15
This is a community/public responsibility that has been shirked to ill effect. Human 
knowledge about what is safe and healthy to eat has always tended to be a public good. As social 
animals who are incapable of self care in our early years, and ill-suited to hunt or manage the 
elements alone in our pre-technological state, we heavily rely on elders and the group to pass on 
knowledge (a public good). (We now use books and the internet rather than observing or having 
respectful conversations with elders, but knowledge of previous generations is still passed on.) 
After suckling, mammals must be taught what to eat, and the larger the brain, the longer the 
teaching cycle tends to be. Manning (2004) argues that the human brain may have grown and 
sustained in size primarily to accommodate more food-based information when changes in 
climate forced hominids to roam more widely for food sources, across habitats and across 
seasons.  
 
For millennia humans have had family, tribe, and culture to teach individuals about safe 
food sources. Now we have family (tribe), culture, and a wholly new subset of culture –
consumer marketing. Now firms’ profit incentives may diverge from consumer health incentives 
in a way that the previous “look-to sources” of information for individuals (family and culture), 
                                                 
15 “The premise that reflective strategies such as health messages or counseling sessions can be used to not only 
elicit changes in the content of people’s beliefs, but also change the structure and association of those beliefs and 
promote healthful responses to food cues may provide the basis for the development of new intervention strategies” 
(Rothman, Sheeran, Wood 2009; p S15). 
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never did. There would seem to be an evolutionary tendency to trust examples of people eating 
foods, without the development of a tendency to distrust manufactured images of people eating 
foods, or to suspect the quality of foods others look happy “consuming”16
Modern food marketing has exploited humans’ biological and psychological gap 
(Zimmerman 2011) simultaneously with the evolution of industrial culture to be more rapid and 
individual oriented, with higher incomes, fewer sit-down meals, and more interpersonal food 
variety at meals (Senauer, Asp, Kinsey 1991). In short, as the evolved mechanisms for learning 
food choice and habits have begun to shift slightly from their traditional reliance on family and 
culture and toward individual “taste,” individual “tastes” have been manufactured in the absence 
of a new human mechanism to ensure safe and responsible food choices for the group, and for 
the young who are developing habits. One test for this assertion would be to see whether there is 
eschewing of foods traditionally known to be healthful (low relative demand), in favor of highly 
processed highly advertised foodstuffs, many of which didn’t exist fifty years ago, and that 
overuse ingredients that are unhealthful in amounts ingested with but a few extra servings. This 
we exactly observe (Nielsen and Popkin 2004; Piernas and Popkin 2010; Marriott et al. 2010; 
Buzby, Wells, and Vocke 2006; Popkin and Siega-Riz 1996).  
 (Smith and  Tasnádi 
2007, cite an example where electrically manipulating the mother’s brain allowed researchers to 
train natural carnivores – housecat kittens – to imprint aberrant food behavior and eat bananas).  
The divergence between the rewards that accrue to human food culture and the effect 
from fealty to new marketing messages precisely defines a role for “culture” to intervene to 
correct the divergence. As no other agent or movement has reacted on a sufficient scale to turn 
                                                 
16 Imagine a Coke commercial with the glistening bottle being raised and drained in the sun, followed by the very 
active/sports-oriented actor’s or actress’s smile: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8GHchvvzms&feature=results_video&playnext=1&list=PL2F7DA31CE03E31
9B; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UL1eFCNRACw; or, say, world-famous golfer Jack Nicklaus: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=vKplbZWsmYs; accessed 02 May, 2012. 
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the tides of the new health epidemics, “culture” here must be in the form of its enforcer of last 
resort, the government, which must act through policy to step in with two primary corrective 
actions. Policy must provide the public good of nutrition education and educate consumers to 
recognize and resist sophisticated marketing where purchase choice might tend the purchaser 
away from their own best long-term interest, and must put reasonable restrictions on the 
unhealthful manipulation of appetites and food habits. With only slight modification, this is why 
we have and enforce laws against business and consumer fraud. The diet-based health epidemics 
that weaken citizens and tax American coffers demand that we provide the missing public goods, 
and fill in the information and educational deficiencies associated with Level 1 compromises and 
failures in food markets. 
 
7.7.2.a    Information Versus Education – Effective Nutrition Education 
As a policy provision, increasing the amount of information a consumer may access at 
relatively low cost to the consumer adds to the set of facts the consumer may actively consider 
relevant to a specific consumer choice. If the person does not stop to consider relevant facts 
before choosing to consume sCSDs or SSBs, say because they have been drinking them regularly 
since the age of 12, or because they don’t generally read nutrition labels, or they don’t know how 
to interpret them, then the added information is unlikely to have the effect the policy is targeting. 
This is to some degree the case, as evident from the “food information/health performance 
paradox” referred in the quote set in 7.2.  Malik, Schulze, and Hu (2006) on concluding a 
systematic review of then extant literature on the SSB-weight-gain connection “[SSBs], 
particularly [sCSDs]…provide little nutritional benefit and increase weight gain and probably the 
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risk of diabetes, fractures, and dental caries. …[I]t is imperative that current public health 
strategies include education about beverage intake” (p 286). 
Effective nutrition education is the application of nutrition knowledge in daily dietary 
choice. “U.S. Department of Agriculture studies have shown that nutrition knowledge has a 
measurable impact on nutrient intake and diet quality for consuming individuals, as well as for 
other members of the household” (Frazao and Allshouse 2003, p 845S). There is correlation 
between the level of formal education a person has and their effective nutrition education 
(Beydoun and Wang 2008; Zoellner et al. 2011; Thompson et al. 2009; Deshmukh-Taskar et al. 
2007; Kranz and Siega-Riz 2002; Guthrie and Smallwood 2003), as one would surmise, given 
that a fundamental goal of formal education is to increase individuals’ discriminatory faculties 
and their application of (evidence-based) knowledge in decision making. Another goal is to help 
people be more perceptive of relevant factors and consequences, which in a consumer context 
would include being more aware of when and how they are deciding, and what the long-term 
effects of certain decisions or decision patterns will be. So the level of formal education of the 
consumer to an extent may proxy for level of effective nutrition education. 
The fact that those with higher levels of formal education tend to read labels more is 
equivalent to saying that more educated people tend to demonstrate higher levels of effective 
nutrition education. Obviously there are many types of exceptions, but the point is that one goal 
of education is to help people to use more facts, higher quality facts, and use them more 
efficaciously in their decision making. Information is facts; education is the building of the 
framework in which facts become useful in choice processes. Decision-theorist Peters (2009) 
implicitly distinguishes between information and education, but in a way that clarifies here: 
Affect and beliefs are also important. How can long-term abstract preferences such as health be made salient 
enough to overcome short-term consummatory desires on an ongoing basis? 
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…[T]he challenge is not merely to communicate nutritional information to the public, but to understand how to 
present that information so that it is used appropriately in eating decisions ( pS85-6). 
Remembering from Essay Two Peters’ differentiation of the emotional “affect heuristics” which 
engage quickly, and the “deliberative mode” which needs to be triggered and will engage only 
slowly, we may depict education as the critical element that incentivizes people to break from the 
affect heuristics they have been using in their unhealthful diets, and to deliberatively re-task their 
habit-producing mechanics toward healthier ends. New information alone is less likely to “stick” 
without adequate education.  Cawley (2004) refers to presentation of information to make it 
“stick” (in a way that in part meets my definition of “education”): “…findings suggest that the 
market failure caused by a lack of information regarding calorie content of purchased foods may 
not be resolved by simply providing more information, but may require finding ways to present 
information so that consumers may process it more quickly and easily” (p 121). 
Education is thus a means of overcoming biases people tend to formulate and live by, 
biases that justify previously made choices (cognitive dissonance, per Leon Festinger), biases 
that lead to the rejection or misinterpretation of new information. These tendencies are real – not 
to be dismissed lightly with assumptions about perfect or adequate information – and profoundly 
impact consumer choice and health outcomes. In a 1999 Quarterly Journal of Economics article, 
Rabin and Schrag summarize: 
Psychological research indicates that people have a cognitive bias that leads them to interpret new 
information as supporting their previously held hypotheses. We show…that such confirmatory bias induces 
overconfidence…. Indeed, the hypothesis that the agent believes in may be more likely to be wrong than 
right. We also show that the agent may come to believe with near certainty in a false hypothesis despite 
receiving an infinite amount of information (their emphasis). 
   …[A] large and growing body of psychological research suggests that the way people process information 
often departs systematically from Bayesian updating (p 37). 
While theoretic rather than food-market tested, the general principles Rabin and Schrag support 
are consistent with observed consumer behavior responding to nutrition information and 
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labeling. Jonas et al. (2001) offer further evidence that the confirmatory bias problem may be 
aggravated due to the long period of re-enforcement behavior in drinking SSBs – brand loyalties 
for beverages are set in the teen years (Brownell et al. 2009). Sporadic presentation of new 
nutrition information cannot jump the hurdle placed by years of re-enforcement. We may be 
seeing cognitive dissonance at work in information gathering and assessment, as Jonas et al. find 
evidence that confirmation bias is caused in part by heightened commitment to a previously 
made decision: 
Research on selective exposure to information consistently shows that after having made a decision, people 
prefer supporting over conflicting information. …In the present research the authors show that an even 
stronger preference for supporting information arises if information is presented and processed sequentially 
instead of simultaneously…, and they [the authors] demonstrate that this stronger confirmation bias is due to 
sequential presentation and not to sequential processing of information… (p 557).   
Only when the level of (effective nutrition) education is high enough will the individual 
absorb relevant new information, and be more likely to apply this information in a RUMax way. 
Otherwise the individual will be more resistant to even the recognition that the information is 
accurate and relevant, and new information will fail to affect behavior (Maio et al. 2007). As a 
result, any non-RUMax consumer behaviors are likely to persist, because information that may 
upset the habitual pattern behaviors is filtered (Maio et al. 2007). Non-RUMax behavior 
resulting from any number of reasons (Essay Two) may be moved toward RUMax behavior by 
education, but is unlikely to be moved by the simple presentation of more product characteristic 
information, which is what Level 2 approaches traditionally recommend. Maio et al. with 
extensive citations to empirical literature, point out that even providing health information is 
often inadequate motivation for individuals to change behavior.  
…[I]t is very important to understand the attitudes and interpretations of target audiences prior to the design 
of well-meaning message interventions. The development of messages aimed at behavior change should not 
be based on so-called common sense, but on social psychological theory, and evidence, combined with 
pretesting (…; p 105). 
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If we succumb to the temptation of merely trying to raise people’s awareness of the dangers of unhealthy 
eating, we might convince them that an unhealthy diet is a bad thing, but have little impact on their behavior.  
… First, because people are reluctant to feel vulnerable to health risks (…). … Research on fear-arousing 
communications has demonstrated over and over again that health behavior change is driven by perceived 
vulnerability to a health risk and not by its perceived severity (…). …[U]nless we can convince them that 
they are at risk themselves, they are unlikely to take any action (…; p 107; omitted citations designated with 
“(…)”).   
   Second, even if people accept that they are at risk, they require recommendations about specific behaviors. 
The specific behaviors must be perceived as protecting against the health risk (p108). 
Maio et al. point to research indicating that the salient determinants of behavior must be carefully 
identified, and may differ by type of individual, who may idiosyncratically weigh material costs 
and benefits and emotional factors. They cite Loewenstein (2001) that emotion can drive 
behavior when there is a conflict between emotion and cognitive assessment in risky situations (p 
109). 
Naturally there is crossover between some types of information and some types of 
consumer education. I will proceed focusing more on education rather than information as the 
solution to information asymmetry problems in the sCSD/SSB market, attempting to be clear 
about the difference when relevant. 
Because those with less formal education or low (effective) nutrition education do not 
tend to respond to new relevant nutrition information by changing their habits (as much as those 
with higher education levels), providing information is unlikely to be an efficient policy 
mechanism for changing unhealthful consumption habits, despite the low cost of providing 
information relative to the cost of educating people. Maio et al. (2007) explain that habits once 
formed create a type of “tunnel vision” that precludes to a large degree the consideration of other 
options (see 6.8.1). They stress how this can lead campaigns designed to provide consumers with 
relevant information (as economists suggest) to fail: “The tunnel vision and the attenuated power 
of attitudes and intentions are bad news for informational campaigns. These campaigns are based 
587 
 
on the assumption that the target group attends to and processes the presented information, forms 
or changes attitudes and intentions accordingly, and thus adopts the propagated behavior” (p 
104). Campaigns failing to attend to these mechanisms and verifying that they work in target 
populations will almost certainly fail to achieve the primary objective. The short version: 
providing consumers with more information as a policy to redress bad eating habits like high 
SSB consumption will fail for the same reason that the bad habits persist, a Level 1 reason. Level 
1 reasons are well-poised to nullify the Level 2 premises regarding the effectiveness of providing 
rational consumers with more information. 
Verplanken and Wood (2006) explain why providing information may fail, and why even 
“education” must be calibrated to change habitual behaviors: 
Interventions that provide people with information about the right thing to do or that increase their 
understanding about how to perform a behavior are likely to be effective primarily with actions that are not 
practiced habitually. …[P]eople’s intentions, desires, and judgments do not easily overcome the practiced 
response that is cued automatically by the environment” (p 95).  
Education interventions that change consumers’ beliefs and understanding of their behaviors are most likely 
to impact those who have not established habits. However, education programs may have long-term effects 
that bring about change in performance environments, such as when education conveys new norms and values 
that infuse decisions of policy makers (p 98). 
In arguing for congressional authorization to evaluate the effectiveness of USDA dietary 
guidelines, so that the definition, publication, and implementation of these guidelines may be 
improved, Guthrie and Smallwood (2003) offer: 
 Government involvement in providing information on private behavior, such as food choice, is justified by 
the high cost of poor diets, as measured in medical expenses and lost productivity (p S42). 
More educated consumers, in particular, are more effective users of nutrition information. …[P]reexisting 
preferences for less healthful foods limit the effects of nutrition education, an argument for early intervention 
to help develop healthier preferences earlier in life (p S47). 
Fulponi (OECD 2009), in response to the information asymmetry between producers and 
consumers, advocates giving consumers more information so that they may make more informed 
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choices, but notes that the evidence favors school-based programs, meaning education more than 
information. She explains, citing Maio et al. (2007) that changing habitual behaviors is difficult 
due to the “tunnel vision” that develops with habituation, making one ignore other alternatives, 
and even resist new information. Maio et al. (2007) stress that transformations of the food 
environment “are often crucial, because all of the best will in the world cannot elicit behavioral 
change if the environment does not provide reasonable opportunities;” and further stress that 
“education is another important long-term…[performance environment] intervention” (p 119). 
So policies to redress existing information asymmetry problems – particularly Level 1 
versus Level 2 problems – are likely to require at least educational supplementation to 
information, where information is not simply supplemental information about the characteristics 
of the product (sCSD), but information on marketing effects that may compromise RUMax 
consumer choice, and nutrition effects that may compromise long-term consumer utility (i.e., 
ignorance of the severity of health effects leading to a mis-assessment of long-term costs 
resulting from the choice to consume). While recommendations may overlap or differ, the policy 
goal from a Level 1 approach is the same as for a Level 2 approach: to achieve the best 
approximation of RUMax behavior for consumers while maintaining insofar as possible legal 
profit-maximizing opportunities for industry. The nearest approximation of a theoretical Pareto 
optimal market outcome remains the goal. Ensuring a level and square market frame and an 
education-information base adequate to enable RUMax choice are goals of either Level 
approach, but are more likely to be assumed in the Level 2 approach, and more explicitly 
considered in the Level 1 approach. 
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7.7.3    Combining Taxes with an Information-Education Strategy 
Since at least Jacobsen and Brownell in 2000, existing literature reflects the recognition 
that taxes alone are unlikely to reduce SSB consumption to the degree the health community 
advocates, and directing revenues to fund an information-education strategy would prove more 
effective (Brownell et al. 2010; Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui 2011a, 2011b, and  2011c; 
Zimmerman 2011; Kuchler, Tegena, Harris 2005). Pomeranz et al. (2009): 
The government…could tax soft drink manufacturers and distributors to fund campaigns aimed at reducing 
the consumption of soft drinks paid for with revenue dedicated to both public health improvement practices 
(Jacobsen and Brownell 2000) and the speech to advance such efforts. Another option would be to tax a 
particular ingredient, such as the sugar or high fructose corn syrup used in processed food products, to fund 
the same government activities and speech (p 112). 
Fletcher, Frisvold, Teft (2011) find the existing evidence from taxes alone support the 
need for “wider net” interventions: 
Comprehensive interventions that reduce access to soda, increase the price of soda, and inform the public 
about potentially negative health consequences are likely to be more effective than relying solely on excise 
taxes  (p 659). 
   …We find that the existing evidence argues for policies that cast a wider net than would a tax on soft drinks 
or even on SSBs. 
   …A comprehensive soft drink policy, including taxes and other restrictions, framed not only as an “obesity 
tax” but touting health benefits along many dimensions, may be both more successful and more effective (p 
665). 
Brownell et al. (2009) find that from survey data, public support for soda taxes rises if the 
revenues from the tax are to be earmarked to promote childhood nutrition and obesity prevention 
programs. France has implemented some form of this (Pomeranz et al. 2009). Sturm et al. (2010) 
find that existing taxes are too small to impact consumption enough to impact obesity rates, but 
do find that certain target populations (inclined toward overconsumption) may be more tax 
sensitive. They advocate using revenues for obesity prevention programs, a specific form of 
education.  
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Using SSB tax revenues to fund some sort of nutrition education effort is the new 
minimum baseline for policies intended to actually improve health outcomes. The questions then 
arise: to what extent might taxes remain inadequate to solve policy goals for SSB consumption 
reduction, what form must education take to be effective (and what information should 
accompany it), and what theories and evidence inform alternative explanations for poor dietary 
behavior, and what other policy mechanisms do these suggest? Answering the last question next 
will lay the foundation justifying new policy strategies. 
 
7.8    Economists Expand Policy Recommendations Beyond Narrow Assumptions About 
Behavior and Market Failure in SSB Markets 
Having explored the motivations and limitations of tax and information policies, it is 
worth exploring arguments from economists for new and different policy mechanisms. 
Empirically derived predictions that implementing new taxes that would raise SSB retail 
costs by 20% or more will not fulfill health objectives, and that providing consumers with more 
product information will also fail to fulfill policy objectives expose how quickly the first-order 
Level 2 strategy set plays itself out. Others with less vestment in strict neoclassical economic 
assumptions about the SSB market have leveled critiques and suggested other strategies, tending 
toward what I describe as Level 1 types of analysis. Many of these are economists, or are 
working with economists. Each attempts to move beyond the restrictive economic assumptions 
that have much evidence to disprove them, while still cleaving to a primarily economic 
framework. In this effort, the citations in this sub-section commonly serve as direct antecedents 
to my approach. The character of the authors’ perspectives and critiques and the quality of their 
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evidence must be evaluated in the larger process of generating policy proposals that may be 
predicted based on a wide evidentiary base to have higher probability of success. 
 
7.8.1    Cawley – Health Economics, Preference Formation, Knowledge as a Public Good 
In “An Economic Framework for Understanding Eating Behavior,” John Cawley17
Economists’ silence on how preferences are formed and how they change (while by 
default assuming they are known and stable, despite the current state of decision theory) lead 
them to recommend changing prices (tax/subsidize), rather than changing people’s preferences, 
say by re-educating people not to harm themselves. Cawley observes that because economics 
offers no guidance on the origin of consumer preferences, economics tends to overlook “the 
extent to which advertising shapes preferences,” and therefore the extent to which regulation 
may be appropriate (p 123).  
 
(2004) seeks to establish an economic framework for behavior that respects that individuals both 
demand and produce health, in order to outline criteria for policy interventions to promote health. 
Cawley respects what economics can offer, while also respecting the limits of the policy 
proposals that Level 2 economics can offer to redress market failures. In his attempt to apply an 
economic framework to eating behaviors that so consistently seem to break from RUMax 
assumptions, Cawley anticipates the approach in this paper: “The economic perspective, if 
integrated with and informed by other disciplinary approaches, may lead to innovative 
breakthroughs with ramifications for both research and policy” (p 124). 
It is worth turning briefly from Cawley’s critique to consider a classic work in preference 
formation theory. Economists Kapteyn and Wansbeek, in “Empirical Evidence on Preference 
                                                 
17 John Cawley is a Professor in the Department of Policy Analysis and Management, and the Department of 
Economics, at Cornell University, and co-Director of Cornell's Institute on Health Economics, Health Behaviors and 
Disparities, as well as co-Editor-in-Chief of the journal Economics and Human Biology.  Cawley received his Ph.D. 
in economics from the University of Chicago. 
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Formation” (1982), challenge mainstream economic assumptions by arguing that an individual’s 
welfare function is a direct function of not only their own consumption, but the consumption of 
others in the individual’s social reference group, meaning that relative social standing must be 
considered in utility. Therefore innate, slow-changing, and auto-referenced internal preferences 
cannot sufficiently describe behavior. “[E]conomists’ almost universal neglect of preference 
formation has led them to construct theories that are in certain respects altogether unrealistic” (p 
137). 
   With relatively few exceptions, economists have ignored preference formation. In quite a few areas, theories 
are heavily dependent on the assumption that preferences are constant and/or independent of behavior of 
others. Allowing for preference formation has some significant consequences. 
   In welfare economics the Pareto principle…loses its practical appeal if it can no longer be assumed that an 
income increase for some, without an income reduction for anyone else, provides an increase in social 
welfare. In cost benefit analysis distributional aspects move from the periphery of the problem to the core. … 
   If the casual observer (that is everyone who is not an economist) is right in asserting that an individual’s 
consumption behavior is influenced by the consumption of others, then all economic models of consumption 
are misspecified. … 
   The evidence on preference formation [PF] sketched in this paper is unambiguous. It uniformly supports the 
PF theory. …[M]ore testing is possible and should be carried out, but at the very least, the existence of the 
preference formation phenomenon appears to be firmly established. Consequently, economic theories that are 
based on the assumption of constant preferences should be considered unacceptable (p151-2, emphasis 
added). 
Television or even print advertisements showing happy healthy attractive and often sporty 
people drinking SSBs is an attempt to exert a psychological if not actual peer influence favoring 
these products. Kapteyn and Wansbeek’s evidence, now supported by  a generation of subsequent 
authors, is plausible as a mechanism for the success of SSB ads, including Coca-Cola, the world’s 
#1 SSB. Policies to restrict advertising content seem less onerous if preferences are not simply 
reflected in purchase, but are rather manipulated by very sophisticated and high-volume 
advertising in a way that bends behavior to induce health-threatening levels of consumption of 
highly processed products. 
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Consumers at least more aware of potential manipulation and actual health consequences 
might be better armed to choose wisely. This returns us to Cawley, who argues that information 
is a public good that the government is naturally charged to provide – “…objective information 
tends to be under-provided by private markets, and there is a role for governments to sponsor 
production and dissemination of information” (p 121). Cawley refers specifically to 
obesity/nutrition/diet information with this observation. He observes that “economists lean 
toward a generous view of human capabilities” which disposes us toward the assumption that 
people behave rationally, despite strong evidence of the contrary, often embodied in the violation 
of time-consistent preferences. “Time-inconsistent preferences, that is, succumbing to the 
temptation to accept immediate gratification at the expense of long-run best interest, seem to be 
fairly common in humans” (p 122) – a precept that must be respected in policy debates. When 
time-inconsistent preferences are employed, the optimal tax rate must include not only all 
external costs, but some internal costs as well (p 122). Fulponi (OECD 2009) notes from a 
review of behavioral economic literature, that the seemingly biased or irrational choices that 
people make (the same that Cawley refers to) can lead to large errors in judgment when decisions 
are made under time constraints or with uncertainty (of the probabilities of outcomes or 
payoffs/costs). All of these are Level 1 criticisms based on evidence. 
 
7.8.2    Thaler and Sunstein – Behavioral Economics and Law, Default Options Matter 
The University of Chicago’s Sunstein and Thaler (2003) argue from solidly behavioral 
economic premises: people’s preferences “are unclear and ill-formed, and their choices will 
inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points” (p 1159). “Default 
options” are the choices that will be made for people if they do not assert their own decision-
capacity and will. Behavioral economist Dan Ariely of MIT has repeatedly demonstrated that a 
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change in default options can dramatically change “market” outcomes, as for example the 
extreme difference in driver’s-license-designated organ donation in a country where one must 
opt in, versus a country where one must opt out (e.g., in The Upside of Irrationality, Harper 
Collins, 2010). Sunstein and Thaler refer to a “status quo bias” that appears to be deeply 
psychological, and can prevent the engagement of self-protecting or maximizing decision 
faculties. “People fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’ rule, use heuristics that 
can lead them to make systematic blunders, exhibit preference reversals (…), suffer from 
problems of self-control, and make different choices depending on the framing of the problem” 
(p 1168). 
With focused relevance to the topic here, “It is the strong claim that all or almost all 
Americans are choosing their diet optimally that we reject as untenable” (p 1168, their 
emphasis). They then define and defend “libertarian paternalism,” which roughly means a 
planned shaping of the market environment (we might call it market frame) to allow the full 
spectrum of consumer choice, while correcting for influences that bias the market environment 
toward unhealthful choices: “…libertarian paternalism should attempt to steer people’s choices 
in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice” (p 1168).  
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) defend their “libertarian paternalism” policy proposals as 
necessary because people fail to rationally protect themselves, and defend the concept from 
critics who fail to see that there “are no viable alternatives,” and who falsely believe that 
paternalism always involves coercion. They point out that re-setting default options could be 
consistent with what people would prefer default options to be, if only they were asked, and that 
changing default options so that people must make explicit choices is useful because it brings 
people closer to conformity with RUMax precepts that consumers choose deliberatively. 
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Understanding that their suggestions to re-shape the market environment, change default options, 
and help consumers avoid status quo bias are not coercive is easier when one sees these proposed 
policies as an attempt to bend a market frame that has been skewed by a dictated market 
evolution back into a level and square shape. Thaler and Sunstein hammer their point home by 
saying that such intervention is no more manipulative than not executing such changes, because 
every food choice environment embeds default options implicitly. There are few such 
environments without them. The policy maker is adjusting or “nudging” an existing default 
option, not instituting one where none before existed. Thaler and Sunstein popularize these 
arguments about how environments affect decisions in their book Nudge: Improving Decisions 
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2009, paperback). 
Chandon and Wansink (2002) suggest that any policy that reduces the visibility (salience) 
or convenience of products will help reduce consumption, as might the repackaging of products 
in inconvenient-sized portions. 
 
7.8.3    Bernheim and Rangel, Camerer – Neuroeconomics, Addictive Substances 
Undermine the Role of Revealed Preferences 
Stanford University economics professors Bernheim and Rangel (2004, 2005) explore the 
economics debate about individual preferences and consumer choice in ways that are supportive 
of positions taken or favorably discussed by Cawley, Fulponi, and Sunstein and Thaler, while 
still offering new perspective. “Traditional revealed preference [theory] doesn’t recognize the 
possibility that actions and preferences may systematically diverge—that people make mistakes” 
(2005, p 128). Bernheim and Rangel refer to American pedestrian accidents in London (see 
6.7.4), offer a scale upon which revealed preferences are more tenable at one end (musical tastes, 
596 
 
sexual preference), and less tenable at the other (eating disorders and psychoses), with 
consumption of addictive substances indeterminate in location. 
Having reached a determination that choices don’t reliably reveal preferences in the context of addictive 
substances, how do we distinguish between good and bad outcomes? … 
   It may, however, be difficult or impossible to reliably estimate a model that allows for mistakes while 
restricting attention to data on consumption behavior (as is traditional among economists). We know of no 
objective way to determine the incidence of mistakes if we have to allow for the tautological possibility that 
people always prefer what they choose (p 130-1). 
This perspective clearly demonstrates the difference between Level 2 analysis and a Level 1 
problem. Writing from a neuroeconomic perspective, as Bernheim and Rangel do, Camerer 
(2007)  expects “the largest innovation  [from neuroeconomics to] …come from pointing to 
biological variables which have a large influence on behaviour and are underweighted or ignored 
in standard theory” (p C35). Camerer suggests that for economic theorists, how the brain makes 
decisions may be thought of as “many biological state variables influenc[ing] preferences; given 
those state-dependent preferences, prices and budget constraints have familiar influences” (p 
C38). Camerer offers neuroeconomic examples that “suggest that the concept of a preference is 
not a primitive (as Pareto suggested)” (p C35). Camerer continues: “This view implies that if we 
understand what variables affect preferences, we can shift preferences and shift behaviour 
(without changing prices or constraints)” (p C35).  
Endorsing this view, I argue that dictated market evolution has effectively done precisely 
this, putting the onus on policymakers to devise countervailing devices to straighten the “bent” 
market frame, and induce more RUMax-approximate behavior. Otherwise, there is a largely 
involuntary transfer of money to marketers of products with unwholesome amounts of added-
sugar (by dietary community standards), at the great expense of Americans’ long-term health. 
The fact that the money seems voluntarily spent should not blind economists to the compromise 
of frame or RUMax behavior, or the economic consequences of allowing these failures to persist 
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in the name of “revealed preferences” when the principle may not bind for the many reasons 
explained in Essay Two, and may not bind by at least the understanding that American 
pedestrians in Britain probably do not tend to prefer injury or death in inordinate numbers, as 
Americans whose diet comprises greater than 25% added sugars probably do not consciously 
court diabetes and heart disease. 
When now-famous economists rejected psychology 100 years ago, and endorsed the 
theory of revealed preferences as adequately equivalent to knowing an individual’s internally 
fixed (in the period of decision) individual preferences, this was before the inventions of new 
highly-processed low-nutrition foodstuffs, and before the developments of new marketing 
techniques that employ advances in psychology that economists in the footsteps of the greats 
have studiously ignored. Now the quasi-economic literature has empirically demonstrated that 
what people choose to buy and consume diverges from what RUMax decision-making would 
predict one buy and consume given one’s full priority set. This defines a Level 1 problem and 
demands Level 1 solutions, independent of the many positive contributions that the Level 2 
perspective has enabled in economic theory and empirics. 
Bernheim and Rangel (2005) are careful not to abandon the theory of revealed preference 
completely, noting the theory is attractive as a political principle precisely because it protects 
individuals in their decision-making sovereignty from any governmental condemnation of 
lifestyle choices as contrary to the individual’s “true” interests: 
Given the clear dangers involved, if we relax the principle of revealed preferences in evaluating policies, it 
behooves us to set a high scientific threshold for reaching a determination, based on objective evidence, that 
preferences and choices systematically diverge in a given context. Although preliminary progress has been 
made, this is one of the most important open questions in economics (p 131-2). … 
   In most instances, it is appropriate to infer the preferences of the affected individuals from their actions. 
However, in the context of addiction substances, objective scientific evidence overturns the validity of this 
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principle. Specifically, recent research in neuroscience supports the view that the consumption of addictive 
substances is sometimes rational, and sometimes a cue-triggered mistake” (p 139). 
I maintain that Bernheim and Rangel’s high scientific threshold has been met and then some in 
establishing that for most Americans, their best health (and correlatively, economic) interests 
systematically diverge from their choice to consume added sugar at the current average rate or 
higher, the primary vector being sCSDs within the primary category of SSBs. 
 
7.8.4    Just and Payne – Behavioral Economics, Poor Information, Bad Heuristics 
In a 2009 article, “Obesity: Can Behavioral Economics Help?” Just and Payne state that 
consumers “regularly and predictably” contradict standard assumptions of economic analysis, 
making decisions that undermine their own goals, especially food decisions. People trade short-
term pleasure for long-term health (they offer no theoretic model, as I do in Essay Two, but do 
identify variables “known to control consumption” by type in a diagrammatic table). Just and 
Payne criticize the neoclassical assumption that “utility is determined by preferences and habits, 
which are generally taken as primitive and immovable” (p S48), explaining that this view cannot 
appreciate systemic mistakes in decision making (RUMax compromised behavior), with market 
failure a predictable and inevitable result. The market fails to provide enough information (for 
RUMax decisions), or the market fails by not appreciating the external costs pushed onto others 
by bad health choices.  
For most people the context of decision-making proves important, more so when they are 
distracted and short on time. Quick decision-making heuristics then dominate the potential of 
slower deliberative thinking to affect a particular food choice.  
Given the limited ability of individuals to retain and use accurate health information, coupled with varying 
levels of self control, profit motivations of marketers can become predatory—though not necessarily 
malicious (p S47). 
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   … Both work and play now emphasize convenience. The consequence of convenience may not only be less 
exercise but also a state of being that discounts cognitive effort in favor of heuristic-driven consumption 
decisions that can be easily manipulated by marketing environments. 
   … We suggest that…in most cases, marketing environments (i.e., packaging, price, and promotion) 
leverage peoples’ heuristic consumption decisions that are anomalous to rational decision making. Heuristic 
driven consumption behavior can be easily steered by marketing environments to meet profit interests. …If 
food policies fail to account for heuristic-based food decisions, they are destined to fail simply because they 
do not mirror consumer reality (p S48). 
 
Just and Payne contrast behavioral economic (heuristic) models with the classical economic 
game theory approach of von Neumann-Morgenstern games with potential Nash equilibrium 
solutions, because in heuristic models individuals may not be maximizing their own well being 
relative to the other players’ best strategy. “However, within heuristic models, while the 
marketer (through experimentation, etc.) will behave as if they know how individuals will 
respond to change in the environment, our evidence suggests that the individual is unaware of 
how the environment affects their consumption decisions” (p S52). 
Marketers now employ decades of cumulative consumer research – exactly as a profit-
maximizer should – while successive generations of consumers remain naïve to the ways subtle 
cues in the market have changed. Consumers remain naïve to the way that the frame has been 
bent to favor purchase, to the way this bent frame is often sold as “convenience.” This 
“convenience” can ultimately prove a bitter trade of short-term fleeting and inconsequential 
“gain” for a very real persistent and long-term cost. Just and Payne call this firm-to-individual 
information asymmetry a “mechanism design problem” in which “loss of efficiency due to the 
asymmetric information” between marketers and consumers is severe enough to derail the 
classically expected effects of standard tax and information policies. 
This asymmetry of information about how the individual acts will persist no matter what the prices or health 
information provided. Thus, simply taxing foods or providing more health information is not likely to 
eliminate this inefficiency. In this context, the mechanism design problem will lead the marketer to find a 
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way to exploit the individual’s environmental responses to induce greater profits at the individual’s expense. 
Thus the environment that is causing individuals to consume too much food is endogenously determined by 
the individuals’ own behavioral responses to food. Policy measures that do not account for the mechanism 
that creates the food and eating environments may only have temporary effects as marketers find ways to 
adjust the environmental factors to maximize profits – likely subverting policy goals (p S52). 
A neoclassical mindset coupled with Level 2 analysis trains a researcher to treat the 
individual’s “endogenously determined…own behavioral responses to food” as a self-determined 
function of utility flowing from preferences that are not influenced by environment or persuasive 
advertising. Herein lies the fundamental misspecification of Level 2 analysis to a Level 1 
problem – fundamental because it encompasses simultaneous compromise of both market frame 
and RUMax behavior. The economist devout to classical assumptions cannot find fault with the 
voluntary utility-maximizing choice a consumer makes in the selfsame information-asymmetric 
markets Just and Payne describe, nor with the methods of profit maximization of the firm. How 
could she? These faults have been assumed away. Just and Payne expose a bitter irony: 
“…because people do not believe that their consumption decisions are under their complete 
volitional control, the decisions they do make are justified [i.e., characterized by economists] as 
occurring because of inherent preferences” (p S54). Thus when a person’s perceived lack of 
control seems to be influenced by environmental factors and largely unconscious heuristic 
drivers that may work contrary to their “true” preferences – as would be clear in an explicitly 
deliberative process with a balancing of time preferences that reflects actual long-term goals – 
economists tend to mis-characterize this feeling as resulting from their true preference set. 
Only by becoming aware of the contrary evidence does the unsettling challenge to 
conventional assumptions begin to undermine the laissez-faire and caveat emptor policy 
prescriptions that naturally flow from the classical economic assumption set. “Variables that 
have received the least amount of attention in the policy context [salience, presentation, 
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packaging, labels], but may be the most important, are environmental drivers of food 
consumption” (p S51). 
Just and Payne lay out what is by my vocabulary dictated market evolution and a bending 
of the market frame to favor the information-rich sCSD/SSB industry over the information-poor 
potential consumer, and presage many of the same conclusions. They also endeavor to expand 
the power of economics to treat problems by expanding the scope of analysis using evidence that 
moves us beyond narrow assumptions about how people behave. 
 
7.8.5    Zimmerman – Health Economics, Logic, and the Flaws of Cutler, Glaeser and 
Shapiro (2003) 
Frederick Zimmerman18
Zimmerman contends that an adequate explanation (or significant explanatory variable 
set) for the particular rise in U.S. obesity must account for: the sudden rise in obesity from 
around 1980 and after, while remaining stable before this trend; must explain the ubiquity of the 
obesity phenomenon across population, age group, and education and income levels, as well as 
across ethnic sub-groups; and must explain the disproportionate influence from beverages and 
snacks compared to meals (because mealtime caloric intake level has been stable for decades). 
 directly argues that Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro’s (2003) 
“rational choice” explanation for the rise of obesity in the U.S. – a function of the reduced cost of 
food processing time for a household, being a relative decline in food price due to technological 
development – “does not fit the facts of the current obesity epidemic” (p 285). Zimmerman lays 
out where he believes CGS’s argument founders, and offers an alternative explanation he 
believes has more power. 
                                                 
18 Ph.D., Economics, University of  Wisconsin; at time of authorship, Chair of Department of Health Services, 
University of California at Los Angeles. 
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Zimmerman lists a number of points where rational choice behavior does not match 
evidence presented to support the rational choice hypothesis for obesity rise. The first point on 
Zimmerman’s list is the argument that low food prices make food so much cheaper that people 
consume more. Remember I made the point previously that people were not generally underfed 
before this epidemic, so cheaper food is not as convincing an explanation as the lower nutritional 
quality of the calories. Zimmerman notes that a 10% decline in food prices is used in the low-
food-cost argument to explain a 10-15% rise in caloric intake, “implying a calorie-income 
elasticity of 1 or greater, much higher than what has been established for individual food groups” 
(p 289). Nor is the effect different for lower- and higher-income groups, groups one expects to 
have substantively different calorie-income elasticities. So this explanation does not hold. Cheap 
corn prices due to U.S. farm subsidies are used to explain the general food price decline leading 
to obesity. Zimmerman points out that the savings to the manufacturer from using HFCS 
averages about 1.6 cents per can, translating to less than a penny a can rise in price if corn were 
not subsidized. Not a motivating price change for consumers. Zimmerman also dismisses high 
fruit and vegetable prices as a motivation for obesogenic diets, because lower relative price does 
not translate into overconsumption of the cheaper food – indeed overconsumption would be an 
irrational waste of resources. The same if one attempts to explain overconsumption from a fall in 
the preparation time of food. Thus fall two more explanations for the rational choice model of 
U.S. obesity. 
More women working would raise the time cost of food preparation, and magnify any 
rising child obesity that by Cutler Glaeser and Shapiro’s argument would result from falling food 
preparation times, but there is no empirical evidence of this for any but the wealthiest quartile of 
working mothers. Rising levels of insurance coverage and better therapies would lower the 
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personal cost of obesity, perhaps motivating a higher obesity rate from a rational choice 
perspective. However, Zimmerman informs, there is no evidence that there is an association 
between obesity and insurance coverage, including the inception of Medicare and Medicaid 
coverage. “Because these [rational choice] models do not identify potential causal mechanisms 
that were relatively stable before 1980 and increased dramatically around that time, and because 
they do not identify causal mechanisms that would have similar effects across the population, 
they fail to meet the explanatory desiderata outlined…above” (p 291). Zimmerman elaborates 
that the empirical magnitudes of the mechanisms that proponents of rational choice suggest are 
too small to explain the rise in obesity, meaning that leaps of faith are required to embrace any of 
the mechanisms listed by CGS and others. 
Zimmerman presents and defends the notion that increases in the amount and 
sophistication of advertising and marketing have changed the American diet more than rational 
choice hypotheses can explain. 
A huge literature has shown beyond any reasonable doubt that…“marketing works.” Marketing has been 
shown to increase the availability of product brands in the mind, to increase preferences for those brands, to 
increase consumption of those brands, and to increase consumption even of dissimilar foods. Marketing 
works not only by operating on the unconscious mechanisms that regulate food consumption—the salience of 
food in the environment being related to perceived hunger and consumption—but also by changing the 
conscious preferences of consumers. How different this model of human behavior is from the rational-choice 
assumptions of consciously rational decision-making around stable, exogenously given preferences (p 292). 
Zimmerman explains that “marketing” included elements much larger in magnitude and 
effect than advertising. Non-advertising marketing includes “in-store displays, giveaways, 
contests, licensing deals, sponsorship deals, product placement, product innovation, sophisticated 
pricing, and expanded sales venues” (p 293). So the 60% real increase in total advertising 
expenditures per capita in the U.S. from 1980 to 2000 pales in comparison to the rise of non-
advertising marketing expenditures from half of advertising budgets in 1983 to triple advertising 
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expenditures by 1993. Advertising expenditures rise, while “a massive increase in the quantity 
and sophistication of nonadvertising marketing” (p 293) leverages these expenditures to greater 
effect.  
Zimmerman offers examples that prove interesting in how clearly they may affect Level 
1 mechanisms while likely escaping Level 2 analyses focused on estimating consumer demand, 
price-elasticities of demand, or market structure – that is, analyses looking at the ultimate effects 
of these mechanisms, rather than at the mechanisms themselves. Not long after supermarket 
scanner data began to be used to asses test marketing of new products, new product introductions 
proliferated rapidly, built on the safety of scientifically accurate marketing evaluations of 
consumer responses. 
Technological changes in food innovation are oriented not to make products with any 
nutritive advantage, but to evoke the lifestyles associated with their consumption (e.g., PepsiCo’s 
Mountain Dew Code Red). The goal is to bypass the simple biological role of nutrition and have 
people focused on purchasing the associated psychological effect (not unrelated to Becker and 
Murphy’s prestige effect). “That’s just good marketing,” you say. Then consider aspects of such 
“innovation” that may lead to unconscious overconsumption of the innovative foods – 
overconsumption versus what people would rationally choose for themselves in advance of 
eating.  Highly processed branded products have the potential for specialty flavors that “have the 
potential to create a special tie with the consumer” (p 294) that less carefully processed foods 
lack: a constructed “hyper”-palatability (with sweet-salt-fat mixes and trace tastes carefully 
researched in artificial ingredient factories in New Jersey19
                                                 
19 Eric Schlosser, in Fast Food Nation : The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (
). Processed foods are also softer than 
“real” foods, so that they can be eaten faster. Both aspects make these highly processed, highly 
Houghton Mifflin, 2002, 288 
pages), describes a visit to such a plant and goes into the details of how useful it is to have a substance that can make 
a strip of paper smell exactly like a sizzling beef burger on the grill. 
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marketed, highly profitable foods more likely to be overconsumed (think “chicken nuggets” 
versus a bone-in chicken breast with an identically spiced coating). These “innovations” trigger 
biological cues of taste and food-in-per-effort that cannot exist in unprocessed foods. 
Constructing an appearance of value also triggers limbic rewards less possible with fresh 
fruit or nuts. “The marketer’s trick is to get the consumer to overconsume by focusing on the 
virtue of economy, not on the vice of gluttony” (p 294), for example putting high-priced low-
value items near something else on the shelf or menu to construct the appearance of value, as 
occurs with “value meals,” and portion size (“supersizing”) deals. Average fast-food portion 
sizes increased slightly in the 1970s but “accelerated rapidly in the 1980s, and continued their 
increase into the 1990s, when a take-away drink larger than the human bladder was introduced” 
(p 295); even the medium size of fast foods has increased over time. Zimmerman calls this a 
“cultural change,” and called the relaxing of regulatory restrictions against certain advertising 
types or venues that occurred under the Reagan administration a “regulatory change” that is 
likewise directly correlated to the period whose sudden obesity rise economists are trying to 
explain. The regulatory relaxation accommodated competitive food in schools and school profit 
on vending machine margins. By 1998, 73% of high schools had exclusive pouring contracts. 
Product placement on television and in films, more attractive and lighter packaging, and in-
school advertising all added to these marketing effects, and added to the obesogenicity of 
environments where greater salience translates to greater consumption (p 295, citing Wansink 
and other’s study of how the visual proximity of candy leads to greater consumption). 
Zimmerman has methodically exposed flaws in argument, failure to empirically 
demonstrate causality, lack of longitudinal support for proposed mechanisms, and weak 
magnitudes for correlates that CGS used to explain the sudden rise in American obesity. 
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Zimmerman then emphasizes the contrast in prescriptions between the marketing explanation 
and the rational-choice explanation for rising obesity: 
In a world-view in which people choose rationally exactly what is best for them, it is natural to conclude that 
people’s rational choice to become obese is making them better off. And if they are better off, any 
intervention can only make them worse off. … 
   Many states have laws on the books that prevent lawsuits against food manufacturers and marketers, and 
these laws often style themselves as ‘personal responsibility’ or ‘common-sense consumption’ laws. Yet as 
institutional economists have long recognized, personal responsibility takes place only within a particular 
legal and social environment, and this legal and social environment profoundly shapes the decisions that 
people make. 
   What is at stake, then, is not merely an etiological exercise, but a defense of the very notion of public health 
(p 298). … 
   Obesity is not a rational choice. Most obese people regret their weight status, and obese individuals have 
poor quality of life, which implies that any choices made along the path toward obesity were made either 
without adequate information or without due foresight (p301-2, internal citation omitted). 
Zimmerman concludes having presented facts and arguments that meet his criteria as 
causal mechanisms – being stable before 1980 then rising quickly, applicable across all 
demographics, with a disproportionate emphasis on caloric beverages and snacks, and of an 
appropriate magnitude – by stating “the most compelling single interpretation of the admittedly 
incomplete data we have is that the large increase in obesity is due to marketing” (p 302): 
   [M]arketing is the single most important cause of obesity because only the marketing explanation has 
adequate conceptual plausibility, paired with a strong evidence base for each link in its causal chain (p 300). 
   …  Of course, every individual determines his or her own dietary decisions. Yet as structural changes in the 
food-marketing environment over the past 30 years have made it increasingly difficult to make healthy 
dietary choices, many adults have faltered. …Although this may seem a pessimistic conclusion, it is in fact an 
optimistic one. Only by identifying the structural forces that operate on individual choices can we make a 
collective choice to limit their influence, and thereby be freed of them (p 301). 
This is a primary argument favoring a social scientist’s Level 1 perspective, and favoring policy 
proposals that follow from identification of plausible causal links with sufficient empirical 
support. Zimmerman’s last paragraph here exposes the tension between people’s need to feel that 
they determine their own choices, and the reality that a bending of the market frame and decades 
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of increasingly sophisticated marketing seem to have compromised their ability to do so, absent a 
conscientious dedication to gathering appropriate knowledge and actively using deliberative 
resources. 
 
7.9    Non-Economists On the Interplay Between RUMax Action and Environmental 
Influences on Behavior 
Much of the implicit struggle between Level 1 and Level 2 perspectives is more likely to 
be explicit between those who argue that diet weight and health are primarily matters of personal 
responsibility (a characteristically “conservative” or “nature” argument by modern American 
political nomenclature), and those who argue that diet weight and health are primarily influenced 
by environmental factors that influence or constrain voluntary behaviors in ways the individual 
cannot or does not usually control (a characteristically “liberal” or “nurture” argument by 
modern American political nomenclature). There is no need for either to be primary or exclusive, 
and there is nothing making either perspective non-economic. 
Because economists are trained to take a Level 2 perspective, emphasizing or assuming 
RUMax behavior, there is a bias trained into modern economic thinking that would favor the 
personal responsibility perspective. In contrast, many of the environmental influence arguments 
stem from non-economists. But there remains crossover, as demonstrated in the previous section 
(7.8). This crossover is not a coincidence, or a quixotic gambit by a radical fringe. If the 
conservative/Level 2 perspective worked purely, there would have been no dramatic rise in 
obesity from the early 1980s, or such a rise would have been solved already with taxes and 
information. To argue that a Level 2 perspective works purely is to argue that over 100 million 
Americans simultaneously and consciously decided to sacrifice future health, quality of life, and 
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economic productivity for Coke and snack pies – there is either mass hysteria, mass stupidity, or 
a set of deeper factors at work. The theoretic Level diagram defended here argues that it is the 
latter case, based on evidence presented in Essay Two and here.  
Kersh (2009) explains that personal responsibility advocates stress a rights-based theory 
meant to focus perception on protecting freedom of choice, that this angle has religious roots, 
and that it can prove philosophically difficult to build support against this framing of the 
problem. Personal responsibility advocates tend to favor industry voluntary action as a policy 
choice (p 299). In contrast those who contend that the obesity problem stems more from 
obesogenic environments than from failures of personal responsibility tend to fault expanding 
portions, expanded choice sets slanted toward actively-marketed processed foods, the ubiquity of 
these foods, and incessant advertising (p 300). 
It is productive to avoid manichean characterizations of the problem. Sunstein and Thaler 
take pains to stress that their “libertarian paternalism” removes no consumer choice (for adults), 
and their approach is not one driven by political expediency. It sets a more stable philosophic 
base from which to defend policy proposals – it faces a real problem without overreaching in a 
way that exposes a philosophic flank to attack. In the formulation of the theoretic models in 
Essay Two and this essay, I respect that something that may be characterized as an obesogenic 
environment exists, and that individual choice occurs and must be protected within a market-
oriented frame. Both personal and environmental factors impact individual choice, and the 
questions become the degree to which each determines behavior, and how policy oriented at 
reducing behavior that generates poor health outcomes should be made to reverse actual causes, 
rather than supposed ones. 
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That personal and environmental factors impact individual choice seems to be the only 
characterization that is both valid, and more importantly, sound. (That is, is the only 
characterization supported by theory and evidence across much of the range of academic 
disciplines focused on the problem, making both the conclusions valid, and the premises on 
which they are based true.) Recall from Essay Two the academic group employed by the United 
Kingdoms’ Foresight Programme of the Department of Trade and Industry to examine 50-year 
trajectories of alternative scenarios for addressing the pressing national problem of obesity. Maio 
et al. (2007) argue from the perspective that individual behavior is a function of both individual 
preferences and the individual’s environment, holistically understood: …individual choices are 
always made within particular environments. “The two key policy implications here are that 
generic behavior change campaigns may have different effects on individuals from different 
socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds and that it may be important to identify ‘predatory’ 
environmental influences on individual choices”20
Cohen and Farley (2008), (medical doctors with Masters’ degrees in Public Health, in an 
article sponsored by the RAND Corporation), offer an important perspective for economists to 
appreciate, because by Cohen and Farley’s premise that eating is an automatic behavior (see 
Essay Two), the belief that personal responsibility in the sense of active volitional decision 
making dominantly influences individual eating behavior cannot reasonably hold. Cohen and 
 (p100-1). Therefore solutions must be 
upstream (environmental, including the removal of “predatory” influences), and downstream 
(individual). Both must be considered for behavioral change initiatives to be successful. Only by 
addressing the environment and the individual, can the gap between individual intentions and 
behavior be properly addressed (p 100). 
                                                 
20 Maio et al. cite, apparently for the embedded concept and use of the word “predatory”: D. Halpern, C. Bates, G. 
Beales, and A. Heathfield, 2004, Personal responsibility and changing behaviour: The state of knowledge and its 
implications for public policy, http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/pr.pdf, which they accessed November 9, 2007. 
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Farley may pose as near polar opposites to the libertarian wing of economists and industry 
proponents, but their solutions about environmental drivers of “automatic behaviors” are not 
without merit, and are built on empirical evidence rather than dogmatically echoing Lockean-
purist philosophy. Cohen and Farley do not abandon the concept of efficiency, as “eating as 
automatic behavior” has roots in biological efficiency, despite also having psychological 
consequences that make it hard for people to recognize their behavior, admit it, and disabuse 
themselves of harmful effects from that behavior. 
Cohen and Farley define ‘environment’ as “the context in which human beings act. Every 
moment…people…perceive features of their environments. …Some of those perceptions occur 
without awareness, and many behavioral responses similarly occur without awareness or 
conscious thought” (p 2). They define ‘priming’ as “the manipulation of decision and judgments 
by the previous presentation of words, concepts, or images that are not perceived as being related 
to the task at hand” (p 2-3) as may occur with advertising images – as any man who has drunk a 
premium beer in public and not been approached by an attractive woman may attest to this. 
‘Salience’ is simply “how much it attracts the attention” (p 3). Priming and salience of certain 
foods in the environment contribute to environmental influence on eating. Cohen and Farley cite 
empirical evidence that: food portion sizes have risen, and the amount eaten rises with portion 
size; that the “amount of food consumed increases as the effort to eat it decreases” (as 
Zimmerman 2011 also explained); that “the mere sight of food can stimulate people to eat”; and 
that “the longer the meal, the more people eat” (p 2). “Wansink’s work demonstrates repeatedly 
that environmental cues influence the frequency and quantity of what people eat and that people 
do not typically recognize these cues” (p 2). For example, from Wansink, Just, and Payne 
(2009): “Primarily, environmental factors influence eating by altering perceived consumption 
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norms, or interfere with our ability to monitor how much we have consumed” (p 165). Wansink, 
Just, and Payne describe a potential mechanism and measurable effects: 
“Eating is multidimensional and difficult to monitor. This can lead people to focus more on food choice than 
on their consumption volume…and it can lead to unmonitored, unintended overeating. Caloric estimates are 
biased not only by the size of the packages and plates, but also by the size of the meal. In general, all people 
underestimate their calorie consumption by a predictable compressive power function” (p 166). 
While Cohen and Farley’s argument is well-supported, compelling, and deserving of 
attention from preference purists, their policy conclusions seem restrictive and impractical to 
economists, as they smack of command and control, without Sunstein and Thaler’s respect for 
choice. They are also too inflexible to the education-induced ability to break patterns of “eating 
automaticity” and establish new habits, as social psychologists advocate: 
This [toxic environment] concept suggests that educational or motivational approaches to reducing 
population-level consumption, such as the food guide pyramid, nutrition labeling, and dietary counseling, will 
continue to fail. In place of these approaches, to reduce consumption we should decrease the accessibility, 
visibility, or quantities of foods to which people are exposed and reduce the cues in our environment that 
encourage eating. The best approaches include reducing portion sizes, limiting access to ready-to-eat foods, 
limiting the availability of snack foods in schools and workplaces, and reducing food advertising (p 4). 
If more subtle means are employed to discourage overconsumption of what the Food Pyramid 
calls “discretionary calories,” reduced demand will handle much of the Cohen and Farley agenda 
without (or with perhaps a much diminished) “junk food rights” battle in society and Congress. 
Harris et al. (2009) cite evidence that “food advertising can ‘prime,’ or automatically 
activate, increased food consumption in children and young adults and that these effects are not 
mediated by hunger, advertising awareness, or mood” (p 215). This supports the interpretation of 
automaticity. Do adults behave similarly, or does the marketing designed to obviate deliberative 
thought fail, because adults carefully consider all food decisions? 
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012) explain the degree of the public health threat from 
refined sugars in the quantities currently consumed, and offer four criteria used to justify the 
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regulation of alcohol, that they claim apply equally to sugar. Each criterion tends to be difficult 
to place neatly in either the personal responsibility or obesogenic environment camp: 
unavoidability(/ubiquity); toxicity; potential for abuse; and negative impact on society. For each 
criterion Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis present unequivocal evidence demonstrating that refined 
sugars meet the same standards for regulation that society has been upholding with alcohol. They 
summarize that “individually focused approaches, such as school-based interventions that teach 
children about diet and exercise, demonstrate little efficacy” (p 28). They advocate “gentle 
‘supply-side’ control strategies” (p 28), a type of environmental funneling that curbs availability 
without banning, as is proving effective in lowering consumption and health harms in the cases 
of tobacco and alcohol, the nearest parallel consumables to added sugars.  
Citing a large gap in understanding between researchers/practitioners and policymakers, 
Katz (2009) advocates structural interventions that change the food environment at low cost to 
the government (remove vending machines, ban SSB sales in places or for some groups). 
With the goal of breaking through an impasse in policy formation, Brownell et al. (2010) 
attempt to forge a compromise between the individual responsibility argument common in policy 
debates about obesity, and the collective responsibility  argument of “environmental influence” 
advocates. They note that a “Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act” created to ban 
lawsuits against the fast food industry passed in the U.S. House, but failed in the Senate. 
Subsequently, versions passed in 23 states. But Brownell et al. recognize that personal 
responsibility cannot be the whole story. “Humans are highly responsive to even subtle 
environmental cues, so large shifts in access, pricing, portions, marketing, and other powerful 
drivers of eating and activity will have major effects on weight (p 380).” They refer to the 
available science, which suggests that elements of the food environment and biology routinely 
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engage appetite and consumptive behaviors on a sub-rational level. The elements are not beyond 
the scope of attention(/awareness) and control, but routinely influence behavior without the 
conscious intent or even acknowledgement of the unaware individual.  
Brownell et al. enlist the work of Sunstein and (University of Chicago economist) Thaler, 
arguing that default options may be reset within institutions, and thus through structural 
intervention bridge the divide between individual and collective responsibility. To reiterate, food 
decision environments already have default options, and Thaler and Sunstein argue these can be 
made healthier. By the vocabulary chosen here, this occurs by disarming certain environmental 
elements residual to dictated market evolution. Sunstein and Thaler build on the work of other 
economists, including Choi (2003), who studies the impact of default options on choices of 
employee health plans. There is no reason to suspect that the first options presented in food 
environments would function much differently. “Default options have an enormous impact on 
household ‘choices’” (Choi, p 180). Default options make “acts of commission” (opt out) costly, 
and opt-out costs vary over time. Choi lists multiple factors that can make default options more 
binding: default options are implicitly perceived as advice; “people are susceptible to 
procrastination” (p 180); and default options are “sticky” because of loss aversion (where 
someone values an item that they perceive as having, more than they value an item they do not 
yet perceive themselves as having). 
Chandon and Wansink empirically demonstrate an environmental effect on purchase and 
on postpurchase consumption, independent of a more general decision to consume at some point. 
Chandon and Wansink use household scanner data, field study, and two lab studies to examine 
whether products that consumers stockpile in the home are consumed faster (“A Convenience-
Salience Framework of Postpurchase Consumption Incidence and Quantity”). As SSBs are grab-
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pour-and-drink products (no can opener or other ingredients or steps), we may presume to 
consider them high-convenience products. Chandon and Wansink present results that: 
…show that stockpiling increases product salience and triggers consumption incidence among high-
convenience products. However, when the decision is made to consume a product, stockpiling increases the 
consumption quantity for both high- and low-convenience products (p 321). … 
   Findings from the field experiment and the scanner data study show that stockpiling indeed causes people 
to consume products at a faster rate. …[scanner and field study] reveal that stockpiling increases the 
consumption rate of high-convenience products more than that of low-convenience products (p 332, emphasis 
added). … 
   Consumption decisions are influenced by factors that do not influence purchase decisions (p 333). … 
   Our findings that stockpiling can increase the short-term rate of consumption support other studies that 
show that sales promotions are not always a zero-sum game (p 334). 
Salience, in the form of visual presentation, which is enhanced by stockpiling, including 
in the home, leads to consumption at a faster rate. Wansink, in a 1996 Journal of Marketing 
article, finds that larger package sizes of familiar products encourage greater consumption 
quantities (per use), in part due to the perception that larger packages are less expensive to use. 
Wansink concludes that package size is a marketing variable that can affect product use long 
after and many more times than it has influenced purchase (p 13). Cohen and Farley report 
evidence from the Journal of Marketing Research that salience is an important feature of food 
environments, because: “when the amount of shelf space for a consumer item is doubled in 
grocery stores, sales of that item increase by about 40%. This effect is seen regardless of whether 
the item is generally popular or unpopular. Sales also increase when special displays and end-
aisle displays are used and when items are displayed at eye level” (p 3, embedded citations 
omitted). 
Have you ever seen a supermarket SSB (not just sCSD) aisle where Coke and Pepsi did 
not dominate shelf space? Remember from the empirical essay here that there is clear evidence 
that households routinely stockpile sCSDs. This is not surprising given that contents and 
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packaging are very well designed for stockpiling and convenient use, with no loss in product 
quality over time for unopened containers. In this way, consumers seeking economy in their 
household budget may be contributing to environmental circumstances that encourage their own 
higher rate of consumption. Any consumer unaware of this effect may be consuming SSBs at a 
rate faster than their own conscientious RUMax calculation would project. If so, this is a 
compromise of frame and of RUMax behavior likely to create long-term negative health impacts, 
without the consumer consciously sourcing the cause. 
 
7.10    SSB/sCSD Advertising and Marketing – Targeted Soft-Drink Advertising 
The role of advertising is one of the established watersheds between neoclassical 
formalists and those questioning the neoclassical assumption set. Advertising that helps raise 
consumer utility and firm profits, regardless of how this is achieved, is good, and should not be 
restricted (neoclassical view). Those arguing that uninformative advertising can change tastes (be 
persuasive without being informative) tend to people the camp less committed to belief in stable 
preferences.  
Dixit and Norman (1978) argue their work shows advertising “to be socially excessive, 
even when post-advertising tastes are used as the standard for welfare judgments and the 
monopoly profits resulting from advertising are included in welfare” (p 1). In 1984, Grossman 
and Shapiro make the theoretical assumption that all advertising in a differentiated product 
market “conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products,” and still 
find the market-determined levels of advertising to be excessive given the diversity of the market 
(p 63).  In 1984, Kihlstrom and Riordan state: “A great deal of advertising appears to convey no 
direct credible information about product qualities” (p 427), while pointing out that if there is an 
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effective market mechanism for mediating the relationship, advertising may signal product 
quality, just as Phillip Nelson suggested over a number of papers (Milgrom and Roberts 1986). 
If advertising changes tastes, the assumption that there are fixed known and ordered 
preferences becomes less firmly rooted, and advertising restrictions may be welfare increasing 
for products that may be abused. “There is no fixed standard for value judgment [in welfare 
analysis] when tastes are variable” (Dixit and Norman, p 1). The desire to cleave closely to a 
fixed standard of value judgment may provide a motive for well-meaning economists with the 
objective of evaluating welfare effects under different scenarios, including different policy 
options. This motivates economists to assume that tastes are not variable, and to resist contrary 
evidence that might undermine the robustness of results achieved through serious and paid effort. 
One objective of marketing through advertising is to make consumers aware of their 
preferences (neoclassical view, as Becker and Murphy 1993), or develop consumers’ preferences 
through product information or persuasion/image associations (exo-neoclassical economic view, 
Galbraith in The Affluent Society, Daniel Ackerberg, and the premise of theoretical work by Dixit 
and Norman, for starters). Persuasive images associate the advertised product to what we may 
now (after Essay Two) refer to as “visceral factors” that powerfully drive consumption: hunger 
(now) sells candy bars; sex (soon) sells cars and beer and jeans, etc.; thirst (now), and love, life, 
fun, and a computer-generated polar-bear mother sharing a treat with her cubs sell soft-drinks. 
Visceral factors we remember engage action without triggering “rational thinking” that might 
“put the brakes on” an impulse. Profit-maximizing SSB companies now spend over $1.6 billion 
per year on advertisements just to children and teens (FTC 2008, ES-1), ads that like those for 
adults do not inform as to price, availability, or clearly differentiable product characteristic. If 
these companies are not playing to individuals’ visceral factors they may be completely wasting 
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that money. If they are playing to visceral factors, they are exploiting psychological vectors of 
economic weakness, and should be heavily regulated. Society has already made this last 
pronouncement for slavery, opiate drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. “Advertising can influence food 
choices; otherwise it would not be undertaken on the scale that it is by the food industry” 
(Fulponi OECD 2009, p 14; citing Marion Nestlé’s 2002 Food Politics). Milgrom and Roberts 
(1986) suggest that uninformative advertising can still be a profit-maximizing strategy for firms 
by signaling product quality to consumers. But profit maximization fails to be a case against the 
need for regulation, as for the banned and regulated industries just listed. 
The quiet battle between those who see advertisements as primarily informative and those 
who see advertisements as socially expensive attempts to shape flexible preferences reduces to a 
battle between those who see advertisements as economic goods, and those who see some form 
of advertisements as economic bads, or at least as appropriate for regulation or restriction. 
In a general exploration of the nature and effect of persuasive communication, Della 
Vigna and Gentzkow (2010) provide insights that apply to sCSD/SSB advertising, given the 
lessons from behavioral economists, decision theorists, and social psychologists already 
reviewed. Della Vigna and Gentzkow explain that existing models of persuasion fall loosely into 
two categories: “belief-based” persuasion, whose proponents hold that “persuasion affects 
behavior because it changes receivers’ beliefs”; and “preference-based” persuasion, whose 
proponents hold that persuasion affects behavior independently of beliefs, either directly entering 
the utility function or through factors peripheral to beliefs (p 653). Those who fall in the belief-
based camp argue that recipients of persuasive communication (“receivers”) are rational 
Bayesians, and argue that advertisements are informative, signal information, or have effects 
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proxying for a theoretic game. I shall attempt to interpret the likely effects of sCSD ads through 
both of the lenses Della Vigna and Gentzkow describe. 
In belief-based models of persuasion, rational receivers will never be made worse off by 
exposure to persuasive communication, because it increases the supply of information, and more 
competitive information markets tend to improve welfare. “Welfare effects are harder to evaluate 
if receivers are not Bayesian or if persuasion works through emotion or preference change” (p 
654). Again, this problem may incentivize some economists to deny preference-changing effects. 
From evidence and conclusions presented here, it is clear that many consumers are not Bayesian, 
and that sCSD advertising is emotion based (as ads convey no content or price or availability 
information, with the rare exception of a new product or slight reformulation; Becker and 
Murphy 1993; Ackerberg 2001). So there seems to be evidence that welfare cannot be assumed 
to rise with sCSD ads, given the failure of precepts for belief-based models. 
Many belief-based modelers have found diminishing returns to repeating the same 
advertisement. This is “consistent with receivers’ priors becoming increasingly strong over time” 
(p 19). While the specific ads vary over the years, the positive-emotion, positive-association 
messages of the main advertising sCSD companies (Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo, Dr. Pepper 
Snapple Group) stay consistent over time. This may indicate strong priors are established over 
the long term, possibly decades, by sCSD advertising leading to brand recognition and brand 
loyalty. Cumulative advertising effects might explain the dominance of brands with relatively 
large mark-ups on lightly spiced carbonated sugar water, a product that can cheaply be mimicked 
in manufacture by almost anyone. Addictiveness is an alternative hypothesis. 
I suggest that the strength and the depth of consumers’ “Bayesian priors,” if one accepts 
the belief-based model, are strong enough to help habituate consumption. Della Vigna and 
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Gentzkow further note that the credibility of the sender influences the inferences of receivers. 
The Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo have extreme product integrity over time, and over a 
century each of client satisfaction, with few corporate scandals. There is no non-nutritional 
reason not to trust them. So belief-based modelers would predict effective response to their ads. 
But it is not clear that consumers buying more due to advertisements would raise consumer 
welfare. Welfare rises when advertising promotes competition that lowers prices, decreases 
search costs, or increases market transparency (p 664). None of these functions is served by 
sCSD television advertising in the very mature U.S. market. 
Preference-based modelers predict that sCSD ads will be effective without conveying 
information. Evidence that beliefs may be affected by framing, salience, and attention – non-
informative dimensions – blur the line between the two model types (p 656). “…[A]dvertising 
campaigns can have an effect even if they do not convey credible information as long as they 
have a direct impact on preferences” (p 659). But these effects occur through behavioral 
economic modalities (framing, salience) rather than by conveying discrete competitive 
advantage. “The broad conclusion from theory is that welfare effects are more likely to be 
positive when persuasion functions as information and receivers are rational” (p 665). Neither of 
these seems to hold generally, either for the majority of sCSD ads, or for consistent consumers of 
sCSDs. Neither can possibly hold for the television ads seen by children (98%), and adolescents 
(89%) for food products high in sugar, fat, or salt. This is because young children have not 
developed the cognitive abilities to discriminate marketing or persuasive content from truth 
(Harris et al. 2009, p 213, 215). There seems to be no solid argument that sCSD television 
advertising is likely to raise consumer welfare, although it certainly raises sales, even in short-
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term effect (see my empirical results). The policy conclusion is that limiting it cannot be argued 
to certainly lower welfare. 
If soft-drink companies themselves believe that advertising will be more effective 
targeting groups with lower education and income levels than average, they would target 
African-Americans (and outside of the high education and income bias found in the Nielsen 
database used here, Hispanics) in addition to any group highly responsive to sCSD advertising. 
(Asian male heads of household respond strongly to sCSD marketing, by the quantitative 
analysis here.) Harris et al. (2011, p 16) cite a marketing industry media source quoting Coca-
Cola as targeting African Americans, Hispanics and Asians for 86% of its future growth. 
African-American and Hispanic targets for growth markets in the sCSD industry are confirmed 
by the industry overview offered by NPLAN (2011; The National Policy & Legal Analysis 
Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity). Growing markets are important in a multi-billion-dollar 
industry with dynamic product lines. Minorities and children are specifically targeted. 
After a 2008 self-imposed advertising restriction on television ads to children (see 
CFBAI, this section below) by some SSB manufacturers, Harris et al. (2011) report SSB and 
energy drink advertising in 2010 of $948 billion, of which three-quarters is spent on television 
advertising. Coca-Cola leads the pack at $300 million, with PepsiCo at $250 million. Compared 
to 2008, these figures represent roughly a 5% rise, but a doubling of sCSD ads viewed by 
children and teens – whom even adamant defenders of neoclassical economic premises will 
concede do not routinely make fully-informed, rational utility-maximizing consumer choices. 
Teens view 12% more SSB and energy drink ads than adults. Harris et al. quote the CDC in 
Atlanta: “There is no reason to give a child a soda or sugar-sweetened drink. …The powerful 
influence of marketing and the targeting of young people cannot be ignored here” (p 14). 
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African-American households have been empirically identified as preferential targets for 
sugary food advertising for nearly a decade. Tirodker and Jain (2003) find that prime-time 
television shows with high “Black” viewership had six times the soft-drink advertisements of 
general prime-time programming, along with double the candy and chocolate ads, and all of the 
“other dessert” ads. Henderson and Kelly (2005) confirm this, analyzing 100 hours of prime-time 
viewing, and finding 10% more of all ads in the African-American television market versus the 
general market are for food advertisements, with two-thirds again more (mean) food 
advertisements per 30 minutes of viewing than in the general market. The African-American 
market in their analysis had five times the number of candy advertisements (p=0.001), and three 
times the soft-drink ads, with soft-drink ads 10% of the African-American market, while only 
2% of the general market (p=0.004). Harris et al. (2011) cite evidence that “black children and 
teens viewed 80 to 90% more TV ads for…[sugary and energy drinks] in 2010 compared to their 
white peers.” While greater viewing times account for some of the difference, “black teens and 
children viewed 2.5 to 3 times as many ads for Sprite as compared with white youth, and four of 
six Sprite ads featured black main characters.” The numbers are nearly the same for Vitamin 
Water, with the black:white child-teen ad-viewing ratio more than 2.5 to 1, while for Coke and 
Pepsi the ratios run about 2:1 (p 11, quotes for paragraph). Targeted advertising restrictions may 
be warranted, and the quantitative work here may assist in identifying target populations at the 
household level. 
Andreyeva, Kelly, and Harris (2011) regress the associations between exposure to food 
advertising and fast food and/or soft-drink consumption. They find that each incremental rise in 
advertising exposure equivalent to just over one sCSD ad every two weeks (33 per year) is 
associated with a 9.4% increase in children’s soft-drink consumption (p=0.01). They calculate 
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advertising response elasticities indicating a 6.5% increase in child soft-drink consumption with 
a 100% rise in advertising exposure. So there is reasonable evidence that sCSD companies are 
not just throwing their advertising dollars away, and that the companies develop teen and adult 
tastes as early as they can. The societal comfort level with the product could prejudice regular 
consumers against reacting to conflicting information on nutrition content that would question 
their judgment in consuming sCSDs on a regular basis (Sassi and Hurst 2008; Jonas et al. 2001). 
Such a prejudice sends the decision path in Figure 4 through the “reflexive choice” junction, and 
reinforces a false probability assessment for the k multiplier in the expectation calculation of 
equation (d), as well as shielding the a from information suggesting long-term health would be 
better served by not regularly consuming an energy-dense nutrient-poor food (see sections 6.6, 
6.9). 
Television ads are not a full measure of effective marketing, however. “Nearly 24% , or 
$116 million, of carbonated beverage youth marketing consisted of in-school expenditures” 
(Federal Trade Commission 2008, p ES-2). Harris et al. (2011) compile FTC data to show this 
in-school sCSD advertising is the largest marketing segment targeted to youth in 2006 (before 
the CFBAI, see next paragraph), even larger than the TV ad budget for sCSDs. Not a mixed 
message from the SSB manufacturers, but certainly a mixed message in an educational 
environment. Advertising restrictions must be considered if simply as a means to avoid implicit 
“sanctioning” of sCSD use in educational environments. 
The self-imposed participation by some soft-drink manufacturers in the Children’s Food 
and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI) from 2008 is narrow in its participatory guidelines 
(Federal Trade Commission [FTC] 2008). Speers, Harris, and Schwartz (2011) find that product 
placement on television programs, wherein a product or its image is seen being used by someone 
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in the show, is dominated by sCSDs, traditional restaurants, and energy drinks, together 
comprising 60% of all product placement appearances. Coca-Cola garnered 70% of all product 
placements seen by children and 61% of all seen by adolescents in 2008, with over 95% of these 
attributed to a single show, American Idol. So despite Coca-Cola’s CFBAI pledge to avoid 
marketing to children, children saw on average in 2008 four Coke appearances a week in prime 
time. The force of product placement versus a full advertisement (per Andreyeva, Kelly, and 
Harris) is beyond the scope of this review, but by inference, there is support that child/teen sCSD 
consumption increases with this degree of exposure.  
The FTC report requested by Congress (FTC 2008) states that “television advertising still 
dominates the landscape of marketing techniques to promote food and beverages” (p ES-2) 
accounting for 46% of all youth marketing expenditures, with sCSD and (fast-food) restaurant 
ads dominating adolescent-directed advertising. Still, there have been strong forays into new 
media advertising, including Internet, texting, viral marketing, premium prizes, in-store displays 
targeting children or adolescents, cross-promotions, licensed character tie-ins (especially with 
movies), and celebrity endorsements, joining product placement in the active marketing tool kit. 
Harris et al. (2009) cite a well-known but non-peer-reviewed publication to make the plausible 
claim that  “newer forms of marketing…are designed to circumvent active processing of 
advertising information and, thus, deactivate skepticism and other defenses” (p 215). Harris et al. 
(2011) also make the critical observation that the CFBAI pledge does not include any 
commitment to reducing advertising to adolescents, who have the highest consumption of sugary 
beverages of any age group (by Ogden et al. 2011), and that Coca-Cola admits specifically 
targeting teen customers, as a good model for business growth (Harris et al., p 17). A copy of the 
wording of Coca-Cola North America’s October 2010 (restated) Council of Better Business 
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Bureaus Pledge (including its CFBAI commitment) are available in “Breaking Down the Chain: 
A Guide to the Soft Drink Industry” (NPLAN 2011; The National Policy & Legal Analysis 
Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity; at www.nplan.org). 
 
7.10.1    SSB/sCSD Advertising and Marketing – Policy Questions About a Key Formatter 
of Market Environment 
Beyond tax schema and information or education policies, a further common theme is the 
regulation or restriction of SSB advertising and marketing, both from economists like 
Zimmerman, and non-economists like Brownell. SSB marketing is ubiquitous and thereby sends 
nearly constant messages, whether one considers these to be informative or persuasive. 
Marketing/Advertising restrictions are a policy proposal defensible from economic principles if 
marketing/advertising is deceptive, if it changes or creates preferences that would not otherwise 
be formed and pull someone toward a lower lifetime utility, if its volume suggests inefficient use 
of social resources, or if it is predicated on a market failure. The latter is claimed for the 
information asymmetry implicit when sugary foods or drinks are marketed to children, who have 
not developed the ability to discern true from false images (Harris et al. 2009, p 215). For adults 
who arguably may not be as driven by automaticity of eating behaviors or habits as children, the 
case that persuasive imagery is a definitively predatory type of information asymmetry is not as 
easily made. 
The position already defended here is that marketing/advertising of SSBs is almost 
always persuasive, not informative, that it is designed to circumvent deliberative choice by 
developing more associative characteristics between the product and feelings. Persuasiveness 
and strong association with feelings is not deceptive by a high standard, but begins to meet some 
level of criteria for deceptiveness. As one example, Sprite®’s campaign of having famous 
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African-American sports stars (mostly basketball players) selling Sprite to African-American 
youth (Gatorade® is no better), associates sports performance with a very unhealthful product. 
(Of course, the Coca-Cola that Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis [2012] claim is toxic in its added 
sugar profile versus tolerable daily load actually does “add life”, and “is ‘it’,” and polar bear 
mothers do give it to their cubs, so there can be no valid accusation of deceptive imagery there.) 
If unwary consumers are being persuaded to eat more high-sugar low-nutrient foods than they 
otherwise would without modern marketing (a Zimmerman axiom), and to medically-defined 
excess, as Americans on average do, then externality costs associated with the poor health that 
results from marketing becomes a nearly indisputable market failure. 
Advertisements do raise consumption utility as Becker and Murphy (1993) contend, but 
enjoying an image (prestige effect) in no way lowers the negative health effects that the medical 
community associates with SSB consumption. Economists and marketing academics have 
already argued that advertising for these types of products is excessive from a social perspective, 
even when it is maximizing for individual firms (see 7.10). Zimmerman’s analysis carefully 
builds a plausibly causal link between the growth in sophisticated marketing and U.S. obesity. 
Leaving aside the extreme market concentration in many SSB industries, there is a market failure 
given the degree of information asymmetry described here, as well as the failure to provide 
nutrition education that would help consumers safeguard themselves from some marketing 
effects. 
Century-old dominant SSB firms have conducted decades of research and employ the 
elite of advertising executives to hone every aspect of marketing, from manufacturing flavors to 
upbeat television ads to container shape and color, whereas consumers tend more to demonstrate 
ignorance about nutrition, and to be naive to their own decision mechanisms. Decision theorist 
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Peters (2009) notes multiple weaknesses in consumers’ ability to decide that make them 
vulnerable to manipulation or poor decision-making:  
Preferences are constructed based not only on cues from the situation but also on stable characteristics of the 
decision maker (e.g., traits such as emotional reactivity, habits, and genetic makeup) and the decision maker’s 
transient characteristics at the moment of decision making (e.g., states of arousal, stress, or pain). 
   …[T]wo individual differences—numeracy and age—…influence information processing and decision 
making and have been linked to some extent with problematic information processing and/or behaviors with 
respect to food (p S83). 
Peters explains one of the information processing problems: “Inadequate numeracy may 
be an important barrier to individuals’ understanding and use of information in eating behaviors” 
(p S83). In one study Peters refers to, 89% of individuals reported using nutrition labels, but 
many did not adequately comprehend the information, and 32% could not properly calculate the 
carbohydrate calories in a 20-ounce soda with 2.5 “servings” in the bottle. These same 
consumers we expect to intuitively understand how to manage their own preference construction 
processes to avoid emotional manipulation of their sCSD consumption decisions by perfectly 
attractive and emotional soft drink ads?  
Marketers, who well understand the power of affect [“affect heuristics” Peters defines as fast, automatic, 
effortless, intuitive, and use emotion rather than deliberation to catalyze decision] typically aim their ads to 
evoke an experiential mode of information processing. As a result, individuals must learn to cope with these 
feelings that food marketers attempt to elicit if they want healthy eating habits. … [p 82, Peters offers 
empirical results and citations.]  
   These results imply that diet interventions may be more successful when they include training 
components in areas such as stress management and time management as a way to increase the cognitive 
resources available for dieting and thereby decrease the role of affect in decisions (p 83, emphasis 
added). 
Conventional economic analyses (Level 2) provide information that may also prove 
useful when considering whether to restrict marketing practices in some circumstances. Zheng, 
Kinnecun, and Kaiser (2010) find that television advertising for soft drinks rotates the demand 
curve counterclockwise, increasing demand elasticity, and suggesting that the number of 
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consumers willing to buy rises, with the greatest impact on those with the lowest marginal 
willingness to pay (Berning 2011).21
Raising a consumer’s willingness to pay for a product is not necessarily consistent with 
RUMax behavior on the consumer’s part, particularly if individual preferences are engineered by 
advertising imagery. There is no absolute way to counter those who hold the hard line that 
preferences are characteristics of the individual, but empirical evidence across numerous studies 
and the decision theory literature (as indicated by Peters 2009) does not indicate a long shelf life 
for preference-as-characteristic purists (see 6.8.2). Harris et al. (2009) cite clear evidence that 
preferences are created by advertising associations in children, and possibly adolescents. 
Andreyeva, Kelly, and Harris (2011) find that for children, “for both soft drink and fast food 
consumption, carbonated soft drink advertising emerges as a strong and significant predictor of 
consumption” (p 227). Harris et al. (2009) cite a review of reviews of the effects of food 
marketing to children, that concludes: “food promotion has a causal and direct effect on 
children’s food preferences, knowledge and behavior” (p 213). Maio et al. (2007) again citing 
multiple empirical works, suggest that preventing food ads during child-oriented television 
programming would prove an important change to the food environment to help combat rising 
obesity levels.  
 To the extent that my empirical results reflect a positive 
correlation between purchase in the same week that sCSD advertising increases for consistent 
purchasers, there may also be an outward shift in the demand curve, in addition to 
counterclockwise rotation.  
Overwhelming support for Level 1 factors indicates a benefit to SSB industries that have 
managed to dictate market evolution and bend the market frame so that SSB marketing is so 
                                                 
21 Berning cites other studies that seem to contravene the counterclockwise demand curve rotation, but these are for 
baskets of goods, not for sCSDs.  
628 
 
embedded in society that it is considered a right. But it also indicates a cost to those whose 
psychologies and consumption choices have been influenced by decades of sophisticated 
marketing for a near-addictive product type, costs in health and lost productivity. Level 2 
analyses may deny that RUMax agents can be compromised by persuasive advertising, but the 
amount of peer-reviewed science they have to deny to maintain this grows daily. A Level 1 
perspective demands it is time to have a science-based discussion about restricting certain types 
of and venues for SSB advertising (of which sCSD television advertising is a subset). Industry 
lobbying and “personal responsibility” advocates will defend their economic or philosophical 
turf, but like the strict neoclassical economists who may fear the threat to mathematical 
tractability from admitting RUMax-compromised consumers exist, they must deny a 
preponderant scientific literature in order to do so. There is precedence for this struggle in the 
fight to regulate alcohol, tobacco (Brownell and Warner 2009), and in certain industry and 
politicians’ campaigns to deny the scientific fact that much of the current rise in atmospheric 
carbon-dioxide is indisputably of human origin.22
 
 Industry resistance will be discussed in sub-
section 7.13.1., but this political problem should not constrain the presentation of responsible 
policy recommendations suggested by scientific evidence. 
7.10.2    SSB/sCSD Advertising and Marketing – Policy Ideas from Broader Literature 
The 2008 Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress, “Marketing Food to Children 
and Adolescents: A Review of Industry Expenditures, Activities, and Self-Regulation,” 
represents the official recommendation from a federal agency to Congress, so none of the 
                                                 
22 The current rise in atmospheric carbon-dioxide is indisputably of human origin because CO2 isotopes from a 
multi-decade panel of atmospheric assays chemically demonstrate these isotopes could originate only from human 
industrial processes. Doubters can start here: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml; or here 
http://mediasite.dl.uconn.edu/Mediasite/Play/04f37a778ee942a4a79ccf16e210cd8b1d. 
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policies they propose can be considered radical. In fact, regardless of a proposal’s ability to rise 
to academic or public prominence, such ideas should be considered baseline, especially those not 
ensconced in polite and tepid language.23
The Report’s “Recommendations for Food and Beverage Companies” are extensive: 
 The 2008 FTC Report was “the first comprehensive 
overview of food and beverage company marketing expenditures and tactics” (NPLAN 2011; 
The National Policy & Legal Analysis Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity). 
All companies that market food or beverage products to children should adopt and adhere to meaningful 
nutrition-based standards for marketing their products to children under 12. A useful first step would 
be to join the CBBB [Council of Better Business Bureaus] Initiative. 
   Companies should broadly construe “marketing” to include all advertising and promotional 
techniques24
   Companies should continue and increase efforts to improve the nutritional profiles of their products… 
through product innovation and reformulation. Companies should improve upon the nutritional criteria 
adopted for “better for you” products as they find ways to lower sugar, fat, sodium, etc., without 
sacrificing taste and appeal. In applicable cases, companies should re-examine whether the fact that a 
product has “less” of, or is “reduced” in, calories or certain nutrients (e.g., sodium, sugar, or fat) is, by 
itself, a sufficient basis for qualifying as a “better for you” product. … 
 … 
   Companies should devote particular attention to outreach aimed at ethnic minority populations that 
are disproportionately affected by childhood overweight and obesity. … 
   The CBBB should closely monitor participating companies’ compliance with their pledges. ...  
Expand the scope of “advertising to children” to encompass all advertising and promotional 
techniques, including, for example, product packaging and in-store marketing. … 
   Work toward standardizing the nutrition criteria for “healthy dietary choices” that may be marketed to 
children, such as by product category. … 
                                                 
23 The only perspective that can cast such recommendations as radical has been refuted by empirical and clinical 
evidence in Essay Two and this essay. Given this evidence, “industry rights” arguments against such proposals fall 
to standard economic arguments. Companies have the right to make unhealthful products, and to an extent to 
advertise and market them. They do not have the right to manipulate people into lowering their lifetime utility by 
taking advantage of psychological mechanisms that resist awareness to dictation of market frame – certainly not by 
economic arguments. Legal issues regarding manipulative advertising as free speech remain unsettled. 
24 “…all advertising and promotional techniques, including but not limited to: advertising on television and radio, in 
print media, and on the Internet (including third-party and company-sponsored websites); product packaging and 
labeling; advertising preceding a movie shown in a movie theater or placed on a video (DVD or VHS) or within a 
video game; promotional content transmitted to personal computers and other digital or mobile devices; advertising 
displays and promotions at the retail site; specialty or premium items distributed in connection with the sale of a 
product; promotion or sponsorship of public entertainment events; product placements; character licensing, toy co-
branding and cross-promotions; sponsorship of sports teams or individual athletes; word-of-mouth and viral 
marketing; celebrity endorsements; and in-school marketing.” 
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   Require companies not to engage in, approve, or allow placement of their product in media directed to 
children under 12. 
   Require participating companies to ensure that their franchisees are bound by the companies’ pledge 
commitments, such as by incorporating the pledge commitments into any franchisee contracts. … 
   All companies that sell “competitive” food or beverage products in schools should join the Alliance for 
a Healthier Generation or otherwise adopt and adhere to meaningful nutrition-based standards for foods 
and beverages sold in schools, such as those recommended by the Institute of Medicine. [“Competitive 
foods” can be understood to mean competing by brand, such as Coke® versus Pepsi®, or Taco Bell® versus 
KFC®.] … 
   Companies should cease all in-school promotion of products that do not meet meaningful nutrition-
based standards (ES8-11 in Executive Summary, original italics, bold added). 
The unequivocal nature of many of these recommendations is striking. “All” companies, 
“closely monitor,” and “cease” may signal a high level of frustration by our federal stewards of 
trade standards, a level similar to what I find among certain economists and the medical 
community. In brief, television advertising restrictions are inadequate given the spectrum of 
marketing techniques now available. Nutrition standards must be defined and adopted to limit 
marketing of unhealthful food categories, and marketing of products below those standards must 
be discontinued in schools and in any media targeting children. Voluntary standards are not well 
trusted to be followed or to affect adequate change. 
This is not a philosophical debate, but recommended minimum standards for Congress 
and Food and Beverage Companies to maintain. To re-iterate, these recommendations, rooted as 
they are in the best federal data and methodologies, and vetted for political sensitivity and 
subject to political pressure in the wording of the draft (Nestlé 2002, on this process in the 
generation of the USDA Dietary Guidelines) must be the new baseline minima for policy 
recommendations.  Strict adherence to these recommendations should be the least stringent 
version of a compromise solution after Congressional battles are fought. For example, given the 
biological and psychological mechanisms already discussed, there is a strong case for extending 
all of these to children under 18, or even to adults under 25, or even extending them to include 
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workplaces as well as schools. “Psychological research has identified mechanisms through which 
marketing influences behavior outside of the individual’s conscious awareness; these affect 
adolescents and adults, as well as children” (Harris et al. 2009, p 221). If reforms apply only to 
12 and under, data will eventually support expansion of similar provisions to older populations. 
Of course, much faster is much better given the epidemic rates of diet-based diseases in the U.S. 
and associated costs. 
For media and entertainment companies, the FTC Report recommends that companies 
limit their licensing of characters to healthier foods and beverages, that the companies test the 
effectiveness of health and nutrition messages aimed at addressing childhood obesity, and that 
the companies should consider adopting a self-regulatory initiative, as sCSD companies not 
coincidentally had in 2008. 
The FTC is coordinating with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food 
and Drug Administration, and the USDA to define nutrition principles and standards through an 
“Interagency Working Group on Food Marketed to Children.”25
Based on their quantitative work, Chou, Rashad, Grossman (2008) recommend 
eliminating the tax deductibility of advertising expenses for fast-food television advertisements 
as a means of lowering child obesity. Henderson and Kelly (2005) empirically find that African 
Americans are disproportionately targeted with television advertising for fast food, candy and 
soda, results that suggest that targeting of advertising restrictions is appropriate if a more general 
case is not won quickly. “Nutrition educators can help counter the effects of unhealthful food 
advertising by teaching consumers the critical thinking skills needed to evaluate the [food] 
advertisements” (p 195). Speers, Harris, Schwartz (2011) find that the Children’s Food and 
  This obviously continues 
directly from the (block-) quoted FTC recommendations above. 
                                                 
25 http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/04/110428foodmarketproposedguide.pdf, last accessed 28 April, 2012. 
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Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI) pledge to limit advertising to children from 2008 is 
grossly undermined by Coca-Cola’s domination of product placement on television shows. 
Indicating the inefficacy of narrow self-regulatory pledges: “Progress on child nutrition is 
difficult to imagine unless the powerful force of food and beverage marketing is attenuated, if 
not eliminated… the exposure of children to food marketing is massive and begins early. Nearly 
all food marketing to children worldwide promotes products that can adversely affect their 
health” (Harris et al. 2009; p 220). 
Harris et al. (2009) not unlike the aforementioned FTC Report, offer conditions that 
could be met to make self-regulatory pledges both plausible and potentially useful in addressing 
childhood obesity problems. They also point out that an expert panel convened by the WHO 
rejected CFBAI-style industry self-regulation as insufficient. The panel recommended that 
“WHO should support national actions to substantially reduce the volume and impact of 
commercial promotion of energy-dense, micronutrient-poor food and beverages to children; and 
consider development of an international code on the marketing of food and beverages to 
children…” (Harris et al. 2009, p 218). 
 
7.11    Strategies for Healthier Food and Policy Ideas from the Medical/Nutrition 
Community and from Economists Who Appreciate Level 1 Constraints 
Policy recommendations vary according to the objectives they are intended to achieve. 
One may expect the same researcher to offer different policy recommendations rooted in their 
own research results based on whether the objective is to reduce SSB consumption, reduce 
American obesity, improve Americans’ dietary quality, or lower incidence of diet-related chronic 
diseases. There is obvious overlap between some of these objectives. Many of the articles from 
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the medical/nutrition literature consulted here began with different objectives, so there cannot be 
unanimity in prescriptions. It is helpful that regardless of which primary objective one seeks from 
this list, policy recommendations do not conflict. Particular recommendations and emphases may 
change. 
Economists (Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui 2011a, 2011b, and 2011c; Fletcher, Frisvold, 
Teft 2011; Powell and Chaloupka 2010; Powell, Chriqui, Chaloupka 2009) tend to look at SSB-
reduction policy as a potential means to control obesity rates, which in turn is seen as reducing 
obesity-related chronic diseases. As explained early in this essay, this is simplistic, and one of 
the reasons that econometric attempts to link SSB-reduction with obesity-reduction has not 
proved promising for tax rates less than perhaps 4 cents an ounce. Health problems that cannot 
easily be seen are often far worse than excess bodyweight, and should be the primary focus of 
SSB reduction. Obesity is a common byproduct of overconsumption of SSBs (Malik et al. 2010; 
Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell 2007; Malik, Schulze, and Hu 2006), but CVD, diabetes, and 
hypertension directly result from overconsumption of SSBs, without necessarily correlating with 
the BMI of users (Lustig Schmidt and Brindis 2012; Stanhope et al. 2009). 
Because of the many poor health outcomes linked to high intake of added sugars, the 
primary focus here will be on policies to reduce SSB consumption, albeit within the larger 
understanding that changing the average dietary profile away from added sugars and toward 
more nutritive foods will improve health outcomes for the U.S. population. As SSBs are the 
number one source of added sugars in the American diet by an extreme margin (Marriott et al. 
2010), reducing SSB consumption can only assist in reducing overweight and obesity and 
improving American health profiles. Using sCSDs as a proxy for SSBs does not compromise any 
of the following arguments in any way I have yet perceived.  
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Recall that liquid calories are more likely to result in weight gain than solid or semi-solid 
calories (Chen et al. 2009), that decreasing SSB use has been associated with lowering of BMIs 
in heavier subjects (Ebbeling et al. 2006), that SSBs may cause weight gain by vectors other than 
their own calorie load (Olsen and Heitmann 2008), that fructose and HFCS energy intakes at the 
25% level raised CVD markers in healthy subjects in only two weeks (Stanhope et al. 2011), and 
that the number of years lived with obesity is associated with the risk of all-cause and cause-
specific mortality (Abdullah et al. 2011). There is no need to narrowly view the benefits of SSB-
reduction as an anti-obesity objective, or to seriously doubt the efficacy of that narrow objective. 
The question becomes how to achieve SSB reduction, again perhaps while enhancing other 
dietary positives. 
The closer an author cleaves to arguments that respect biological drivers of food 
decisions in opposition to the assumption that fully informed, aware, and rational decisions are 
the undeniable purview of every economic individual, the more that author is compelled to 
suggest strong limitations on advertising, marketing, and presentation cues including packaging, 
over a simple tax-and-inform strategy. This I would call a Level 1 awareness overriding Level 2 
limitations. This tendency generally holds for economists and non-economists, so the medical 
community tends to advocate changes in food environment, including advertising and marketing 
restrictions, inherently doubting the single-mode effectiveness of tax-and-inform strategies. 
There is no question that the medical/nutrition community favors reducing dietary added 
sugars. Over a decade ago, Krebs-Smith (2001) advocated trading out sugar beet acreage for 
fruits and vegetables. Regardless of the potential growing zone problems with this suggestion, it 
precedes Buzby, Wells, and Vocke’s 2006 explanation (see 6.7.1.c) that simple compliance by 
U.S. citizens with U.S. Dietary Guidelines would require millions of acres be transferred into or 
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out of production for primary grains, feed grains, fruits, and vegetables – on an order that could 
not quickly occur, even with instantaneous shifts in demand. An economist sees that what would 
cause such a demand shift should be the larger question. If the demand shift could be induced 
without force, say through raising awareness of the advantage of individual compliance with the 
Guidelines, then the nation’s agricultural production profile will change on its own (perhaps even 
if artificially constrained by unresponsive farm program policies rooted in Depression-era and 
pre-obesity-epidemic production priorities). Krebs-Smith also advocates taxing soft drinks and 
snack foods, limiting their availability in schools, and restricting marketing of same to children. 
She makes further useful recommendations as a nutrition expert: quantifying what “use 
sparingly” means in the (now older) USDA food pyramid, stressing in educational literature that 
5-A-Day fruits and vegetables should replace “empty calorie” (junk) foods, and quite useful for 
addressing the added sugar problem, recommends labeling added sugars separately on nutrition 
content labels from naturally occurring ones (534S). 
In a 2002 article, McCrory, Suen, and Roberts are already advocating control of 
environment and mechanisms to help people self-monitor their diet to break from habits: 
…[E]xisting data strongly suggest that individual biobehavioral dietary habits need to be regularly self-
monitored to help prevent weight gain and combat the current obesity epidemic. In addition, environmental 
factors such as excess portion sizes and the lack of easy access to affordable low energy dense foods may 
need to be addressed at a population-wide level to effect nationwide changes (p 3833S). 
The American Heart Association’s 2009 scientific statement upgrades its 2006 statement 
to propose an upper limit for the intake for added sugars. “A prudent upper limit of intake is half 
of the discretionary calorie allowance that can be accommodated within the appropriate energy 
intake level needed for the person…” (Johnson et al. 2009; p 1016).  
Recently the 2010 DGA [Dietary Guidelines of America] Advisory Committee stated that among several 
strategies to reduce the incidence and prevalence of overweight and obesity, Americans should avoid sugar-
sweetened beverages. The use of the word avoid is the strongest recommendation to date for a policy 
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document of this nature, indicative of the strength of the association between sugar-sweetened beverages and 
obesity (Johnson and Yon 2010; p 1297; authors’ emphasis). 
Vartanian, Schwartz, and Brownell (2007) already targeted SSBs within added sugars, 
whose danger had become more apparent by the time of Johnson et al.’s articles (cited): “Given 
the multiple sources of energy in a typical diet, it is noteworthy that a single source of energy 
[soft drinks] can have such a substantial impact on total energy intake. This finding alone 
suggests that it would be prudent to recommend population decreases in soft drink consumption” 
(p 673). 
Marriott et al. (2010) make an evidence-based recommendation that by their results 
implies limiting intake of SSBs, as SSBs are an increasingly prominent vector for added sugars 
for those whose intake exceeds 20% of calorie intake:  
Among children less than 18 y, and adults of all ages, for all nutrients [vitamins A, E, C, and K, and folate, 
iron, zinc, magnesium, phosphorous, calcium, potassium, fiber, and total choline], the median estimated 
nutrient intakes were lower with increased added sugars intake and the nutrient intake was lowest with added 
sugars intakes greater than 25% (p 238). …  
   These data indicate that for all nutrients, but especially for nutrients for which the U.S. population is most at 
risk for inadequate intake, the suggested maximal limit of 25% of energy from added sugars may need to be 
revisited. …[E]ven the 0 – 15% intake range may need further consideration…for specific life stage groups (p 
246). 
 By 2010, the argument to challenge American waistlines by moving beyond personal 
responsibility and to changing food environments was mainstream: 
Physiological considerations suggest that the apparent energy imbalance for much of the US population is 5- 
to 10-fold greater [than the 60 kcal that walking an extra mile a day versus resting would burn off], far 
beyond the ability of most individuals to address on a personal level. Rather, an effective public health 
approach to obesity prevention will require fundamental changes in the food supply and the social 
infrastructure. Changes of this nature depend on more stringent regulation of the food industry, agricultural 
policy informed by public health, and investments by government in the social environment to promote 
physical activity  (Katan and Ludwig 2010; JAMA; p 66). 
Katan and Ludwig are not more specific, but others are. Bleich et al. (2009) consider reducing 
the standard serving size of SSBs in the workplace (e.g., from a 20-oz bottle to a 12-oz can), 
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having found increased consumption per drinking occasion with the rise in package size away 
from home. They also consider reducing the ready availability of SSBs, a euphemism for not just 
restrictions on marketing as incentive building but on actual sales venues (p 378). Swinburn et 
al., and Gortmaker et al., both in The Lancet 2011 article set featuring WHO researchers on the 
global obesity epidemic, advocate changing the environments in which people make food 
decisions. Swinburn et al.: 
Obesity is the result of people responding normally to the obesogenic environments they find themselves in. 
…[T]he priority should be for policies to reverse the obesogenic nature of these environments. Governments 
have largely abdicated the responsibility for addressing obesity to individuals, the private sector, and non-
governmental organisations, yet the obesity epidemic will not be reversed without government leadership, 
regulation, and investment in programmes, monitoring, and research (p 804). 
Gortmaker et al. discuss an Australian survey of attempts to reduce childhood obesity, and find 
eight that would be cost effective: a 10% tax on unhealthful food and beverages; front-of-
package traffic light nutrition labeling; reduction in junk-food advertising to children; school-
based education to reduce television viewing; school-based multi-faceted education for nutrition 
and physical activity; school-based cuts in SSB consumption; family-based programs to counter 
child obesity; and multi-faceted targeted school-based programs (p841, table). Hall et al. also in 
The Lancet 2011 article set, advocate front-of-package traffic light nutrition labeling as well. 
Gortmaker et al. note that while “...reduction of advertising of unhealthy food and beverages to 
children was found to be one of the most cost-effective interventions…(p 840),” advertising 
restrictions are unlikely to pass legislative muster in the current Australian political environment 
(also a potential constraint for U.S. policy options). Instead they expressly advocate restricting 
“corporate tax deductibility of advertising costs for unhealthy foods” (p 841), which while an 
idea that has been floated for many years in some circles, seems to be surprisingly rare in this 
debate, given the potential cost effectiveness of such a regulation. 
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Gortmaker et al. also note that government requests to reformulate existing high-sugar (or 
high-fat) product lines might prove useful, as might requesting companies to broaden current 
voluntary bans on advertising of sCSDs. This follows a U.S. FTC proposal to Congress. 
Brownell and Frieden’s careful warning about the degree of industry resistance to regulatory 
attempts in the alcohol and tobacco fights of yesteryear make this last option less attractive. Even 
if partially successful, broadening self-regulatory efforts could be well short of what is necessary 
to create an environment conducive to better health outcomes, and could dull legislative force to 
achieve adequate concessions. Why would companies give up a dime more unearned profits than 
they believe to be politically expedient? 
In an article intending to bridge the gap between the personal responsibility and public 
responsibility approaches to policy, Brownell et al. (2010) recommend many devices, including 
but expanding beyond the tax-and-inform platform to direct attempts to change food 
environments. They seek policies to encourage nutrition education; to regulate food marketing; 
to monitor the truthfulness of advertising information as a protection against information 
asymmetry; to block access to junk foods in schools; to regulate food ingredients, e.g., banning 
transfats; and to tax junk foods while dedicating the tax revenues to subsidizing healthy foods (p 
384-6). Cohen and Farley (2008) clearly reference research such as Wansink is known for, that 
demonstrates that (relatively well-educated) people are routinely unaware of the amount they just 
ate, or the environmental  influences that affect consumption quantities: “suggesting that focus 
should be less on nutrition education and more on shaping the food environment” (p 1). 
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By 2012, Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis26
Some of these recommendations will appear draconian to the economist, who is trained to 
view the widest choice opportunity as optimizing (a prospect that even Thaler and Sunstein 
 are calling sugar toxic (due to its extreme effects 
on the liver), and while similar to Brownell et al. in advocating taxes and the limiting of SSB 
sales during school hours, they go much further. Their suggestions for limiting availability 
include serious regulations, taken from the alcohol and tobacco control playbooks, “reducing the 
hours that retailers are open, and controlling the location and density of retail markets,” including 
zoning ordinances to limit fast-food outlets and convenience stores around schools and in low-
income communities, while incentivizing proliferation of grocery stores and farmers’ markets. 
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis “would tighten licensing requirements on vending machines and 
snack bars that sell sugary products in schools and workplaces.” “Many schools have removed 
unhealthy fizzy drinks and candy from vending machines, but often replaced them with juice and 
sports drinks, which also contain added sugar,” so Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis would “limit 
sales during school operation, or…designate an age limit (such as 17) for the purchase of drinks 
with added sugar, particularly soda”  (p 29, for paragraph). Kersh and Monroe (2002) also 
consider serious regulations to intervene in eating habits for the public good. Lustig, Schmidt, 
and Brindis, having defined added sugars as always comprised at least in part of fructose 
molecules, suggest that the US Food and Drug Administration: “consider removing fructose 
from the Generally Regarded as Safe (GRAS) list, which allows food manufacturers to add 
unlimited amounts to any food. Opponents will argue that other nutrients on the GRAS list, such 
as iron and vitamins A and D, can also be toxic when over-consumed. However, unlike sugar, 
these substances have no abuse potential” (p 29). 
                                                 
26 R.H. Lustig: (endocrinologist) Department of Pediatrics and the Center for Obesity Assessment, Study, and 
Treatment, Univ. of Cal., San Francisco. L.A. Schmidt and C.D. Brindis: Clinical and Translational Science Institute 
and Philip R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies, Univ. of Cal., San Francisco. 
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respect as they argue for libertarian paternalism in the design of market environments), but the 
extent of recommendations from the medical and Masters’ in Public Health communities does 
indicate the degree to which many believe that controlling food environments has become a 
necessity. Few from this network seem to believe that price controls or extra information can 
begin to adequately slow the obesogenic juggernaut. 
Economists, including behavioral economists (Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Wansink, Just, 
and Payne 2009) and neuroeconomists, who argue from a Level 1 perspective – recognizing 
psychological or biological inclinations toward compromises in RUMax behavior and the 
skewing of market frames – make policy recommendations similar to those from the 
medical/nutrition community. Wansink, Just, and Payne suggest that information will prove 
inadequate to change unhealthful eating behaviors, and that changing food environments (cues) 
and helping introduce new heuristics must augment individual efforts if desired outcomes are to 
be achieved: 
Portion control and calorie counting are difficult for even the most diligent. It becomes even more 
problematic when environmental cues bias one's feeling of satiation. Given that only 1 in 20 dieters 
successfully maintains weight loss (Hill 2009), it appears that strict, mindful regulation may not be the 
winning strategy for many individuals. For some, it may be easier to change their environment than to change 
their mind.  
   …It is less clear that consumers need more nutrition information than they need better heuristics to help 
them develop a bias toward eating less and eating more healthfully.  …The most effective heuristics entailed 
little decision making (such as use a smaller plate or eating in the kitchen) and little ambiguity. Flexible 
heuristics (eat a hot breakfast) were easier to comply with and more effective than more restrictive heuristics 
(eat oatmeal for breakfast). … Interestingly, these heuristics may help individuals make better food choices 
by taking their mind out of the game, effectively creating healthful heuristics and behavioral rules-of-thumb 
(p 167, emphasis added). … 
   Keeping a focus on the mechanisms or processes behind consumption–the whys behind it–will help the 
interdisciplinary area of food consumption progress in ways that can raise its profile and its impact on 
policymakers, and ultimately on consumer welfare. 
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   … People are often surprised by how much they consume. This indicates they may be influenced at a basic 
level of which they are not aware. This is why simply knowing these environmental traps does not typically 
help one avoid them. Relying only on cognitive control and on willpower is often disappointing. 
   … [A] personally controlled environment can help people more effortlessly manipulate their consumption 
and lose weight in a way that does not necessitate the discipline of dieting or relinquishing self-governance to 
another. For some, this might involve repackaging food into single-serving containers, storing tempting foods 
in less convenient locations, and pre-plating one's food prior to beginning a meal. Perhaps individuals do not 
need more nutrition information, but information about their own behavioral tendencies and how they may be 
more easily managed through heuristics (p  168). 
Note the rejection of new information as a solution, with the endorsement of educating 
consumers as to how to manage their own environment to preemptively avoid tendencies to 
overconsume.  
Bernheim and Rangel (2005), the neuroeconomists, are more severe, rejecting even 
education as sufficient to overcome the force of addictive neural pathways: “Target populations 
frequently ignore information, particularly when confronted with peer pressure and strong social 
norms. But more importantly, education cannot alter the neural mechanisms through which 
addictive substances subvert deliberative decision making” (p 134).  
While this may not be strictly true given the option of educational methods that may 
repetitively engender new heuristics and behavioral responses to familiar environmental cues, it 
does reflect Bernheim and Rangel’s focus on strongly addictive substances that influence 
individual behavior, not weakly addictive ones: “…[A]ddictive substances systematically 
interfere with the proper operation of an important process which the brain uses to forecast near-
term hedonic rewards (pleasure), and this leads to strong, misguided, cue-triggered impulses that 
often defeat higher cognitive control” (2004, p 1582).  
Bernheim and Rangel perhaps dismiss the panoply of educational methodologies too 
easily, but they do seek a balance between paradigms that suggests certain policies are likely to 
be more effective than others in changing addictive behaviors: “Users and addicts are neither 
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entirely rational, which would argue for minimal interference with consumer sovereignty, nor 
entirely irrational, which might justify heavy-handed interventions” (2005, p 132). Bernheim and 
Rangel’s theory of addiction “places a high value on policies that increase the likelihood of 
successful self-regulation without making particular choices compulsory, and it identifies a 
central role for ‘cognitive’ policies, including the suppression of certain environmental cues 
(e.g., through limitation on advertising), and the dissemination of counter-cues” (p 139). 
Counter-cues include potentially shocking images on packaging, like those of diseased organs 
prominently displayed on Canadian cigarette packs: 
 “Since environmental cues frequently trigger addictive behavior, public policy can also influence use by 
changing the cues that people normally encounter. One approach involves the elimination of certain 
problematic cues. … In principle, a sufficiently strong counter-cue could trigger thought processes that induce 
users to resist cravings, even though the same information is ineffective when offered in a less provocative 
format” (p 136).  
 Use of advertising restrictions and counter-cues can help when an individual’s lone attempts to 
monitor cravings and resist environmental cues may prove insufficient: 
…policies that reduce the likelihood of cue-triggered mistakes by removing problematic cues or establishing 
counter-cues unambiguously increase welfare. …these policies are attractive because they are noncoercive, 
because they accommodate individual heterogeneity, and because they have the potential to reduce 
unintended  use without distorting choice. Though individuals may have some ability to avoid problematic 
cues and create their own counter-cues, the government is arguably better positioned to do this (p 1580). 
Bernheim and Rangel provide the important insight that marketing restrictions may be more 
effective than taxation in dissuading the use of addictive substances, because taxation alone 
leaves in place environmental triggers to use.  
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7.12    Proposals for Effective Policies to Reduce SSB Consumption and Improve American 
Health Outcomes 
 
A great portion of the theory and evidence that we have considered makes clear that unhealthy behaviors may 
not always be driven by consciously held intentions. Habit, automatic attitudes, and situational limitations are 
just some examples of the factors that may compete with volitional control. 
Maio et al. 2007 (p 129) 
 
Empirical results from the Heckit model in Essay One include variables expected to 
correlate with household-level weekly sCSD purchase response to weekly sCSD-industry 
marketing variables. The range of results is rich and interesting. Folding these correlates into 
predictions of household-level responses by education and income levels across racial groups and 
gender of household head while controlling for head-of-household age and family size offers some 
general insights into which policy recommendations to favor.  
Predicted purchase outcomes for weeks in which a purchase was made varied significantly 
with changes in the sex of the head-of-household (HHH), the HHH’s terminal level of formal 
education, household income level, and racial group, even when levels or types within these 
groups were interacted to identify fairly fine demographic sub-groups. Because these changes 
were almost exclusively non-linear within rising categories such as education or household 
income, and nonlinear across differences in racial grouping of household in different fixed 
combinations of income and HH education level, results tend to foil simple targeting mechanisms 
such as “give more information to lower-income households,” “or “restrict sCSD advertising to 
male-headed Asian households.” 
The largest predicted household (HH) purchase generally occurred for the combination 
of lower education with lower HH income. This is generally consistent with other empirical 
results, despite the difference in methodologies and my focus on purchase response to marketing 
variables rather than estimated sCSD (or SSB) consumption based on surveys of dietary recall 
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(e.g., Thompson et al. 2009). Predicted differences in HH purchase generally demonstrated a 
larger span from lowest to highest education level of the HHH (for a fixed HH income level) 
than for lowest to highest HH income level (for a fixed HHH education level). With a few 
exceptions, the differences across education level (for a fixed HH income level) were larger in 
span than differences between racial groups that share the same education and income levels. (If 
this is confusing, consult the REFINED prediction tables and how to read them, in Essay One.)  
Thus, one general takeaway is that insofar as the formal level of education of the head of 
household proxies for level of nutrition education or critical thinking about household dietary 
choices, this education level explains more variation in purchase than do changing levels of 
household income or racial differences. So in aiming for the primary policy goal of reducing 
sCSD purchase and consumption, policies stressing nutrition education and critical thinking 
should be given precedence over policies using income-based incentives such as excise taxes on 
sCSDs.  
Controlling for HH size and sex of HHH, predicted purchases in ounces were often the 
same or higher at the poverty level for a family of four than at four times this income level, with 
the same level of education across both groups. This means that many poorer HHs already spend 
four times more of their household budgets on sCSDs than a certain level of higher-income 
households.27
                                                 
27 For White, dual-parent-of-two households with high-school level of education for the HHHs, a family of four at 
the poverty level is predicted from empirical estimation results in Chapter 5, Table 20a, to buy 329 ounces per 
purchase week, versus 291 ounces for an otherwise similar family earning four times the poverty level. Results are 
parallel for African-American households with similar attributes, and the difference is much larger for Hispanic 
households. 
 Given this pattern of commitment to purchase, how then would sCSD excise taxes 
less than, say 50 or 100% of retail cost, be expected to have a large effect on lower-income HH 
purchase? Taxes alone would seem unlikely to strongly dissuade heavier purchasers at low 
incomes or low levels of education (or a combination). 
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Education messages may target certain demographics, and may prove quite effective if 
carefully designed to address highly marketing-responsive groups. But if a generally effective 
message is proved in pilot studies, inattention to targeting specific racial-education-level or 
racial-income-level sub-groups may still lead to a strong gain in overall public welfare.28
By demographic sub-group HH purchase responses vary significantly with weekly 
changes in each marketing variable. The strength of the response to sale is not surprising. Some 
of the seemingly reverse responses to price increase compared to the reference sub-group and 
other demographic sub-groups is surprising, and is indicative of purchase habits that would prove 
resistant to income-based (tax) mechanisms to reduce purchase. The strength and consistency of 
HHs response to sCSD-category-wide advertising within the same week was surprising, 
especially given the lack of apparent correlation between advertising and price, and advertising 
and percentage of category on sale over the data period (Feb 2006 – Dec 2008) when these 
relations were graphed. The correlation could be evidence of television advertisements triggering 
a bypass of deliberative thought by quick emotional processes, as posed by decision theorist 
Peters, or by engrained reactions to these ads in the form of persistent habits or automatic 
 For any 
policymaker interested in targeting such sub-groups, the empirical results here provide a level of 
specificity that by my search to date is unprecedented in the existing literature, given the copious 
range of demographic sub-groups identified by the methodology in Essay One, each with a 
unique response to a particular marketing variable (sCSD industry average price or level of 
television advertising for the purchase week, and whether the household purchased sCSDs on 
sale). 
                                                 
28 This assumes a public benefit by coming closer to medical literature recommendations for added sugar intake by 
reducing sCSD or SSB consumption without substitution by other high-calorie-low-nutrition foods. Direct 
calculation of welfare changes in the classical economic sense cannot be conducted from these empirical results, 
because they do not result from a structural economic model of demand, for reasons clear from the context and 
explained in the first essay and this one, so my methodology does not accommodate counterfactual analysis. 
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attitudes that resist deliberative override, as posed by Maio et al. (2007), and Rothman, Sheeran, 
and Wood (2009). 
There are undeniably common and significant HH purchase responses to sCSD industry 
marketing variables measurable from the Nielsen HomeScan data set. There seems to be an 
undeniably positive purchase effect from marketing variables that industry controls and that I 
had data for. This could be no problem, or indicative of Level 2 or Level 1 problems. The quasi-
exogenous literature strongly indicates Level 1 problems, which would require a re-framing of 
the sCSD market, and emphasis on building RUMax behavior in consumers who display 
purchase patterns indicating they are RUMax compromised in their sCSD purchase behavior. 
Because the RUMax failures that lead to overconsumption of sCSDs have been 
empirically associated with biological, psychological, and social factors (including ubiquitous 
marketing extending far beyond television advertising), policy must address each cause. There 
can be no single lynchpin that once removed will break unhealthful consumption patterns. 
Economists will benefit by casting our empirical net wider than our own quantitative estimations 
of consumer demand elasticities responding to price changes. In some cases this requires 
recognizing that rational utility-maximizing behavior has been compromised by combinations of 
market environment and individual behavior.  
There is a generality to this realization that suggests no compelling reason to particularly 
target specific demographic groups with campaigns to reduce sCSD consumption, to the 
exclusion of other groups. While the combination of low-education and low-income stands out as 
very purchase-responsive to sCSD marketing variables, very few groups seem immune to 
marketing variable influence – even less so when post-purchase responses such as those Wansink 
and a variety of co-authors (including first authors) identify. Details like the odd responsiveness 
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of Asian male heads of household to marketing variables at higher education and income levels, 
and the odd resistance to decrease in purchase as African-American female heads of household 
rise in average education level, are considerations that pale next to the need to raise the 
nutritional and marketing awareness of a population that is more than two-thirds overweight or 
obese, with high rates of CVD, hypertension, diabetes, and cancer.  
Targeting of message can be useful, but ideally will not be forced by limited policy 
implementation budgets, as will become clear below. (Recall that estimates of tax revenues of 1-
cent-per-ounce on American SSBs are in the $15 billion range.) I pose that given the massive 
rises in the cost of diet-related disease, the policy days when the government’s primary healthful-
food initiative may be funded at less than 1/1000th the amount spent on commercial marketing of 
food, beverages, and candy has quickly passed for any policymaker concerned with society-wide 
costs and benefits.29
                                                 
29 The 2005 Consumers Union report, “Out of Balance: Marketing of Soda, Candy, Snacks and Fast Foods Drowns 
Out Healthful Messages” cites Advertising Age (June 25, 2005), and a conversation with the former director of the 
5-A-Day program at the National Cancer Institute regarding the 2004 budget in claiming (Figure 5 in report) that in 
2004, $6.84 billion was spent advertising food, beverages, and candy (with another $4.42 billion on restaurants), 
versus the $4.86 million 2004 budget for the national (minus pilot state California) 5-A-Day program advocating 
more fruit and vegetables be eaten.  Adding the California 5-A-Day budget to the federal communications budget 
raises the 5-A-Day total to $9.55 million, funded through the food-stamp program. This combination does break the 
1000-to-1 ratio of commercial advocates of unhealthful foods versus federal promotion of healthful foods.  Figure 8 
in the CU report shows that in 2004 Coca-Cola spent $246.2 million, Pepsi spent $211.7 million, and Dr. Pepper 
spent $104.8 million in “measured advertising dollars,” the only soda, snack, or candy companies to individually 
break $100 million for the year. Each of these company budgets alone is more than ten times the combined 5-A-Day 
budget for 2004. The industry expenditures do not include product placements, internet, special promotions, word-
of-mouth marketing, or cell or text message campaigns. Accessed April 30, 2012: 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/OutofBalance.pdf.  
 The FTC 2008 report to Congress calculates that for food and beverage 
brands marketed to children, when all audiences for the same brands’ advertising are included, 
the 2006 figure is $9.6 billion. This includes restaurants, so while perhaps more carefully 
calculated than figures from within the advertising industry, this figure verifies the overall 
magnitude of the $11.26 billion Consumers Union calculated for 2004 (see previous footnote). 
The degree of dictated market evolution in markets for unhealthful foods may in part be inferred 
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when one considers the effect of such a funding gap on the preference formation of a generation 
of Americans. A persuasive television, radio, or internet advertising campaign linking a bright 
positive message with an SSB product that is repeated over years establishes norms in individual 
psychology that seeing the odd “eat more fruit” public-service announcement is unlikely to 
dislodge.  “Coke adds life” and new zesty-flavored corn chips burst with excitement. Fruit is 
fruit – and the varieties on shelves currently are bred more for bruise-free travel than for taste or 
nutrition. 
Given the strong correlations between SSBs or any high-added-sugar-low-micronutrient 
product and a range of poor health outcomes when these are consumed at the current average 
level in the U.S. (> 83g-e/d per capita, see 7.2), the primary policy goal must be to reduce 
consumption of SSBs (of which caloric sCSDs are the primary component, see 1.2, 6.7.1.f). The 
available science suggests that elements of the food environment and biology routinely engage 
appetite and consumptive behaviors on a sub-rational level. The elements are not beyond the 
scope of attention(/awareness) and personal control, but often influence behavior without the 
conscious intent or even acknowledgement of the unaware individual. So reducing SSB 
consumption must involve certain basic elements to correct Level 1 problems. All policy 
recommendations should extend from sCSDs to the SSB category, because they are nearly 
identical biologically (therefore medically), and medical/nutrition effects due to market failure 
are the reason for policy correction. Including all caloric SSBs in policy designs would forestall a 
simple substitution by manufacturer marketing strategies or by consumers to sports or energy 
drinks, fruit drinks or fruit ades, etc.,30
                                                 
30 I would include pre-packaged fruit juices in this list, even to 100% juice content, but I do not believe there would 
be sufficient support for this yet from the nutrition community. My argument is based on natural fiber and active 
 from policy-targeted sCSDs. This fulfills the primary goal 
while avoiding policy “slippage” and consequent inefficiency of operant policy mechanisms. 
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Policy mechanisms may be old or new, but must change elements of the SSB market 
environment, must draw attention and improved critical thinking skills to individual choices 
made in the context of the market environment, and must serve to re-enforce dietary heuristics 
and habits conducive to healthful outcomes. In slightly more detail and in the vocabulary of this 
essay, this means recognizing the necessity of the public role to rectify the dereliction in not 
having provided the public goods necessary for a fair market to this point: a square and level 
market frame, and sound information and critical thinking skills as part of a higher effective 
dietary knowledge base than is the current norm in the U.S. This will mean undoing the “dictated 
evolution” that favors the SSB industry, and training people to avoid compromise of RUMax 
behavior in their habitual dietary choices. Policy must re-orient the market environment, induce 
consumer awareness of both marketing techniques and their own diet-related heuristics, break 
health-compromising habits, and build and re-enforce new ones consistent with sound nutrition 
education. Verplanken and Wood (2006): “Successful habit change interventions involve 
disrupting the environmental factors that automatically cue habit performance” (p 90).  
All of the policy recommendations endorsed here are meant to engage elemental 
mechanisms to achieve the primary policy goal. Many researchers now hold the conviction that 
only a combination of policies to change environment and internal decision-making can be 
effective in changing unhealthful dietary habits. Kersh (2009) offers for the obesity epidemic: 
“At a minimum, a package of well-tested reforms would appear to be in order,” and quotes Kelly 
Brownell from an article in the popular press, that “the social, economic and political factors 
                                                                                                                                                             
enzyme and micronutrient content, the factors that favor fresh fruit over juice, especially when it is more than a few 
minutes old. If there is consensus in the nutrition community, then fruit juices should be in the list. As this would 
then include “juice boxes” for small children, I believe at this stage, arguing to include juices would court further 
controversy when there will be plenty of that already. While less economically efficient, political realities may 
dictate that reforms evolve in stages. Fruit drinks and fruit ades have low fruit juice content, with the balance 
comprised of added sweetener, water, and often added chemical flavorings. 
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contributing to these problems [obesity and health] are stampeding forces that will thwart single, 
easily concocted solutions” (p 310-1). 
 
7.12.1    Preserving Choice: Taxes and Regulations Over Bans 
Consistent with economic precepts, political-economic and legal realities, and people’s 
(learned) ability as part of a utility-maximizing strategy to enjoy things in moderation that would 
prove unhealthful in excess, no ingredient or product should be banned from sale or 
consumption: not SSBs, not sCSDs, not HFCS, not refined sugars. The goal is to reduce 
unhealthful levels of SSB consumption, not to prohibit consumption.  
The findings of Jensen and Smed (2007) that taxing sugar will prove more effective than 
taxing added-sugar products compels consideration of taxing HFCS, as it is the primary 
ingredient in SSBs, after water. Given the particular effects of HFCS on the liver, postprandial 
lipid profiles, hunger-influencing hormones, cardiovascular disease markers, and excessive 
caloric ingestion (extensive discussion in Essay Two), a good case may be made for restricting 
HFCS production and use in the food system by some means. While “most other developed 
countries eschew HFCS” (Lustig, Schmidt, Brindis, p 28), there is no need to ban HFCS. 
Reformulating U.S. SSB formulas back to sugar from HFCS need not be mandated, but could 
assist in achieving public health goals. Restricting HFCS production and use is achievable using 
production quotas, as the European Union does with a 2005 quota of 303,000 tons within an EU 
sugar-production environment tending over 18 million tons. 31
The government regulates the production and price of HFCS in order to limit competition with sugar and 
obtain funds to partially pay for the high support to sugar beet and cane producers. HFCS production targets 
 In Japan: 
                                                 
31 Mitchell, Donald, 2004. Sugar policies: opportunity for change; World Bank Publications. Collection Title: no. 
WPS 3222; ISBN 0821358634; 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2004/06/01/000009486_2004060116
5704/additional/128528322_20041117173100.pdf, accessed April 30, 2012. 
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are established by the MAFF [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries] for each producer and a 
surcharge is paid to the government on production up to that level. An additional surcharge is added on 
production which exceeds targets, which effectively establishes production quotas on HFCS and prevents the 
balance between sugar and HFCS from changing. ... In addition to controlling HFCS production and prices, 
high tariffs are imposed on imported HFCS and tariff-rate quotas are imposed on starch imports. Food 
manufacturers are prevented from circumventing the high barriers to imports of sugar and HFCS by higher 
tariffs on intermediate or final products that contain added sugar (Mitchell, from last footnote, p 35, emphasis 
added). 
Similar HFCS production quota and enforcement mechanisms could prove useful in the U.S. 
Based on decades of policies protecting them from cheaper world sugar prices, sugar beet and 
cane farmers in the U.S. seem likely to continue to find political support, so the EU and Japanese 
methods are attractive means of protecting sugar farmers. Corn farmers have plenty of advocates 
without bringing corn-derived sweeteners to the table. HFCS production quotas would 
theoretically release corn for ethanol mandates and for trade in pricey world commodity markets. 
This might prove useful in keeping high world prices partially in check.32
By 2010 and 2011 figures from the USDA’s ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook 
Tables, the price of HFCS seems to run about 20% less than for cane sugar, and some 80% less 
than for Midwest beet sugar wholesale prices (per dry pound, or weight-equivalent).
 Phasing out corn 
subsidies in the U.S. farm program would also raise the price of HFCS, but by Zimmerman’s 
estimate, only by 1.6 cents per 12-ounce can, so not enough to reduce SSB consumption. While 
HFCS used in baking – where it is used in smaller amounts – has desirable humectant properties, 
the only advantage in SSBs seems to be cost.  
33
                                                 32 
 A 50% tax 
Michael J. Roberts, Wolfram Schlenker, April, 2010. “Identifying Supply and Demand Elasticities of Agricultural Commodities: Implications for the US Ethanol Mandate”; NBER Working Paper No. 15921 Issued in April 2010; http://www.nber.org/papers/w15921, accessed 30 April, 2012. Phasing out ethanol mandates would be more effective in not inflating world grain prices, but production commitments have already been made according to existing targets, which could lead to lawsuits against the U.S. government if phase out of the mandate is proposed. 
33 USDA, ERS, Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook Tables, Table 4--U.S. raw sugar price, duty fee paid, New York, 
monthly, quarterly, and by calendar and fiscal year; Table 5--U.S. wholesale refined beet sugar price, Midwest 
markets, monthly, quarterly, and by calendar and fiscal year; Table 9--U.S. prices for high fructose corn syrup 
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on the HFCS wholesale price would be easy to implement, and could be enforced using 
Japanese-style methods, if there is no American appetite for production quotas. Any policy 
raising the HFCS cost to an average at least 20% above cane and beet sugar average prices 
would seem from the medical literature to have good health effects, as market economics suggest 
this would cause HFCS to be reformulated back out of products, reversing its reformulation into 
them from around the mid-1970s. While HFCS 55 is used primarily in soft drinks, and HFCS 42 
is used in other beverages and baked goods, it is important not to make any policy restriction so 
narrow that the industry could simply change a formulation (say to HFCS 54) to avoid it. If corn 
use could be traced back to the farmer, a halving of U.S. government subsidies to the farm-
program grower of corn going to HFCS could also provide a disincentive, but perhaps at much 
higher policy implementation cost than other policy options for HFCS reduction. 
Similar to avoiding the banning of any product or ingredient that is not immediately and 
permanently harmful, rationing of even the least healthful food products (SSBs qualify) would 
have to be very carefully (expensively) implemented in hopes of not removing choice from 
consumers who rationally maximize their utility while including moderate consumption of 
indulgence foods. Like banning, plausible rationing schemes for indulgence foods rub 
economists and most Americans the wrong way – as they should, they are likely to penalize 
many RUMax consumers in an attempt to greatly improve health outcomes for the worst abusers, 
with indeterminate effect for those in the middle, at very high administrative cost (deadweight 
loss).  Such schemes therefore may only dubiously be argued to move society toward a Pareto 
improving market equilibrium. Targeting certain foods as unhealthful for reduced consumption is 
                                                                                                                                                             
(HFCS), Midwest markets, monthly, quarterly, and by calendar and fiscal year; Source: Milling & Baking News (all 
three tables).  http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/sugar/data.htm, accessed 30 April, 2012. 
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one thing; expressly limiting the amount available to a RUMax adult who may make the 
conscious and fully-informed decision to overconsume is dictatorial and likely inefficient. 
 
7.12.2    SSB Excise Taxes: Raising Awareness, and Revenue for Nutrition Education 
Campaigns 
We choose policies to change economic signals. These economic signals in part 
characterize the market environment in which individuals make purchase and consumption 
choices, they “shape the conditions that promote and sustain desired habits.” “…[P]rice changes 
implicitly include the contingencies that drive effects of reinforcement: they make it aversive to 
perform the unhealthy behaviors and relatively rewarding to perform the healthy behaviors” 
(Maio et al. 2007, p 118, both quotes). Other aspects of the market environment may be 
regulated or directly changed. Educational initiatives may help change the heuristics and habits 
that internally drive consumer purchase and consumption. All of these may prove effective 
elemental mechanisms to reduce SSB use and achieve more favorable health outcomes.  
After the relatively heavy-handed options of banning or imposing purchase quotas or 
making SSBs a controlled substance (with production, trade, and retailing regulations under 
federal supervision as for products listed with Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, or the Food and 
Drug Administration), come relatively light-handed economic signals: taxes, regulations, and 
restrictions, cooperation with government requests, and voluntary industry initiatives. 
An excise tax on SSBs (sCSDs) of between half-a-penny and two cents per ounce has 
been proposed in one form or another for a decade (discussed above, 7.7.1). Given SSB’s 
primacy as an unhealthful product category in Americans’ actual dietary profile, imposing a tax 
projected by many economists to be too small to effectively reduce SSB demand on the order the 
medical community suggests seems to be a quite reasonable proposal (section on industry 
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resistance to policy initiatives to follow). Two cents per ounce of pre-packaged caloric SSB 
(sCSD, energy drinks, sports drinks, sweet teas, fruit drinks, fruit ades, etc.) is a promising 
starting point. 
Remember from empirical results here that the income effects of a tax this size are not 
expected to burden any household to the point of making SSB consumption economically 
painful, and from other economists’ estimations of demand elasticity may not prove much of a 
restriction to national purchase. Estimations other than Zhen et al. 2011 did not anticipate that 
demand would rise again after an initial negative response to a tax. This rise is likely to the 
extent that purchase and consumption are driven by marketing and habits/heuristics formed with 
low levels of nutrition knowledge. A tax might temporarily dissuade, but without other changes 
in the marketing environment and food-choice heuristics, habit would revert toward pre-tax 
norms as people realize that $9/week for soda is not much more of a strain on the budget than 
$6/week for soda. Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis demonstrate conclusions assuming a linear 
tax/price effect. They conclude from Sturm et al. (2010), that soda prices would need to double 
(be doubled) to significantly reduce consumption. 
Particular to households participating in federal or state food assistance programs, Powell 
and Chaloupka (2009, p 247) point out that households in the food-stamp/SNAP program are 
exempt from state sales taxes on food. Given empirical results discussed in Essay One 
demonstrating that household income at or below the poverty level for a family of four increases 
purchase response to marketing variables associated with lower education and within most ethnic 
sub-groupings, existing tax exemption from sales tax on food should be lifted for foods with 
relatively large amounts of added sugars. On August 19th, 2011, the USDA responded to New 
York City’s request to begin a pilot program exercising a waiver to lift the tax exemption for 
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SSBs/sCSDs purchased through SNAP.34
There is an argument for incremental excise tax rates within the SSB category,
 The request was rejected, but the grounds do leave 
open the possibility that smaller-scale pilot projects of this type may be pursuable in the future. 
Established science in medical and nutrition literature, behavioral economics, and social 
psychology suggest little doubt that health outcomes from such a measure would be positive, to 
the ultimate household savings of SNAP recipients, and to a public funding health care costs for 
those on federal assistance. Established science suggests that the USDA’s rejection of NYC 
Mayor Bloomberg’s proposal is backward-looking in its conservatism, protecting a very 
unhealthful product from minor restriction for underinsured populations, based on rapidly 
antiquating beliefs about individual choice and food environments as they apply to energy-dense 
low-micronutrient products. 
35
The primary reason for this small tax would be to generate revenues for educational 
campaigns and other initiatives, again, at a penny an ounce, perhaps in the $15 billion range.
 say at a 
half-cent per ounce for less than 10 grams (or gram-equivalent) of added caloric sweetener per 
12 ounces, one-cent per ounce for 10-20 grams, one-and-a-half cents per ounce for 20-30 grams, 
and two cents per ounce for 30 grams and above of added caloric sweetener per 12 ounces. 
(Recall that 30 grams of carbohydrate translates to roughly 120 calories, above the American 
Heart Association recommended limit of 100 kcals for added sugars for women for a day from 
all sources, and approaching the recommended limit of 150 kcals for men.) A content-scaled 
excise tax would incentivize product reformulations reducing added-sugar content. 
36
                                                 
34 Link available through Marion Nestlé’s website (link to letter is second address): 
 A 
http://www.foodpolitics.com/2011/08/snap-soda-ban-usda-says-no/; http://www.foodpolitics.com/wp-
content/uploads/SNAP-Waiver-Request-Decision.pdf, accessed 07 May, 2012. 
35 A concept briefly and generally discussed in Sturm et al. 2010. They favor the application of tax revenues to 
educational programs to limit consumption.   
36 I will not speculate on the revenue effect of a two-cent-per-ounce tax, as this would involve assumptions on the 
linearity of elasticity and purchase effects. 
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tax in the one- to two-cent range would make campaign coffers competitive with unhealthful 
food industry television and print advertising. There are other ways to tip the scales toward a 
public communication budget relative to the commercial advertising budget, and these are 
discussed below. 
There is a critical secondary effect of such an excise tax, which is to signal consumers 
that prices have changed because the government is flagging the product category as unhealthful, 
even if the sin tax is quite low relative to alcohol and tobacco products. Arguably, given the less 
addictive nature of sugar relative to alcohol and tobacco, a sin tax may be set lower because the 
addictive distortion toward overconsumption (or by Becker and Murphy 1993, the need to raise 
the future cost of consumption) would be lower for a less urgently addictive product. Added 
sugars are probably low on a biological scale of addictiveness and direct danger from use-
compulsive behaviors, but by the scale of their use in society, added sugars are significant 
contributors to morbidity and mortality. Added sugars’ champion is sCSDs. Given the extreme 
rise in medical costs for diet-related diseases, the societal costs from overuse of added sugars 
may, if honestly calculated, rival the social costs from all addictions to controlled substances 
(“illegal drugs”), perhaps even including alcohol, and although less likely, perhaps even from 
tobacco. While a smaller sin tax may be argued for SSBs, the principle of putting a sin tax on 
pure vectors of added sugars like SSBs would likely be well defended by simple product-by-
product quantification of addictiveness (by some measure) times the societal cost of abuse of 
each substance. 
SSBs are quite cheap as portions of overall household budgets. Despite the two primary 
objectives achievable by a 2-cent-per-ounce tax – generating revenues to fund policies and sin-tax 
signaling – a larger tax that would double or quadruple the current SSB shelf price, even if it were 
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politically achievable, would unnecessarily punish the rational SSB consumer, whose use tends to 
well under 24 ounces per week. It might achieve SSB use reduction goals, but perhaps at 
measurable cost to rational users of what I yet argue should remain a legal product. The Pareto 
improvement from a large tax is not as clear, and the regressivity of a 200-to-500% tax might 
prove of sufficient scale to demand an offset by transfers to low-income users in order to merit 
any consideration. A tax of 2 cents per ounce would raise the cost of a 2-liter bottle of soda from 
roughly $1.99 to $3.33, a roughly 60% increase (closer to 40% if the original list price is 2.19); or 
by 40 cents, or roughly one-third, for a $1.25 20-ounce vending machine bottle. This drops to 24 
cents, or a roughly 20% increase, if the $1.25 vending machine soda is a 12-ounce can.  
Note the implicit counter-cue to volume purchases, consistent with preserving the choice 
to consume, while discouraging the unhealthful choice to overconsume non-nutritive, highly 
sweetened products. Because the cent-per-ounce tax is irrespective of brand or SSB type (for 
nutritional reasons), the percentage change will actually be smaller for higher-priced premium 
brands, a relative pricing advantage from the policy for the very companies and product lines 
best funded and situated to fight the tax politically – those who already enjoy higher margins due 
to successful product differentiation through advertising and possibly product characteristics. 
The primary use of SSB excise tax revenues should be public education campaigns to 
raise consumer nutrition knowledge and consumer sophistication in processing marketing 
messages (discussed below, 7.12.7). If there is enough funding from SSB taxes, subsidies of fruit 
and vegetable provision to poor and poor minority neighborhoods, and of material costs incurred 
executing ‘drink water’ initiatives in public schools (see 7.12.3) would be good uses of money. 
There should be little overage from SSB tax revenues, given the large need that has emerged 
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from underprovision of public goods (nutrition and consumer awareness of marketing 
techniques) in the decades that aggressive marketing has been dictating the market frame. 
Because a key mechanism is to get consumers to become aware of the strong negative 
health consequences of habitual SSB consumption, multiple ways to trigger consumer awareness 
of their SSB consumption should be employed. Chief among these are restrictions on venue of 
sale, changes to SSB labels, marketing restrictions, and public education campaigns. 
 
7.12.3    Re-Squaring the Market Frame: Reducing or Removing Marketing and 
Consumption Cues From Non-Commercial Spaces 
The medical/nutrition, social psychology, and consumer psychology literatures along 
with the economists cited here who respect the influence of environment on purchase and 
consumption choices together paint a very clear picture. We know to a certainty that our 
youngest citizens cannot distinguish between marketing hype and truth37
Cohen and Farley (2008; the MDs with MPHs, in Preventing Chronic Disease), cite 
research proving that: 
, that young people 
generally are less capable of making balanced rational decisions based on sound evidence, that 
adolescent tastes for sweetness and for brands can strongly impact adult buying habits, that once 
dietary habits are engrained through repetition, they are hard to disabuse, and that at any age the 
effects of priming, anchoring, framing, and naïve decision heuristics can induce individual 
choices to deviate from RUMax behavior consistent with assumptions of fixed preferences and 
exponential discounting.  
                                                 
37 Pomeranz et al. 2009 cite evidence for this claim, and recall also that the FTC proposed rules under the Carter 
Administration that would protect children from television advertising of sugary products as unfair and deceptive. In 
response, Congress withdrew the FTC’s authority to enforce the “KidVid” provisions early in the Reagan 
Administration (p 189). 
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Because people are unaware of their behaviors, they are also unaware that the behaviors are not under their 
control. Nisbett and Wilson [1977] have shown that people are often unaware of a particular stimulus that 
elicits a response, and even if they are aware of both the stimulus and the response, they may be unaware that 
the stimulus actually caused the response. Instead, people tend to fabricate reasons to explain their 
behaviors, typically choosing the most plausible, culturally acceptable theories. Bargh and Chartrand [1999] 
found that, even after people have been shown the results of experiments demonstrating the automatic nature 
of their actions, they steadfastly refuse to believe that those actions did not result from conscious choice. Our 
difficulty as a society in accepting how strongly our environment influences eating may stem from our 
inability to recognize and our refusal to accept our own eating as an automatic behavior  (p 4). 
Elementary and secondary schools are forums for learning knowledge, critical thinking, 
and responsible individual and social behavior. Allowing sale in any form of caloric SSBs in 
schools undermines health and the formation of responsible dietary habits of students, by 
providing environmental cues that trigger consumption: advertising, ubiquity, social 
acceptability (popularity) versus the healthier option of drinking water, easy access, and large 
portion sizes relative to recommended dietary limits on added sugar intake. All SSB vending 
machines and lunchroom and sports-facility soda and fruit-drink fountains should be removed 
below the collegiate level for all public schools.38
                                                 
38 Kersh (2009) proposes this for all “Foods of Minimal Nutritional Value,” “judged unfit for children’s 
consumption in public school cafeterias” as defined by the U.S. government, but not enforced. For reasons similar to 
those motivating my suggestion, Kersh should be endorsed in advocating a ban on all “competitive foods” in 
cafeterias, including but beyond soft-drink vending machines, to include fast-food chain foods, etc. 
 This would mean no SSB vending machines in 
administrative, janitorial, or teacher-only areas. The same is recommended for private schools. A 
desirable stricter version would prohibit student importation of SSB containers (commercial or 
privately filled) to school grounds without express permission (which would also make a black 
market harder to establish, and therefore cheaper to control). Of course any SSB marketing of any 
kind should be prohibited on school property (with the necessary exception of any internet 
content that is unavoidable due to the breadth of the internet audience for the educational or 
research programming being viewed, such as when target audiences include a significant 
collegiate or adult audience). A compromise is conceivable whereby soft-drink manufacturers 
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are involved in anti-soft-drink messages, but the dubious effectiveness of Philip-Morris-
sponsored anti-smoking television ads targeting youth raises concern in addition to the natural 
fox-as-henhouse-guard concern. Regulatory implementation must be sensitive to existing 
business contracts to avoid unnecessary litigation, but effort should be made to achieve in as 
little time as possible a change in the food environment for a place that children are required to 
be. 
For similar reasons, policymakers may consider banning (outdoor) advertisements for 
any SSB within 1000 feet of school grounds, and making it illegal to sell SSBs to minors within 
1000 feet of school grounds on days when school is in session. In the interest of maintaining 
consumer choice, note this recommendation does not prohibit teachers or parents from bringing 
SSBs to be offered during exceptional social events or for their own personal consumption. It 
does not ban convenience stores from selling SSBs at any distance from a school. It would be 
onerous to prohibit school sports patrons from bringing their own SSB containers to sporting 
events at the high school level. No child needs an SSB during any school day or sporting event 
(Harris et al. 2011, p 14, quoting the CDC: “no reason to give a child a [SSB]”). School 
administrations and coaches might be allowed to determine use on practice fields and during 
games, meets, and matches, but this would rely on what is likely inadequate nutrition knowledge 
(failing to match the literature) among these school/team authorities.  
Exceptionally, this proposal set should include non-caloric/diet beverages, to encourage 
the drinking of water and discourage patronization of highly marketed brands. The goal is to 
break patterns that create automaticity of consumption of highly marketed products, this break 
being a key factor in the establishment or recovery of RUMax consumer behavior. Students can 
learn the ‘feed the vending machine and get a fix’ habit somewhere other than school grounds. 
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Sturm et al. (2010) offer findings based on data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal 
Study – Kindergarten Cohort, for children then in fifth grade. They average more than six sodas 
per week, with wide variance, 15% drinking none, 25%  daily, and 10% two or more per day. 
“The average number of soda purchases at school is small. Four-fifths of children buy no soda at 
school, although the remaining children average three soda purchases per school week” (p 1054). 
So this data slice indicates that removing machines from schools is unlikely to lower the utility 
of many, and effectively target the highest users – an efficient policy choice given the primary 
goal. This conclusion would hold less in circumstances perhaps more reflective of older students 
in junior and high school, among whom purchase at school may be more broadly distributed, but 
is no less nutritionally damaging or inconsistent with broader educational objectives of fostering 
responsible behavior. 
Replacing existing primary and secondary school vending machines with fruit (and 
lightly processed nut) vending machines may be an option, but junk-food vending machines are a 
step in the wrong direction. Ideally, a school would provide cups or closeable containers to 
students that could be filled at drinking fountains and would be turned in daily for washing in the 
cafeteria. This would allow the portable hydration the generation has become accustomed to,  
without training SSB use or spending a dollar a bottle for landfill-clogging water bottles. If the 
SSB tax revenues are high enough, they could cover these costs or some portion of them. 
Corporate sponsorship to cover initial costs and some maintenance might be useful.  
The loss of soft-drink company exclusive pouring contracts as a revenue source, where 
such contracts still exist, is a reflection on other revenue problems. A pittance from corporate 
sponsors cannot be an excuse for fostering poor dietary habits in the young generation with 
thrice the obesity rate of its predecessor. The practice is predatory, and should be discontinued. 
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There are obvious advantages for similar biological, psychological, and economic reasons 
to extend many of these proposals to college campuses, but the force of the claim for significant 
marketing restrictions begins to dilute as adult choices are considered. 
 
7.12.4    Re-Squaring the Market Frame: Reducing Marketing and Consumption Cues In 
Spaces With and Without Food Orientations 
The equivalent change of environment at adult workplaces would be to reduce or 
eliminate SSB vending machines and fountains if agreeable to management, or replace them with 
containers of fluids with different properties. These other fluids might include all calorie-free 
options (including un-/flavored  waters), for example, or anything less than a small number of 
calories, say thirty kcals, including low-calorie energy drinks. If this cannot be agreed upon, 
requesting manufacturers to replace existing machines with machines that dispense smaller 
portion sizes for caloric SSBs could prove useful, while maintaining consumer choice. If no 
caloric SSB might be in the vending machine in a container larger than 6 ounces, we might 
expect lower individual health impacts, as well as expecting the manufacturer profit margin per 
sales unit to rise. There is no reason that SSB manufacturers should not make money through 
product reformulation, development, or repackaging as they establish their profitable niche in a 
more health oriented system. The goal is to square the market frame and encourage RUMax 
behavior by individuals, not to eliminate entire markets for manufacturers of legal products. 
Choice should be preserved, albeit slightly altered choices from the ones that helped fuel current 
diet-based disease epidemics (per, e.g., Thaler and Sunstein 2003). 
Legislatively mandated controls on portion sizes in vending machines or for fountain-
dispensed drinks may push boundaries, but may bring advantages if carefully designed and 
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executed. Requesting SSB manufacturers, fast-food, food-court, sports-venue, and 
theater/cinema chain vendors to commit to smaller standard receptacles for SSB drinks might 
prove effective, especially when the excise taxes begin and the public education campaign begins 
to build momentum. 
Michael Bauer, food critic for the San Francisco Chronicle, reports in 2011 that AMC 
Metreon, the second largest cinema chain in the U.S. with over 5000 screens, offered their 
smallest soft drink in 32-ounce cups.39
Americans’ calibration for what an economically and gastronomically fair soda size is 
has been ratcheted up in recent decades, but could be ratcheted back down. While perhaps not 
appealing to those who resist acknowledging the behavioral economic forces of priming, 
anchoring, framing, and other environmental cues, if policy makers federally or in any state 
chose to impose portion-size definitions, then any particular vendor would be protected from 
accusations that they are particularly stingy or unfair. ‘Society’ would have picked sizes that 
begin to counter-cue the dictated market evolution. Leaving aside the volume of ice, if the SSB 
in a small cup totals 6 ounces, in a medium 10 ounces, in a large 16 ounces, in a supersize 24 
ounces, and in a giant 32 ounces, then after an initial round of disgruntlement people would 
recalibrate their expectations down (and likely lose weight in the process).  
 This is four times the average sCSD serving size in the 
1950s. By an account from former Coca-Cola CEO Donald Keough, Coca-Cola finally relented 
to any change in its standard 6.5-oz. bottle size in 1955, when it allowed “king-sized” 10-oz. and 
12-oz packages to be created, along with a “family-sized” 26-ouncer (Keough 2008). College 
students today think nothing of downing a 20-ounce bottle, because it is no longer double the 
king size, but a dwarf to the family two-liter bottle.  
                                                 
39 Michael, Bauer, April 07, 2011, “When did a ‘small’ soft drink become 32 ounces?,”  
http://insidescoopsf.sfgate.com/blog/2011/04/07/when-did-a-small-soft-drink-become-32-ounces/, accessed 30 
April, 2012. 
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This is not wishful thinking, this follows psychological and behavioral economic 
evidence of consumer adaptation to marketing cues. A true society-wide standard would hold for 
all restaurants, not just fast-food and food-court places. Many fountain soft-drink vendors offer 
free refills, in which case sale might even be capped at a large. Of course there would be no limit 
on the number of large cups one might purchase. With no possible knowledge of proposals 
drafted many months earlier in this essay, in September 2012, spurred by Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg, the New York City Board of Health approved a ban on SSB containers for fountain 
drinks larger than 16 ounces, to take effect in the spring of 2013 (Grynbaum, NYT, 2012).  
An excise tax incrementally larger for larger containers is possible, but while medically 
defensible, is unlikely to find support because it grates against the learned expectation of volume 
discounts. Legislating that machines not take cards or paper money, or coins other than pennies 
or nickels, would send a clear market-environment message by breaking convenience, forcing 
awareness and discouragement of high-volume drinking in exact accordance with elemental 
mechanisms and the primary goal. Chandon and Wansink (2002) suggest the repackaging of 
products in inconvenient-sized portions. Mandating a 25-to-50-cent container-deposit fee on all 
pre-packaged SSBs, while imposing 4- or 6-ounce container size limits would remove 
convenience while disincentivizing more littering as some people might begin drinking multiple 
containers at a time. But as with the ‘small coins’ idea, this would be unlikely to find support, 
because it would be perceived as punitively annoying. Neither option would limit consumer 
choice however, only disrupt convenience in a way that may provoke deliberative thinking about 
the choice. 
As with any excise tax large enough to notice, any of these devices that make consumers 
aware that policy has targeted SSBs would serve a useful role, and anything that reminds 
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someone over and over opens the opportunity to break habitual modes of consumption, and 
allow for the introduction of more healthful habits, consistent with findings in behavioral 
economics and social psychology. 
The libertarian paternalism that Thaler and Sunstein espouse to preserve choice while 
also unskewing the market frame (to use my phrasing), moves default options so that 
sophisticated marketing techniques built by decades of marketing research are less capable of 
exploiting basic biological triggers. Empirical behavioral economics has demonstrated that 
sophisticated marketing will almost certainly trigger automatic behaviors unless consumer 
awareness is specifically evoked, or heuristics are specifically changed.  “…[C]ognitive factors 
such as price and health information might be less effective than policies that employ 
sophisticated marketing techniques to combat obesity. These techniques could help individuals 
by creating contexts that encourage healthier decisions” Just and Payne (2009, S53). Just and 
Payne (2009) give the examples of the all-you-can-eat sunk-cost fallacy, wherein people eat 
more when they pay more; of how paying with cash seems to make people more aware of trade-
offs than paying with credit;40
Just and Payne (2009) note that companies and consumers might benefit from lifting the 
ban on packaging claims that discourage overeating: “…policies that address lower order 
 and of people buying more unhealthful foods when given a debit 
card where half the money can only be spent on “green dot” foods designated as “healthful,” 
versus just giving them the same amount (as both halves) in cash. They suggest that while debit 
cards are commonly used in school cafeterias as a convenience, they may promote overeating by 
separating a person’s monetary involvement in the decision from the food choice. Just and Payne 
suggest an advantage to using restricted debit cards that cannot be used for unhealthful foods 
(like SSBs) as a way to correct for unhealthful food environments (S52-3). 
                                                 
40 Or paying with a voucher card or proxy money, a method exploited by Disney World™. 
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behaviors of the consumer may be effective in creating both greater profits for the marketer and 
better health outcomes for the consumer” (p S53). “Behavioral economic principals (sic) suggest 
that…policies could encourage healthier eating without abridging the choices available to the 
individual or reducing the profit opportunity of the food manufacturer” (p S54).  Food-
environment reconstruction could, based on numerous empirical studies, prove very effective in 
changing choices (and possibly also habits). But it is likely that interventions need to be 
voluntary, because legislation dictating payment types and rules for displaying foods 
commercially would be onerous and very restrictive. 
 
7.12.5    Re-Squaring the Market Frame Using Information: Nutrition Labeling Addenda 
Package labeling falls into this same category of changing the market(ing) environment. 
Front-of-package “traffic-light” labeling of certain nutritional properties is welcome. Mandating 
an additional line on nutrition labels that defines “added sugars” versus naturally occurring 
ones would be an important step forward for all foods with nutrition labels. On the same line 
there may be room for a percentage comparison of that product’s added sugar content in grams 
versus all discretionary calories available for a 2,000-calorie-a-day diet (the existing label 
standard). This would be a welcome bonus to the added sugars line, and begin to better define 
medically-recommended limits as a form of consumer education. 
Assuming there is progress by the Interagency Working Group to categorize foods by 
levels of healthfulness, there may soon be an agreed-upon standard. Say this standard ranks 
foods from 0 to 100, which will save me the trouble of speculating with negatives. Then for 
example a 20-ounce sCSD would be a 0, dry popcorn a 30 (fiber with slightly complex carbs), 
and a serving of steamed kale would be 100 (micronutrient- and fiber-rich, protein, complex 
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carbohydrates, no added fats or sugars). Then by some agreed-upon standard, no sCSD would 
rank above a 20, and probably not even above a 5, even with the addition of vitamins, as some 
manufacturers have played with. (I am assuming a responsible attempt at a scale will factor in 
the bioavailability of added vitamins as eaten in the product, which would cut the nutrition 
profile of many kids’ cereals substantially, as it would for “vitamin-enhanced” caloric sodas.)  
For SSBs particularly, but perhaps extending to any very-high-energy-low-micronutrient 
food  (scoring, for example, below a 15 on this hypothetical scale41
This label would serve the exact purpose that the warning label on cigarettes does – as a 
constant presence that potentially or actively reminds the user that consuming this product 
regularly and in large quantities is correlated with poor health outcomes. This may present 
precisely the awareness vector needed to allow people to recognize then choose their 
consumption behavior rather than allowing marketing, socialization, and habit to choose for 
), an FDA warning label 
should be displayed adjacent to but outside the rectangular plane of the nutrition label. This 
warning label should be in explicit contrast color to the manufacturer’s packaging and the 
nutrition label (with the color for each package chosen by the FDA based on maximum contrast 
for psychological notice), but mandated as with current nutrition labels to be printed as part of 
the factory-printed label (not affixed post production). The wording on the label would be 
determined by the U.S. surgeon general or an equally august panel, and parallel the tobacco 
warning in medically sound content. For a bottle or can of calorically sweetened soda, for 
example, a warning label reading: “HIGH LEVELS OF CONSUMPTION OF THIS PRODUCT OR ITS 
PRIMARY SWEETENER HAS BEEN CLINICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH OVERWEIGHT, OBESITY,  
DIABETES, LIVER DISFUNCTION, HYPERTENSION, CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE, AND SOME 
CANCERS” is not a reach beyond current medical findings.  
                                                 
41 This would include a wide range of highly processed snack foods, across many categories beyond SSBs. 
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them, as behavioral economists, consumer psychologists, social psychologists, and some in the 
medical community have repeatedly verified occurs for unhealthful eating behaviors. 
 
7.12.6    Re-Squaring the Market Frame: Limiting Socially Inefficient and Predatory 
Advertising/Marketing 
The marketing environment may also be changed by restricting the marketing practices 
that SSB firms may use, or by regulating their methods. Zimmerman (2011), who refuted the 
effectiveness of Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro’s (2003) explanation for the rise in U.S. obesity, 
claiming instead that the unprecedented expansion in scope, power, and ubiquity of food 
marketing more strongly correlated with expansion in food consumption, is assertive in his 
prescription: “Only by reigning in or countering marketing power can rationality be restored to 
the dietary choices of Americans” (p 285). 
Television advertising has for decades framed the perception of sCSD products by 
associating their brand with life-affirming, positive, and tender images that have little to do with 
product content and divert attention from risks associated with consuming large volumes of 
liquid candy. Accepting these image associations biases consumers against active RUMax 
choice. It is obvious, fundamental, and recommended in a range of literature that laws allowing 
the tax deduction of advertising/marketing costs for the promotion of high-energy-low-
micronutrient foods should be reversed (per, among others, Chou, Rashad, Grossman 2008; 
Gortmaker et al. 2011). This should apply to SSBs, but extending the reversal to all high-energy-
low-micronutrient foods is common sense given current U.S . health outcomes. Why should a 
government subsidize the marketing of foods that prove unhealthful to its citizens when eaten in 
common amounts, and by no rationale contribute to a healthy diet? (Such junk foods may be 
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marginally included in an overall diet that is healthful on other grounds, but are incapable 
themselves of producing healthful outcomes if a primary food source.) That recommendation is 
baseline, making economic sense to any economist (because the advertisements in question are 
not informative, and the resources used are inefficient from a social standpoint; per Dixit and 
Nelson 1978, for starters).  
With the goal of resetting the market frame for unhealthful foods, there is another policy 
that should be pursued whether or not the rescinding of tax exemption for advertising/marketing 
budgets passes. For every dollar of marketing of such foods (it is easiest to visualize this for 
television advertising expenditures but would extend to internet, and other marketing, including 
giveaways and sponsorships), some matching percentage must be paid into a fund for public 
education to raise consumer’s level of sophistication in how they process sophisticated 
marketing messages, or perhaps into a common fund with SSB tax revenues to pay for nutrition 
and diet-heuristics education. This proposal allows companies to choose their own marketing 
packages and budgets, without government ban or extensive restriction, but at a level closer to 
what would occur if the government had warily protected the market frame from dictated market 
evolution over the past five decades.  
This is where the demographic sub-group targeting that my Essay One methodology 
enables may find the best application. Empirical studies indicated that African-Americans are 
targeted with unhealthful food advertisements on television at a disproportional rate (Henderson 
and Kelly 2005; Tirodkar and Jain 2003; Harris et al. 2011). For groups with high advertising 
responsiveness as identified in my empirical work here, and for groups targeted with unhealthful 
food advertising generally, the matching percentage based on company advertising expenditures 
should rise accordingly. Sports or health-activity-related sponsorships should be matched at a 
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lower rate. Thus if Coca-Cola was paying into the fund at one percent for its banner placements 
at Olympic venues with televised coverage, and two-and-half percent for its actual commercials 
during Olympic broadcasts, it might match into the fund at 5% for advertising on television 
programs with primarily African-American or Hispanic viewership. (These example percentages 
might just as easily be doubled, to ensure firms get the message. Similarly they could be phased 
in, or used as penalties for abuses of other regulations.)  
Rather than relying on the effectiveness of voluntary advertising restrictions by certain 
sCSD manufacturers, which was clearly undermined by Coca-Cola product placement on 
American Idol, the higher-level matching percentage for marketing on programs with child 
viewership can be determined by Nielsen estimates of child viewership for shows. Naturally, the 
FTC and Federal Communications Commission would work with the Internal Revenue Service 
to determine a grid so that percentage contributions remain fair and efficient across firms, in 
accordance with this social initiative to reduce marketing to the most targeted and most 
responsive demographic groups. And naturally, the regulation should be codified with treble 
penalties for falsifying accounting records to mask advertising/marketing budgets. 
If such a system is not adopted, there should be restrictions on gross-rating-point 
exposure to groups vulnerable to SSB advertising, starting with children under 12, but including 
all children, and the most advertising responsive lower-education, lower-income, and minority 
demographic groups. 
If any of these policies should change the marketing environment in a way that SSB firms 
no longer make large television buys, the companies may have to rely on their century of brand 
image creation, some of the most recognized logos on earth, and the available panoply of other 
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marketing devices to eke out a profit.42 That said, in the interest of public health, product 
placement in movies or television shows should be prohibited for products that have unarguably 
low (say, less than 10 on a 100 scale, as SSBs would be) standardized nutrition scores, once a 
responsible standard has been set.43
A third separate policy that could exist in conjunction with ending tax deductibility for 
marketing and a marketing-budget percentage-matching fund mandate is a requirement to 
include health disclaimers (similar to the warning label idea above, and as applied to 
advertisements for tobacco and prescription drugs) as part of all SSB broadcast advertisements, 
with a print equivalent as well. In France, television, radio, billboard, and internet advertisements 
for processed, sweetened, or salted foods must include government-written health messages, and 
companies refusing to comply “may be fined 1.5% of their advertising budget for that particular 
campaign, with funds earmarked for the National Institute for Health Education” (Pomeranz et 
al. 2009, p 191). For the U.S., at least in the first years of the campaign, government health 
warnings may apply only to advertisements for high-energy-low-micronutrient foods such as 
 A prohibition on the use of successful sports figures to 
market products with similarly low interagency-standardized nutrition scores would be welcome, 
as this practice certainly sends the inappropriate message linking sports performance with sugar 
water (Coke®, Mountain Dew®, Sprite®, Gatorade®, sugary energy drinks, etc.). Professional or 
Olympic athletes burning 4000 or more calories per day can drink a 20-ounce SSB with less 
chance of harm than any teenager or weekend warrior.  
                                                 
42 “Earlier this year, the Company also announced its 50th consecutive annual dividend increase, raising the 
quarterly dividend 8.5 percent….” Muhtar Kent, Chairman and CEO of The Coca-Cola Company: “Our system’s 
2020 Vision to double our revenues over this decade provides a clear roadmap….” “Coca-Cola Board Recommends 
2-for-1 Stock Split,” April 25, 2012;  
http://www.beverageworld.com/articles/full/15017/coca-cola-board-recommends-2-for-1-stock-split, accessed 30 
April, 2012. 
43 “Responsible” means determined by science, and less politically influenced than Nestlé (2002) describes the 
USDA Dietary Guidelines process to be. For example, candy is not “healthier” (higher ranked) because it is low salt 
and low fat. 
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SSBs and sweet (or very high fat) junk foods. This would leave non-caloric and low-caloric 
beverages off the list, at least until empirical studies of the first wave have been done. The U.S. 
may never go so far as to attach warnings to all processed foods. As with advertising budget 
matching percentages, codification of treble penalties against the ad buy cost for failing to 
provide a government-approved or -generated disclaimer should lead to pattern self-compliance. 
Of course product reformulation and the advertising of non-caloric lines within the brand 
would limit SSB manufacturers’ economic exposure to new regulations. For the largest 
manufacturers with more than a certain number of product lines, regulators might consider a 
system similar to the fleet-wide mileage standards for Detroit automobile manufacturers, where 
there must be a minimum nutrition rating average for the volume the manufacturer sells across 
all its product lines. This would serve to reduce high-energy-low-micronutrient products within 
manufacturer product sales, and directly reduce potential negative health impacts. 
 
7.12.7    Re-Squaring the Market Frame: Raising Awareness and Consumer Sophistication 
Through Public Education 
The public responsibility to re-square the SSB market frame from its current state of 
dictated evolution includes new taxes and regulations on industry, but also includes new 
incentives for individuals, incentives that begin to correct the underprovision of public goods: 
nutrition knowledge and knowledge enabling consumers to develop sophistication in their 
processing of sophisticated marketing messages and manipulations of the market frame. Simple 
cognition of elements driving desire, purchase, consumption incident, and consumption amount 
is an important starting point, and some of the policies directed to the industry side will help 
raise awareness among consumers, including excise taxes, product labeling, restriction on sale in 
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schools, and health disclaimers on advertisements. Lessons and prescriptions from social 
psychology and behavioral economics will prove critical in designing effective messages to help 
individuals break unhealthful consumption habits and heuristics, and establish and engrain habits 
and heuristics likely to yield more healthful outcomes. Just and Payne 2009 warn that policy 
recommendations based on rational or cognitive approaches have resulted only in modest 
leveling off of overweight and obesity rates: “Significant improvements in reducing obesity and 
overweight may come from approaches that account not only for rational consumers but also 
consumers whose decision making is based on heuristics. … The heuristic component of food 
decision making suggests that behavioral economics can inform not only the obesity epidemic 
but also food policy created to fight it” (p S48). 
There is every reason to believe that a well-designed broad and sustained campaign will 
be successful in greatly improving American dietary health. When the anti-saturated-fat message 
of the late 1970s proliferated, people adopted, adapted, and products were reformulated. While 
much of this anti-saturated fat push is now understood to have been predicated on faulty 
demonization of dietary fats, and drove people further down the dangerous path of excessive 
consumption of refined carbohydrates, the fact that a fairly uniform message began in the 
medical community and replicated across all media to establish a new understanding of basic 
markers of healthful diet does set an encouraging precedent for the positive public reception of 
diet-change messages.44
                                                 
44 FLATOW: So you think then that sugar, not fat, is to blame for the obesity epidemic? 
  
LUSTIG: Look, we've had a reduction in percent consumption of fat from 40 to 30 percent over the past 30 years. 
And in the process, our obesity and metabolic syndrome prevalence has gone through the absolute roof. Now, in 
1977, the McGovern commission Dietary Guidelines for Americans basically told us that we needed to reduce our 
consumption of fat. The question is: Where did that come from? Where did that directive come from? Very simple, 
in the early 1970s, we learned about this thing in our blood called LDL, low-density lipoproteins. 
    In the mid-1970s, we learned that dietary fat raised our LDL, which is true. And we also then learned in the late 
1970s that LDL levels in populations correlated with cardiovascular disease. So the thought was if dietary fat raises 
your LDL and LDL raises your risk for cardiovascular disease, let's get rid of dietary fat, therefore cardiovascular 
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The public service announcements (PSAs) to be funded by taxes on SSBs must fulfill 
multiple objectives for multiple populations across a range of media. Messages could formally be 
delivered in schools and doctor’s offices, but the epidemics discussed here are far too pervasive 
and too well-rooted in populations beyond school age to wait for a generation to grow into the 
new messages. Furthermore, with school curricula and budgets already stretched thin, mandating 
a semester of nutrition classes for every student is unlikely to get off the ground, no matter how 
many billions of dollars in social costs have accumulated. There are too many institutional 
barriers for that to be a primary vector for change. This is not to discourage targeted programs or 
the advantages of one-on-one interventions recognized in the literature, but institutionally and 
politically this seems a non-starter, as well as likely being an inefficient use of policy budget, 
requiring as it would an entire additional layer of nationwide institutional support. So while not 
ruling creative and important smaller ventures out, the primary focus here will be on mass media 
and social media messaging. 
                                                                                                                                                             
disease would go down. That was the thought process. And the AHA, the AMA and the USDA all bought into this, 
and that is what was done, and the food industry went along with it. 
    They retooled. They reengineered all their recipes. That's how we got Entenmann's fat-free cakes. That's how we 
got Snackwell's. They're still with us. Bottom line, not only has it not worked, but it's actually made things way 
worse. Now, the question is: Was that logic rational? And I would pose to you that that logic was completely off 
base. Why? Well, number one, dietary fat does raise your LDL - that's true - but there are two LDLs, not one. 
There's one called large buoyant, and there's one called small dense. 
    When you measure your LDL levels in your blood, you measure both at the same time. It turns out the 
large buoyant has nothing to do with cardiovascular disease. They float. They go along inside your blood 
vessels. They're too large to get under the surface of the cells that line the arterial wall. They don't cause 
anything. The small dense ones, though, those are the ones that are driven up by carbohydrate, and they are 
small enough to get under the surface of endothelial cells. 
    They're the ones that start the foam cell process. They're the ones that start atherogenesis, and they're the 
ones that have gone through the roof, because when we took the fat out, the food tasted like cardboard. We had to 
substitute something. We substituted carbohydrate. So, yes, our percent fat went down, and our percent 
carbohydrate went up astronomically, and that drove hyperinsulinemia, drove liver fat, drove all the 
processes I've mentioned before, and that's how we got into this mess. We have to get out of it. 
“Should Sugar Be Regulated Like Alcohol?”; Talk of the Nation, host Ira Flatow, guest Robert Lustig (of Lustig, 
Schmidt, and Brindis of the 2012 Nature article cited in main text); February 17, 2012; Copyright © 2012 
National Public Radio®; bold emphasis added. Last accessed May 6, 2012: 
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/17/147047545/should-sugar-be-regulated-like-alcohol. 
The confusion Lustig refers to about LDL being adversely affected by high fat versus high carbohydrate 
content in diet is evident in Sacks 1994. 
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Research already points to what works. Maio et al. (2007):  
…[T]here is often psychological conflict [/”ambivalence”] between what people desire (e.g., fatty, sweet 
foods) and the need to stay healthy. People’s mixed feelings and beliefs make any public health policy based 
on individual choice more complex [the fatal flaw in neoclassical/neoliberal economic thinking, or the sCSD 
industry’s likely counter-campaign]. … In this context [i.e. with inevitable psychological conflict and 
“ambivalence”], it is unlikely that public information campaigns reminding people to avoid certain foods and 
exercise will suffice. Behavior change programs that simultaneously inform, shift motivation, and provide the 
necessary skills to maintain behavior change are required (p 102, emphasis added). 
Maio et al. carefully stress that effective interventions must use knowledge from existing 
research and conduct pilot studies to effectively “tailor interventions” to meet the needs of those 
who will have difficulty in implementing changes:  
Physiological processes and skills deficits contribute to the grip of certain habitual behaviors, including 
smoking and eating behaviors (p 116).  … 
   …[I]t is imperative that…[the effectiveness of interventions] be examined in small-scale studies that use the 
best measurement devices available, before the messages are used in large-scale campaigns (p 117-8). 
   …[T]ransfer of knowledge from research to practice is foundational to the establishment of evidence-based 
health promotion practice. … 
   …[M]ost health behavior interventions are combinations of many [between 1 and 13] discrete behavior 
change techniques (p 124). 
Commitment to using scientific evidence to determine and verify the effectiveness of the 
messages and to update the message bank will protect against wasteful and ineffective 
messaging, and allow the campaign to work out flaws before becoming a national staple. This 
will involve direct research on the effectiveness of campaign methods and messages to change 
heuristics and dietary habits associated with consumption of at least SSBs. Message research 
should not involve popular construction of messages, as a “critical failing is an overreliance on 
survey data or focus groups to develop the interventions. These methods reveal what people 
think would work and not what actually does work” (p 127, original emphasis). Misapplication of 
these marketing techniques (survey and focus group), would merely reflect existing ignorance  of 
nutrition and the constructed bias toward SSB consumption. The degradation of the social 
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environment in which SSB consumption has tripled and health has eroded is severe enough to 
engender some distrust in the public’s ability to value health and know what it is to be healthy: 
People tend to consider abstract values, such as equality, freedom, pleasure, and family, to be very important, 
while having difficulty describing reasons for why they are important (…). People’s values are based more 
on learned feelings than on reasoned arguments (…). As a result, people’s behavior often fails to live up 
to their values in situations that make it tempting not to fulfill the value (…). … In the context of healthy 
lifestyle change, this evidence is interesting because the news media have recently noted a lack of 
understanding of what it means to be healthy (…). If the value of health lacks cognitive support for most 
people in the same way as other basic values, then people’s ability to resist temptation and perform 
healthy behaviors may be improved by the provision of interventions that stimulate thinking about 
health and health-related values (p 123; italics original emphasis, bold added emphasis; embedded citations 
omitted, marked with “(…)”). 
One can easily anticipate how industry and anti-intervention politicians will frame their 
arguments against policies proposed to correct failures in the SSB market: they will call to 
abstract values to evoke feelings that trump reasoned arguments. Zimmerman (2011) notes that 
the “Center for Consumer Freedom, a trade group for soda and chain restaurants, has been 
quoted as saying, ‘people should prevent obesity by getting regular exercise’” (p 298). As has 
already been established quite clearly in the literature the overweight and obesity problem comes 
from too many calories, and particularly added sugars and other refined carbohydrates. But the 
industry is not concerned with empirical facts on the origins of American obesity, because the 
evidence impugns them. Their concern is too call upon the failure of personal responsibility, 
which protects their image, their brand, and their bottom line. 
Despite the above indications of how much public ground and social value needs to be 
reclaimed to create a health-conducive marketing and food environment, there may be some 
‘shovel ready’ PSA message elements, and the campaign can proceed without years of repetitive 
study and spurious fine tuning, while still managing efficacious targeting.  
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The PSAs will have to make consumers aware of the market frame in which they decide, 
make consumers aware of their own choices and how they make them (help expose their usually 
tacit food-choice heuristics), help consumers to break unhealthful dietary habits, suggest new 
food-choice heuristics and dietary habits, and build deeper nutrition understanding over time. 
This will require dozens and dozens of different approaches, many targeting only one of this list 
of objectives, some targeting multiple objectives, but all interweaving in effect, over at least a 
decade. As stated earlier, current health epidemics have been decades in the making, and given 
the acculturation and poor food-choice heuristics developed over these decades amidst a sea of 
nutritionally-poor hyper-marketed products, the Level 1 problems will take a long time to 
correct. People need to understand what the problem is in their own behavior in their own 
kitchens, admit that part of the problem is under their control, know that regardless of past 
mistakes they can change, and know that the information techniques and skills they will need to 
do this can be acquired without exceptional initiative or stressful effort (Maio et al. 45
…[H]ealthy choices are often made in environments that require psychological effort to combat temptation 
(…). Freedom of choice makes it more difficult to resist temptation (…), and diversity of choice may have a 
similar effect (…). Other research indicates that stress (…) and habit formation also impede the ability 
to resist temptation (…), and this impediment is also evident for healthy eating behavior in particular. … 
).  
   [O]ur emphasis is on the idea that the person and environment interact to determine behavior and behavior 
change(…). …[O]ur review reveals useful principles that could be used to complement existing health 
                                                 
45 Maio et al. refer to the theory of planned behavior, which identifies how behavior is influenced, and how it can by 
design be changed. The theory is: “supported by an impressive body of empirical evidence…and has proven 
particularly useful in guiding the development of effective health messages” (p 106). This theory predicts human 
behavior is guided by: 1) behavioral beliefs (likely consequences of own behavior); 2) normative beliefs (what the 
expectations of others are); and 3) control beliefs (the individual’s belief that they have some control over 
outcomes).  By these same three behavioral guides, I believe the exogenous literature cited in this and in Essay Two 
identify SSB marketing and ubiquity, low levels of effective nutrition education, and an implicit ceding of dietary 
control to naïvely formed heuristics and habits to be the primary behavioral motivators of the current 
overconsumption problem and attendant poor health outcomes.   
     “…[E]vidence suggests that successful interventions have their effects on behavior because of their impact on 
these theory-specific cognitions. …[C]ognitive changes mediate the effects of interventions on behavior” (p 107). It 
is for this reason that economic signals including taxes and labeling and removal of SSBs from schools signal a 
change in other’s expectations, that PSAs must make consequences clearer and encourage self-reflection on dietary 
patterns, and must support the belief that change is achievable and under the individual’s control. 
678 
 
promotion campaigns and social marketing approaches (e.g., using market segmentation to target messages) 
to increase lifestyle change. …[M]ost of the problems [with our approach] arise primarily in the campaigns 
that are not at all informed by relevant theory and evidence (…). When armed with the relevant theory and 
evidence, public information and social marketing campaigns aimed at lifestyle change should be quite 
successful  (Maio et al. 2007, p 103-4; original emphasis in italics, added emphasis in bold; embedded 
citations omitted and noted by “(…)”). 
Attempting to achieve many campaign goals, some simultaneously, will not be done 
quickly or on a low budget or using antiquated marketing techniques without diminishing the 
prospects for success in helping individuals change eating behaviors. Remember from Essay 
Two that research demonstrates that food choices are influenced by “implicit measures” beyond 
those that a person consciously attaches to choice and self reports. These Maio et al. refer to as 
“automatic attitudes”: “ …it is vital that interventions manage to influence the automatic 
associations tapped by the implicit measures and not just the conscious attitudes obtained by self-
report measures. This change in the automatic associations may require repeated and creative 
interventions to change attitudes—even a single powerful message may not be enough” (p 116, 
embedded citation dropped).  
 
7.12.7.a    Funding Options for Media Education Campaign 
If some $20 billion per year is generated by the SSB tax and advertising budget matching 
(possibly a low estimate), this should enable a media spread with enough frequency and 
penetration to achieve target messaging for a broad range of demographic groups. The ubiquity 
of SSB marketing must be matched or even temporarily surpassed to change consumers’ 
normative beliefs about SSB consumption. One should become surprised if one of these PSAs is 
not seen or heard in an average media consumption day.  
The excise tax appears to be the most efficient way to fund the campaign to reduce SSB 
consumption, as it directly changes the incentives for users, scaled to level of use, and directly 
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matches the source of the problem to the solution. To an extent the campaign may be expected to 
change behaviors that will affect diet behaviors related to all high-energy low-micronutrient 
foods, and would be funded by the highest-energy, lowest-micronutrient category (SSBs). The 
efficiency is implicit. If the excise tax on SSBs does not materialize due to industry resistance (or 
the U.S. Congress’s resistance to economic arguments), the PSAs should receive billions from 
the general fund, due to the economic efficiency implicit when comparing costs of prevention to 
costs of treatment. 
Discounting the media purchase price for this spectrum of PSAs could be made a 
contingency of having one’s  FCC television, radio, or internet license renewed. The airwaves 
are public until public bandwidth is licensed to private parties, so it seems further restrictions 
could be put on such licensing, just as there are restrictions on the use of U.S. government land 
for grazing. Such a contingency would greatly extend the capacity of annual PSA campaign 
budgets46. The Partnership for a Drug-Free America successfully leveraged pro-bono donations 
by advertising agencies, and it is claimed, the value of $1 million per day for a decade by 
broadcasters, for airing anti-drug-use television advertisements: “Thanks to the Partnership's 
high-powered connections and unabashed arm-twisting, TV networks, newspapers, magazines 
and other media outlets have donated more than $2 billion in free space and time to ensure that 
the messages are seen.”47
 
 There is a critical difference in garnering support for a campaign to 
thwart overuse of legal products, unless Lustig Schmidt and Brindis’s claim that sugar is toxic 
begins to gain serious traction.  
 
                                                 
46 And perhaps set a precedent for the use of airwaves for publicly-funded campaign financing. 
47 “Can You Just Say No? Pamela Warrick, Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1996. http://articles.latimes.com/1996-
08-30/news/ls-38870_1_drug-user, accessed May 04, 2012. 
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7.12.7.b    New Media and the Construction of Effective Message Content 
The Partnership for a Drug-Free America success demonstrates that  creative solutions to 
expensive PSA message dispersal are possible. For example, smart phone texting campaigns and 
interactive mobile-phone “apps” could re-enforce or even develop basic messages to target 
groups for infinitesimally less cost than the national television PSA campaign budget. 
The PSAs will have to be constructed, worded, and tested for effectiveness in achieving 
the specific goals of breaking old habits and food-decision heuristics and creating new ones, of 
breaking passivity to marketing messages for highly processed foods, and training critical 
consumption of marketing messages. With the goal of recovering the health of a majority of the 
nation’s citizens, the simplistic “Just Say ‘No’ to Drugs” PSAs laughed off by many youth in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s will provide some if little instruction.48
The sophistication of the new PSAs must rival that of the best marketing agencies, 
because these agencies have been the fonts of the marketing campaigns that have helped bend 
the junk-food market frame for decades. Zimmerman (2011): “…the number one rule of 
marketing…is to have a single, consistent message that is hammered home in many different 
media and modes” (p 299). Coke Adds Life®, Be a Pepper®, Do the Dew®, Obey Your Thirst® – 
these are all very successful, curt market-differentiating phrases that plant a suggestion, often 
with a jingle to help remember the heuristic, to influence purchase and consumption behavior. 
These trademarked slogans are offered as consumption heuristics and reinforced over years: 
  
                                                 
48 The “Just say ‘No’” campaign was successful by some measures, and unsuccessful by others, both perhaps rooted 
in the simplicity of the message. The campaign seems to have been particularly effective in discouraging marijuana 
use among high-schoolers (http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/infofacts/high-school-youth-trends; accessed 03 
May, 2012). The slogan partially succeeded and partially failed to establish effective implementation intentions 
(defined in coming paragraphs) or effective re-tooling of decision heuristics. In fairness the campaign preceded the 
great body of empirical work by psychologists such as Loewenstein and co-authors, and Baumeister and co-authors, 
by behavioral economists who have studied food-choice heuristics (including Wansink and co-authors), and by 
social psychologists who have extensively studied how habits are formed and changed, including Verplanken and 
co-authors. Most of this work was published after the Reagan Administration campaign began. A level of campaign 
sophistication driven by scientific evidence is now possible that was likely unachievable in the 1980s or 1990s. 
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“…marketers need to provide short, simple, and often repeated health messages to have any 
sustained effect on purchasing behavior” (Just and Payne 2009, p S49). PSAs to help consumers 
reconstruct a decision-making style that fostered health before the barrage of beverage bumper-
sticker slogans would be no different. PSAs must establish counter-cues to this type of heuristic, 
and plant new ones conducive to health creation. Behavioral economics and social psychology 
have contributed much scientific literature relevant to how to frame effective educational 
messages to change decision behaviors. This literature must be consulted and checked in an 
iterative design process. 
Social psychologists Verplanken and Faes (1999), in “Good Intentions, Bad Habits, and 
Effects of Forming Implementation Intentions on Healthy Eating,” speak of conscientiously 
forming implementation intentions in advance of decisions as an effective method for changing 
complex eating behaviors. “Implementation intentions are specific, “if-then” plans of action that 
specify where, when, and how behavior is to be executed in order to accomplish a particular 
goal. … Evidence indicates that opportunities to act that are specified in implementation 
intentions do not easily escape people’s attention, even when people are busy with other 
ongoing tasks” (p 111-2). 
Maio et al. (2007) draw on this concept in recommending a fifty-year plan to manage 
obesity in Britain. They address the gap between intentions and actual behavior, noting that for 
health behaviors in particular, people enact their intentions only 53% of the time: “In other 
words, although the motivation to change is a prerequisite to behavior change, it is far from 
sufficient” (p 110). A primary reason for this, they draw from empirical studies, is that “physical 
environments and social contexts are liable to activate thoughts and feelings that can undermine 
progress toward one’s goals,” and one fails to start the new behavior, or “gets derailed” (p 110). 
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The taxes, labeling and PSAs proposed here all seek to change the marketing/food environment 
(in the spirit of libertarian paternalist change toward optimal defaults) so that individuals can 
enact their implementation intentions with less drag. 
Thus if PSAs or other policy interventions can convince people to define implementation 
intentions for themselves, perhaps by suggested phrasing of new inner-voice food-choice 
heuristics, they may prove effective even when people are choosing to eat while watching 
television or driving (secondary eating behaviors), or shopping for food while on their cell 
phones.  
Without the ability or need to specifically define campaign-message language here, I 
anticipate that certain methods prove promising. Successful educational jingles were achieved in 
the 1970s with SchoolHouse Rock pieces (PSAs) threaded between Saturday-morning children’s 
programming on the American Broadcast Company national television network. A similar or 
more grown-up version of SchoolHouse Rock educational-jingle-PSAs, or both, could help 
inform people why to break certain dietary habits and how to form new ones. 
Social psychologists and behavioral economists ultimately must determine the best 
wording to achieve different objectives in different populations, but one may imagine messages 
planting such new suggested heuristics as: “I will not drink more than 30 ounces of soda in a 
week”; or “I’ve already had a 20-ounce bottle of soda this week, do I really need another one?”; 
or “How about an apple and a square of chocolate instead of my usual soda?”; or “That hit the 
spot, but I don’t need to finish the bottle. It’ll still be good in a few days.” Zimmerman (2011) 
recommends hammering home the message: “Processed snacks and sugary beverages cause 
obesity” (p 299).  
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Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood (2009) draw from a range of empirical studies, concluding 
that “active inhibition over established eating patterns” is in part dependent on fluctuating levels 
of self-control:  
…[B]ehavior change interventions…can break habits by disrupting the processes that trigger them…. 
   …[V]igilant monitoring…inhibits acting on the habitual response when it is activated in memory. … 
…[P]eople taught to use this strategy were able to inhibit unwanted habits during an experimental task. 
   Because vigilant monitoring involves active inhibition over established eating patterns, its long-term use 
might have a number of counterproductive effects…it is unclear whether people can sustain effortful 
inhibitory efforts in daily life… (p S14). 
Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood expect that people trained to “vigilantly monitor” their 
environment and thinking about healthful eating will have the best effect only when combining 
this vigilance with new habits, and with changes to (marketing and) food environments to 
establish defaults less likely to trigger old habits (p S14). In this context, the desire to exercise 
specific new habits may be called implementation intentions. 
Building active nutrition knowledge will likely prove more challenging than suggesting 
heuristics and implementation intentions. But the payoff can build over time. If people eat 
balanced meals high in protein, fiber, nutrients, and fat, their blood sugar is less likely to flag and 
induce the ego depletion that Baumeister (and various co-authors across multiple articles), 
identify. The reflexive need to patch over these ego-depletion times with SSBs could thus be 
avoided (or trained away, as Job, Dweck, and Walton indicate is possible). 
There is a creative way to present nutrition-educational PSAs that may influence 
perceptions at a level basic enough to re-frame expectations and prompt effective 
implementation intentions. Use actual pictures of plates of food comprised of acceptable 
“ratios” by USDA or WHO dietary guidelines for a daily diet, contrasted with concrete images 
of discretionary calories allowed outside that meal. PSAs could show one of a set of three plated 
combinations meeting children’s, young adults’, women’s, or men’s nutritional requirements for 
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a day. For any combination, there would also be a demonstration of  some food meeting exactly 
the daily discretionary calories given the diet displayed. Thus “this much soda or that half of a 
candy bar is OK for this balance of protein veggies fruit and grain, for the whole day.” 
Obviously, some options would be displayed with and without meat, with and without 
milk, etc. For example: breakfast lunch and dinner, emphasized with no processed foods, 
balanced by half of a nougat-loaded candy bar as discretionary sugar and fat for the whole day. 
Use of actual photographs of actual quantities that meet and do not exceed USDA recommended 
limits by explained age, sex, and activity level would place accurate nutritional images in the 
mind in a way that cartoonish pyramids and textbook numeric tables cannot.  
There is no reason such PSAs could not be creatively shot and edited so that they were 
actually attention-grabbing and memorable, especially if explicitly contrasted with what some 
people actually eat, which is known from dietary recall surveys.  
Current diet-based threats to long-term health will not be rid simply by pointing out the 
danger. Once again citing copious empirical evidence, Maio et al. (2007) explain that “messages 
designed to arouse fear…lead people to deny the threat.” Important threats historically have been 
effectively addressed however, as happened when the U.S. deglamorized smoking in the mid-
1960s, and with anti-HIV interventions two decades later (p 105). Poorly designed and untested 
messages can backfire. Simple messages that do not conform with theory and evidence fail for 
recognized reasons, just as successful messages succeed by conforming with scientific evidence. 
Changing the marketing and food environments are critical to establishing the space for 
individual intentions to manifest without reversion: 
…[T]he broader theories that we have described retain a high level of empirical support. … …[R]ather than 
telling people what they should do and how to do it, campaigns should encourage more reflection on the part 
of individuals. 
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   Such an approach might succeed in promoting healthier values, attitudes, and behaviors over the long term, 
but this approach must also be maintained until there are matching changes in the environment. This assertion 
is consistent with evidence regarding eating behaviors in particular: ‘Attempts to halt the weight increases 
merely by imploring people to be more prudent in their food consumption or more physically active, without 
modifying the environment that facilitates positive energy balance behaviors, are likely to have little impact’ 
(…). Across behavior change domains, it is clear that failures to change the environment cause cues to 
older, habitual behavior to reassert themselves over time. As a result, behavior reverts to past tendencies 
(p 126; emphasis added; embedded citations omitted, marked by “(…)”). 
The form of marketing environment and food environment changes, as well as the form of  
information/education PSA messages will prove critical. All must be done, and all must employ 
lessons from existing and updated empirical results in their design, as indicated by studies, and 
authors cited here. Failures exist, generally due to restricted scope, or design that does not 
respect evidence from social psychology experiments, and now behavioral economic 
experiments, among others.49
To evaluate policy efficacy over time it is important to define policy benchmarks for 
success, and to gather data and evaluate program effectiveness. Policy makers may define 
success in many ways. Perhaps success would be moving the U.S. from world #1 in obesity and 
heart disease rates to out of the top ten in under a decade, or perhaps would involve achieving 
average weights from the mid-1970s in half the time it took for the average to reach current 
levels, or perhaps bringing the incidence of Type 2 diabetes back to 1985 levels. 
  
If it proves possible to avoid bureaucratic determination of program objectives rather than 
scientific ones, as Marion Nestlé (2002) laments occurred in USDA Dietary Guideline 
construction, that would prove useful, streamlining efforts and saving hundreds of millions of 
                                                 
49 Harris et al. 2011 write as if education fails as an option, citing only a 2007 Science Daily article, “Diet education 
had no long term impact on childhood obesity.” Old standards for how to teach nutrition and diet will not be 
adequate given the media diet of children today, and certainly not without changes in food environments. Block et 
al. 2010 call the posting of a few signs in a cafeteria “education,” and find that education has “no statistically 
independent effect on sales” (p 1429). Again, this method does not begin to meet the definition of “education” as 
proposed here. 
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dollars in false starts, backpedaling, and ineffective messaging. Former Food and Drug 
Administration commissioner David Kessler, in a 2001 book,50
 
 discusses how the Office of 
Management and Budget repeatedly funneled pressure from the White House as it bowed to 
pressure from the beef industry to change wording of a final FDA rule, where in many drafts the 
OMB’s recommended wording sometimes exactly matched what industry had proposed, a 
perspective the FDA had “already carefully considered.” The U.S. government bowing to sugar 
industry pressure attacked a WHO report recommending limited use of added sugars, even 
threatening U.S. funding of the WHO itself (Brownell and Warner 2009, p 274).  
7.13    Problems Associated with Achieving and Executing Effective Policies to Improve 
American Health Outcomes 
There are documented historical reasons to expect that the SSB-tax-funded-PSA idea will 
prove politically difficult to implement, reasons including but not restricted to bureaucracy, 
conflicting opinions (Nestlé 2002), and commodity industry battles. Beyond Nestlé’s careful 
documentation of frustrations with the U.S.-Dietary-Guidelines sausage factory,  there were the 
blue-ribbon panels under President Johnson that included academics and industry executives, in 
which there was strong disagreement on what anti-hunger and grocery industry structure goals 
were or how to achieve them. 
Short of statutory action, a simple declaration of the U.S. Congress’s intent to “address 
complicated obesity issues” could not make it to the floor in either house in the 110th Congress 
(2007 – 2009; Kersh 2009; p 303). Kersh also points to U.S. Congresses in the 1960s and ‘70s 
waging a decade-long fight including several legal battles, finally settling on the U.S. Secretary 
                                                 
50 Kessler, D.A. 2001. A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle with a Deadly Industry.  New York: Public 
Affairs, p 58; cited in Brownell and Warner 2009, p 274. 
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of Agriculture drawing a (shortened) list of  Foods of Minimal Nutritional Value (FMNV), 
“judged unfit for children’s consumption in school cafeterias,” including soft drinks, water ices, 
chewing gum, and “certain candies.” Kersh explains the list is still unchanged and technically in 
place since 1980, but unenforced. Kersh advocates the prohibition of all national brand-
competitive foods in school cafeterias (p 308, including quoted words). Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 
(2008) point to a successful legal challenge from a 1983 National Soft Drink Association 
lawsuit, in which the court ruled that the Secretary had no authority to put time-and-place 
restrictions on sales of competitive foods. This authority could be specifically granted the 
Secretary by Congress, but has not been passed. 
The general inability to recognize the extent of Level 1 compromises of RUMax behavior 
and market frame as causing many failures in SSB markets allows Level 2 approaches and 
simple neoclassical theory to dominate the minds of academics, politicians, bureaucrats, 
activists, and the general public, all of whom may to varying degrees influence policy debates. 
Without agreed-upon science, political solutions are more likely to involve compromises of 
political origin, rather than cleaving closely to what is necessary to correct market failures. “‘It’s 
too complicated…there’s insufficient scientific proof’ is a familiar shibboleth of opponents of 
legislative reform…,” notes Kersh (2009, p 311), but this argument can no longer apply to diet 
vectors of pure added sugars for any academic reason, only commercial ones. 
The science is clear that various aspects of SSB marketing in addition to the ubiquity and 
cultural acceptance of SSBs tends to exploit psychological and even biological tendencies to 
overconsume SSBs as they currently present as consumption choices. Government intervention 
is not an intrusion on personal decision making, but an attempt to provide an underprovided 
public good, to re-square a skewed market frame, and enable consumers to make choices with a 
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more full information set, using deliberative rather than automatic decision criteria. Primary 
obstacles to policies that would improve American health outcomes will draw primarily from 
refusal to understand these truths, as they have been carefully documented in these essays. 
To characterize diet-based health problems as primarily failures of personal responsibility 
has the political advantage of being simple and convenient, but bears the disadvantage that it is 
remiss in ignoring or refuting decades of related empirical results across at least a half-dozen 
academic fields. It is always easier to blame a victim than admit co-responsibility for allowing an 
exploitative environment to evolve, to evoke general principle or emotion rather than to 
empirically identify and acknowledge causal factors.  
The personal responsibility argument requires us to believe that an entire generation 
failed in personal responsibility for eating behaviors for the first time in history, simultaneously, 
and in proportion to the marketing penetration of highly-processed sweetened snack foods. A 
major generational downtrend in the health markers for a country growing in wealth first 
indicates systemic changes to food environment and decision processes (Level 1 factors). To 
argue the alternative, one must claim that nearly 200 million Americans, RUMax in behavior 
almost to a person by this same argument, each alone accurately perceived their environments 
and their personal goals, and nonetheless decided to engage in slow-motion self-destructive 
consumption as part of a long-term utility-maximizing strategy.51
                                                 
51 To be fully explicit, the discussion here is centered on habitual use of sCSDs (or SSBs). Acknowledging that there 
is a degree of automaticity involved in the consumption behavior, a strictly RUMax individual must in the creation 
of the habit or each incidence of soft-drink consumption within the habit: stop their current dominant decision 
process to think about whether to drink an sCSD and exactly how much; devote rational decision-making resources 
to all relevant facts and factors for the current decision, and all of these facts must give an adequate representation of 
reality and the individuals’ future states to avoid a preference reversal later, with no hyperbolic discounting involved 
in the current consumption versus the future health effect, and given all of these things, decide that the high 
probability that the individual is negatively impacting future health is a small price to pay for the utility of 
consumption. The neoclassical economist is bound by consistency of theory to argue that this occurs with sCSD 
consumption, despite the fact that the process involves knowledge people have demonstrated they do not have 
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When this paradox becomes more widely understood, and repeated empirical findings 
from the quasi-exogenous (to economics) literature become as well-known as neoclassical- 
(libertarian-) value platitudes, the folly of the purist “personal responsibility” thesis may be set 
aside in favor of empirically-driven policy. Personal responsibility will always remain a critical 
component of food environments and individual performance. But it will only be the primary 
determinant of eating behavior for informed aware deliberative individuals who are not 
constantly surrounded by intentionally subtle marketing and consumption cues that encourage 
quick emotional decisions to drink what by historical standards are gross portions of added 
sugars. The assumptions about environment and individual decision behaviors that make 
personal responsibility arguments so attractive generally fail to hold in food environments where 
people consume large volumes of SSBs.  
Harris et al. (2009) refer to examples in the U.K. and the U.S. where the personal 
responsibility argument strongly influences legislative debate in ways that would tend to protect 
industries making products that are unhealthful when consumed in even slightly large amounts. 
They point to the irony of the (fast-food) restaurant industry backing personal responsibility 
arguments, while simultaneously fighting efforts to get nutrient information on menus, and using 
“stealth, viral, and guerilla marketing campaigns to conceal marketing intent,” while also 
spending billions marketing high-sugar and low-nutrition foods to children (p 218-9). This 
undermines the moral legitimacy of the industry’s “value-driven” stand for individual rights. 
Harris et al. go on to describe the U.S. Supreme Court’s test to determine whether a 
commercial actor’s First Amendment rights may be violated by regulations on marketing. There 
is no strong indication that the Court understands the ways that dictated evolution of market 
                                                                                                                                                             
(USDA and nutrition literature), and decision resources they have demonstrated they will not mete to small food 
decisions (behavioral economics, social psychology literatures). 
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frame may undermine efficiency and to an extent undermine self-determination of choices when 
marketing is designed to trigger reflexive rather than deliberative consumer choices. 
The now established tension between the value-based defense of ‘right to self-
determination of food choice,’ despite the resistance of this principle to copious scientific 
refutation, and the empirically derived advocation of environmental and educational changes 
including proposals here, confirms what may have become a stasis of grim import. “Incremental 
approaches are the usual government response when sweeping reforms appear elusive [omitted 
citation], but no single innovation appears effective in addressing obesity’s nationwide (and, 
increasingly, global) advance” (Kersh 2009; p 310).  
Kersh warns that as obesity levels hit a stable equilibrium in the U.S., comprehensive 
reforms to limit rising obesity become less feasible, making it more necessary to employ rapid-
response research to identify promising reforms, and to combine this research with concerted 
lobbying efforts, if any meaningful change is to occur. “…[S]tudies of ‘punctuated equilibrium,’ 
a metaphor borrowed from species evolution, indicate how rare major policy shifts can be once 
an issue regime has achieved a steady state” (p 303).  
The implicit fatalism here may only be shed as the preponderant science is accepted at 
face value, in its negation of the misplaced value arguments used to defend large systemic Level 
1 problems as if they are minor Level 2 individual deviations from a generally gainful norm. 
Momentum will build from there, especially when it is clear that reforms are merely corrections 
of previous market and government failures, that individual choice will remain fully protected, 
and no one will be prevented by the state from eating what they as well-informed deliberative 
and un-influenced decision makers choose to eat as part of their utility-maximizing diet plan. If 
the market frame is square, people are reasonably aware of the consequences of their choices, 
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and they actively develop their primary eating habits, then self-destruction through diet is a valid 
and possibly utility-maximizing individual strategy. The various sciences weighing in here (and 
most advocates of the empirically-based position) have no stake in curtailing individual liberty, 
only in educating individuals and keeping them from a dictated market environment. 
Given contentious political realities already described, there is a recognized legislative 
tendency to compromise in a way that protects industries even when economists identify 
efficient policy options by which these industries should bear much of the market costs of 
actions to make markets fair. While perhaps less defensible on economic grounds, it therefore 
may be politically strategic to call for SSB taxation at the 5-cent-per-ounce or 3-cent-per-ounce 
level on SSBs, to achieve the desired 1- or 2-cent per ounce tax. Numerous econometric 
estimates of consumer’s price-elasticity of demand for SSBs and related products indicate that a 
tax of this small magnitude (compared to sin-tax rates well over 100% for tobacco and spirit 
alcohol in some states) will not have strong negative impacts on SSB purchase. Among many 
(including Sturm et al. 2010), Powell and Chaloupka (2009) discuss results concerning the taxing 
of a range of energy-dense foods: “The current body of empirical literature that we reviewed 
offers limited evidence that weight outcomes could be improved by using fiscal policies and that 
substantial price changes are needed to improve these outcomes significantly” (p 246). 
 
7.13.1    SSB Industry Resistance to Policies to Improve American Health Outcomes 
The justification for new policies is to correct market failures (Levels 1 or 2). Taxes, 
regulations including environmental controls such as marketing restrictions including point of 
sale (public schools), public education campaigns, and other devices can help correct market 
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failures, because they bind firm behavior where it has overstepped competitive bounds, re-square 
the market frame, and build the capacity for individual RUMax behavior in food choice. 
Brownell and Warner (2009) in a long detailed and intriguing piece, draw strong parallels 
between how the tobacco industry fought government regulation and how the food industry is or 
likely will use many of the same strategies. The first play is always the “personal responsibility” 
card, already refuted as it may generally apply to routinely habituated food behaviors formed in 
teen years and followed often without much awareness or effective nutrition education. 
Strategies to follow include paying scientists to generate research that will plant doubt while 
criticizing other scientists’ work as deficient (see 6.7.2.b here for SSB industry-funded authors),  
making pledges to self-regulate or follow guidelines for corporate responsibility (as the CFBAI), 
lobbying heavily to prevent government action (publicly this is to protect personal/corporate 
freedom), influencing government processes in other ways, and denying that the product is 
addictive while marketing it to children (p 259).  The latter can include influence over 
professional organizations, as occurred when Coca-Cola became an “American Dietetic 
Association Partner” in 2008, helping make the case that there are no good or bad foods. This 
last is an ADA platform that preceded Coca-Cola’s new “partner” status, perhaps influenced by 
the many fact sheets that industry (at $20,000 per sheet) helped the ADA write, with sponsors 
from the fast-food, distilled spirits, and gum industries/brand companies (p 277). To the case of 
food, an emphasis on exercise rather than diet is used, despite indisputable empirical evidence 
that weight gain over the last thirty years is due to extra calories (Swinburn et al. 2011; Cutler, 
Glaeser, Shapiro 2003). Marketing “safer” versions of products is a further step in preserving 
markets and profits. Examples include light cigarettes, trans-fat free processed foods, and the 
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introduction of primarily whole grains in RTE cereals in conjunction with the 2008 USDA 
Dietary Guidelines (p 282-3). 
The soft-drink industry has used many of these strategies, with large emphasis in recent 
years on voluntary restrictions. As proposed to date, none of these bind member or distributive 
agent’s behavior (Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008; Sharma, Teret, Brownell 2010), and are 
virtually incapable of adequately correcting failures associated with dictated market evolution. 
How can such efforts be judged incapable of adequate effect? Historical evidence consistent with 
political-economic theory. 
More than a generation of economic game theory supports the notion that companies will 
invest in policy debates to protect every revenue source they legally can, up to the value of that 
revenue source (plus the cost of protecting it, per Gordon Tullock’s rent-seeking).  They will 
protect brand image, seek positive public image, and offer the concession of self-regulation at 
every turn, to protect profits. Firms must fulfill “their fiduciary obligation to maximize 
shareholder value by maintaining and improving their market position” (Mello, Pomeranz, 
Moran 2008, p 601).52
The only incentive firms have to acknowledge that they have dictated market evolution 
and skewed the market frame comes from public, interest group, and government (local, state, or 
federal) pressure. Industries have every incentive to resist, and do, with every resource at their 
disposal. This is all the more reason to be very clear about what the science is, what the 
  
                                                 
52 An appealing by-product of regulatory enforcement removing SSBs and similar products from schools would be 
that it would remove the fiduciary responsibility of SSB companies to maximize profits in school environments. 
This incentive will remain so long as SSB-company marketing does, even for fruit juices and bottled waters. Schools 
are a mandatory attendance environment for education, not fairgrounds. The SSB industry’s decades of skilled 
dictation of market evolution has perhaps blinded some to this civic reality. 
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economics are (including the Level 1 - Level 2 split), and that there is no call to ban SSB sales or 
even tax them to prohibitive levels.53
Congress stripped the FTC of its authority to place rules restricting advertising, after the 
FTC in 1978 moved to restrict television advertising of sugary foods to children under 11 years 
old. Perhaps the science verifying children’s inability to react rationally to advertisements is 
indisputable enough at this point for Congress to concede its error, and the Supreme Court to 
recognize that the ability to manipulate customers cannot be a protected legal right in a fair 
market. But the more than $1.5 million that Coca-Cola alone spent on lobbying in the U.S. in 
2007 (Harris et al. 2009) perhaps indicates some reasons that certain Congresspeople may refuse 
to acknowledge the preponderant science. 
 
Industry resistance to government-imposed reforms waxes or wanes with the likelihood  
the industry perceives that regulatory reforms will be imposed, or that the industry will lose 
lawsuits or public face (a component of brand equity, from which premium prices are drawn in 
differentiated product markets). When the government effectively banned certain foods in public 
schools, the soft drink industry sued (Mello, Pomeranz, Moran). When state SSB policies began 
to emerge around 2000, the industry ramped up “historically strong lobbying efforts,” then 
industry-leader Coca-Cola suggested “Model Guidelines for School Beverage Partnerships,” 
which would remove sCSDs from elementary schools, but leave them in high schools – “with no 
mechanism for enforcement or measuring uptake of the recommendations” (p 597).  
In 2004, the Public Health Advocacy Institute was planning to work with others on class 
action lawsuits against sCSD companies marketing to children in school environments, on the 
                                                 
53 Being such a small budget item, a prohibitive level of taxation might be 300% or more of current retail price per 
container. But the very concept is speculative from an economic standpoint, because no one has studied nonlinear 
consumer price-elasticity-of-demand effects in structural models of soft-drink demand, although Yale School of 
Public Health’s Jason Fletcher is working on it with co-authors. 
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grounds that children are mandated to be in these environments. The Center for Science in the 
Public Interest was considering similar action. In 2005, 200 bills addressing sCSDs and other 
low-nutrition foods were introduced in 42 states. Perhaps then it was no surprise that in 2005 the 
industry promoted a more restrictive self-regulatory response for school vending, again with no 
enforcement mechanism (Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008, p 597-601).  
In 2006 the top two and another sCSD firms allied with the William J. Clinton 
Foundation and the American Heart Association to phase out sCSDs and SSBs from many public 
schools, limit portion sizes for remaining vending machine drinks, and publicly report 
implementation (the first agreement to offer this, although with no commitment to data collection 
on  student consumption). The agreement “is not intended to preempt existing laws or policies. 
… is not as restrictive as many state and local policies. It permits a wider range of beverages to 
be sold…” including sports drinks (think pure sugar like an sCSD, without the bubbles and with 
a pinch of salt;54
The CFBAI restricting television advertising for unhealthful foods to children under 12, 
honored by various sCSD manufacturers from January 2008, is also voluntary. The pattern of 
proposed SSB-industry self-regulations is clear. It is slow, combative even when gaining positive 
 Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008, p 600). The self-regulations proposed simply 
conformed to where the market was already heading, with lower purchase in middle schools, and 
away from sCSDs and toward sports drinks, bottled water, diet sodas, and 100% juices in all 
schools (p 601). The agreement does not bind signatories to any action but a yearly update of the 
effect of the new plan, not even binding them to ask their bottlers to conform. Existing often 
exclusive sales contracts with schools are not voided (p 600). The industries are fully aware that 
brand loyalties for beverages are set in the teen years (Brownell et al. 2009). 
                                                 
54 Coca-Cola Company now sells “POWERADE ZERO,” a calorie-free, vitamin and mineral enhanced sports drink. 
The SSB companies’ ability to adapt to markets and or policy environments is not a thorny issue. 
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press for cooperating with government, and entirely predictable by relatively unsophisticated 
economic game theory. 
Where industry and public health objectives conflict, an industry has incentives to create a public image of 
concern and promise to change, but then to create weak standards and lax enforcement (Sharma, Teret, 
Brownell 2010, p 245). 
   …[T]he industry itself may not remain committed to the agreement if pressure from public policymaking 
and threatened litigation decrease. … 
   [T]he industry tends to act through statements of principle rather than binding commitments. By 
emphasizing the decentralized nature of beverage production and distribution, it has preserved local bottlers’ 
autonomy to disregard its guidelines. 
   Again, the motivation appears to be preservation of the school market for beverages insofar as possible 
(Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008, p 601). … 
   The findings of our study [a “50-state legal and regulatory analysis and a review of industry self-regulatory 
initiatives”] suggest that policies to curtail students’ consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages tend to be 
strongest when they originate with a statewide legislative mandate and give explicit implementation 
responsibilities to an administrative agency (p 602). 
   Governance by all stakeholders, transparency in creating standards, and external, objective evaluation of 
impact appear to be at the heart of the self-regulatory successes seen in some industries. These conditions do 
not prevail in current food industry self-regulation (Sharma, Teret, Brownell 2010, p 245). 
There is almost as little evidence indicating that SSB industry self-regulation will be successful 
in achieving consumption reduction targets on the order that public health demands as there is 
economic theory to support that it would. Level 2 economic analysis works quite well on this 
front. The responsible and impressive wording of Coca-Cola North America’s October 2010 
(restated) Council of Better Business Bureaus Pledge (including its CFBAI commitment) are 
available in “Breaking Down the Chain: A Guide to the Soft Drink Industry” (NPLAN 2011; 
The National Policy & Legal Analysis Network to Prevent Childhood Obesity; at 
www.nplan.org). 
When the U.S. Senate held hearings in May 2009 to discuss whether soft drink taxes 
might be used to help finance health care reform, “the industry launched an aggressive national 
anti-soft drink tax campaign in the summer of 2009,” Americans Against Food Taxes (Sturm et 
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al. 2010, p 1053). A Wall Street Journal  article points to the over 2500% rise in American 
Beverage Association lobbying money from 2008 ($668,000) to 2009 ($18.9M) to fight a federal 
soft drink tax. Of course this figure doesn’t include the amount spent battling state and local 
taxes. When New York considered putting an 18% tax on SSBs, PepsiCo® threatened to move its 
corporate headquarters from the state (Brownell et al. 2009). In 1992 when Ohio put a small but 
unique general revenue tax on soft drinks, the industry campaign that outspent opponents to a 
citizen repeal of the tax by over 98:1 was so brazen and effective that the day after the repeal 
passed Republican governor George Voinovich called it, “the most despicable, deceitful fraud 
perpetrated on the citizens.” In Arkansas, where the soda tax revenues were targeted to support 
Medicare provisions, legislative repeal efforts failed (Dreier and Blumgart, HP, 2010).  
When the threat of litigation or legislation grows dire enough, SSB manufacturers turn to 
now well-known methods. They litigate, knowing their own pockets are deep, and their list of 
political friends is long; they lobby knowing the same; or they play to the public and 
policymakers with “values” arguments as previously discussed. The “don’t let the feds tell (y)our 
community what it can and can’t drink” is the last, a card played by the American Beverage 
Association in its desire to “enhance the role of community decisionmaking over the sale of 
beverages in schools” (Mello, Pomeranz, Moran 2008, p 600). By framing big government as the 
enemy of community choice, when the community has evolved over the last generation with 
exactly the dictated market evolution and nutritional ignorance already described, the SSB 
industry is playing to an advantage in large part of its own creation.  
If the “public” is creating its own health epidemics by poor food choice over the last 
thirty years, how are we to trust the same “public” to suddenly understand the problem? Powell 
and Chaloupka (2010) site a 2005 study finding only 33% support for a tax on soft drinks and 
698 
 
snack foods, even with revenues designated for health education. Why would a public that has 
demonstrated nutrition ignorance through its own (often irrational eating) behavior be capable of 
recognizing Level 1 problems or how to address them without these being expressly presented? 
In the New England Journal of Medicine, Brownell et al. (2009), do find that polls show the 
popularity of a soft-drink tax rises in New York residents from 52% to 72% if the tax revenues 
are to be designated for promoting children’s health, media campaigns, healthier foods in 
schools, etc. Chaloupka, Powell, Chriqui (2011b) claim that “new SSB taxes are a win-win-win 
for policymakers: they will generate significant new revenues, lead to significant reductions in 
SSB consumption that will almost certainly reduce obesity, and are popular with the public when 
the revenues are used to support obesity prevention efforts” (p 652).  
As always, the wording of public opinion polls matters, and phrasing that endorses use of 
revenues to promote health, especially for children boosts the positive numbers (Brownell et al. 
2009). But the larger issue is that if many in the public demonstrate poor understanding of 
nutrition and RUMax-compromised behavior in their own eating, should policy turn to their 
opinion before they are properly educated? Assuming the public is adequately educated on 
dietary issues already is akin to assuming their eating behavior is RUMax – the evidence against 
is too deep to ignore. 
Recall the work cited above from Jonas et al. (2001), and Rabin and Schrag (1999) on 
confirmatory bias (7.7.2). People will defend previously held positions and choices, will defend 
them against pertinent correct new information as it flows in, even in infinite amounts. People’s 
tendency not to fault their own previous consumption and what they allow their own children to 
consume given their current level of applied nutrition information is almost certain to bias survey 
results, almost as much as their ignorance of nutrition literature. The same will hold for school 
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boards, principals, coaches, and even policymakers who are more interested in upholding 
abstract values even when they conflict with proven science. 
Public opinion should influence policy when that opinion is adequately informed and 
rational, meaning it is at least roughly congruent with provable science. Otherwise there is an 
irrational and potentially self-destructive tendency that may undermine the sustainability of the 
democratic process. 
When industry promises self-regulation, it is within the context of having dictated the 
market frame for highly-processed (chemically) flavor-enhanced products. This is a multi-
billion-dollar-per-year industry that sees the writing on the wall, and attempts to cover it daily 
while claiming to help the community by fighting graffiti. They are still trying to maximize 
profit, but are stepping back just far enough to avoid government regulation while holding every 
marketing and food-environment advantage they can retain. This is identical to Coca-Cola 
agreeing to extract the cocaine from coca leaves, while leaving the less but still addictive 
caffeine and sugar ingredients in the mixture. 
Industries have other political options that allow them to exploit markets without 
economically efficient oversight. Pomeranz et al. (2009), refer to efforts by the fast-food industry 
to use the doctrine of “preemption” to prevent themselves from being sued by patrons. By 
preemption, as guaranteed by the supremacy of the U.S. constitution, local laws may be 
superseded or nullified by state action, as state law can be superseded or nullified by federal 
action. This is a very useful construct. However, when bent to industry interests, federal 
preemption of actions by lower levels of government can “seriously impede public health goals,” 
especially when problems are not evenly distributed through the population, and there is a local 
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need for protection (p 204). Twenty-four states passed laws protecting fast-food chains from civil 
lawsuits between 2003 and 2006, after an attempt at a federal bill failed. 
A compromised (skewed) market frame in which RUMax-compromised consumers 
“choose” to damage their own health is not the ideal democratic platform to debate corporate 
rights and personal responsibility. It is precisely the sort of platform where government must step 
in and do its job of making sure that commerce is fair and naturally advantageous to no party. 
The alternative is to abdicate a core responsibility of government, and thereby fail to allow 
markets to function as we are taught to expect them to function. Companies know this, so seek 
weak self-regulation to deflect government action. Ignoring Level 1 factors supports success in 
that industry campaign. 
 
7.14    Summary and Key Conclusions 
Essay Three answers the question: what policies seem best-suited to solve actual market 
failures associated with overconsumption of sCSDs/SSBs in the U.S.? This requires definition of 
what the market failures are. As in Essay Two, this process draws on results from neighboring 
literature (outside of marketing, industrial organization, and classical demand analysis). It also 
requires a review of suggested policies, and endorsement and development of policy options 
specifically designed to reform the bases of identified market failures. Current literature from 
economists and non-economists clearly predicts that the standard economic tools – imposing 
taxes and giving consumers more information about SSB products – will not curb consumption 
significantly. So the path to the research objective here is not as clear and obstacle free as 
conventional economic policy strategies would suggest. Primary elements of arguments in Essay 
Three are summarized here, usually without citation unless directly quoted, and occasionally 
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simplified, i.e., without requisite academic nuance that is in the main text. Both choices assist 
brevity here. 
Reviewing the classic four market failures in economic theory, I contend that while 
market power and externalities certainly exist, a neoclassical economic understanding is too 
narrow to immediately appreciate the public good and information asymmetry problems that 
impact sCSD markets and consumption. While often unnoticed, these other market failures may 
drive equilibria from Pareto optima just as surely as more commonly appreciated market failures 
may.  A long quote from “Chronic Disease: an Economic Perspective” (Suhrcke, et al. 2006) 
highlights the difference between information asymmetry that can be cured by revealing 
information, and insufficient information, which must be addressed by information campaigns. 
Consumers unaware of health risks from their choices can be helped by providing health 
information, with the recognition that health/nutrition knowledge is a public good, undersupplied 
without government action. Interesting given the arguments in Essay Two which conclude at 
least near-addictiveness for high added-sugar foods, this same long quote offers:  
Time-inconsistency [of preferences] can be easily confused with insufficient information…, especially in the 
case of addictive goods. …The outcomes of these market failures may be identical, but the causes – and 
hence the policy implications – differ significantly. While the solution to limited information is to provide 
more information, … the solution to time-inconsistent preferences is to provide individuals with effective 
commitment devices (Suhrcke et al., p 37). 
Thus providing consumers with an adequate level of health knowledge (a public good) might by 
itself lessen behavior currently characterized as time-inconsistent (and therefore not classically 
rational).   
In my review of many aspects of food choice informed by neighboring literatures, I offer 
a vocabulary and simple graphic model intended to emphasize where standard economic thinking 
may disregard market characteristics and aspects of consumer behavior that impact choice 
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(reproduced below). Drawing attention to these overlooked elements should elicit more 
efficacious policies. 
Elemental features of markets include the market frame, or the market environment or 
transaction space, holistically understood; and rational utility-maximizing (RUMax) agents. 
Either of these features may be compromised or may fail. For the market frame this would mean 
either sellers or buyers enjoying or having built a natural advantage, “bending the market frame” 
so they benefit more than would be possible under a fair or “square” market frame (benefits 
“tend to roll toward them” in any transaction, given the current default market scenario). For 
RUMax agents, compromise or failure involve not choosing in ways consistent with objective 
utility maximization. These market failures involve decision and market processes, not just the 
decisions – including price and quantity solutions – that are most easily observed (Cawley 2004). 
Elements affecting the transaction space and aspects of individual decision making must be in 
place before transactions occur. So these are Level 1 features, whereas transactions and records 
of transactions occur at Level 2: 
 
 
The arrows depicting how different types of information must flow show that inadequacy 
or asymmetry of information is complex. Decades studying and adapting sales methods to 
consumer psychology has allowed SSB companies to “bend the frame” by designing packaging, 
image creation, and persuasive advertising that exploit human psychology at levels often too 
Level 1: 
Holistic Market Environment   transaction-relevant info    Transacting Agents 
           (market frame)       (RUMax agents) 
Level 2:       Discretely Economic Transactions 
(character of transactions:  freely competitive  OR  not freely competitive) 
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subtle to be appreciated as skewing the market. Underprovision of the public good “health 
knowledge” set the stage in part for this skewing of the market frame. Economists focused like 
marketers on “product, price, place, and promotion” will naturally focus on economic 
transactions, Level 2 problems, and can easily dismiss as background the holistic transaction 
space, and consumer-psychological elements, Level 1 problems, particularly when biases 
develop over decades. When Level 1 market failures are ignored, the government right and 
responsibility to correct market failures whose cost of correction is less than the benefit from 
redress tends to be forgotten, even argued against, for this market failure type. 
The general assumptions economists make about how consumers make decisions are 
demonstrably weak for SSB consumption, as carefully annotated in Essay Two, and further in 
Essay Three, using sound science collected from neighboring literatures. These results demand 
that to remain scientific in our science of economics, we must drop assumptions where they are 
not appropriate, and develop new techniques. 
It is frustrating for economists to accommodate the likelihood that an individual seems of 
freewill to make a choice that objectively given the individual’s own comprehensive priorities 
does not achieve an optimal consumption of goods and services, as measured by highest 
cumulative level of satisfaction. The frustration arises from the tension between the economic 
assumption of utility maximization as a real and economically efficient process, and how people 
eat. It is certainly logical that smaller economic decisions, like whether to have a Pepsi with 
lunch should involve less deliberation than a decision with higher economic value on the line, 
such as whether to buy a new or old car. The problem is that sCSDs are not like other small 
budget items such as paper, batteries, or plastic forks. Regular use/ingestion of this product type 
can greatly impact later utility by substantially degrading health and raising health costs and 
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work loss. So the default logic an individual may seem to rationally pursue – deliberating only a 
little or not at all over choice of snacks or drinks at meals – can fail to serve a long-term utility-
maximizing process when habits and their health effects over time reverse the utility effect from 
sCSD consumption.55
Biological limitations constrain decision-making capacity, just as time and limited 
information do. Then efficiency takes on more than one meaning, and may tend toward 
biological and psychological efficiencies, which would undermine the economic efficiency 
achieved by deliberate rational optimizing as a decision process. People satisfice, accept the first 
choice that meets a standard of adequacy, often treat the present as disproportionately more 
important than the future in different ways for different choices, and even refuse or ignore 
relevant new information that by economist’s thinking should be employed to update decision 
criteria. Context matters. Factors physically defining the decision environment, including the 
order of choices, visual cues designed to persuade, and sensual cues that subtly trigger one to 
indulge a habit can and do affect choice before a rational process can engage.  
  
Whether these processes and factors that pre-empt or confound rational optimization 
processes occur for economic choices larger than food choices remains a matter of debate, but 
there is sufficient evidence from decades of research across many fields that for low-cost 
mundane food choices, the efficiencies that drive and result from many food choices are not 
consistent with utility optimization for all but the most dedicated and present-biased hedonists. 
The problem then is that when evaluating which from a range of decision criteria and 
default and conscientious decision-processing modes seems to describe actual behavior, rational 
utility-maximizing choice does not top the list for SSB consumption. If economists unilaterally 
                                                 
55 Many assumptions about decision psychology were borne of economists’ frustration with the inability of 
psychologists a century ago to identify a reliable metric for pleasure (Camerer 2007). Further assumptions were 
driven by mathematical restrictions requiring curves with discrete maxima and minima for optimization calculations. 
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mandate (assume) it does, then there is no overconsumption. Medical evidence tells a different 
story. Overconsumption at the individual or the societal level is an inefficient use of resources, 
demanding redress. 
If there is a small miscalculation in a predominantly rational process, taxes and more 
product information should re-set consumers to an equilibrium consumption level closer to an 
objective optimum. But they will not, as numerous researchers, economic and not, project. So 
economists tend to look in the wrong place for a solution, because they are not looking at the 
right problem. If people do not choose as we expect them to, then solving the overconsumption 
problem means adapting policies to speak to what they are doing, not to correct what we hope 
they are doing. 
 For many economists, Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003) explain why Americans have 
become more obese (their title). I offer this as a demonstration of well-done empirics that leads 
to bad conclusions owing to a Level 2 perspective. They ignore the composition of the diet, 
nutritional quality of food over time, and the relatively severe health loss versus the miniscule 
time savings when they conclude that savings in food preparation time acquired when buying 
processed foods is the driver of American obesity. Zimmerman (2011) picks their logic apart 
rather cleanly, so my criticism draws in part from his insights while I use it to demonstrate the 
terms I define for the simple graphic model here. 
Conventional economic prescriptions for conventional market failures include new taxes 
and better conveyance of product information. These recommendations have their place in SSB 
policy, but are constrained in effect, because they tend to derive from Level 2 perspectives, 
leaving Level 1 problems unresolved – hence the agreement that these mechanisms individually 
must fail. Taxes are a flexible economic tool, although not currently used in the “sin tax” sense 
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on any food. (This follows from the low price-elasticity of demand and substitutability of many 
food types.) Empirical work shows that 20%, even 40% taxes on SSBs will have but small effect 
– 37 kilocalories per day (kcal/d), and 12.7 kcal/d, by the respective authors. Compare this to the 
120 kcal/d that SSBs have contributed in additional energy intake from the late 1970s to the early 
2000s. Manipulation of tax pass-through rates could further undermine this effect. Powell and 
Chaloupka (2010) conclude that SSB taxes will not lower obesity rates, but might affect children, 
and lower socio-economic groups. This hope ignores mechanisms of habit formation discussed 
in Essays Two and Three: “…failures to change the environment cause cues to older, habitual 
behavior to reassert themselves over time. As a result, behavior reverts to past tendencies” (Maio 
et al., p 126). Policy recommendations with taxes as the primary tool rely on rational economic 
responses as the primary mechanism, when RUMax behavior is far from routine for habitual 
consumers of sCSDs.  
The type and scope of sCSD/SSB taxes will greatly affect policy impact. The category 
needs to be quite broad, to avoid substitutability (and the broader SSB category will tend to be 
less price-elastic than any sub-category, for higher pass-through of the tax). Excise taxes will 
work better than sales taxes for SSB policy goals. I join other authors in demonstrating that 
concerns about the regressive effect of any SSB tax are ill-placed given the likely magnitude 
relative to household budget, even for the food budget alone.  
As there are types of taxes and ways to implement them, there are many types of 
information. Nutrition and health knowledge is low enough in the general American population to 
be deemed inadequate. Providing information and providing education are different prospects 
with different effects. Only education provides means of overcoming biases people tend to 
formulate and live by, biases that justify previously made choices, biases that lead to the rejection 
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or misinterpretation of new information. Giving consumers more knowledge without the means 
and motivation to effectively apply it will not adequately reduce SSB consumption. Information 
must be paired with education, and with a rubric to apply both in new ways to dietary choices. 
Briefly, policy must raise effective nutrition education that will apply in repeated dietary choices. 
Both self-deception and the manufacture of tastes by SSB marketing must be countered to break 
unhealthful consumption habits. Policy to reduce SSB consumption can meet this tall order. 
For at least a decade, some have recommended using tax revenues to increase public 
information, and this is the new baseline for effective policy strategies. But a range of 
recommendations for affecting environmentally-influenced behaviors, and food-related 
behaviors specifically, remain. Section 7.8 explores recommendations by economists, section 7.9 
recommendations generally by non-economists. Section 7.10 discusses issues particular to 
advertising, and section 7.11 reviews strategies proposed by economists and non-economists 
who appreciate what I call Level 1 constraints. Proposals I recommend are in 7.12. 
The economists in 7.8 recognize that choice is context dependent, and that preferences 
are formed or at least leveraged by environmental factors at the time of decision. Cawley 
advocates providing health and nutrition knowledge as a public good. The behavioral economists 
(including Thaler and Sunstein 2003) carefully document where judgment errors occur, and 
recommend changing marketing environments (a Level 1 change). Behavioral economists Just 
and Payne (2009) also recommend overcoming the large information asymmetry between 
processed-food suppliers and consumers. Zimmerman (2011) carefully describes how Cutler 
Glaeser and Shapiro fail to describe a mechanism to explain American obesity that is stable 
before 1980, then increases – driving weights with it – after. He charges that the volume and 
708 
 
sophistication of marketing of low-nutrition snack foods does correlate properly, and the prestige 
effect of advertising, chemically enhanced tastes, and increasing portion sizes all contribute. 
In section 7.9, doctors with MPHs Cohen and Farley (2008) cite environmental drivers of 
obesity, and along with Katz (2009) advocate “structural interventions” that would influence 
default options in food marketing environments, much as Thaler and Sunstein do. Chandon and 
Wansink (2002) find that stockpiling – which my empirical work in Essay One confirms 
definitely occurs for household sCSD purchases – directly increases consumption, an 
environmental cue driven by the perception that one is economizing. 
SSB Advertising is persuasive, not informative. As there also seems to be no Bayesian 
learning (consumer updating of decision criteria) associated with increased advertising, positive 
welfare effects from advertising cannot be inferred (Della Vigna and Gentzkow 2010). SSB 
advertising forays into non-traditional areas such as product placement and in-school marketing 
have helped them double the exposure of their ads to young people – even after the voluntary 
ban on television advertising for children under 12 effectuated in January of 2008 by some 
manufacturers. There is explicit evidence of sCSD industry targeting of vulnerable populations 
as growth markets. Actual prestige effects from SSB advertisements does not limit later health 
effects, so raising a consumer’s willingness to pay does not necessarily correlate with RUMax 
consumer behavior. So even if these ads raise utility, the effect may be overwhelmed and 
reversed by associated health outcomes later (Essay Two). Decision-theorist Peters (2009) finds 
that consumers’ ability to process food advertisements and nutrition information can be quite 
weak, concluding that marketers specifically design advertisements that trigger automatic and 
emotional processes that pre-empt deliberative processing when preferences are constructed at 
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the time of decision. Peters further concludes that consumers need training to resist such 
influences. 
A 2008 FTC report is plain and bold in its assertions: for limiting SSB advertisements to 
those under 12 years; for a broad definition of marketing; for reformulating products to make 
them less unhealthful and more nutritious; for holding manufacturers to reform pledges that have 
generally proved to be empty promises; and for ceasing all SSB advertising in schools.  
Policy proposals from health experts and Level-1-sensitive economists include: taxes; 
labeling added sugars in foods separately; controlling aspects of food marketing environments; 
reducing standard serving sizes; front-of-package labeling; cutting the corporate tax break for 
advertising expenditures for unhealthful foods; and reformulating high-added-sugar products. 
Lustig, Schmidt, and Brindis (2012) go so far as to advocate not only soft-drink bans in schools, 
but zoning against near-school private sales, and that added sugars no longer enjoy “generally 
regarded as safe to eat” supplement status. Some neuroeconomists recommend advertising 
restrictions and bold, even shocking labels to dissuade consumption of addictive goods, citing 
pictures of cancerous lungs on some countries’ cigarette packages. 
To these I caution that the goal should not assume that lowering SSB consumption will 
lower obesity. Obesity reduction should not be a target, because obesity is an effect, not a cause 
of bad choices and health problems. Policy tools must match policy objectives, because a close 
matching can increase the chance that policies will be effective and efficient. 
My own empirical results from Essay One identify purchase reactions to sCSD industry 
marketing variables with a degree of precision by specific demographic grouping that is not 
possible with commonly used estimation strategies. For example, purchase reactions to rising 
price significantly vary by ethnic-group-income-level combinations and ethnic-group-education-
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level combinations, and by which sex heads the household. Sale responses are stronger for higher 
income and higher education groups, and the influence of weekly increase in television 
advertising of sCSDs on purchase is surprisingly strong and robust relative to price change.  
These results could be used to direct targeting of non-tax policies to specific demographic 
groups. But while the methodology was chosen to avoid presumptions of utility maximization or 
even of rational choice, it is still grounded in analysis of market transactions. To rely on these 
results alone while denying the empirically-based conclusions of neighboring fields would lead 
to narrow policy prescriptions (tax and information) such as those repeatedly projected by 
economists and others will fall short of intended targets for reducing consumption and positively 
affecting American health outcomes. My prediction tables clearly show that families of four at 
the poverty level are often already spending more than four times their household income on 
sCSDs than very similar households earning four times the poverty rate (with heads of household 
at the same level of terminal education). What tax rate could offset the dedication signaled by 
this result? USDA ERS results and others indicate that lower-income lower-education 
households already ignore currently provided nutrition information more than other demographic 
groups. My results will be more important for targeting if the following recommendations are not 
followed, which would likely limit any budget to affect change. These same results apply well to 
efficient targeting for certain revenue proposals within the proposed set. 
An effective policy set must seek to redress Level 1 market failures involving the market 
environment and consumer choice psychologies that diverge from theoretical RUMax behavior. 
Excise taxes and putting more information on product labels or in pamphlets in doctors’ offices 
will only scratch the surface of Level 1 problems. The available science suggests that elements of 
the food environment and biology routinely engage appetite and consumptive behaviors on a 
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sub-rational level. The elements are not beyond the scope of attention(/awareness) and personal 
control, but often influence behavior without the conscious intent or even acknowledgement of 
the individual. So reducing SSB consumption must involve certain basic elements to correct 
Level 1 problems. Policy mechanisms may be old or new, but must change elements of the SSB 
market environment, must draw attention and improved critical thinking skills to individual 
choices made in the context of the market environment, and must serve to re-enforce dietary 
heuristics and habits conducive to healthful outcomes. 
What follows is a set of policy proposals carefully designed to counter factors 
scientifically identified as strongly associated with raising added sugar consumption in the U.S. I 
maintain this is the first comprehensive policy set defended in each of its parts by scientific 
evidence, that together would effectively set U.S. consumers on a path to reduce their added 
sugar consumption to a degree that would lower health care costs by hundreds of billions of 
dollars over the first decade in which these policies were administered as described here, with 
savings inflating into the following decades (based on figures cited in Malik et al. 2010, amongst 
others, see section 6.7.1.b). There is every reason to believe that BMIs, diabetes rates, and 
incidents of cardiovascular disease would measurably and significantly fall as an effect of this 
policy set, if enough elements are adopted, and adopted with the care in design and feedback and 
re-tooling that the literature cautions will be necessary. 
The first and primary goal is to reduce sCSD consumption to 1960s levels or lower, 
without consumers switching to other SSBs, whether they are vitamin-fortified or not. So the 
policy is to reduce SSB consumption broadly. Lowering liquid added sugar calories will lower 
obesity creation more than lowering semi-solid or solid added sugar products in the diet. The 
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education mechanism should ultimately generate a spillover effect that will lower consumption 
of all energy-dense nutrient-poor (EDNP) foods.  
The following policy recommendations are a collection and expansion from the italicized 
policy elements in the main text. 
The goal is to reduce unhealthful levels of SSB consumption, not to prohibit 
consumption. Taxes, regulation, and education are preferable to any sort of ban. That said, sugars 
differ in their medical effects, and the U.S. should follow Japan and the European Union in 
restricting or subjecting to production and import quotas the use of HFCS. Alternatively the price 
of HFCS may be raised by any mechanism, so that it is consistently 20% above the price of sugar 
from cane or beet.  
Excise taxes are better than sales taxes to achieve purchase SSB reductions. Do note that 
excise taxes (versus sales taxes) will implicitly penalize large volume containers as a percentage 
of shelf price, also properly signaling manufacturers to repackage, and consumers to re-think 
their stocking behaviors. A tax of between one-half-cent per ounce and two cents per ounce may 
prove adequate to send the proper policy signal and fund other policy elements proposed here. 
Note from Sturm et al. 2010 that a tax doubling sCSD price is not projected to significantly 
reduce consumption, given the small portion of household budgets and demonstrated price 
elasticities. Two cents per ounce is therefore not onerous. Food tax exemptions should be 
terminated for all EDNP foods. An excise tax on SSBs should not be phased in, so that 
consumers perceive a clear policy message from the sudden price rise. This is in part a (relatively 
quite low) sin tax on what may be the most unhealthful snack food. However, an incremental tax 
that rises with sugar content of the SSB would properly incentivize manufacturers to reformulate 
their products, and American tastes would re-calibrate, just the reverse of the last thirty years.  
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SSB excise tax revenues should be pre-designated to fund education programs, to be 
described below. Targeted clinical interventions are unlikely to be the best use of funds, as they 
will be prohibitively expensive at the national level, but they may find use in specific 
populations. If taxes generate a very large volume of policy funds, healthy food distribution in 
poverty areas and reusable-container tap water options for schools may be funded, along with 
some clinical interventions. 
Removing biases that SSB manufacturers have built into the marketing environment over 
decades will take attention, time, and direct policy focus. Food-environment reconstruction 
could, based on numerous empirical studies, prove very effective in changing choices (and 
possibly also habits). As public institutions designed to educate responsible and logical behavior, 
schools are not the place to absorb SSB marketing tactics and build high-SSB consumption 
habits. All vending of SSBs (machines and fountains) in schools below the collegiate level 
should be cut, exceptionally including diet and no-calorie beverages by the same manufacturers, 
and not to be replaced with vending machines for other EDNP foodstuffs. The main text offers a 
perspective on how to deal with existing exclusive pouring contracts. In adult non-commercial 
spaces existing vending options may be removed or reduced by agreement, and if they remain, 
smaller container sizes should be requested. New state-level SSB container size regulations for 
all venues (vending machines and all fountains) would deflect criticism aimed at particular 
restaurateurs, vendors, or venues. The move from 6- or 6.5-ounce containers in the 1950s to 
“king-size” 10-ounce containers and “family-size” 26-ounce containers seems to have been 
medically bad, on the road to serving cups larger than the human bladder (Zimmerman 2011). 
Re-setting serving-size standards denies no one access or profit. 
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All of these recommendations (and lesser others in the main text) are intended to change 
the marketing environment in ways that make consumers pay attention to their own choices. 
New nutrition labeling can similarly contribute to this goal. A line for added sugars, as distinct 
from naturally occurring sugars, should appear on nutrition labels. There should be an explicitly 
large and contrast-color warning label on SSBs adjacent to the nutrition label (suggested details 
and possible wording in main text). 
The tax break for marketing/advertising budgets for all EDNP foods should be removed. 
For marketing/advertising budgets for SSBs, a percent-matching fund scaled to the marketing 
budget should be donated for the public education program. The percent-match could be scaled 
by the degree to which at-risk populations are affected by the marketing – say double the 
matching percentage for advertising on programs with high African-American teenage 
viewership. A direct application of my Essay One results would assist. There should be no 
product placement for EDNP foods in U.S. television or movies. All television, radio, and 
internet advertising should include health disclaimers written by the CDC, with no influence 
from industry or Congress (per lessons from Marion Nestlé 2002 and David Kessler 2001). 
France has something similar already. 
Re-squaring the market frame will further require raising consumer’s awareness of how 
their market environment has been affected, and how their consumption psychology has been 
manipulated by very sophisticated marketing techniques. Providing adequate levels of the public 
good that is knowledge of marketing techniques must accompany provision of the public good 
that is health and nutrition education. This extends beyond an effort to make people more savvy 
to the tools used to make them buy, but must clearly and carefully extend to the suggestion of 
new heuristics they might use in food decisions. (Yes, this advocates using sophisticated 
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marketing tools in new ways, at the same time it advocates educating consumers to beware of 
them.) The primary education campaign will implement a complex, targeted, tested (monitored 
and improved by its designers), program of public-service announcements (PSAs) across the 
media spectrum: print, billboards, airwaves, internet, mobile device applications (apps), and 
health-care providers’ offices. Maio et al. 2007 write by request to address obesity in Britain 
over fifty years (quote structurally condensed and re-arranged, for brevity): 
…[R]esearch indicates that stress (…) and habit formation also impede the ability to resist temptation (…).  
Behavior change programs that simultaneously inform, shift motivation, and provide the necessary skills to 
maintain behavior change are required (p 102). …Physiological processes and skills deficits contribute to the 
grip of certain habitual behaviors, including smoking and eating behaviors (p 116). …  
   People’s values are based more on learned feelings than on reasoned arguments (…). As a result, people’s 
behavior often fails to live up to their values in situations that make it tempting not to fulfill the value.... 
[P]eople’s ability to resist temptation and perform healthy behaviors may be improved by the provision of 
interventions that stimulate thinking about health and health-related values (p 123).  
   …When armed with the relevant theory and evidence, public information and social marketing campaigns 
aimed at lifestyle change should be quite successful  (p 103-4). 
Message research should not involve popular construction of messages, as a “critical 
failing is an overreliance on survey data or focus groups to develop the interventions. These 
methods reveal what people think would work and not what actually does work” (p 127, Maio et 
al.’s emphasis). Specific messaging must be carefully developed by social psychologists, but can 
benefit by applying lessons learned from commercial and previous public education campaigns. 
The message must include “implementation intentions” and how to use them, as well as specific 
phrases to help even passive message recipients begin to change the internal voice they hear 
when making EDNP food choices (new heuristics), and develop new habits (quote structurally 
condensed for brevity): 
…[B]ehavior change interventions…can break habits by disrupting the processes that trigger them. … 
[V]igilant monitoring…inhibits acting on the habitual response when it is activated in memory. …[P]eople 
taught to use this strategy were able to inhibit unwanted habits during an experimental task. Because vigilant 
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monitoring involves active inhibition over established eating patterns, its long-term use might have a number 
of counterproductive effects…it is unclear whether people can sustain effortful inhibitory efforts in daily 
life… (Rothman, Sheeran, and Wood 2009, p S14). 
Televised and internet PSAs presenting actual pictures of plates of food comprised of 
acceptable “ratios” by USDA or WHO dietary guidelines for a daily diet, directly contrasted with 
concrete images of discretionary calorie limits allowed outside that meal, could establish new 
internal benchmarks for individuals to gauge relative volumes of their consumption choices. 
The multi-pronged, multi-level PSA program should require at least a decade to undo the 
market environment and RUMax compromising that has built for no less than three decades. 
People need to be brought to understand what the problem is in their own behavior in their own 
kitchens, admit that part of the problem is under their control, know that regardless of past 
mistakes they can change, and know that the information techniques and skills they will need to 
do this can be acquired without exceptional initiative or stressful effort (Maio et al.). Some $20 
billion or far more may be generated by the excise tax and marketing-budget matching funds 
mandate.56
Historical evidence, summarized by Brownell and Warner 2009, indicates strong 
resistance to these proposals from industry, many politicians, and perhaps some neoclassical 
economic theorists resistant to the weight of empirical evidence. But the magnitude of effects on 
U.S. health outcomes demand that policymakers now respect the extant science and not as before 
bend to political lobbying posturing and even credible threats by well-known SSB 
manufacturers. The question is who we wish to be as a nation. Overconsumption of SSBs is not 
in the current market frame and general level of nutrition and health knowledge primarily a 
 This money may be spread further by efforts to discount the cost of these PSA media 
buys, or provisioning requirements into FCC airwave contracts.  
                                                 
56 If one accepts as better than back-of-the-envelope calculation the SSB-tax revenue calculator algorithms designed 
by Frank Chaloupka (cited elsewhere here), a two-cent-per-ounce SSB tax alone would generate $18.7 billion from 
estimated 2012 consumption (www.yaleruddcenter.org/sodatax.aspx). 
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matter of personal responsibility – although following the policies recommended here is 
designed to make it one. The goal here is to evoke more RUMax-approximate behavior in EDNP 
food choice – hence to reduce consumption for many. Resetting environmental default options 
(per Thaler and Sunstein, Just and Payne, Wansink and many others) can allow us to use tools 
developed by industry to correct their manipulation of the market frame and compromises of 
RUMax behavior. Kersh (2009) warns of the danger of policy stagnation once factions develop, 
particularly once American BMI growth has finally leveled out. Political compromise could 
easily undermine the coherent and potentially effective and efficiency raising policy agenda laid 
out here.  
Brownell and Warner 2009 spell out industry strategies from the alcohol and tobacco 
industry playbooks, and how the American Dietetic Association (publisher of a Journal often 
cited in this dissertation) can and has had its message leveraged  by Coca-Cola. In 1978, 
Congress stripped the FTC of its right to block advertising of sugary foods to children under 11. 
All efforts at reform have so far been leveraged to SSB industry advantage, even by conceding 
reductions in sCSD marketing as they more than compensate the difference by developing their 
sweetened sports-drink and energy-drink product lines. Voluntary efforts by industry are 
designed not to bind, and do not have enforcement mechanisms (NPLAN 2011, in addition to  
Brownell and Warner). When buying slanted scientific studies and endorsements proves 
inadequate, and voluntary reform efforts are rejected by other stakeholders, industries will turn to 
lawsuits and counter-advertisements, stressing the community’s right to choose their own 
beverages. A compromised (skewed) market frame in which RUMax-compromised consumers 
“choose” to damage their own health is not the ideal democratic platform to debate corporate 
rights and personal responsibility. Public opinion is not a reliable ally or yardstick before the 
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public goods deficit is made up, and a minimal credible level of nutrition and health knowledge 
becomes common. Evidence of confirmatory bias (Jonas et al. 2001, Rabin and Schrag 1999) 
must not be ignored in carving out the new process. People will defend previously held positions 
and choices, will defend them against pertinent correct new information as it flows in, even in 
infinite amounts. People’s own tendency not to fault their own previous consumption and what 
they allow their own children to consume given their current level of applied nutrition 
information is almost certain to bias survey results, almost as much as their ignorance of 
nutrition literature. The same will hold for school boards, principals, coaches, and even 
policymakers who are more interested in upholding abstract values even when they conflict with 
proven science. 
The stakes are too high, the trends too clear, the costs too overwhelming. A science-based 
policy program to reduce SSB consumption as proposed here is the best way to solve the full set 
of market failures associated with consumption of high-added-sugar products, and to achieve 
more rational and efficient outcomes, at the individual, market, and societal levels. 
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